Chapter 11 RAAF Guide to Solomons; Dual; His Crowded Hour; Ruled The Air

RULED THE AIR

THE great victories in the Middle East were possible because Britain ruled the air. The twelve months covered by this volume saw the beginning and end of the great Allied offensives in North Africa which finally ousted the Axis armies and air forces from that continent, and first allowed Allied forces to set foot on Axis soil in the "soft under-belly of Europe".

The Western Desert proved a great testing ground for British air strategy. It was, in fact, a great laboratory in which the R.A.F., by trial and error, co-ordinated and perfected the role of an air striking-force. The technique thus evolved is fit to take its place in the military textbooks of the world as showing the real meaning and use of air power. It certainly points the way to the future role of the R.A.F. and the R.A.A.F.

In the Western Desert, Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and Tunisia, it was successfully demonstrated that the Air Force must be regarded as a separate entity, to be used offensively against the enemy, together with the sister Services of the Army and the Navy. The air striking-force, it was shown, is three-pronged. Its tactical units work in full view of the ground forces, and are well known to them. They are usually fighters, strafers and fighter bombers, which, working in close support of the Army, swoop on the enemy forces, mechanized or men.

Beyond them are fighters, strafers, tank-busters, intruders and fighter bombers, which work just over the Army's horizon and are, therefore, less better known to it. They carry on the work of destruction, delay, and disorganization behind the front line. The third prong, the strategic units, are not necessarily seen by the Army at A. Their work and its results become known to it only ultimately in the diminished strength of the enemy's striking power. Usually bombers, these aircraft harass the enemy far behind the front lines, smashing at his bases, his ports, his ships, his factories and his general war organization. A bomb dropped on the Flat works at Turin has its reverberations in the front line.

These three prongs are not only interlocked as between themselves, they are also knitted in with the skein of military and naval operations. The torpedo-bomber, which ranges the skies over the enemy's sea lanes, is on all fours with the submarine which lurks beneath the waters. Both strike at the enemy's shipping and supplies. The bomber which blasts an enemy's ammunition dumps is only unlike the artillery in so far as it is more mobile.

Before a shell fell at El Alamein, the British air weapon had struck at the heart of the enemy. For days before, his landing grounds had been ruthlessly attacked from the air until he was obliged to move them to the west. He was as effectively driven from the sky by these attacks as though all his machines had been shot down in aerial combat by our fighters. It was as though his army stood silhouetted against the skyline. Bereft of air protection, it was at the mercy of all our arms.

So potent is the air weapon. Without it an army is doomed. This has become a cliché, yet that makes it no less true, and in North Africa the campaign gave still another unanswerable proof of this truth.

With his aircraft withdrawn, the enemy could no longer give any sort of cover from the death which descended from the skies by day and by night, nor dared he move to attack the British positions, for every move he made exposed him to renewed flailing by our "close support" air weapons. As British air superiority became more and more marked, the slow and well-ordered withdrawal of Axis troops became accelerated, until in the last stages it was precipitate.

The primary advantage won by the air striking-weapon was magnificently exploited by the ground troops-it was a piece of perfect co-ordination, proof that the lesson of the air weapon had been well learned by the arms which ousted the Axis from the long chain of their positions from El Alamein to Cap Bon. That lesson is that command of the air determines what happens on land or sea, whereas neither armies nor navies can influence what happens in the air. The air weapon is the key which unlocks or bars the door to victory.

The North African campaign has been described as the perfect example of a combined forces' victory. Of incalculable value in itself, it gains added importance from the fact that it probably shows the pattern of the ultimate German defeat on the mainland of Europe. In Europe, as in the Middle East, the initial task of the air striking-forces will be to prevent the enemy from building up his strength at a rate which equals or betters ours. To do this, short-range and long-range strikes by the various air weapons against war potential are necessary. In North Africa, this was done by systematic and unrelenting attacks on the enemy's sea-borne supplies, on reinforcements snaking along the long and dusty desert tracks, and on his limited port installations.

In Europe, the pattern need be varied only so far as local circumstances demand. The enemy's roads, transport routes, canals, railways and air will be attacked. No doubt the enemy will retaliate, as he did in the Middle East. There his efforts were unavailing, because the R.A.F. and R.A.A.F. wrested air superiority from him. Unless he holds air superiority in Europe, they will again be unavailing.

