Chapter 5 Hide & Seek War; Italian Stranglehold; Night Flight

HIDE AND SEEK WAR

WAR in Russia, Europe, Italy, and Burma have dwarfed into relative insignificance the operations carried out daily in the Aegean and Ionian seas. Nevertheless, they form part of the grand strategy and have an important bearing upon the war as a whole, especially that in the Mediterranean area.

Once the enemy lost the initiative following the break at El Alamein, the whole complexion of the Mediterranean theatre of operations changed. The back door to Nazi Europe-Greece and the Balkans-had to be kept shut. German strategy entered a new phase which was based on a strong outer
ring of defence in strongpoints at Crete, Scarpanto and Rhodes.

These islands, with air and sea bases, were to protect the back door. Their retention was vital for we then had no base from which single-engined fighters could provide cover over the Aegean and so render a landing on the mainland behind them practicable.

Germany quickly grasped the strategic importance of this and anticipated events very early.
They did not leave garrison duty entirely in the hands of Italians, but maintained sufficient forces scattered throughout the islands to seize complete control within a few days after Italy had signed the Armistice. Extra stocks of food, fuel, and ammunition from Italy were laid down and clearly indicated
that Allied action had been anticipated.

Nevertheless these supplies had to be augmented, so that early Allied policy was to cause a maximum dislocation of sea and air traffic as a preliminary to possible future offensive activity against the outer ring. As the war receded from Egypt certain units remained to carry this out. Reconnaissance, twin-engined fighters, and torpedo bombers stayed to protect our convoys as they passed through the Mediterranean and at the same time institute the new policy of offensive patrols in the Aegean.
Here the R.A.A.F. contributed its share, not only in the Australian squadrons operating from Egypt, but in the R.A.F. squadrons as well, because there are large numbers of Australian aircrew in these units adding their full share to the combined war effort.

Months passed during which the Air Force engaged in a daily battle of wits with the German Navy. Convoys passed through the area with a minimum loss to us, while enemy shipping was being attacked all the time. The enemy could ill afford the losses and soon be-came hard pressed to find sufficient shipping to supply their garrisons on Crete and the numerous Greek islands. Reconnaissance aircraft of No. 454 R.A.A.F. Squadron kept an ever-watchful eye on all movements. They located and shadowed the supply vessels until the strike force attacked with torpedo or gunfire.

Every vessel sunk weakened the enemy's hold on their outer ring of defence.

It was war in miniature. The ships were often no more than small coasters Of 400 tons and even small caiques of 40 to 200 tons had to be pressed into service. But their smallness gave the Germans a certain advantage. They could hide in the rocky islets during the day and continue their journey at night in an effort to escape the ever-present eyes of our aircraft.

In fact, the whole of our operations were in the nature of a vast game of hide and seek played in deadly earnest between the Australian reconnaissance aircraft and the enemy sea captains. Ships took roundabout routes, hid beside the rocky cliffs, tied up in toy-town harbours, and even in narrow deepwater creeks. Aircraft had to come right down to spot them. And so their course was plotted day after day until the moment came for the strike force to attack.

During this period 163 ships, aggregating approximately 531,580 tons were sunk or damaged; but the value of the operations went far beyond that. The enemy had to maintain a defensive air force in the Aegean and later to augment it in the face of Allied landings. Outlying garrisons had to be reinforced by troops that would have been useful in the main theatres of war, and a continuous state of tension was caused among the enemy.

The importance placed by Germany on this area is evident in the energetic action taken to seize the Italian-held islands after the Armistice.

More ambitious Allied undertakings, the occupation of Cos and Leros, were planned to take effect at the same time. They were to coincide with the invasion of Italy and were intended to be in the nature of a diversion, aiming to make the Germans transfer forces to meet the threat to their Balkan flank.

Rhodes was the first objective. It was anticipated that there would be co-operation from the numerically strong Italian garrison. The chief concern was to gain control of the landing grounds from which single-engined fighters could be operated. Without such bases any chance of an invasion of the Greek mainland was out of the question.

Strong air support was necessary for a successful conclusion to these plans, but that would not be spared owing to expected commitments in Italy. The Armistice was announced and little could be done to prevent the Germans on Rhodes from seizing control. It took three days for them to possess the island from the Italians.

