Chapter 6 Air Swat; Syrian Triumph; Eyes for the army.

ONE of the worst drubbings the Axis airmen suffered was in the Acroma region, when 2o enemy aircraft of a flight Of 30 were shot down and the rest were damaged. The fight was described by a R.A.F.-officer, who said: "There were at least 30 of them, but numbers didn't mean a thing. It was like swatting flies, the way they went down. As we dived and banked, we could see our troops on the ground below flinging their hats in the air as the Jerries and Wops hit the ground."

All our aircraft in this amazing adventure returned safely to their bases. The R.A.F. men destroyed eleven and a half enemy aircraft, and the R.A.A.F. squadron destroyed the other eight and a half. Every~, pilot bagged something. Australian pilots who bagged two enemy aircraft each were Sergeant Pilot W. H. A. Mailey, of Cronulla, New South Wales, and Flying Officer P. R. Giddy, of Toorak, Melbourne.

It was soon after this that a new Australian Kittyhawk squadron in the Western Desert, composed of Empire air trainees, made its first "kill"-a Junkers 88. In the following month, another member of this squadron got his first "kill", a coveted Messerschmitt. Though still in his operational swaddling clothes, he behaved with the resource and sang-froid of a veteran of many encounters. Stukas were about to bomb Tobruk when the Australian saw them, and their top cover of Messerschmitts.

Becoming separated from his squadron, he was attacked astern by five of the fighters. Turning swiftly in his tracks, he opened the throttle and hurtled straight at the enemy, and with his guns blazing, made a path right through them. One of the Me.'s turned on its back and spiraled down to earth with smoke pouring from the engine. The remaining enemy fighters turned, and the Australian wheeled also and went through them again. This time another Messerschmitt turned away with pieces of fuselage falling from it., The Australian flew on, and this time there were no followers. He was credited with one Me.

In all these operations in the Middle East, the Imperial air forces had been hampered; by the lack of heavy long-range bombers, but before Rommel began the spectacular advance which took him to the gates of Egypt, there had been a slight accretion of strength in this section of the air arms, and in the Battle for the Gap which was waged bitterly in May 1942, his panzer forces were given a taste of the terror blitz which they had made famous as battle-winning tactics.

For these strafes, the Allied air forces in Libya used Kittyhawks, Tomahawks, Kitty-bombers (fighters equipped to carry bombs and then continue the battle as fighters), Hurricanes and Hurri-bombers, fast Boston medium bombers, and Skua (not Stuka) dive bombers.

Australian, British, and South African airmen took part in these furious attacks, and for days the enemy mechanized divisions staggered under the unending blows rained upon them.

At night, the long-range Wellingtons and Albacores hammered at the enemy's rear bases at Derna and Martuba, from which his bombers and fighters operated, and smashed at his supply depots, adding to the delay, destruction, and disorganization of the advance.

Wedged tightly in the narrow defile of the minefield which he had penetrated, the enemy suffered terrible losses. At one place where the channel was only 1,000 yards wide, the sky was filled with darting, spitting aircraft, which flew in low to drop their bomb loads, and hastened back to base for another cargo, then back again to the Gap, to wreak more destruction. This incessant attack from the air threw the enemy into a state of chaos, and in the smoke, dust and confusion, he suffered still more losses through collision or crashes into bomb craters. Hundreds of enemy transport vehicles were wrecked in this battle, in which the Empire forces did a magnificent job, working in close co-operation with the land forces in spite of the bitter retaliatory action of German and Italian aircraft.

Rommel's continued advance in the face of this battering served to emphasize the need in the North African campaign for more heavy four-engined bombers to blast his backward bases, and so, hitting at the source of his supplies, slow up the general advance, if not render it impossible.

Much of the effectiveness of air attacks is, of course, due to sound reconnaissance flights before and during the battle. It is the reconnaissance aircraft which detect and report targets for the fighters and bombers to attack. Theirs is a hazardous task. It is the duty of their pilots to find the targets, and then radio, or hasten back to base with their information. However great the temptation, they must not tarry to fight. The information they have gleaned is more important to the armies below than mere personal glory.

Webmasters note. Early in the war the Zero had a reputation for being able to out climb Allied planes. This advantage disappeared when newer models were released.