Thus it was that our supplies of war-like materials increased in North Africa while his remained stationary or diminished. Rommel was forced in the desert to use up more ammunition and equipment than he could renew. This gradual but inexorable weakening of his position went on until the time came for the joint air and land blows. Rommel was disarmed by the air force; he had to retreat.

The strips from which his dive bombers had planned to blast our land forces were bombed into dust and rubble, and became untenable. In the greatest air blitz which the desert had seen, similar punishment was meted out to the landing-grounds used by his fighters and medium bombers until they were neutralized. It then became possible for our ground forces to operate without the risk of powerful air opposition.

When our armies were ready to move, all available aircraft added the weight of their bombs to the terrific barrage which the artillery laid down on and behind the enemy's front-line positions. In daylight, tank-busters and ground strafers, armed with cannon and machine guns, sought out the enemy's armour and thin-skinned vehicles. Every attempt made by them to regroup for an assault on the land forces was smashed by the air weapon, loosing bombs, cannon shells, and machine-gun fire.

In these circumstances, no counter attack was possible. The German armies cracked, moved back in an orderly withdrawal, broke and finally ran before the withering onslaughts of an irresistible air weapon. Between El Alamein and Tripoli, a thousand and seventy-five enemy aircraft were found destroyed or abandoned, and it was estimated that the enemy's total losses amounted to two thousand.

In the respite which followed this retreat, the Axis moved frantically to restore its fortunes, or at least, to stave off complete overthrow in North Africa. The lesson of the power of the air weapon had not been lost upon them, and the Russian front was weakened by the transfer of some of the fighter strength from that front to the Mediterranean. The aerodromes in Tunisia, Sicily and Italy received new flights of tested pilots, and it was estimated that at least a fifth of Germany's fighter strength was massed in the Mediterranean.

It was estimated at this time also that less than fifty per cent of the German air force remained in Russia and that the balance was on duty in the Mediterranean and Northern France, posted there to ward off the blows of the Allied air forces. It was noted, too, that the Luftwaffe was outnumbered in fighters in Northern France, Belgium and Holland, and in the Mediterranean was using bombers - operational aircraft - for transport duties, a sure confession that its air strength was becoming atrophied by the continued assaults of the Allies.

In all these historic happenings in the Middle East-from the beginning of the first big Libyan drive, to the landings at Pantellaria, Sicily, and in Italy itself-men of the R.A.A.F. have taken a prominent part, wielding the rapier of single-seat fighters and the broadsword of heavy bombers and torpedo craft, with equal facility and effectiveness. An Australian was credited with having dropped the last bomb in North Africa, and a R.A.A.F. fighter unit was the first to operate as a complete squadron on the mainland of Italy.

In the great advance, Australians were to be found in all phases. in combat and in the ancillary and auxiliary services which helped to make that advance possible. They were in fighters, bombers, torpedo-bombers, air ambulances, transport columns and flights, supply, movement control, repair and salvage, and maintenance units, air stores and parks, mobile units for signals and meteorological duties, and in every section which goes to make an efficient air striking-force.

The two fighter squadrons operated in the wing which played such an important part in stemming the advance on Egypt, they were in the task force which prepared the way through El Alamein, they were escort for bombers locating and pin-pointing targets, strafing enemy patrols, destroying his supplies, and delaying his plans. From there they followed up the advancing armies, leap-frogging from one landing-ground to another so that the enemy, should have no respite. Without a break, they fought right to Cap Bon, and from Cap Bon they continued the battle over the water to Italy. In between these two fights, they participated in the mopping-up operations, ensuring that no enemy evacuations were successful.

One of the most brilliant feats of the two Australian fighter squadrons during the final battle for North Africa was their rescue of Fighting French forces which, having come all the way from the Lake Chad area, in the heart of the Sahara, were besieged by the enemy in a fort remote from any land forces which could support them. The French were without air support and were in a perilous position when a signal was received from them seeking immediate assistance. The two Australian squadrons swooped on the enemy armour with all guns blazing. Under their withering dive-bombing and strafing, the panzers were destroyed. It was a complete victory by the air weapon over an armoured column, and the French detachment was relieved.

On another occasion, one of these squadrons silenced a nest of German heavy guns, and enabled a force of New Zealand infantry to attack and overcome the enemy. This was later described by General Montgomery as a most successful example of air-army cooperation.

The R.A.A.F. fighter squadrons were also among the first to institute the new tactics of continuously bombing and strafing the enemy's front-line positions, and helped greatly to beat down and crush what resistance remained in him.