Our opportunity had gone. The alternative was to bypass Rhodes. The only other island to possess a landing ground was Cos in the Dodecanese. That became the key to any Aegean projects.

Plans were made for combined operations by the three services. Air Force commitments were increased by the shortage of suitable shipping, and many Australians played an important role in covering the air transport obligations in addition to the fighter, bomber, and reconnaissance tasks.

Strategic bombing of enemy airfields in Greece, Rhodes, Crete and other strongpoints %vas instituted with the idea of tying down the enemy air forces operating from them. Here No. 459 Squadron played an important role. Every serviceable Hudson was out night after night bombing Calato aerodrome on Rhodes and other objectives.

Reconnaissance Baltimores of No- 454 squadron continued to search out enemy shipping and movements of any kind. The full list of sightings during this hectic period would be too numerous to be given in detail. They continually ran foul of the angry German and few trips were made without being spotted and chased by at least one enemy fighter. Several of our crews were lost. Enemy fighter activity was intense, but in spite of all the difficulties the sightings were made and information brought back of enemy movements.

Cos was occupied. Leros followed on September 14 and Samos on September 16, 1943. Contact was established with the Italian garrisons and great efforts were made to consolidate the positions. It was clear, however, that we would not be allowed to enjoy the occupation unmolested.

More enemy aircraft were flown into the Aegean, while German ground reinforcements came from Greece. Enemy air attacks commenced, and were followed by an invasion which drove us out of Cos. Superior forces followed up with attacks on Leros until the situation became untenable. Once Leros had fallen, the enemy immediately switched heavy bombing attacks to Samos. It was decided to evacuate our garrison.

The loss of the islands did not bring about any lessening of the Air Force efforts in the Aegean area. Attacks went on against both sea and land targets. Australians continued to take part.

The venture, however, was not all loss, for the operation had succeeded in creating a diversion at the time of the invasion of Italy. It had compelled the enemy to divert both troops and aircraft from other theatres. German losses were higher than ours. In the air alone, the estimated loss of the G.A.F. was 203 destroyed, 18 probably destroyed, and 94 damaged.

Since November 17, 1943, when the final evacuation of the islands began, the Air Force has continued offensive patrols with the result that the enemy is finding it increasingly difficult to keep his garrisons supplied. In fact, he has tended to move northward as the problems of shipping increase.

An instance of one strike will tell the story of what has been going on in the Aegean Sea all the time.

Early in the morning of June 1, 1944, an enemy convoy was sighted in the central Aegean by a Wellington of an R.A.F. squadron. The machinery of war immediately went into action. Two Baltimores of No- 454 R.A.A.F. Squadron were airborne at first light to locate and report on the convoy.

Three hours later the convoy was found north of Pholegandros. It had fighter cover and was flying balloons. It was taking a southerly course to Crete and consisted of three merchant vessels, four destroyers, and six or more other escort vessels.

Shadowing by the Australian squadron commenced in spite of the fighter opposition. On several occasions the Baltimores were chased a considerable distance from the convoy. Nevertheless, one after another popped up over the horizon to report the latest position of the vessels. They were hotly pursued by M.E.109s, but continued their watch.

Meanwhile a strike force, including three Australian aircraft and others of the R.A.F. with Australian aircrew, took off and arrived at the target.

Marauders placed the first bombs across the bows of a 2,300 ton ship. Then the Baltimores straddled a 2,000-ton merchant vessel and scored a near miss which caused flames and smoke to issue from amidships. Both ships remained stationary after the attack. Simultaneously, Beaufighters delivered low-level attacks with rockets, and other aircraft performing anti-flak duties strafed the vessels.

Enemy fighters endeavoured to get at the formations, but were held off by our fighters. One enemy fighter was shot down by a Baltimore.

All the ships were hit repeatedly by rockets and cannon shell. Each merchant vessel was on fire, and at least one must have been in a sinking condition because the crew were seen to be jumping overboard. Two of the destroyers were giving off smoke and flame, while many of the smaller escort vessels were not expected to reach port.

Subsequent reconnaissance revealed that all that could be found of the original convoy were two merchant ships burning in Candia harbour, one destroyer lying ashore on Dia Island, and two more destroyers in Candia.

A second attack was made in the face of heavy and accurate flak with the result that one merchant vessel sank and the other burnt more fiercely than ever.

