Chapter 10 Wolf At The Door; Back From The Grave

WOLF

AT THE

DOOR

AUSTRALIA issued her first war communiqué on December 11, 1941, recording that seaward reconnaissance had been carried out dally since hostilities with the Japanese began. One aircraft had failed to return. Two days later, enemy aircraft were observed spying out the Bismarck Archipelago north of New Guinea. Australian bomber-reconnaissance aircraft set out in pursuit, but the enemy aircraft disappeared before they could be intercepted.

The first engagement was reported on December 16, when our aircraft located and bombed a Japanese supply vessel near Greenwich Island. Greenwich Island is near Kapingamarangi Islands in the Caroline group. It is a Japanese mandate, and the nearest Japanese-controlled territory to Australia. Then, on December 19, R.A.A.F. aircraft successfully bombed Japanese installations on Greenwich Island and damaged one vessel in a low-level attack, beating off attempted interception by the enemy. Taraets at Greenwich were constantly under surveillance by the R.A.A.F. and other raids were made on them.

While these were going on, the Japanese were busy flying high over the Bismarck group, giving thus early an indication of intentions, which were to be developed later in full clarity.

Our attacks at Kapingamarangi were marked by daring and skill, and our losses in those early days were slight. Buildings, installations, and some grounded aircraft of the Japanese were destroyed or damaged by our bombing attacks.

The first bombing attack on Rabaul, where Australia had an advanced base of land and air forces, occurred on January 4, 1942, the enemy using long-range bombers to attack the aerodrome. Only a few bombs were dropped, and some damage was caused to service installations. No Europeans were killed, although there were some native casualties. Our aircraft did not make contact with the enemy, who returned to a base, probably in the mandated islands under Japan's control. Later that day a second attack was launched by the Japanese. More bombs were dropped than in the daylight raid, but no casualties were caused. Three days later the third raid occurred, the enemy bombers making a single run over the target and causing slight damage and flying north before interception could succeed. Next morning the bombers returned to bomb the aerodrome and some of our aircraft were hit.

On January 8, the R.A.A.F. carried out a reprisal raid on Kapingamarangi, damaging installations and destroying a seaplane on the water. These attacks by the R.A.A.F. on the one hand and by the Japanese on the other, continued for some time, no great damage being caused by either side. The Japanese were apparently feeling out the defences and kept at great heights over places where little or no defence existed, in preference to coming low with the consequent risk (negligible at that time) of meeting ground and fighter defences.

The feeler raids on Rabaul had evidently persuaded the enemy that he need expect no fierce opposition there. Rabaul was a strongpoint essential to his plan of outflanking Australia's lines of communication with the United States, and on January 2o he launched the first full-scale attack. More than 100 bombers and a fighter escort, apparently launched from aircraft carriers, swooped on Rabaul, and by pattern bombing blasted wharf accommodation, gun posts, shipping, installations, both civil and defence, and the aerodrome, and killed ii and wounded six persons, including civilians.

Our fighters-Wirraways-went up to intercept the raiders, but were no match for the accompanying Zero fighters, and all (there were only five of them) were shot down.

This marked the beginning of an intensified effort by the enemy. He spread his tentacles farther afield, searching out Australian strength in the islands. He went about this task with the same care and precision which had marked his other operations, and Australia gained much time by his caution. The day after the attack on Rabaul, he attacked Kavieng and Madang, and flew over Salamaua, Lae, and Bulolo. Our reconnaissance aircraft sighted large numbers of enemy aircraft at a number of points in the Bismarck Archipelago, and it became apparent that a large-scale action could be expected. This action came next day, when two raids were made on Rabaul, each by about 4o bombers with fighter escort. This was followed a few hours later by the arrival of ii Japanese ships, which proceeded to land troops. To protect the landing party's left flank, Tulagi was also bombed and machine-gunned, though the help Tulagi could have given was negligible.

On January 25, our bombers attacked enemy shipping at Rabaul, now in Japanese hands, and some hits were observed in the target area. One of our aircraft failed to return. Valuable information was brought back by the other bombers, and two nights later another raid was launched. Three vessels were damaged and set on fire. Hits were scored in bad weather in another raid which followed.