While the desert battle was, in progress, advance parties of the R.A.A.F. were right up with the Army, waiting for the first moment when advanced landing-grounds could be used. The supply columns stood at the ready, and rushed up supplies the moment these grounds were available to our aircraft. Many of these landing-grounds were made ready by all available hands under the expert eye of an Australian.

Australians were also in the van of convoy protection and that our supplies for the land battle were built up faster and more fully than the enemy's was in a measure due to them.

That the enemy's were overtaken was due, in part, to Australians flying in anti-shipping strikes. These two squadrons fitted closely into the general strategic picture and their work was an essential part of the race for supplies. Many ships were sunk, and much Axis material sent to the bottom of the Mediterranean by Australian torpedo and bombing squadrons. They also took part in the furious blitz which prevented the salvage by the enemy of his supplies and their return to the mainland of Europe over the Mediterranean escape route.

An Australian air ambulance went right through the campaign and in one month set up a record when it evacuated six hundred casualties.

As in other theatres of war there are more Australians in the Middle East serving with R.A.F. squadrons than with R.A.A.F. squadrons. In the for-ward areas they have been doing the same sort of work as their fellows in the E.A.T.S. units, while others were in communications flights to Malta, Persia, Sudan, East Africa, and wherever the R.A.F. is operating.

In the Middle East, too, there are many Australians whose job is on the ground, and in the battles of North Africa they have done splendid work. These men do not merely include fitters, riggers, armourers, electricians, wireless operators, and mechanics, but ground staff in the multitude of other jobs which go to make up the complete organization. Their job is to keep the aircraft in the air. They have never failed, even though they have been obliged to toil in almost impossible conditions. Repair and salvage personnel have literally snatched damaged aircraft from under the noses of the enemy, and either repaired them on the spot so that they could be flown out, or dragged them back and made them airworthy under conditions slightly less arduous and exacting.

Australians were also to be found right along the coast, controlling the movements of convoys with vital supplies for the forward areas, organising motor transport and keeping the machinery of the ground organization well oiled. Farther back, Australians worked on production units, assembling air frames and engines, fitting instruments and testing the completed job so that other Australians might fly them into battle.

WESTWARD HO!

FROM October 23, 1942, until May 13, 1943, the Allies in North Africa set and kept the Axis forces on the run, and ousted them from the Continent. By April 7, the Allies had advanced from the jumping-off point at El Alamein, one thousand seven hundred miles to the west. When the battle was over, they had killed or captured nearly one million troops, destroyed eight thousand aircraft, captured or destroyed six thousand two hundred guns, two thousand five hundred and fifty tanks, and seventy thousand trucks, besides vast quantities of material and equipment.

And all of this was made possible by the Allied Air Forces having, as a preliminary, gained air superiority and then having kept it. In this gigantic retreat, the Middle East squadrons of the R.A.F. played a not inconsiderable part.

The land battle opened with the heaviest artillery barrage ever seen in North Africa, but before that curtain of shells was laid down, the air weapon had been busy, and during the artillery barrage it continued to be busy, adding the weight of bombs to the sum total of the barrage. The barrage began at 9-40 p.m. on October 23. By dawn next day gaps had appeared in the enemy's defences. Through them, men of the Eighth Army found their way; this small percolation of force became a steady stream, then a torrent and then a flood. The early days of November made it plain that the battle for Africa was in its final stages. In December, Rommel's battered remnants were in full flight westward.

The enemy air forces attempted to challenge our air superiority and our fighter aircraft had many engagements. Enemy casualties were heavy. While the fighters scrambled, Bostons, Baltimores, Mitchells, and escorting Kittyhawks intensified the ground attacks by bombing. Our losses were slight. As these operations progressed Allied domination in the air over the battlefield became more and more apparent. Spitfires and Hurricanes made a record number of sorties, bombers attacked
by day and by night. The air weapon made sure that the weary enemy forces were given no respite, no single opportunity to regroup.

The westward stream of Axis men, materials, weapons, and transport, was a target not to be missed, and our bomber forces were diverted against the closely-packed columns. They were moving slowly, were to move still more slowly, as the congestion and disorder were accentuated by repeated attacks and increasing destruction from the air. Fighter bombers and fighters also operated incessantly against this traffic. More than three hundred vehicles were immobilized, anti-aircraft guns were silenced, and troops were mown down. By dusk of the first day many vehicles were burning along the whole length of the road.