The following message was received by the Australian squadron:

"Air-Marshal Park sends congratulations to all squadrons that took part in the most successful attack on the enemy convoy north of Crete yesterday evening, June 1. The Baltimores that hung on to the convoy throughout the day in spite of opposition deserve special mention. The whole attack by bombers, Beaufighters, and their fighter escort was first-class and showed excellent team work by all squadrons."

So the work of harassing the enemy's outer ring defending the Balkans continues. That it has been successful is proved by the number of ships destroyed, and the plight of the garrisons on short supply.

There are few ships moving between the islands today and the effort to use air transport has been frustrated, with the result that the supply position has been critical time and time again with Australians playing an important role, in reconnaissance by No- 454 R.A.A.F. Squadron, fighter escort to convoys by No. 451 R.A.A.F. Squadron, and bombing and air-sea patrol by No. 459 Squadron R.A.A.F.

RAAF Medical Clearing Station, kitchen.

ITALIAN STRANGLEHOLD

THE story of the last year's air fighting in the Mediterranean and Middle Fast theatres of war can be summed up in four words-landing grounds, roads, oil and ships.

All Allied air strategy has been directed towards the capture, protection, or destruction of these four things. Although major interest has been focused on the doing of the land forces, actually the key to the campaign has been held by the air arm. But as no purely air battle can be decisive (the power and futility of the air weapon were shown simultaneously at Cassino), the Allied armies were brought into Italy to possess and hold the landing grounds which, once possessed and held, become launching fields.

The gallant victories the land forces have won from Salerno northwards through Cassino and Rome to their present positions, have been facilitated and accelerated, if not made possible, by the air arm. Without the cruel and clever plan of suffocation which the air forces have been pressing, the land battles, if they had succeeded, would have taken immeasurably longer, and would have cost many more valuable Allied lives.

Essentially the battle in Italy was for landing grounds, the possession of which provided Allies with the second arm of a giant arm which was reaching up from the south as a complement to the giant arm which was reaching down from the north. These pincers complete the aerial encirclement of Hitler's fortress Germany

An analogy is that of two gladiators, fighting the Colosseum of ancient Rome. One has his left hand on the throat of his opponent. By a quick and subtle movement he slips his right hand into position and completes the dread circle. By means of this stranglehold, proceeds to squeeze the resistance out of his adversary.

That has been the simple plan of the air in Italy. When the Allies drove Rommel's forces out of North Africa, and established themselves in Italy, the war reached a grim stage for Hitler. That victory cast the shadow of a million wings over parts of Germany which had hitherto been immune from bombing from the north. It not only menaced the war factories which he had established in or moved to safe zones, but it was a threat to the strained morale of Germans who had fled from the terror of the north.

Apart from the political significance of the Italian invasion and the elimination of Italy from the war as a power on the side of the Reich, the foothold gained in Italy was the beginning of the end. Italy had to be eliminated so that the Allies could establish the bases from which their air arms could soften the enemy for ultimate blows which the Army and its ancillary forces were to inflict.

In the initial landing the air arm played its traditional role. It is a versatile weapon, mobile, flexible, and hard-hitting, and chief of all, it is easily adaptable to the special part it is called upon momentarily to play. Thus, in conjunction with the sea and land forces, it pounded enemy positions on the beaches with heavy bombs, harried him in his front line, blasted him behind his lines, smashed his aircraft and landing fields, and generally played the part of front-line troops armed with automatic weapons (the low-level attack and ground-strafing planes) and of medium and long-range artillery. It also provided the means of transport for troops, and made a complete success of the airborne invasion. Air superiority was soon established and throughout the campaign in Italy has been consistently maintained.

In the Mediterranean the Luftwaffe has ceased to exist as a considerable striking force and is playing only a minor role as a defensive weapon. In Air Force slang, the Luftwaffe has "had it".

When the initial stages of the landing had been successfully completed, the Bari aerodrome captured and the Nazis driven a safe distance north, the first stage of the campaign for the air arm was over, and the second began. With an assured base from which to operate, aircraft were flown in and began the real pounding of the enemy's areas. The stranglehold began to tighten.

