General Adachi said; RAN in Japan; MID; Saltwater Voodoo.....

Barada Gorge by G. W. Lambert, ARA 

GENERAL ADACHI SAID

These are figures very much at variance with ours!

The effect of Allied air attacks, said Adachi, was negligible; but artillery fire was deadly and unexpected-and had a very detrimental effect on morale.

Thus began the Japanese retreat. The tide had turned.

On the subject of the operation known to Australians as "Templeton's Crossing", Adachi had little to say. He knew nothing of the Japanese withdrawal except that it was in the nature of a rearguard action to permit the withdrawal of the main body to Kokoda, the unit engaged being one battalion of infantry supported by one field gun.

By this time the physical condition of the Japanese troops was very poor. They were suffering from dysentery, malaria, beriberi and tropical ulcers. Their morale was low and had been undermined by the newly developed Australian tactics of "bypassing" and attacking from the rear.

Eora fell. Then the Australians under Major General G. A. Vasey, who had now assumed command in the area, headed for Kokoda whilst another force pressed on to Oivi by an easterly track. Kokoda fell on 4 November, and on the same day the 2/3rd Battalion contacted the main Japanese force at Oivi.

It was intended by the Japanese to establish a defensive line from Oivi to Gorari, but the Australians took up a position midway between the two spots, thus cutting off the Oivi force and jeopardizing the defence of Buna. Casualties were "extremely high", said the general, most of them occurring in an attempt to escape down the swiftly flowing Kumusi River. Among the dead was the commander of the Army South Sea Detachment, Major General Horii. The total drowned numbered fifteen hundred.

Organized operations in the Owen Stanleys were now at an end. The retreat became a rout: a scramble for the haven of Buna and Gona. Australians, after little delay, crossed the three hundred yards wide Kumusi and were hard on the heels of the retreating Japs. Actually Gona was entered by the 2/31st Battalion on 20 November, but, owing to supply problems, they were forced to withdraw to a point on the Sanananda track about three miles north of Soputa.

Japanese forces in the Buna-Gona area at this time numbered about nine thousand, made up of reinforcements landed on several occasions from the middle of July and the survivors of the Owen Stanley operations.

Four attempts were made to strengthen this garrison still further, but two were definite failures - the destroyers carrying the troops being intercepted by Allied aircraft. Of the other two, one party of five hundred landed at the mouth of the Kumusi where three hundred were killed; the other party landed at Mainbalai but lost their arms and equipment and were therefore rendered useless added Adachi.

The battle for the beachheads commenced on 20 November when General Blamey's carefully prepared plan was put into operation by Lieutenant-General Sir Edmund Herring. On the first day contact was made along the whole front. On the extreme right Americans under Major-General Harding were engaged on the coastal road south of Buna airfield and near Buna Mission. On the Sanananda track was the Seventh Australian Division. Another A.I.F. and a C.M.F. battalion were located on the extreme left.

The whole thing, stated General Adachi, came as a complete surprise, because any offensive against Buna was expected to be in the nature of a wholly amphibious operation.

But, despite this, the battle raged for two months - a period which will remain very vividly in the minds of Australians who fought there.

The battle for Milne Bay had been another disaster for the Japanese during 1942. On 24 August the Australian garrison there consisted of the 7th and 18th Brigades. These troops were supported by a few base units, two squadrons of R.A.A.F. fighters and a detachment of R.A.A.F. bombers. The whole force was commanded by Major-General C. A. Clowes. Japanese intelligence once again proved wrong. The force was thought to consist of only two or three companies for defence of the airfield and about thirty planes.

To occupy the Solomons and the eastern half of New Guinea was the main object of Jap planning, and, as Milne Bay possessed this airfield, it was considered to be a strategic point on the northern coast of the island. For the operation to capture the strip Adachi planned to use naval troops only; these plans were later altered to take in army troops as well. The American forces, however, upset this scheme by landing at Guadalcanal. Army troops were then required in the Solomons to handle the situation and the original plan was brought into use again.

The convoy which left Rabaul on 24 August carried specially picked troops of the Kure Naval 5 Special Marines and the 10th Naval Labour Corps, and consisted of the Nankai Maru, the Kanai Maru, and the cruisers Tenryu and Tatsatu, with two escorting corvettes. In addition the Sasebo 5 Special Marines left Buna in seven barges to act as reinforcements. These barges stopped at Goodenough Island on the twenty-sixth where they were seen by Allied planes. Later the same day the force was attacked from the air and all seven barges were destroyed - leaving about three hundred men stranded on the island.

Meanwhile, the main Japanese convoy arrived off Milne Bay in the early hours of the twenty-sixth and a barge landing was completed without "much opposition" near K.B. Mission, a point held by a company of the 61st Battalion.

All the first day Allied aircraft worried the Japs as they pushed on toward the airfield against stiffening opposition and casualties here became "considerable".

As with the Owen Stanleys operation, lack of detailed knowledge of the area by the Japanese resulted in the landing being made farther from the aerodrome than was intended. The rainfall was extremely heavy, the troops' physical condition low, and the unknown terrain - about which the natives once more refused to provide information - all contributed to the Jap High Command's decision to "abandon" the operation and withdraw the Japanese forces engaged. The commanding officer of the Kure Marines, Naval Commander Hayashi, and most of his staff were killed, as well as a large part of the force itself. Accurate casualty figures, however, were "not known" by General Adachi.