R.A.A.F. personnel were in all phases of this smash-through at El Alamein and the advance to Tobruk and Tripoli, through to Mareth and on to Tunis, across the desert, and through the green belt to the hills of Tunisia. Australians were to be found in the forefront of every action, in fighter squadrons, bomber squadrons, air ambulance, torpedo-bombers, reconnaissance flights, communication aircraft, supply and transport columns, movement control, repair and salvage, maintenance, air stores parks, and every other section that goes to make an efficient air fighting force.

All the Australian squadrons contributed their full share and in addition there was an even larger number of the R.A.A.F. infiltrating into the R.A.F. who gave their all towards the successful conclusion of the North African campaign. In every type of aircraft, in every unit, they worked in harmony with airmen from New Zealand, Canada, U.S.A., South Africa, and every corner of the Empire. They gave outstanding service and will still be found doing the most unusual jobs throughout the Mediterranean area.

For instance, following the break-through at El Alamein, members of the R.A.A.F. took part in one particularly masterly move. While our main fighter activity against the enemy was still in the Jebel area, two Hurricane squadrons were taken one hundred and eighty miles east to a desert landing-ground at Jedabaya from which they attacked the enemy in the rear.

The enemy was taken completely by surprise. While the main Axis units were still east of Benghazi, the Hurricanes suddenly appeared from nowhere over the leading columns of his retreat in the Jedabaya-Agheila area. Immediate results of the fighter-attack were excellent. One hundred and thirty vehicles were destroyed and one hundred and seventy were damaged. Two aircraft were destroyed in the air and twelve on the ground.

Of greater value than this material destruction, however, was the effect on the enemy's morale. To be attacked by short-range fighters an area considered to be beyond the range of that type of aircraft must have given rise to tremendous consternation among enemy troops, and it no doubt threw the retreating column into great chaos.

Tank-busting is another sphere of operations in the Middle East in which Australians have excelled. As members of a R.A.F. squadron, they flew the specialized Hurricanes fitted with 40-mm- cannon which were known in the Air Ann as "tin-openers". Their special mission was to attack tanks and all "thick skinned" vehicles and armour. They scored many decisive successes.

These are isolated instances selected at random from among the daily routine of Australians in R.A.A.F. and R.A.F. squadrons. Throughout the battle they remained in the vanguard of operations from east to west. This was particularly true of Three and Four Fifty squadrons which formed part of the most forward fighter wing of the Desert Air Force. At El Hamma, near Gabes, the wing was only twelve miles behind the front line, and was not only bombed and strafed, but was shelled as well. It travelled two thousand miles from El Alamein to Tunis and occupied more than twenty aerodromes in the process.

In the advance the wing perfected the technique of leap-frogging from aerodrome to aerodrome and advance parties were right up with the Army waiting for the first moment when a new one could be occupied and used by aircraft as a new base.

This was progressive warfare at its best.

The combined air and land forces had set the retreat in motion and the Air Force kept it moving at a speed which spelt disaster to any plan for a re-grouping of strength or holding action by the Axis forces. The Air Force impelled a momentum which carried the Axis to the lapping waters of the Mediterranean.

There were some amazingly rapid advances, made possible, to a great extent, by the willingness of everybody to do more than his share. One result of this was that our aircraft were operating from one aerodrome from which the Germans had been flying only twenty-two hours before. As the advance progressed the difficulties became greater. In his first surge to the west, the enemy departed so precipitately that he left many landing grounds without any attempt to deny them to our use, and many of them were dotted with serviceable aircraft which he had abandoned in his great haste. Many landing grounds were innocent of mines or booby traps, and it was not until Derna was reached that our forces encountered the first organized enemy attempt to impede their progress by these devices.

Just behind these parties came the wing of which the two Australian Kittyhawk squadrons were members. Their primary role was not that of fighters, but of fighter-bombers, although at times they engaged in aerial combat. Bombing and strafing and bomber escort were their main functions, but to them they added many different and hazardous tasks requiring the highest courage and efficiency. On one occasion at El Hamma, one of the R.A.A.F. squadrons was sent up to draw ack-ack fire from German 88-mm. guns while the other squadrons of the wing came in and silenced them.

They were also among the first aircraft to institute the new tactics of continuous bombing and strafing enemy front-line positions, which had such a demoralizing effect on the enemy and contributed handsomely to the disorganization of his whole resistance.

March 26 was a great day for these two squadrons. The land forces were held up before the Mareth Line and, instead of forcing the strong positions at great cost, it was decided to send a New Zealand force through the rugged mountains to outflank the line.