Cassino was a severe check to the Allies. This mountain town dominated the narrow defile through which the land forces had to move and was a severe thorn in the side of the advancing Allied armies which suffered the casualties inevitable in any type of siege or static war. It was, therefore, decided to put into operation one of the most tremendous air blitzes which the world had ever seen. Cassino was bombed to saturation. Every available aircraft, vast numbers of all descriptions, filled their bomb-bays, flew to Cassino and turned it into a perpetual eruption. Thousands of tons of high explosives were dropped on Cassino and reduced it to rubble and dust. This mighty effort only showed that the air weapon alone cannot win a battle. For Cassino continued as a Nazi strongpoint.

The second landing at Anzio followed and in this the air arm played the same role as at Salerno. The real stranglehold tightened once more. The air arm set out to suffocate the enemy so that he could no longer offer effective resistance. The way to do it was to deny him the means to fight-food, supplies, munitions, tanks, reinforcements, everything.

The air arm did the job. While the short-range fighter and strafing types concentrated their attention on the front-line troops and positions, other aircraft, according to their range, flew farther afield and blasted gun positions, concentrations and strongpoints supporting the front line. Still others attacked roads-particularly road junctions-railways and bridges. At more than one stage, these attacks were so successful that the enemy had not a single route by which he could supply his troops in the front line. Bridges were broken, railways cut, roads blocked.

When this stage had been reached, the land forces, still with air support, swung into action. However well the enemy fought, it was only a matter of time before his resources were so seriously depleted that, under pressure, he was forced to fall back. The squeeze had robbed him of the wherewithal to fight. When he had moved to another position, the same tactics were repeated against him. He was squeezed farther and farther north. As he made new and desperate efforts to supply his armies, more aircraft were sent up from the constantly increasing number of aerodromes, and converging from south, west and east, swooped in from low level and burned up thousands of lorries, many trains, and a terrific percentage of all vehicles which the enemy was using.

A favourite device was to wait until the enemy vehicles had advanced, then having destroyed strategic road and rail points behind them, to sweep the roads and fields, over which the terrified drivers fled, with cannon shells and bombs.

Caught like rats in traps, the Germans' loss in transport in this fighting was colossal.

As this pressure-irresistible because the Allies had overwhelming air superiority-continued and increased, the enemy found himself incapable of offering any sustained resistance to the ground forces which burst open the gateways to the north as the air arm unlocked them, and marched steadily towards the Brenner Pass.

How effective this simple strategy has been and how un-destructive of Allied life and Italian towns and settlements is shown by a survey of the route of battle. Only the key points in Italy suffered. The bones of towns or villages which dominated communications, whether road or rail, lie sprawled on the bomb-pitted landscape. They are unlikely ever to be rebuilt on their present sites, for only twisted steel, splintered timber, and a rubble of masonry remain to say that this was once a place where men and women worked and children played. Places at which the railway called, or which boasted bridges, have been flattened. Even those where only culverts crossed some shallow dip, received the attention of our bombers and, between bombing by our forces and demolitions by the enemy, little remains. These are the places which mark the way the war went.

But other villages of no strategic value, without major roads, bridges or railway, still bask unmarred and undisturbed in the soft Italian sunshine, while men and women work in the unscarred fields just as they did in 1939,

While this tornado was lashing the Germans in and near the front line, the squeeze was being tightened in two other directions. The military movements against roads and bridges,

railways and vehicles, supplies and men just described, were tactical in character. Farther afield the strategic bombers were adding their tremendous weight to the squeeze. From bases in Italy they made nightly sorties against targets ranging in a wide semi-circle from the north-west to the east. Key points in the enemy's communications were also hit, but the most important blows were directed against oil.

One of Hitler's principal problems is to find sufficient oil fuel and he is reputed to have long been feeling the pinch. Thus, many heavy raids were made by Allied Halifaxes, Wellingtons, Fortresses and Liberators, against Roumanian oil fields, cracking plants and installations and organizations concerned with the production of fuel for the Nazi armies and air force. One of the absorbing puzzles about the fighting in the Mediterranean has been the very limited operations of the Luftwaffe and it is probable that it is accounted for by one of two things - either the Luftwaffe is short of aircraft, or oil - or both. It is to ensure that he is ultimately denied both that frequent raids were made against the oil installations of Roumania, the synthetic plants of southern Germany, and the aeroplane works of Austria.

SQUADRON-LEADER STAN SUMMERS