During the Milne Bay battle some wounded were evacuated to Rabaul by destroyer-a risky business; which ended on 6 September when the Tenryu sneaked in at might, loaded six hundred aboard and sped back to Rabaul.

The troops who had become stranded on Goodenough Island were left to defend it. For months the garrison was without rations, then meagre supplies were landed by submarines which also evacuated the sick. Australians landed on 21 October and, after two days' disorganized  fighting, the remaining Japanese troops were evacuated by barge to Pula-Pula Island, off the coast of New Guinea.

The events of 1943, with the Australians' successful actions at Wau, Salamaua, Lae and Finschhafen, and the final expulsion of Japanese from the Huon Peninsula, spelt doom for General Adachi's army.

The year began with a move on Wau: one third of the Japanese 51st Division against what their intelligence reported to be "about two companies of native troops under the command of Australians". This force numbered fifteen hundred men.

But, again, lack of previous reconnaissance, supply difficulties and trouble experienced in establishing signal communication from forward troops, were given as reasons for the Japanese failure. Killed in action numbered six hundred and evacuation of casualties totalled four hundred, which meant a loss of two thirds of the force. The Japanese attributed these heavy casualties to telling artillery fire in the clearings around Wau.

They suffered their next blow in March when a convoy of eight troop transports and twelve destroyers left Rabaul for Lae. Troops in the convoy were the main body of the 51st Division, part of 18th Army Signals, and the complete 18th Army headquarters: in all, approximately eight thousand three hundred men. Off the west coast of New Britain on 28 February, the ships were observed by a lone Flying Fortress. Simultaneously Japanese at Rabaul intercepted a message from the plane to it, base at Moresby reporting its discovery and giving the convoy's position.

The commander at Rabaul decided to send fighter cover for his convoy in relieving waves. The aircraft chosen could remain airborne for only three hours, which meant that each wave could spend only one hour over the convoy. It was during one of the "change-over" periods, when the ships were left unprotected for a short time. that Allied bombers struck.

When the relieving Japanese fighters eventually arrived most of the damage had been done, and cloud conditions made interception "difficult". The attack continued without interruption and when our bombers departed, all ships with the exception of four destroyers were sunk or sinking. Of the eight thousand three hundred only three thousand five hundred survived - two thousand reaching New Guinea and fifteen hundred landing at Rabaul. Adachi and his headquarters staff were on one of the destroyers which escaped destruction.

That action was the Battle of the Bismarck Sea.

In the middle of the year operations centred around Salamaua, which was considered by the Japanese to be another strategic position and one to be held at all costs. The fall of Salamaua would also mean the fall of Lae, so that the security of the latter base depended upon the Salamaua defences. The strength of this garrison was accordingly built up to about five thousand with troops from Rabaul, New Ireland, Lae and Wewak.

The first move was an operation designed to recapture Bobdubi Ridge. At that time the Japanese front line of defence ran between Mubo and Komiatum and as the ridge was west of Komiatum it was obvious that, should the Australians continue to hold it, both vital points would be menaced and communication between Komiatum and Salamaua would be endangered.

After eventual failure here and the death in action of Colonel Hungo, chief staff officer of the 51st Division, the position at Salamaua began to deteriorate.

Then on the night Of 30 June American troops landed in the Nassau Bay area and the Japanese garrison there had its communications with Salamaua severed. Supplies were scarce and the troops were ordered to withdraw to Salamaua.

From a new line of defence at Rokan, the commander of the 51st Division, Major General Nakano, planned to take the offensive against the Americans but owing to "lack of materials" he was forced to abandon the plan.

After the American landing the Australians at Mubo and Bobdubi intensified their offensive, particularly at Mubo, where a successful encircling movement forced a Jap withdrawal to amalgamate with the troops at Komiatum.

The Japanese front line now extended inland in an arc with Salamaua as centre and a naval garrison of about five hundred was installed on the narrow peninsula. When the Australians at Wampit pushed down in the direction of Bung, the Jap commander interpreted this move as being designed to take Bung and thus facilitate an amphibious landing there.

In order to prevent this one battalion of the I02nd Regiment-about a hundred and fifty men-attacked the Australians (who had now reached Bung) and occupied the position. This success certainly improved and strengthened communications with Lac, but the healthier state of affairs was short-lived for on the night Of 20 July both Americans and Australians suddenly intensified their offensive on all fronts. The garrison at Salamaua was hard pressed and further reinforcements of two regiments were thrown in to stem the Allied advance.

On io August the Japanese succeeded in holding, for a short time, a line stretching from Bobdubi to Komiatum to Rokan. Allied artillery bombardments now became the greatest danger, said the general, and a desperate attempt by a hundred picked men to infiltrate the gun positions failed miserably. Instead American and Australian troops infiltrated the Jap positions at Komiatum and Rokan, forcing another withdrawal to a feature known as Grass Mountain.