The New Zealanders advanced to a mountain pass dominated by 88-mm. guns where they were halted. With others the two Australian squadrons were called upon to liquidate the German obstruction. Their role was to bomb, dive-bomb and strafe in an attempt to draw the enemy fire while the Army attacked. For two hour s they swooped upon the enemy's strong-points with devastating effect. The enemy was demoralized and the New Zealanders pressed on and gained their objective. This exploit was cited as a most successful example of army-air co-operation and earned the appreciation of General Montgomery.

Another brilliant feat of these two Australian squadrons was the rescue of a Fighting French force which was threatened with annihilation at a remote desert fort. The Kittyhawks blasted the enemy armour and relieved the Frenchmen.

One of the secrets of brilliant air operations is sound ground organization. It is axiomatic that no aircraft can operate without a continuous flow of supplies. In the North African campaign supply columns never lagged behind when a new landing-ground was to be occupied. There were three such columns, and each one was commanded by an Australian, who saw that fuel, armament and all other necessities came forward regularly. Still another Australian was behind the planning and organization. There were hitches, of course, but a flair for improvisation on the spot kept the supplies moving west, often under the most appalling conditions.

But the Middle East story is no longer only the story of fighter-bomber squadrons. The all-important work of convoy protection also found Australians keeping an ever-vigilant eye on the seas and so made a material contribution in getting supplies through to the forward area. They worked with the Navy on anti-submarine patrols and provided the eyes by night and day to forestall any interception of our supply ships. In this capacity Four Fifty-nine Squadron, R.A.A.F., has done outstanding work, augmented in the latter part of the campaign by Four Fifty-four Squadron- R.A.A.F.

Their work was not as Spectacular as that of the forward units, but they did a vital job often in dangerous conditions and had a real and vital place in the coordinated effort. Four Fifty-one Squadron, R.A.A.F., also contributed its share on fighter reconnaissance and in protecting shipping in the sector allotted to it. In attacks on enemy shipping, Four Fifty-eight Squadron, R.A.A.F., rendered great service. The torpedo-bombers of this squadron prevented supplies coming from the mainland of Europe and sank many ships. During the most hectic period of the battle a section of the squadron was detached for duty at Malta and attacked shipping off the coast of Sicily and Italy, with good results.

Heavy bombers, including those of Four Sixty-two Squadron, R.A.A.F., added weight to the attacks against the enemy's landing grounds. Primarily their function was to limit the enemy's fighter activity and to ensure that the Western Desert Air Force continued to be master of the air over the battlefield. They also attacked harbour installations, where they inflicted material damage which limited the power of the Axis to make war in North Africa.

Behind these squadrons stood the ground staff. Fitters, riggers, armourers, electricians, instrument repairers, W/T operators, mechanics, drivers, and all the other miscellaneous personnel worked at tremendous pressure, whether in the forward areas, or maintenance and production, to keep up the flow of replacements demanded by the tremendous wastage of modern warfare. They never failed, even though working under conditions that in peace time would have been considered impossible, and the aircraft were kept flying. Major repairs were done without adequate equipment and under the nose of the enemy.

Repair and Salvage Units also numbered Australians in their ranks. They towed grounded aircraft from No-Man's-Land, walked through enemy minefields to recover secret instruments, worked through the night under the shadow of enemy guns and did major repairs in the wastes of the desert.

ON TO SICILY

And so, on to Sicily.

Sicily began the Battle for Europe as armies understand the world "battle". It was the prelude to more fighting by bigger armies, and the stepping-stone to the final destruction of the Nazi menace. Its conquest has brought Germany within the practical range of heavy bombers carrying effective loads.

Allied troops seized Sicilian aerodromes. Allied fighters and fighter-bombers moved in to be nearer the enemy. The bombers followed later. Ground crews, petrol, ammunition, and all supplies to keep the fighters flying had to come in by air.

This was one of the most dangerous, most important, and least noticed phases of the combined warfare; but the fighters had to have their supplies before they could operate from one of the captured aerodromes.

In the words of one of the younger pilots who was in the job of air supply: "Here we go again. We move into the combat zone so fast that we feel like fighter pilots. The Jerries take off and then we land. Our fighters come in for fuel and ammunition. Why, sometimes we nearly fill up the Jerry kites, we move so fast."