THE Syrian campaign was a triumph for the Allied air forces, whose support of the land and naval forces considerably shortened the operations against the Vichy French troops.

No. 3 Royal Australian Air Force squadron, which had been doing magnificent work in the Allied advances and retirements in Libya and Cyrenaica, had been transferred for the campaign, and carried on in the same tradition of offensive spirit that had marked its operations in North Africa. Flying their new Tomahawk fighters, the Australians shot down 24 enemy aircraft in combat in the four weeks' campaign and destroyed, or seriously damaged, about 5o on the ground. To this splendid score must be added a long list of "possibles" and "probables". In achieving this, the Australians lost no pilot, and only one aircraft.

One of those dramatic escape stories of which this war has been so fruitful hangs on this incident.

In a dogfight near Hama, this pilot was shot down by the pilot of a Dewoitine aircraft, who was himself almost immediately shot down by another Australian. The pilot of the lost Tomahawk baled out, and landed near an Arab village, but as he did not know whether the Arabs would be friendly, he hid in the hills for a couple of days. At the end of this time, a band of wandering Arabs found him. Fortunately, they proved to be friendly, bade him remain where he was, brought him food, of which he was in considerable need, and an array of Arab clothing, in which he attired himself. Thus disguised he was smuggled into Homs, which was then held by the French.

In the very heart of the enemy stronghold, the pilot remained hidden until an Allied column reached the outskirts of the city.

One of the friendly Arabs then sneaked through the Vichy lines, and told a British unit of the pilot's plight. Soon after, the Armistice negotiations were in progress, and after being five days behind the French lines, the pilot returned to safety.

These Australian Tomahawks rendered yeoman service in Syria. In addition to constant patrols and to interception and attacks on enemy aircraft sent out to strafe the A.I.F. the pilots seized every opportunity to launch low-flying attacks on troops and armoured and other fighting vehicles. Valuable protection was also given to British naval vessels operating round the coast.

The attacks on Vichy land transport were devastating. On one occasion, a convoy of vehicles was sighted on a main road leading to Damascus. Flying at a low level, the Tomahawks sped back and forth, vomiting a hall of lead and high explosive into the lorries.

The cannons with which the Tomahawks were fitted made them especially suitable for this type of attack, and the Vichy loss in men and materials was extremely high.

At this stage of the campaign, the loss of transport was a severe blow to the enemy, as quick movement of men, materials, equipment, stores, and food was vital to him.

Another spectacular success was scored by our men at the strafing of the railway yard at Homs. Bursts from the Tomahawk set a petrol dump alight, and the fires quickly spread to an ammunition train, which exploded with a terrific roar, and destroyed a troop train with 2,000 Vichy soldiers on board. The damage was appalling. The Australians were unable to guess at its extent at the time, and it was not until they visited the railway yard after the Armistice, that they were able to see the wreckage, and learn from reports of eye-witnesses, the terrible havoc they had caused.

The best "bag" scored by No. 3 squadron in any one day in Syria was six Glenn-Martin bombers out of a total of six, and this occurred at an extremely opportune moment. The Vichy bombers had been giving Allied troops outside Palmyra a thin time, and had caused the morale of the Vichy defenders to soar. The wiping off of the whole six in one fell swoop, right over our cheering troops below, had a remarkable effect on their offensive spirit. They swept irresistibly into the city, and the enemy resistance collapsed. This was a striking example of the morale and offensive power of air attack against troops not extremely well equipped to counter it.

On another day, the Tomahawks met five Dewoitine fighters and shot them all out of the sky. In a single day's operations, die Australians made 31 separate sorties, and in one of them two more Glenn-Martins were shot down. Three Vichy fighters and five motor transports were destroyed by the Australians during a heavy raid on a Vichy aerodrome on June 23, 1941, and aerodrome buildings were extensively damaged. The operation was planned as a reprisal against Vichy air attacks on our troops, and the squadron was under orders to reduce the activities at the Vichy air base. The attack was launched, and the Tomahawks raked military objectives with machine-gun and cannon fire.

A Glenn-Martin bomber was destroyed on the ground, and at least five motor transport vehicles were badly damaged in the initial attack. A large hangar was marked out for particular attention, and after prolonged attack, it was left a mass of flames. To such purpose was this raid carried out that subsequent reconnaissance showed that not only was the hangar and all it contained completely destroyed, but only a mass of cinders remained where a number of huts had stood nearby.