By 4 September the Japanese forces were prepared for a final stand on the Francisco River, near the township, but shattering news of the Ninth Australian Division's landing at the Busu River near Lae indicated that it was now impossible to hold Lae and Salamaua.

Orders for withdrawals went out from Adachi's headquarters and the evacuation from Lac commenced on 8 September, the last unit leaving eight days later.

Air raids on Lae and Salamaua were highly effective, pinning troops down in trenches during the daylight hours and taking heavy toll in shelters wrongly dispersed. The 51st Division headquarters had to be moved after a direct hit. Adachi himself was there when the bomb fell but escaped injury.

The most efficient feature of the campaign in Japanese eyes was considered to be the cooperation between Allied air and ground forces. Attacks on Japanese positions were preceded by heavy and accurate raids. They were almost completely destroyed when ground forces attacked. Organized resistance was therefore impossible.

As far back as July the Japanese command realized that Allied attacks on Lae and Nadzab could be expected, but there was never any definite intelligence of pending plans until after the Australians had landed. To use Adachi's own words: "We were taken completely by surprise."

Similarly, the Japanese expected an Allied landing in the Finschhafen area, and on 20 July it was decided to send the 80th Infantry Regiment to counter this attack. Expectations of the move were definitely confirmed when a surprise bombardment of the Busu River area commenced before the Ninth Division's landing.

This was recognized as the beginning of the Huon Peninsula campaign.

Japanese garrison troops at Finschhafen numbered about four thousand but through sickness the actual fighting strength was only two thousand eight hundred men, comprising infantry, artillery and certain base naval units. To strengthen this force the main body of the 2oth Division left Madang on 15 September, travelling by land and sea.

But on 22 September at 4.45 a.m. two companies each of the 2/17th and 2/13th Australian Battalions landed at Siki Cove, to be followed later by the remainder of the 2oth Brigade. Jap defence preparations were still far from complete and the commander ordered the 8oth Regiment to occupy and hold high positions near Satelberg, thus enabling the 2oth Division to reach Finschhafen. The subsequent fighting was described by General Adachi as " a delaying action".

Meanwhile the 2oth Division, learning of the Australian landing, tried to quicken their pace. Although the wild terrain and poor physical condition of the troops made it impossible to speed up the advance to any extent, the two Japanese forces linked up near Satelberg on io October and an offensive was launched on the Allied beachhead a week later.

This operation was considered by the Japanese to be on the verge of success when another flanking move by the Australians led to the loss of Satelberg. This meant that the fall of Finschhafen was imminent. Local resistance was continued, however, in order to prevent the Allies from making an attack on Cape Gloucester and Marcus Point, an operation which the Japanese thought would immediately have taken place had resistance at Finschhafen ceased altogether. To prepare for a move against these two points the I 7th Division was being moved from Rabaul to Cape Gloucester, but only part of the division had arrived when on Christmas Day American troops landed. The delaying tactics around Finschhafen were therefore of no avail. The

2oth Division had fared badly: losses were extremely high and infantry units were reduced to twenty per cent of their normal fighting strength. This fact, and the quick success of the American operation at Cape Gloucester, resulted in Adachi ordering the withdrawal of the formation along the coast to Sio-about midway between Finschhafen and Saidor. But on i January 1944 a United States landing was made at the latter point - where the Jap force consisted of about two thousand under Major General Nakai - cutting the coastal escape route.

General Adachi then ordered the 2oth Division at Sio and the 51st Division to march inland and across country to Madang. Further, he planned for the battered 20th on the way to move in to the coast and attack Saidor en route. This project, however, was abandoned because the ration position was such that only thirty tons of food were landed by submarine at Sio - all that was available to feed a division! Those thirty tons were landed by one of four submarines which left Rabaul loaded with supplies. The rest were sunk.

So the march began. Pursued by the Fifth Australian Division, the Japanese route lay over rugged unmapped mountains rising to heights of up to six thousand feet. The "north-west" season had just begun and the mountain streams became swollen rivers within a few hours of torrential downpours.

Knowing something of the enemy's morale, the Australian commander, Major-General A. H. Ramsay, did not expect any major opposition from the retreating Japs. The Australians kept fairly close to the coast: the Japs were forced to trek over the mountains.

To last the whole journey under these conditions, each Japanese soldier could be issued with only one cup of rice and a pinch of salt. Of almost twenty thousand who set out for Madang, half perished, and the remainder straggled into their destination on i o March.

During the Finschhafen campaign seventeen thousand Japanese troops were killed in action or died from sickness and starvation.

General Adachi revealed that the first indication of Australian operations at Satelberg came when the attack actually started and that the use of Matilda tanks in such country was another complete surprise. This is understandable because elaborate precautions were taken by the Australians to keep secret the presence of part of the 1st Tank Battalion.

When the vehicles were clattering to their assembly point, an artillery barrage was directed at the Japs, thus drowning the noise which would have been easily distinguishable. This bombardment, although not inflicting many casualties, had the usual considerable effect on morale. Casualties from air strafing were "light".