But there was a lot of preparation and detailed organization before this invasion could be attempted. In the first place, the Allied bombers had to blast the way for the attempt. The area hit ranged from Sardinia to Greece. It was an area of destruction. Along the whole path lay shattered Axis planes, bomb-ripped aerodromes, flaming hangars, charred docks, twisted loading-cranes, blasted harbour installations, supply ships fire-gutted and listing at anchor, billowing smoke from oil dumps, rubble of factories and supply depots. Four Sixty-two Squadron, R.A.A.F., did its share in blasting the way for the biggest invasion in history.

The men went over night after night to prepare the way for men assembling all along the North African coast waiting for the moment when they would board the huge invasion armada. Convoys of ships and landing barges were making the ports daily, carefully watched by the air sea patrols. Supplies were being built up in ever-increasing quantities to be ready many weeks before the crossing.

Australians again played their part to ensure that supplies got through. Four Fifty-one Fighter-Reconnaissance Squadron, R.A.A.F., watched the ships get through; while Four Fifty-nine Naval Co-operation Squadron, R.A.A.F., and Four Fifty-four Squadron, R.A.A.F., maintained the anti-submarine patrols, and Four Fifty-eight Squadron, R.A.A.F., kept up an offensive against enemy shipping. They all contributed their part, even though less spectacular, towards the final success.

All this time the offensive squadrons were getting ready to co-operate with the Army. They were doing intensive training in preparation for the new offensive. Air crews went through a new schedule, including all forms of aerobatics and formation flying, while the ground staff had to switch from desert warfare to that suited to the new terrain.

At last the appointed hour arrived. The invasion fleet was loaded and on the move. Everyone was keyed up for the great event. All were anxious about the first attack across water. Australian pilots went off to escort the ships. They were amazed at the size of the Allied invasion armada and the almost complete lack of effective enemy air opposition. There were 3,267 ships.

From dawn to nightfall the squadrons maintained patrols over the north-bound invasion fleet to protect it from attack, and next morning covered the landing of our troops, guns, motor transport, and equipment of every kind.

Operating from dawn to dusk just preceding the fall of Catania, the two Australian Kittyhawk squadrons did perhaps some of their most effective work. The task allotted was to strike the enemy on the roads and harass him in every other way. Pilots of both units took advantage of every opportunity.

Later the squadrons moved up and conducted anti-shipping sweeps along the southern coast of Italy. They continued to harass the enemy during the closing phases of the campaign. Then they moved over to attack the toe of Italy.

SINGLE-SEAT JOBS

THREE R.A.A.F. squadrons in the Middle East have been announced as flying fighter-types. They are Three Squadron, Four Fifty Squadron, and Four Fifty-one Squadron.

When Three Squadron was formed at Richmond, N.S.W., in June 1925, it already had a tradition and history, f or it was the direct descendant of Three Squadron, Australian Flying Corps, of the first World War. That tradition it was to honour and that history to adorn in years of hard fighting, and splendid achievement.

In this war, Three was the first R.A.A.F. squadron to be sent to the Middle East. On a cold winter's day, July 15, 1940, it set out on its great adventure-an adventure which was to take it in honour and glory through the first Libyan campaign, the fighting in Syria, the second Libyan push and the disastrous retreat which followed it, the advance from Alamein to Tunis which resulted in the ejection of the Germans and Italians from North Africa, and then to Sicily and Italy.

When in March 1942 the squadron was withdrawn from operations for a short rest, it had a tally of 68½ enemy planes destroyed, 16 probably destroyed and 59 damaged during the second Libyan campaign. On the evening of May 26 Rommel struck again and on June 17 our forces resumed their retreat. In twelve days Three Squadron fell back by way of five landing-grounds from Gambut to Amiriva, near Alexandria. In the period of the retreat the Air Force, Three Squadron included, was strained to the utmost. Sometimes pilots were flying two or three sorties a day. Ground crews were working day and night and sleeping beside their aircraft.

Three Squadron stayed in Egypt until the Eighth Army launched its big offensive which was to drive the Germans from Egypt to Tunis and out of North Africa. It went forward with the Army from Alamein to Tunis, always in the forefront of the battle. Five days after the beginning of the battle it topped its second century - 200 enemy aircraft destroyed. Between November 6 and 19 the squadron went forward with astounding rapidity by means of seven landing-grounds to Martuba. It spent its third Christmas overseas at Marble Arch, in Tripolitania.