Meanwhile, the Japanese were not idle. For sometime our reconnaissance aircraft had been shadowing enemy shipping about Borneo and Celebes, and on January 30 a Japanese convoy was sighted north of Ambon, where the A.I.F. and the R.A.A.F. had small forces, The aerodrome was bombed, and land forces were put ashore by the Japanese. As in other operations, while engaged at Ambon, the enemy sent bombers over points on both flanks, and Salamaua, Lae and Bulolo on his left, and Koepang on his right, were raided from the air.

Having got their land forces ashore at Ambon, the Japanese then resumed operations from Rabaul, sending out raiders to Tulagi and, for the first time, to Port Moresby, where Australia had its strongest force in this theatre outside the mainland. Only six bombs were dropped and not much damage was done. It was from Port Moresby that Australia was launching her attacks against Rabaul, and fast on the heels of the Japanese attack on this base, the R.A.A.F. sent a force against Japanese shipping at Rabaul. Some hits were obtained and the R.A.A.F. aircraft were obliged to meet fighter opposition which they drove off, all our aircraft returning to base.

While these attacks on Port Moresby were becoming intensified and more frequent, the Japanese were laying plans for the first attack on the Australian mainland, and the Australians were hammering at the enemy's lines of communication. The R.A.A.F. struck a hard blow in a series of raids at Gasmata. Our bombers came down to mast height and in dogfights which ensued with enemy fighters, two R.A.A.F. machines were shot down, but two large enemy transports were left in flames. In following raids, installations and grounded enemy aircraft were strafed with some success.

A feature of this period of preparation was the increasing activities of Japanese Zero fighters.

In most of the raids made by our aircraft, designed primarily for reconnaissance and bombing, they were met by fighter aircraft, and it is a remarkable fact that by sheer courage, determination, and skill, our pilots inflicted considerable losses on the enemy.

The enemy, switching suddenly on February 19 from the north-east of Australia, launched his long-prepared attack on Darwin. The defences were caught unprepared by the swiftness and size of the attack, and very considerable damage was done to service and civil installations, and a large number of casualties was caused. Actually, there were two separate raids. The first, about io o'clock in the morning, was made by a force of some 72 twin-engined bombers with an escort of Zero fighters. These forces separated into two parts, one of which concentrated on the town, wharves and shipping, while the other turned inland. Several ships at the wharves and in the harbour were hit, and the wharves and installations were badly damaged. About noon, die second raid was made, and was directed mainly at R.A.A.F. installations. On this occasion, a force of some 2o-odd bombers was used. Service buildings and aerodromes were bombed and machine-gunned, and some damage was caused. Several hospitals were hit, some patients were wounded, and some killed.

Having, as he believed, put Darwin out of action for the time being, the enemy's next move was to land paratroops in Timor. A strong Japanese naval force was sighted :-,car Dilli, and there were transports in the harbour. Dilli was on fire. That night, R.A.A.F. bombers took off, and pasted enemy positions in Timor. All returned.

Simultaneously, we bombed Rabaul with increasing regularity, and in the face of growing fighter and ground fire opposition, doing considerable damage to shipping and port installations, and generally hampering the enemy's plans for a quick move south. The attacks on Dilli apparently particularly angered the enemy, because on March 3 he sent twin forces over Broome and Wyndham, coming in low to ground strafe aerodromes, grounded aircraft and flying boats. No bombs were dropped, the attack being made by cannon and machine-gun fire. In these raids, the enemy used fighters fitted with long-range petrol tanks, and was apparently so pleased with the results, that he sent similarly equipped fighters over Darwin the following day. They did small damage to R.A.A.F. installations.

These enemy attacks round a large arc caused the R.A.A.F. effort to be fanned out between Dilli and Tulagi, and the enemy returned to attacks concentrated in the vicinity of Port Moresby and adjacent Australian strong points, whence he expected the most powerful opposition. He then brought up naval forces and transports to Salamaua and landed troops, following this with another landing at Lae. The force of enemy naval vessels which protected this landing force stood off and bombarded the township and bombers dropped bombs. The R.A.A.F. sent out a force of bombers which attacked the ships, and although conditions of visibility were bad, registered some hits.