Reverting to the attempt to capture our beachhead at Finschhafen on 17 October, the Jap commander said that the barge-borne force which landed at Scarlet Beach consisted of approximately two hundred men equipped with knee mortars, grenades, light machine guns and flame throwers. Bofors fire from the 2 /4th Australian Light A.A. Regiment and the .50 calibre guns of the 532 United States Boat and Shore Regiment destroyed two of the barges and another one drifted away out of control, loaded with screaming men. The Japanese insist that all four barges were sunk and that only sixty men survived the operation.

In the fighting around Anto Point on the same day, about fifteen hundred troops took part. These troops, moving from the northern heights of Satelberg and cutting a track through the jungle in order to make a surprise attack, were to co-ordinate with the troops landed from the barges. Another under-estimation of Allied strength, the failure of the amphibious landing, lack of artillery support and the sustained fighting, led to the only large-scale counter-attack ending dismally for them. Organized resistance now ceased: the Huon Peninsula campaign ended.

Members of the Eleventh Australian Division who landed at Rabaul on io September 1945 saw for themselves the elaborate defence preparations which had been built up by the Japanese forces on New Britain.

This was done by no starving army.

The storming of Rabaul would have been a bloody battle indeed, for the Japanese here, although cut off from their homeland, were fresh, physically fit and splendidly equipped. The defences were the result of clever and, for the most part, accurate interpretation of Allied moves, based on close observation in the Pacific war theatre.

In September 1944 an Allied offensive was expected to be launched at the north coast of New Britain. Allied shipping movements were closely watched, the area was searched in an endeavour to capture members of the Allied Intelligence Bureau operating on the island and certain units were strategically disposed to meet the invading forces. Everything pointed to this operation being carried out by United States troops, but when the Fifth Australian Division landed at Jacquinot Bay at the end of 1944, it was decided by the Japanese Command that any attempt against Rabaul by Australians would come by land from the south.

Australia did not possess a "strong Navy", and, they said, as the American fleet was engaged elsewhere, lack of naval support for an amphibious operation pointed to a long arduous land campaign with the Australians moving northwards from bases at Jacquinot Bay and Open Bay.

New defences were immediately established at Wide Bay on the west coast, while around Open Bay were additional troops who had escaped from Cape Gloucester after the American landing.

The Australians landed at an "unprotected point" in the Open Bay area and as they did not follow up their advantage with an immediate attack, the commander of the 17th Division, Lieutenant-General Sakai, ordered troops to strengthen all positions, to study the terrain and carry out intensive training.

It was difficult, the Japanese said, to understand the presence of Australian troops on New Britain at all with the war moving swiftly towards the Philippines.

Some Japanese officers contended that it was a political move designed so that Australia could claim her Mandates after the war. Others held the view that the use of Australians in New Britain was an excuse for not participating in the Philippines campaigns. Yet another section believed that Australians would not be sent there to fill a minor role. Another school of thought considered the Fifth Division's presence as a clever ruse to give the impression that most of the Australian Army had landed, whereas, in fact, the greater portion would move to the Philippines with the Americans.

Such was the Japanese attempt to pierce the fog of war.

When it was subsequently discovered that only a "few thousand" Australians were on New Britain, the Rabaul Command decided to make a "big show" in the Open Bay sector where they would endeavour to engage as many Australians as possible. This would, they thought, result in reinforcements being withdrawn from the Philippines.

The plan began with a move near Ulamona on 26 October, where, after several clashes with Australian troops, the small force withdrew by barges, taking with them the impression that the Australian force was even smaller than was at first thought. Hope of fighting a large-scale battle began to wane.

On the eastern side of the island New Guinea natives landed in the vicinity of Tol Plantation and commenced harassing tactics. This appeared to indicate another Australian landing at Wide Bay. Consequently Japanese troops were sent down the coast to comb the area and soon clashed with the Australians moving north. After suffering heavy casualties the Japs withdrew.

The garrison at Wide Bay was now reinforced with units from Rabaul and orders were issued to rid the area of Allied Intelligence Bureau personnel and to put up a stiff resistance should operations commence.

Attack came in the beginning of February when an Australian force estimated at one battalion met the Japs at Kalai. The garrison was forced to retreat on 9 February, while the Australians with artillery support moved up to the Henry Reid River.

Early in March the dreaded artillery barrage came over and the Australians south of the river advanced under cover of the fire, capturing the main Japanese water point. Thereafter the Jap lines were systematically infiltrated and casualties began to mount. Reinforcements from Rabaul were not forthcoming because the Japanese main line of defence along the Warangoi and Keravat Rivers "could not be disturbed".

The commander of the 38th Division, Lieutenant-General Kagesa, sent a "message of encouragement" to the Tol commander, who, on 12 March, decided to fight it out to the last man. All personnel, including headquarters staffs, were in this final rally along the northern bank of the Henry Reid and, in the absence of further information, the unit was subsequently assumed to have been completely annihilated.

Australian troops now moved in force to the Wide Bay area and the Rabaul garrison waited for an attack to come.

They were still waiting when the war ended two months later.

M. H. S.

THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY IN JAPAN

Other ships to leave the area during this month were Quickmatch, Nizam and Ballarat, the latter ship proceeding to Hong Kong via Subic Bay , while Ipswich arrived in Adelaide on 13 October.

H.M.A.S. Nepal left Tokyo on 12 October for Sydney, arriving at the at port ten days later.