Tripoli fell on January 23, 1943, and Three Squadron moved on into Tunisia. March saw the Battle of the Mareth Line. When the squadron reached the Moslem holy city of Kairouan-its most advanced landing-ground in North Africa - on April 18 it had operated from twenty-one aerodromes between Egypt and Tunisia. When Tunis fell its record was 212½ enemy aircraft destroyed - the half representing a "kill" shared with another squadron - 63 probably destroyed and 166 damaged since it began operations in the Middle East. And in the long advance from Alamein to Tunis, it should be remembered Three Squadron was never a fighter squadron, its Kittyhawks were fighter-bombers.

With North Africa ours, Three stood down for rest and training, but the respite was brief. On the eve of the invasion of Sicily it went to Malta. Then in Sicily, and later in Italy, it was still in the vanguard of the battle, advancing with the Army, strafing, bombing, always attacking . In short, wherever in the Mediterranean there was a front, there was Three Squadron.

Three Squadron's companion squadron is Four Fifty Squadron. On April 9, 1941, with nothing but personal kit and the mixed feelings of sailing-day, the original members of Four Fifty Squadron took a train to Sydney, a truck to Woolloomooloo docks, and a ferry across the harbour. Two days later their convoy of giant ships, including the Queen Mary, sailed for the Middle East. On May 3 they disembarked at Suez.

Four Fifty Squadron went to Abu Sueir, where it was given its C.O., Squadron-Leader G. H. Steege, D.F.C., and then to Palestine, where it was equipped with Hurricanes. But it had no pilots as those who came from Australia were almost exclusively ground personnel so the pilots of a R.A.F. squadron, who were awaiting the arrival of their ground crews from England formed a combined team with the Australian ground staff.

This combined squadron did a good job when the Syrian campaign opened in June. Flying across the border from their base at Amman, in the Trans-Jordan, for ten hectic days they carried out fighter sweeps and ground-strafed trains, motor transport and aerodromes. Lord Haw Haw himself christened Four Fifty Squadron at this time, bitterly referring to an Australian squadron which, by ruthless ground-strafing, had become known as the "Australian Harassers". Four Fifty joyfully adapted this to "Desert Harassers", a name it made famous in many hectic campaigns.

When Damascus fell the squadron was the First to enter Syria. One flight was sent to -Beirut and the other to Haifa, in defence of those towns. Then the R.A.F. squadron's ground crew arrived from England and the combination was broken. Four Fifty was once more merely the shell of a squadron, with no aircraft, no pilots and very little equipment. At Rayak, Syria, ground personnel were given the job of sorting and cataloguing captured French material. Then twelve Hurricanes, two Magisters and twenty pilots arrived, the latter mostly Australian. A brief period of training followed and the squadron was split up again.

After various vicissitudes, during which pilots were converted from Hurricanes and Tomahawks to Kittyhawks, the squadron was ready for operations, and was stationed in the Western Desert. On February ig, 1942, it became operational, carrying out a fighter sweep west of Tobruk. Days of hard fighting followed, with Rommel never far away. In May Squadron-Leader A. D. Ferguson became C.O. Rommel advanced again, and by the end of June the squadron's "advanced landing-around" was at Amariya, near Alexandria. It had been a fighter-bomber squadron for some time, and in three months to the end of July lost twenty-four pilots through various causes.

Before General Montgomery launched his victorious offensive in October 1942, Squadron-Leader J. E. A. Williams had assumed command, but only for a few days. On the last day of the month he was forced down in enemy territory and was taken prisoner. He was succeeded by Squadron-Leader M. C. H. Barber, a Rhodesian. The squadron advanced with the Eighth Army, working hard escorting bombers, ground-strafing at long range, and carrying out fighter sweeps. In November it moved from Amariya to Martuba, in Cyrenaica. When the New Year opened it was in Tripolitania. In February Squadron-Leader J. B. Bartle took over command from Squadron-Leader Barber, who had just received the D.F.C.

In March the battle for Tunisia proper began, and in March Four Fifty Squadron-with its sister squadron Three-put up two outstanding performances. On March io the squadron helped to liberate the Free French forces besieged by the Germans at Rhilane; then on March 26, when the Eighth Army was held up before the Mareth Line, it was among the squadrons which helped the New Zealanders to outflank the enemy.

The Tunisian campaign was drawing to its close. April saw Four Fifty move west in the final stages, to Medinine, El Hamma, El Diem, and Kairouan. At El Hamma the squadron was bombed, strafed-and even shelled by German guns in the hills only twelve miles away. In the final stages anti-shipping patrols were flown over Cape Bon and the Gulf of Tunis. On May 7 Tunis and Bizerta fell and five days later the last German resistance in North Africa ended. The long trek west which began at El Alamein nearly seven months before was ended.