To divert attention from his landing operations, and hamper retaliatory action, the enemy launched an attack by 10 heavy bombers on Port Moresby, directed against service installations. These tactics were repeated by the enemy the following day, when a medium force of heavies dropped bombs, but they failed to achieve their objective, for next day the R.A.A.F. and U.S. airmen launched an attack (the heaviest to that time) on Salamaua.

Following this violent daylight raid, four Japanese ships were seen to be burning. Two were sinking, and one was beached. Later in the day, the aerodrome was attacked by the R.A.A.F. In the Allied raid, the first of our aircraft attacked an enemy cruiser in the face of mixed calibre A.A. fire. The second wave directed its attention to transports and warships. One large ship was surrounded by bombs and left burning. Several direct hits were scored by two other aircraft on a warship, and two other ships were hit and set on fire. Later attacks recorded hits and -near misses, and when the big bombers left the target, one ship was burned out, three others were on fire, two were sinking, and the other was beached.

This was the first appearance in action in the Australian theatre of United States pilots and aircraft. It marked the end of a lone, heroic fight by the R.A.A.F., ill-equipped with aircraft no longer fit for front-line service, against an enemy who had designed and built one of the most maneuverable and effective sea-borne fighter aircraft then seen in action. Thereafter, the weary pilots of the R.A.A.F. were to get some respite, and when they went into battle, were, in many instances, though not always, to have beneath their hands the controls of modern U.S. fighters.

Soon afterwards the operational organization of the R.A.A.F. was merged in that of the Americans, with Lieut.-General George N. Brett as Commander-in-Chief. Under his command, the identity of the R.A.A.F. has been lost in the anonymity of "the Allied Air Forces". The R.A.A.F., however, is still at action stations, and some of the men who in those first heroic days held the enemy at bay, are still fighting grimly with the Americans to defend their homeland. They have been reinforced by the return from abroad of many Australian pilots and air crew who have made their names famous in other parts of the world.

The R.A.A.F. saved Australia from a quick invasion, and gave us the breathing space which enabled the Allies to build up considerable opposition and deter the enemy from any rash descent on Australia. Since American aid reached us, the tempo of the Japanese advance has decreased, and he has suffered heavy blows at the hands of heavy bombers and speedy fighters manned by Americans and Australians. Working together, bombers of the Allied Air Forces have been busy in blasting the bases from which the enemy might launch an attack, and have met with considerable success at a satisfactory cost in men and aircraft.

Rabaul and the Solomons have been the main target, and the enemy is finding tenure of those bases very costly. His bases at Salamaua and Lae have also been bombed heavily, and stores, equipment, installations, and aircraft have been damaged or destroyed. The R.A.A.F. has spent considerable time over Timor, and that time has by no means been lost, as has been testified by Japanese wastage in equipment, time, and the disorganization of his schedule.

When the merging of the U.S. air forces in Australia and the R.A.A.F. took place, the whole R.A.A.F. organization was recast so that it would more efficiently tic in with the U.S. organization. The new Allied framework was designed to put the two forces, now under one head but with a mixed general staff, in its strongest position. Important factors in the R.A.A.F. reorganization were the arrival in Australia of combat aircraft from overseas and the return of veteran Australian air crews from abroad. These men, numbering among them some of the most famous air fighters who had emerged from the war, were later posted to operational stations, or placed in the administrative and

staff instructional posts in which it was believed their wide and close knowledge of air warfare and modern combat aircraft would be of the most value.

The R.A.A.F. dissection into "areas" for the higher control of the Service also came under review, and new areas were defined and some adjustments made to the boundaries of existing areas, with a view to aligning them with operational requirements and increasing their efficiency. Within these areas fighter squadrons were reorganized to fit more snugly into the operational system. These fighter squadrons provided Australia's air umbrellas for the more effective protection of air striking forces, army troops, industries, communications, and civil population.

The fighter bases are in effect springboards from which fighters can take off to intercept enemy raiders aiming at some vital Australian target. The fighters use a close network of aerodromes, bases, dispersal strips, and landing grounds from which also bomber, reconnaissance and general purpose aircraft operate. This network permits the dispersal of grounded aircraft and personnel, whether civil or Service, and thus reduces and spreads the targets at which the enemy may aim. Organized fighter defence now extends over a vast area of the continent, and the whole operational set-up is linked by comprehensive observer and communication systems.