The cruiser Hobart returned to Tokyo on 17 November, in company with H.M.A.S. Arunta, and the following day H.M.A.S. Shropshire departed for Sydney.

Commodore Collins in H.M.A.S. Hobart on 6 December assumed the duties of Flag Officer, Force "T". He was the Senior British Naval Officer afloat after the departure of Vice-Admiral E. J. P. Brind, C.B., C.B.E., until 24 December when Rear-Admiral E. R. Archer, C.B.E., D.S.C., arrived.

On 17 January 1946 H.M.A.S. Warramunga left Sydney for Japan, arriving at Kure on 1 February. Shortly afterwards H.M.A.S. Arunta departed from Kure to rendezvous with and escort back to Kure the United States merchant ship Stamford Victory, which was carrying the first large Australian contingent forming part of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force. Another U.S. merchant ship, Taos Victory, carrying Australian troops arrived on 2 1 February with Force "A", which included the R.A.N. frigate Murchison (Lieutenant-Commander J. McL. Adams, R.A.N.).

This ship made a brief visit to Hiroshima and left Kure for Morotai on 27 February. A return trip was made to Kure, where the vessel arrived on 1 April, leaving a week later for Hong Kong, thence Morotai.

During March, Hobart and Arunta left Japanese waters for Rabaul and Sydney.

On 13 April the "Q" class destroyer H.M.A.S. Quiberon (Lieutenant-Commander G. F. E. Knox, R.A.N.) arrived in Kure and was engaged in the sinking and demolition of Japanese submarines. Towards the end of May Warramunga was employed as a ferry for the Naval Marine Contingent of two hundred who were taking part in the Empire Day review in Tokyo.

During July, August and September, Quiberon, Quickmatch and Quadrant have taken their share of Occupation Force duties.

MENTIONED IN DESPATCHES

Confining ourselves to the wars of recent times in which Australian troops have taken part we find that during the South African War, x899-i9oz, those officers and soldiers who received a "mention" had their names included in the London Gazette. It was reprinted in South African Army Orders, and again in local General Orders. The recipient had no personal outward sign to show that he had received a "mention", unless of course, some decoration as well had been conferred upon him.

Other forms of "mention" during this campaign were the promotion of other ranks to "King's Corporal" and "Kitchener Sergeant", and the presentation of the coveted "Queen's Scarf ".

The history of King's Corporal and Kitchener Sergeant in the Army is known to some, but is frequently the subject of argument. A writer to the Journal of Army Historical Research, 1935, states that the current tradition of the rank was instituted as a reward for gallantry during the South African War and existed during that campaign only. Private soldiers, it is said, once promoted King's Corporal-supernumerary to regimental establishment-could never be reduced. except by the King himself.

In the same journal for 1936 a reprint from the Naval and Military journal quoted the following on the subject of King's Corporal, which apparently was a "mention": "There was an official suggestion in igoi to the effect that soldiers who had distinguished themselves in war-time, but were unsuited to be N.C.Os in peace-time, should be given some mark of distinction on the right arm, preferably an embroidered band, carrying with it a step in rank whilst actually on active service, with additional pay, and a donation of £10 at the end of it. Some members of the War Office Committee who sat to consider the proposal objected to the monetary grant, urging that such was derogatory to the soldier, but one of them pointed out that Lord Roberts had not hesitated to accept £100,000, so I cannot see why a soldier should object to receive £10. The idea, however, was not adopted, though some men were specially promoted in the field in the latter stages of the Boer War, and were generally known as 'Kitchener Sergeants'.

Many inquiries were made during World War 11 on the question of King's Corporal, whether it really existed or not. On 22 October 1944 a letter appeared in the London Times referring to the statement made by the Secretary of State for War in the British Parliament on 10 October. It had been asked on what authority Lord Kitchener had promoted a rifleman of the Rifle Brigade to the rank of King's Corporal on 8 December 1901. Other correspondents cited additional instances. The Times writer asked: "Can any authority say what the award is intended to convey to the recipient if it is not recognized in the War Office?"

During the South African War Australian contingents had King's Corporals and Kitchener Sergeants. It is recorded in official orders that two corporals and a lance-corporal were promoted sergeant and five troopers, a lance corporal and a private were promoted corporal by the Commander-in-Chief for gallantry in the field. These were termed "King's Corporals" and "Kitchener Sergeants" and the promotions were announced in orders under the heading of "mentions", and were published in the London Gazette.

The order announcing the promotions stated that "the General Commanding-m-Chief had been pleased to sanction the following promotions of N.C.Os and men for distinguished gallantry in the field (should they be desirous of accepting it). Such promotion to take effect in each case from the date mentioned on which the act was performed. They will be absorbed supernumerary to establishment of their unit, and will be absorbed into vacancies on the first opportunity-New South Wales Mounted Rifles, Corporal P. J. Daly, promoted sergeant by C.-in-C. (Commonwealth General Order 148/1902);Victorian Imperial Bushmen, Lance-Corporal R. McRae, Trooper W. Sheehan, Trooper J. Clay, Trooper J. Green, and Trooper P * O'Brien promoted corporals by C.-in-C. (Victorian General Order 661 1901); Victorian Imperial Regiment, Corporal Hewitt, promoted sergeant by C.-in-C. (Victorian General Order 79/1901); Victorian Imperial Bushmen, Lance-Corporal A. N. Gregg, promoted sergeant by C.-in-C. (Victorian General Order 83/1901); Victorian Imperial Regiment, Trooper Hipland, promoted corporal by C.-in-C. (Victorian General Order 93/1901); Victorian Mounted Rifles, Private H. A. Wilson, promoted corporal by C.-in-C. (Victorian General Order 93/1900".