While the attack was proceeding on the aerodrome, a number of Vichy fighters came on the scene unexpectedly, had turned on the Tomahawks. The Australians immediately dashed into the attack, and two of the enemy went spinning down in flames within a few minutes. The rest of the enemy broke off the engagement. Only one of our aircraft was slightly damaged.

Two days later, three more Vichy aircraft were shot down. A formation of Tomahawks was on patrol over the A.I.F. and other troops at Palmyra when they intercepted a strong force of Potez 63s. These were twin-engined fighter-bombers, and mounted two cannon and a machine gun. The Australians immediately wheeled into the attack, and in the brisk dogfight which ensued, three Potez were shot down and -another was damaged. Up to this stage, ii enemy aircraft had been brought down by the Australians, the victims including three Junkers 88s. Proof had been supplied by this time that not only were there some German aircraft being used in Syria, but some were being flown by German pilots.

On June 26, R.A.A.F. Tomahawks destroyed or damaged 15 Vichy aircraft and petrol ,and ammunition dumps, during raids on hostile airfields. The Australians concentrated their attacks on the fields at Horns and Ruyak, machine-gunning any aircraft or other ground targets they could find. At Horns the attack was most successful. Four Vichy aircraft were destroyed, and six more were badly damaged, a large petrol reserve was fired, and an ammunition dump was blown up. At Ruyak five more aircraft were damaged on the ground. One was a Dewoitine, and the others could not be identified.

July was ushered in by the Australians with a low-flying strafe of enemy ground targets. Baalbek was the rendezvous for these attacks, and two light tanks and 20 other vehicles were left in ruins. Two Potez 63s and four unidentified aircraft on the landing field at Baalbek were shot up without loss to ourselves.

Intense air activity marked the concluding stages of the conflict in Syria. In three days, the R.A.A.F. squadrons damaged or destroyed 19 Vichy aircraft. Aerodromes, munitions dumps, goods trains, and transport columns were attacked, and sorties made to intercept aircraft machine-gunning and bombing our troops. July 9 saw the opening of three days' intensive strafing by the Australians. Beirut was elected for attention, and Tomahawks made 25 sorties against selected targets. They exploded an ammunition dump near Damour and machine-gunned several transport columns and three railway goods trains.

Next day, a small formation of R.A.A.F. fighters escorted Blenheim bombers of the R.A.F. Middle East Command in an attack on ammunition dumps at Hammana. Five Dewoitines attacked from below, shooting down two of the British Blenheims and forcing another to land. But the Vichy elation was short lived, for the Australians dived to the attack with such verve that not one of the Dewoitines reached its base. Not content with this exhibition of their power, the Australians, before the day was over, made 20 sorties against enemy aerodromes at Talia and Hama, shooting up everything of military value, and by their daring, inviting enemy fighters to go up and offer battle. None, however, did so.

July ii was one of the most successful days since the opening of the Syrian campaign. The Australians machine-gunned aerodromes at Fah, Hama, and Aleppo. Three Vichy aircraft on the ground were destroyed, and ii others were damaged. (It was in this engagement that our only loss was suffered, a Tomahawk being shot down.) The same day, motor transport on Mazar Ridge, near Dimas, was machine-gunned, and three vehicles were destroyed and others were damaged.

These were the types of operations at which the Australians in the Middle East campaigns had proved particularly adept. They had learned their technique over the desert of North Africa, to which, with these Vichy scalps at their belt, they were soon to return, to resume the war against the Germans and Italians where they had left it off.

Since they had arrived in the Middle East, the members of this squadron had flown, five types of aircraft, all of which were different from those which they had used in. Australia. Of these types, four were fighters-Gauntlets, Gladiators, Hurricanes and Tomahawks-and the other was the army co-operation type Lysander.

STERLING work has been done in the Middle East by No- 451 R.A.A.F. army cooperation squadron, yet, by the very nature of its work, it has not "made the headlines" as some other squadrons, particularly fighter squadrons, have done.