Offensive and defensive, these measures were supplemented by the allocation to the Army of army co-operation squadrons, and the disposition of many kinds of specialist squadrons, such as bomber, reconnaissance, long-range fighter, fleet co-operation, heavy bomber, and interceptor-fighter squadrons. Tied in with these are transport squadrons, air ambulance units, aircraft depots, reserves and stores, repair and salvage depots, radio and maintenance units, medical receiving stations, and all ancillary services.

By this reorganization, the air forces in Australia were placed on a full battle basis.

0fficer Commanding at Rabaul when the Japanese launched their full-scale attack on January 20 and the R.A.A.F. Wirraway pilots made their tragic gesture of defiance, was Wing Commander John Lerew, of Melbourne.

"The Japanese came over in perfect formation," he reported later. "It was as though they were at a Hendon pageant. They made a single run over assigned targets, dropped their bombs' and returned to their carrier. Each wave had been assigned a special target - wharves, shipping, installations, service buildings, gun posts, and the like - and it performed its task and departed. The Wirraway pilots took the air against the Zeros, and shot down plane for plane."

During the R.A.A.F. occupation of Buna and Lakunai aerodromes, Rabaul, from December 5, 1941, to January 3, 1942, Lerew was confronted by many problems, as these aerodromes were equipped with very little in the way of appointments for the safety of either personnel or equipment. Despite extreme labour shortage and under trying climatic conditions Lerew, by his energy and industry, organized dispersal areas and prepared slit trenches for the protection of aircraft and personnel, and these subsequently, in the full-scale Japanese attacks on January 20, 1942, saved much loss of life and material.

Besides performing these and the attendant administrative duties falling upon him as commanding officer, Lerew led several Hudson bombing raids and attacks on large enemy formations with great determination and no little success. When evacuation of the area became inevitable in the face of overwhelming Japanese weight, Lerew not only organized the evacuation, but also led his squadron. With the exception of a few sick and special duties personnel, all the squadron withdrew safely.

Lerew's courage, determination and devotion to duty in all circumstances were an inspiration to his men, and indeed, to all R.A.A.F. personnel serving at Rabaul and elsewhere where Australia was holding the line against the invader.

On February 12, 1942, Lerew, then operating from Port Moresby, led a formation of three Hudson aircraft with instructions to carry out low-level attacks on enemy shipping at Gasmata and New Britain. Locating the target, the Hudsons prepared to attack in the face of heavy fire from the ground. Six enemy fighters took off and dived on the

Hudsons, but Lerew pressed home the attack on the ships from mast height. One enemy, ship was destroyed, one enemy fighter was shot down, and at least another was damaged. Lerew was himself attacked by enemy fighters and his aircraft was set on fire. After instructing the remainder of his crew to abandon the Hudson, Lerew struggled out of the steeply diving aircraft and made a parachute jump. He landed in the tree-tops two miles from the Japanese lines.

Lerew was reported missing. How he came back from the grave nine days later is recorded in the diary he kept during that hazardous march. The following are extracts which tell the story:

"Wednesday, about 3 p.m.-at bottom of dive. Got big bump as though all bombs had gone off together. Took violent avoiding action and attempted to see results. Gunner rushed forward and said 'We're afire.' Fire quickly got worse. Cabin filled with smoke and flames obscuring wing, so I yelled, 'Go for your lives.'

Beginning to get toasted. Thought 'No chance, better jump without 'chute.' Attempted to open escape hatch. Unable to locate crew in smoke. Put on 'chute and tried to climb out window. Got stuck and stood on 'stick'. Aircraft dived steeply, so climbed in again and pulled nose up.

Could not see for smoke, but at last managed to get through pilot's window, and jumped sideways, shielding my head from the tailplane. Tumbled over and over, but couldn't reach rip-cord as 'chute was right out in front of me and it was
reversed so that the toggle was on the left-hand side. Eventually found rip-cord and stopped with a bump.

Caught sight of a Hudson pursued by three fighters.