In the despatch from Field-Marshal Earl Roberts to the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for War, published in the London Gazette dated 17 June 1902, reference is made to the Queen's Scarf, which is considered to be a "mention". In April 1900 Lord Roberts received from Her Majesty Queen Victoria four woollen scarves worked by herself, for distribution to the four most distinguished private soldiers of the Colonial Forces of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, then serving under his command.

The selection of these gifts of honour was made by the officers commanding contingents concerned, it being understood that gallant conduct in the field was to be considered the primary qualification. Those presented with the scarves were-Canada, Private R. R. R. Thompson. Royal Canadian Regiment; Australia. Private Defrayer, New South Wales Mounted Rifles; New Zealand, Private H. D. Coutts, New Zealand Mounted Rifles; South Africa, Trooper L. Chadwick, Robert's Horse.

The award of these scarves carried no distinctive honour, neither did they confer any precedence in British awards. They were merely a gift from Her Majesty. As they were notified in the Commander-in-Chief's despatches and subsequently published in the London Gazette it is reasonable to assume that they can be treated as "mentions". The official notification for the award of the scarves is announced in Commonwealth General Order 155/1902.

During the war of 1914-18 His Majesty King George V approved of certificates being awarded to all personnel mentioned in despatches. British Army Order 166/1919, sanctioning this, stated that certificates for "mentions" were authorized by the Army Council to all personnel of the Navy, Army, and Royal Air Force, and to members of the Indian, Dominion, Colonial and Egyptian Forces who from time to time had been "mentioned" in military despatches during this particular war by a commander in the field; also to members of the Red Cross, Y.M.C.A., Y.W.C.A. and British civilians of both sexes.

As an outward sign to denote that a serviceman or servicewoman had been "mentioned" approval was given by the King for an oak leaf emblem in bronze to be worn on the ribbon of the Victory Medal by all personnel borne on the strength of the British, Dominion, Colonial, and Indian Expeditionary Forces, who had been "mentioned" once or more in military despatches during the war by the commander in' the field. The oak leaf was issued in two sizes. The larger is worn with the medal and is affixed to the centre of the ribbon at an angle of sixty degrees from the inside edge of the ribbon, stem to the right; the smaller is worn, when the wearer is in service dress, transversely across the ribbon (British Army Order 3/1920).

In World War 11 the system of recording and acknowledging mention in despatches was practically the same. On 2 February 1944 His Majesty King George VI approved of the wearing of an emblem to denote mention in despatches. Australian General Routine Order A. 144/ 1944 announced that the emblem would be worn by all personnel who had been "mentioned" one or more times in military despatches during the war by a commander in the field. 

The emblem is a new pattern, different from that used for the war of 1914-18 and is in the form of a single oak leaf in bronze. During the war the oak leaf was not worn on any World War 11 medal ribbon, but in a position in which a ribbon would be placed immediately after those already worn. When no medal ribbon was worn the oak leaf was placed immediately above the centre of the left breast pocket. An amendment was issued by British Army Order 162/1944 wherein it stated that when the emblem is worn with the bush shirt or blouse in tropical dress, it may be worn mounted on a cloth strip backed with buckram or on the medal ribbon bar. In every case the emblem is worn. with the stalk of the oak leaf farthest from the left shoulder.

Only one emblem is worn in respect of any number of "mentions" and each person entitled will be issued with two "sew on" type emblems for wearing on cloth uniforms and one "brooch" type emblem for wearing on drill uniforms.

Another form of "mention" is the Commendation Card issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Australian Military Forces. A number of these cards were given for bravery and distinguished service in Timor area, Southwest Pacific area, Malaya area and at sea during 1942. This Commendation Card was subsequently known as the Commander-in-Chief's Card.

Australians serving in the Middle East under British commanders-in-chief also won these cards.

R. K. PEACOCK (V.P.A. and R.A.G.A.)

I DON'T THINK FRED LIKED THE TONE OF MY VOICE

I met him in the city street, in the sunshine; different sunshine from the jungles and dense kunai-grass valleys. This sunshine was friendly and somehow clean. It was discerning too, so that the stubble of beard showed gingery brown and the thread-bare patches in the old sports coat and Army pullover were the more obvious, and the grease spots on the battered felt hat gleamed as if newly wet.

He was not proud any more; but pathetically eager and keen as the talk swung to motors and guns and machines.

Then he was in trim overalls again, and, as I sometimes remembered him too, in freshly pressed dress uniform, O.C. of one of in the smartest small workshop outfits islands.... That seemed a laugh now....

The "wog" in the Middle East-and at Kokoda-and at Lae. They had left their marks now, and, somehow, things didn't seem quite the same on Civvy Street any more, after six years.