By then Four Fifty had completed nearly fifteen months on full-time operations in the desert. Its pilots had destroyed 49 enemy aircraft in aerial combat, had probably destroyed t6 and had damaged 27, In ground-strafing they had destroyed and damaged 93 aircraft, as well As 584 motor transport units and numerous gun posts and supply dumps. They had between them gained eight D.F.Cs and five D.F.Ms.

The end was not yet. Four Fifty went to Malta before the launching of the Sicilian campaign in July, it went to Sicily when first the army landed there, and it followed close on the heels of the Army into Italy. Like Three Squadron it was always in the forefront of the battle.

Like Four Fifty, R.A.A.F. Squadron Four Fifty-one was one of the squadrons formed in Australia for overseas service early in 1941, tinder the Empire Air Training Scheme. These two squadrons sailed from Sydney in the same convoy. Four Fifty-one had been in the Middle East less than two months when it went into operations from an aerodrome in the Western Desert under the command of Squadron Leader V. A. Pope.

Equipped with Hurricanes, Four Fifty-one was an Army Co-operation squadron. Its work was tactical reconnaissance, photographic reconnaissance, and artillery co-operation. On July 1, 1941, the squadron did its first operation. Four months later the second Libyan push was to begin. In the intervening period it was wholly responsible for all reconnaissance and photography and for the direction of artillery shoots. Its work was to determine the disposition of enemy concentrations and minefields. The reports rendered by the squadron's pilots supplied information which was vital in the planning of the forthcoming campaign. The squadron was the eyes of the Army. In October Squadron-Leader R. D. Williams took over command.

During the siege of Tobruk, Four Fifty-one dropped messages and photographs to the defenders, which were a valuable aid in the defence of the port. But the squadron had an even closer link with Tobruk than that. In September two of its aircraft were flown there and remained to operate from within the defences until Tobruk was relieved over two months later. Their presence was a closely guarded secret and the enemy remained in ignorance of it.

When General Auchinleck launched his big push on November 18, Four Fifty-one was farther forward than any other squadron in the Western Desert. There was excitement in plenty. The heavy, confused fighting of the early days of the offensive provided Four Fifty-one's personnel with their grimmest adventure of the war, ending for some of them in a period of five weeks as prisoners of war.

One party, trapped at Sidi Aziz, was captured by a German panzer unit after it had reduced the fort, and taken to Bardia. The party remained there until Bardia was recaptured on January 2, 1942.

During the battles for Bardia, Sollum and Halfaya Four Fifty-one was occupied in continuous tactical reconnaissances and in directing artillery fire on enemy gun posts and troop concentrations. It also directed gunfire on an enemy ship in Bardia. harbour, which the artillery sank. The Army was warmly appreciative of the squadron's "invaluable assistance".

Four Fifty-one was then recalled from the Western Desert. After a brief spell at Heliopolis, it was sent to Syria to co-operate with the British Ninth Army, which at that time included the 9th Division, A.I.F., and the New Zealanders. The orange groves and gum-trees of Palestine and the snow-covered Syrian countryside were a vivid contrast to the sands of the desert.

In Syria Four Fifty-one was given its first Australian C.O. in February when Squadron Leader A. D. Ferguson took over. He was to be succeeded in April by Wing-Commander D. R. Chapman. For four months until the middle of June, Four Fifty-one worked in co-operation with the Army in both Syria and Cyprus. In June it was made responsible for the defence of Haifa and assumed the role of a fighter squadron. For the next six months, from bases in Syria, Palestine, and Cyprus, it was engaged in intercepting enemy aircraft, protecting shipping convoys, and hunting U-boats.

Early in January 1943, after a year in the Levant, the squadron was moved back to the Western Desert. Soon afterwards it became responsible for the defence of Alexandria, and was re-equipped with Hurricane Mark II aircraft and Spitfires, and was officially converted to a fighter squadron. It spent the next few months guarding convoys-traffic in the Mediterranean was heavy in the months leading up to the invasion of Sicily and Italy intercepting enemy aircraft, and raiding the
island of Crete.

Squadron-Leader J Paine became C.O. in May. He was succeeded in September by Squadron-Leader R. N. B. Stevens, D.F.C. and Bar.