Trees rushed up at me. My 'Mae West' was choking me and my head was forced back so I couldn't see the ground. Landed in trees. Realized I was choking but was unable to undo jacket. Nearly exhausted when I managed to struggle up to a higher bough and ease pressure.

Heard twigs breaking beneath me and almost resigned to being taken by Japs. Turned out to be wild pig.

"Found rip-cord still firmly grasped in right hand. Lumps on my head, too, so I couldn't have missed the tailplane!

"Determined to make big effort to avoid capture. Climbed gingerly down 100 feet tree to ground. Lost lots of skin and landed in dense, dark jungle. Heard twigs breaking. Hid behind tree. Another pig.

"Wednesday, 4 p.m. - Walked on north-west course until I became thoroughly confused. Sat down and waited for stars, then set off through jungle again. Checking again, found I had turned north-east. Sat down. Very thirsty. Only two matches in box and striker not much good. Mosquitoes nearly drove me mad, and wild pigs getting on my nerves.

By licking leaves kept myself going till I found puddle. Drank cold water which made me feel sick.

Found track leading west, but struck mosquito-infested swamp. Drank more water then climbed up bank and lay down. Awake all night killing mosquitoes. Began to feel weak and sick.

11 Thursday.-Started again at dawn and walked for hours.

Followed dry creek towards coast, but time after time got cut off by impenetrable sword grass. Climbed back up steep mountains and cliffs. Only water cupped in leaves and pockets of fallen trees. Forced to go north-west for hours, climbing over fallen trees, up steep banks, very high hills, and steep gorges. Made about six attempts to reach sea, but always blocked. Sun got too high to judge direction, so sat down and rested. Feeling weak from emptiness. Thought about the dangers of scratches turning into tropical ulcers, or malaria. I had to stop every half hour in a lather of sweat. Always thirsty. Made determined effort to follow small creek of stagnant waterholes to sea, irrespective of direction. Heard sea, a long way off.

"An hour later.-Am not sure whether it is the sea I hear, or wind in the trees. Am thinking of crew and hope, if they were killed, it was instantly. Reach I sea at last. Took off clothes and lay in water. Perfect. Carried clothes and walked naked along beach. Reached native village. They gave me bananas, paw-paws and water. Got very feverish and sick in the stomach. Natives frightened to help me.

"Thursday, 6 p.m.-Set off again. Reached another village, very tired and sick. Got three tabs of quinine and set off again. Climb up and down steep track. No water. I get hotter and hotter. Every time I stop I lie down before I fall down-feeling very dizzy. Stagger on. I suck a few leaves. Am all aches and can only just stop vomiting. Push on for hours.

"Thursday, io p.m.-Find small puddle and stagger down and drink. Find it full of pig marks, but can hardly prevent myself lying down beside it and staying there. Twice I decide I must lie down and go no farther, but struggle on. Reach beach and find Japs are in possession. Hurry back into jungle until I can go no farther. Lie down and shiver until morning.

"Friday.-Reach white man's hut but no white man in it. Pillow torn up and bed up-turned. Hundred yards on find white man in cave. So I meet Bill -. Bill looked after me all day. Fed me on coffee and marvelous soup. We celebrate Friday the thirteenth, and wish the Japs an unlucky day. We discuss prospects and he says he is going to stay - may be able to help other airmen. We meet Harold - and discuss getting out.

A Hudson comes over and drops flares. Try to signal with flash which is hardly any

good. Jap destroyers have landed troops in these parts, and we are all a bit jumpy. We set out in Harold's pinnace. Keep sharp lookout for Jap ships which, Harold says, have been operating here since before Christmas.

"Monday.-Meet another white man, who gives us a bottle of beer-his last-a sumptuous meal, and a bath. Life seems grand again. Weather continues unfavorable and I feel like giving it a go in a dinghy with oil drum flotation lashed in.

"Tuesday.-Walk a mile to visit another white man. He is alone. We talk to him about his schooner and spend some time camouflaging it.

"Wednesday.-It is now just a week since life seemed so desperate swinging in that tree in my 'chute. We have worked all day loading the schooner. Near dusk we begin to move.