A quick hand-shake, and I watched his head bobbing rather dejectedly through the crowds until it disappeared.

Fred had stood, waiting, a few yards off. We picked up our stride again as he said:

"Friend of yours?"

Miles and months away, I answered "Mmmm, Army."

Fred was self-righteous. "I can't understand half these blokes that are coming back now. Because they've been in uniform they think they don't need to work any more. They've only themselves to blame. I can't understand them."

"You wouldn't," I said slowly, "and lots of you wouldn't WANT to."

I don't think Fred liked the tone of my voice.

EDGAR LITTLEON (A.M.F.)

SALTWATER VOODOO

"----you made an effigy of the intended victim. The next thing was to get some personal article belonging to the victim and fix it to the effigy."

"Such as?

"Such as a lock of hair or something. See?"

"Uhuh."

"Then calling the victim by name and uttering incantations-"

"What are incantations?"

"Curses and spells. If you want him to die, you stick a pin or a nail through the effigy's heart or stomach, see, and if the curse is strong enough, the victim snuffs out."

"Uhuh."

"Well, that's what we are going to do to the Jimmy."

"Yeah. It sounds all right, but don't you think we're rubbing it in a bit?"

"Oh, we don't want to kill him outright. We'll just heap a few curses on him to give him a fright, then we more or less drop a hint that we're responsible, see, and consequently our time in the service will be one long holiday. Now what can we make this effigy from?"

Splinter cast a speculative eye round the deserted mess deck. A few odd articles of clothing graced the tops of the lockers; cups and spoons littered the mess tables, legacies from the stand-easy of ten minutes earlier. A fruit tin with holes punched in the sides gave him an idea. It was a soap container used for lathering the dishing-up water and contained a large lump of soft soap.

He retrieved the sticky mass. "Just the very thing," he murmured, and rolled it between the palms of his hands into a round ball.

"Look out, the Jaunty," hissed Mac, and seizing the rag and polish began to rub at the brass work as if his life depended on it. Splinter, at a slight disadvantage, with a handful of soft soap, was not so lucky.

"Righto, me son, skulking again, eh?"

Those unfriendly words could belong only to the Master-at-Arms. Splinter turned and beheld him leaning casually against the lockers.

"Just because you're working in the mess deck doesn't mean you can sit on your stem and loaf. Now get on with it, or I'll take you before the First Lieutenant. All right, me hearty tar?"

"Yes, Master," replied Splinter meekly, and commenced polishing industriously as the Jaunty sauntered aft. Able Seaman Woods cursed softly, then snarled, "Fair dinkum, after we've finished with the Jimmy that monster is next on the purge list."

"Uhuh," replied Mac dutifully.

They worked steadily until the Quartermaster piped "Secure".

The midday meal over, Splinter and Mac left the littered mess table for the unfortunate mess cook to clean up and vanished behind a row of lockers. The little sailor produced the lump of soft soap and began to mould it into the rough outline of a man.

"While I'm doing this," he said, "shoot down and see what you can borrow from the Jimmy's cabin. They'll be eating in the wardroom now, so you should have an open go. Get something small. Don't bring a boot or his pyjamas because they'll be miles too big. Just use your common dog."

Mac shambled aft, quite unperturbed at the thought of breaking into the First Lieutenant's cabin. He returned several minutes later with a triumphant grin creasing his unbeautiful face. In his fist was a collar stud.

"This do? "

Splinter looked up from the nearly completed effigy and nodded. He deftly finished it off, then laid it on the deck and squatted down Gandhi-like in front of it. Mac did the same and passed over the stud, which was pressed to the head of the figure.

"Right, that should do it," said Splinter, and rubbed his hands together gleefully. "Now for some incantations. We've got to make them petty powerful if we want 'em to work. What do we want to happen to him first? Something mild to see if it works."

"How about tripping him over that coil of rope on the port side aft?"

That sounds all right. We'll give it a lash anyway."

Splinter in a solemn chant began, "0 Lieutenant Tackline, persecutor of able-bodied seamen, I command that you trip over the coil of rope on the port side aft and bash your shin, this curse taking effect as from now. O.K. Mac"

"O.K."

"If this works, we'll have another go at stand-easy this afternoon. Now let's go up and see what happens."

They hid the little soap figure and hurried aft. Lurking behind the mainmast, they waited for the bewitched First Lieutenant to appear.

Ten Impatient minutes passed before he did. He was apparently talking to the Engineer Officer who was still in the wardroom flat. As he stepped out on to the quarter deck and turned for'ard, he flung a last remark over his shoulder and-tripped over the coil of rope left neatly stowed against the bulkhead!

Most un-officer like language was heard as he picked himself up and angrily examined the torn trouser leg and scraped skin that showed through. Curtly answering the Quartermaster's query as to whether he was all right, he disappeared back into the wardroom flat with a pronounced limp.

Splinter and Mac were ecstatic. "It worked," they cried and hammered each other's backs. Shaking with excitement, they returned to the mess deck, Splinter murmuring happily, "Just wait until I put the finger on the Jaunty. He's the next to go."