In April 1941 the Australian ground staff for No. 451 left Australia, and on arrival in Egypt the squadron was built up from pilots already there or to come from Rhodesia and other training schools. In six weeks the squadron was in air operations in the Western Desert. At first, some of the key ground jobs were held by R.A.F. technicians and the pilots were a mixed collection, representing the R.A.F., the R.A.A.F. (all Empire air scheme !ads) and South Africans. The R.A.F. provided the commanding officer and flight commanders. In the next 12 months, the R.A.F. personnel were gradually replaced by Australians, and an Australian (Squadron Leader Ferguson) was placed in command. Later again, Squadron Leader Dixie Chapman, formerly of No- 3 squadron R.A.A.F., was posted to command the squadron.

By this time, practically every member of the squadron (and the pilots without exception) was an Australian. To-day, the squadron is 95 per cent R.A.A.F.

No. 451 is responsible for tactical reconnaissance, artillery co-operation, photographic reconnaissance, and direct air support for troops. This squadron was responsible for the whole of the reconnaissance photography, and for the direction of certain artillery shoots for the six months preceding the last campaign in Libya. This, of course, entailed photography to determine the presence of minefields, the disposition and number of the enemy, his guns, fortified positions, and so on; and on this work, and the information supplied, depended in a large measure the plans for the general offensive.

A vast proportion of army co-operation reconnaissance work is done before the campaign starts, but during the campaign, repeated sorties are made by the aircraft to "spot" the movements of enemy transport, concentrations of enemy supplies, and troops. In addition, as the campaign moves forward, photographs must be taken of the new positions, so that the land forces may know where to expect strength and where to attack weakness. During a siege, such as that at Halfaya, Bardia, or Sollum, the aircraft "spot" for the land gunners, directing their fire on to gun positions, troops, headquarters, and the like, before the final assault is made by 'infantry and tanks.

As an instance of the importance of this work, it may be stated that in the siege of Bardia, one reconnaissance aircraft of No. 451 squadron directed the artillery fire which sank a large supply steamer in the port.

During reconnaissance over the enemy lines, the pilot of an army co-operation aircraft may decide that some form of air support is needed to assist certain army formations. He advises the central control and his advice is accepted or rejected, as the general position dictates.

There have been many fine exploits performed by the men who act as the eyes of the army, and the following brief account of one such expedition is typical of what occurs quite commonly over the battlefields.

A Maryland reconnaissance aircraft, manned by Sergeant Sydney George Welshman, of Newcastle, New South Wales, as pilot, Sergeant Jones, of Adelaide, as observer, and Sergeant Kelly, of Rockhampton, as air gunner, and a second gunner who hailed from Durham, England, was spying out the land over enemy positions in the latest enemy advance, when it ran into heavy anti-aircraft fire, one burst of which tore through the wing and aileron. Another burst shot away the Maryland's cowling. While it was in this damaged condition, the Maryland was attacked by five fighters, and suffered further damage.

1n this desperate plight, Welshman decided to take cover, and he dashed for thin cloud, and after clever maneuvering, succeeded in losing the five attackers. Twenty minutes later, while the Maryland was still on its mission, another enemy fighter swooped down on it and riddled it with bullets from 2oo yards. This time, Welshman resorted to evasive action which took the Maryland right down to ground level, and eventually shook off his pursuer. Welshman then turned for home. As he circled his home aerodrome, with the fuselage riddled, the port wing damaged, and the cowling shot away, the ground staff could see daylight through the holed wing, and the ambulance was called out for what was expected to be a crash landing. But Welshman brought his aircraft down safely, and the crew triumphantly handed over a complete set of valuable photographs and other information they had gathered visually.

A few days later, Flight Sergeant Raymond David Dyson, of Cottesloe, Western Australia, shot down his sixth enemy plane. The Messerschmitt victim was the first of two shot down on the same day by the Australian squadron of which Dyson was a member. In a quarter-of-an-hour aerial duel, in which both aircraft spiralled and twisted, and dived and dodged, Flight Lieutenant J. E. A. Williams, of Sydney, bagged the first. Williams was patrolling near El Adern when the Messerschmitt came at him from the sun. Williams swerved away and for the next 15 minutes the two fought it out, man to man. The German fired several bursts ineffectively. At last Williams saw his chance, and ripped in a fierce burst which sent the enemy into a tremendous dive to earth. Williams followed him down and saw the Messerschmitt crash into the ground and explode. Dyson made no mistake about his sixth victim, which cracked up in the air after a burst from his guns.