The wind is blowing hard and the crossing threatens to be hazardous.

"Thursday.-The crossing is hazardous. Seas break
over us and it is difficult to hang on. There is a lot of water in the black hole of Calcutta we call the engine room. I am black with oil. The pumps won't work and we begin to bail. Water seems to be gaining. Weather seems to get worse.
"Friday.-Dawn, and there is no sight of land.
"Friday, 1 p.m.-Sight land. A pinnace rushes
towards us.

They might be Japs. But no, whacko, I can see Aussie hats. They point Tommy guns at us. We look so much like bushrangers they won't believe us. No wonder, I've got eight days' beard. Then we speak and they're satisfied. Their first words are, 'What about a long cold one?' Oh boy,
what about one?"

Some months later, Lerew was awarded the D.F.C., and this incident was mentioned in
the citation to the award.

"His industry, determination and courage throughout the period his squadron was at Rabaul was an example and encouragement to all his officers and men," it added. Lerew is a Permanent Air Force man. He enlisted as an
air cadet on December 19, 1932. He was appointed pilot officer on April 1, 1933, promoted to flying officer on July 1, 1935, flight lieutenant on March 1, 1937, temporary squadron leader on June 1, 1940, and temporary wing commander on October 1, 1941.

Two other members of Hudson squadrons were decorated at the same time as the crew. They were Flight Lieutenant William Allen Pedrina and Flight Lieutenant David Watt Ian Campbell.

By his daring and devotion to duty in the face of great odds, Pedrina's name became known wherever men of the R.A.A.F. flew. His determination to complete his allotted task, whatever the obstacles, not only proved an inspiration to the members of his squadron, but resulted in extremely valuable information being obtained about enemy dispositions and shipping. From the beginning of hostilities with Japan, Pedrina had been constantly engaged on reconnaissance over enemy-occupied territory. His skill as a pilot, and his courage and his determination, had resulted in clear, distinct, and valuable photographs being obtained under the most trying conditions.

On February 11, Pedrina took part in a daylight raid on enemy destroyers and transports in the occupied port of Gasmata. With his two accompanying Hudsons, Pedrina dived to mast height and attacked the target, flying down into a cloud of antiaircraft fire. Pedrina continued coolly with his task and completed it with considerable success, and on returning to his base, he furnished a clear and full account of enemy strength and the results of the raid.

Eight days later, Pedrina carried out a notable daylight reconnaissance over Rabaul. In a clear sky, without opportunity to take cloud cover from the persistent attacks of an enemy fighter, Pedrina obtained full and accurate information of the enemy's movements at the port. His aircraft was riddled with bullets, his landing flap controls were damaged, one tyre was holed, and his rear gunner was killed. Yet Pedrina flew back over 5oo miles to his base and landed his aircraft safely.

Pedrina enlisted in the R.A.A.F. as an air cadet on January 17, 1938. He was promoted flight lieutenant on September 1, 1940

Campbell was awarded his D.F.C. for a most hectic daylight reconnaissance of Rabaul on February 6, 1942, while it was in enemy hands. As Campbell arrived over the target, an enemy fighter took off to intercept him. Campbell calmly continued his photographic and visual reconnaissance as the Zero climbed to attack. Four minutes after his job was commenced, the Zero opened the engagement, and Campbell sped for cloud cover. In repeated attacks by the Zero, he was wounded in the left hand and wrist, his second pilot was wounded and put out of action, and his rear gunner was wounded in both legs.

To add to his tribulations, the sea-markers were hit and exploded, filling the aircraft with a dense cloud of the fine aluminium powder with which they are filled. The altimeter and air speed indicator were smashed by bullets, the starboard tyre was shot away, and the petrol tanks were holed.

Campbell eluded the enemy, flew his mangled aircraft back to base, and landed safely on one wheel, with only one engine functioning, and with his petrol exhausted.
Although weakened by wounds and loss of blood, Campbell was able to give a clear and concise reconnaissance report which was later substantiated by the excellent photographs he had brought back.

Campbell joined the Citizen Air Force as a cadet on November 6, 1939, and was appointed pilot officer in February 1940. He was promoted flying officer the following August, and temporary flight lieutenant on October 1, 1941