They spent the remainder of the time planning what next to do to the unfortunate First Lieutenant, and were still undecided when hands fell in at 1-15 p.m. Detailed to carry on working in the mess deck, they hurried off to their tasks with an alacrity that surprised the other seamen.

The next hour and a quarter passed all too, slowly, but during that time Splinter was able to work out what next was to happen to the Jimmy.

"Bungy Williams is up the foremast with, a paint pot. Let's have him tip it over and splash the Jimmy. Bungy's an old hand so he'll get off lightly and, anyway, he never returned that Comforts Fund scarf of mine he borrowed, so it will do him good."

At last the Quartermaster piped "Stand easy" and most of the hands headed below for a cup of tea. Bungy Williams, wielding a paint brush on the upper yardarm, stayed there, and carried on with his work. Behind the lockers Splinter and Mac were hard at it. Squatting down with the effigy between them, they once again cursed their victim.

"0 Lieutenant Tackline, persecutor of able bodied seamen, I command that Bungy Williams, who is at present up the stick, tip a pot of crab-fat all over you, this curse taking effect as from now."

Unthinkingly Mac left the soap figure on the top of the lockers as they raced up top. The other seamen, sipping their brews from thick china cups, looked after them in surprise, because the two sailors were usually the first to sit down and the last to get up.

The First Lieutenant wandered slowly along the upper deck and drew thoughtfully at his cigarette. His scraped shin still pained him and he wore his going-ashore suit in lieu of the damaged one. A spot of grey paint splashed on to the deck in front of him and he looked up in alarm.

"Hey, easy with that paint there, Williams. You're dropping it all over the deck," he shouted up to Bungy.

Bungy looked down from his lofty perch. "Sorry, sir," he shouted back. "I've got a full pot and the wind blows the drops off my brush."

"How are you going up there, Williams?"

"Very well, sir. Should be able to finish it off this afternoon with a bit of luck."

Shifting his cramped position on the yardarm slightly as he spoke, Bungy nearly lost his balance and a wildly swinging leg tangled with the spun-yam that suspended the paint pot from the yard. Immediately a stream of thick grey paint cascaded down.

The First Lieutenant jumped aside like a startled grasshopper, but not quickly enough. The front of his going-ashore uniform was covered with paint that ran slowly and lingeringly down the coat and trousers and dripped softly on to the deck.

Splinter and Mac rolled helplessly round the flag deck in silent mirth. The furious Jimmy, speechless at first, was not slow in finding his voice and he called Able Seaman Williams every unpleasant name he could lay tongue to. Squatting paralysed on the yardarm, Bungy shuddered and grew pale at the possibility of being drummed out of the Service after fifteen long, devoted years.

At last, out of breath and language, Lieutenant Tackline turned to go to his cabin and change his ruined uniform, when queer choking noises from the flag deck drew his attention. Still snorting with anger, he climbed the ladder to investigate and found Woods and Mackay holding aching sides and dashing tears of mirth from their eyes. They sat up with a jerk when he spoke.

"I suppose this is your idea of a very humorous situation? "

"Oh no, Sir," they replied weakly.

"It isn't mine either, but you apparently think it funny. Well, I'll see if I can change your minds. Mackay, you will relieve Williams up the mast. Woods, you can clean up every drop of paint on the deck. Neither of you will go ashore until the j ob is finished to my satisfaction. Is that understood?

"Yes, Sir.,'

"Anyway," said Splinter as Mac prepared to go aloft, "we've still got him just where we want him. What did you do with the effigy? "

Mac thought for a moment. "Left it on top of the lockers, I think. Nobody will touch it. Stand-easy's over and there's no one down there. We can get it afterwards."

But that is where Mac was wrong.

In the mess deck remained one man, the mess deck dodger, who looked with distaste at the stack of dirty cups that would have to be washed up. He picked up the mess kettle and went in search of hot water.

Lieutenant Tackline returned on deck in his sole remaining blue suit. It was patched and frayed but would have to do until the other two were repaired, if that were possible. He cast a malignant eye over Able Seaman Woods who was diligently cleaning up the mess of paint on the deck, and then elevated his line of sight to where Able Seaman Mackay had relieved Bungy Williams on the top yardarm. They had seen him too, which was why they were working so willingly.

Lieutenant Tackline continued his tour of inspection, and leaned over the rail to see how the seaman was progressing with the red leading round the water-line.

At that very moment in the mess deck the dodger was preparing to wash the cups and spoons. With a steaming mess kettle of hot water ready, he was slightly perturbed to discover that there was no soap, until he spied a little figure on top of the lockers.

"Wise guys! No wonder there's nothing around here when you want it. These matelots behave like a lot of kids at times." So saying he tossed the figure into the kettle of water',' where it disappeared for ever in a cluster of malignant bubbles.

Splinter swears to this day that the First Lieutenant, in a fit of remorse, threw himself overboard. When they fished him out of the sea, the Jimmy said he was pushed in, but couldn't prove anything.

Whatever caused his unexpected high dive, no satisfactory explanation was ever found, which I think was just as well for all concerned, including the mess deck dodger.

G. WARWICK WAYE (R.A.N.)

KAMIKAZE KIDS

B. GORDON (R.A.A.F.)

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