Shortly
after World War 1, the Naval Staff instituted a system of civilian coast
watchers, whose duty it was to report any matters of naval intelligence
coming to their notice. Slowly the scheme was developed until the
settled part of the Australian coast was under observation. In the late
twenties the organization was extended to Papua, New Guinea and the
Solomon Islands.
| Webmasters
note. US Admiral Halsey said that the intelligence signalled
by two coast watchers from Bougainville had saved Guadalcanal,
and Guadalcanal had saved the South Pacific. |
On the mainland of Australia land-line
telegraphy was depended on for the transmission of messages, but in the
islands it was necessary, to use radio.
The principal stations were controlled
by Amalgamated Wireless of Australia (AWA) and later teleradios
communicated to them.
However. the area was but
sketchily covered, radio stations being placed to suit commercial
development and without regard to strategic needs.
Soon after the outbreak of war in
1939, the writer was appointed Staff Officer (Intelligence) at Port
Moresby and given the task of expanding the coast-watching organization
to meet war needs, but still on an unpaid civilian basis.
New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago,
the Solomons and the New Hebrides form a screen across the north-east of
Australia.
The object was to make this a
sensitive web which would immediately give notice of any hostile force
penetrating it.
The peace-time
organization left gaps, so that it was rather like a fence with a few
gates in it, left open.
I had lived in New
Guinea for sixteen years as a civil servant and had served in most
districts. In addition, I had made friends in Papua and the Solomons, so
that I not only knew the country but knew the people in it and many of
them knew me. I made my first survey, with the assistance of the local
governments, using any means of transport available and making personal
contact with all those placed in strategic positions. Throughout,
personal contact was of greater importance than the official
relationship.
By August 1942 there
were over a hundred teleradios tied in, each to its own centre, either
Port Moresby, Rabaul, Tulagi or Vila, on a special frequency which was
rarely used so that attention would not be called to it. During this
time a teleradio reporting system had been organized along the same
lines in the islands of Torres Strait.
Until the entry of
Japan into the war the coast -watchers remained a civilian, static,
defensive reporting system, designed to report the incursions of an
enemy into our own territory. The question of coast watchers remaining
in the event of the country being over-run had been raised. It was
decided against, except in the case of naval intelligence officers.
The entry of Japan
into the war left the island screen as the front line. Coast watchers
reported scouting enemy aircraft and, soon afterwards, enemy flights on
their way to bomb Rabaul. Tabar Island lay directly on their route and
Page, the coast watcher there, usually gave Rabaul twenty minutes'
warning of an attack. On occasions when the aircraft passed beyond his
sight., others reported them, so that Rabaul had no raid without a
warning, which minimized casualties, though there were no effective
aircraft there to meet the attacks. On 21 January 1942 a Japanese force
occupied Rabaul, driving, our troops, a little more than a battalion in
strength, into the jungle of New Britain. With them went the naval staff
of Rabaul, and the silence closed about them.
So I sent a signal to
McCarthy, who was Assistant District Officer at Talasea, about two
hundred miles west of Rabaul, on the north coast of New Britain. He was
a civilian and not under my orders and quite free to save himself. I
asked him to take his teleradio and go towards Rabaul to find out what
was the fate of our forces. Two planters volunteered to assist him; he
took one with him and left the other to manage the base. Travelling by
launch, he met the first refugees at Pondo and was joined by other
civilian helpers there, one of whom walked across New Britain to advise
anyone on that side to join McCarthy. The latter went farther forward,
sending back the small bodies of soldiers he found at plantations.
In the meantime a few
small vessels had been collected on the New Guinea coast and these came
across Vida Strait to assist in the evacuation. McCarthy sent his
parties westward, and was met by the good news that a small motor vessel
was still hidden at Witu Island. He took possession of her, loaded his
men, over two hundred, on board and ran out to China Strait and safety.
Several of the civilians who had assisted him remained behind to
continue reporting.
 |
His signals had told
us that there was still a large number of troops on the south
coast of New Britain so the Laurabada, in charge of
Lieutenant Ivan Champion, R.A.N.V.R., was sent across to pick them
up.
She made her arrival at dawn,
remained at anchor camouflaged by branches during daylight, and
then successfully ran back in the night with another hundred and
fifty men. |
Page, on Tabar,
remained on his island. as did Kyle and Benham in southern New Ireland,
the latter two sending off two boatloads of escapees while themselves
remaining. Woodroffe, on Anir, was raided and his teleradio smashed,
though he himself escaped to the jungle. All of these were captured and
killed a few months later. Cecil Mason who landed from a submarine in an
attempt to rescue them, shared their fate.
In Papua, New Guinea
and the Solomons most civilians were evacuated. Many coast Watchers,
however, decided to remain and continue their reporting. They were still
civilians, were unpaid and had no provision for their families. Their
only hope of survival appeared to be in the reconquest of the country by
our forces, which was problematical in the dark days of 1942. Theirs was
a very special type of courage.
In the Solomons the
Resident Commissioner abandoned the north-western part of the group but
kept his staff in the south-eastern islands, himself retreating to
Malaita. In Bougainville, Read, Assistant District Officer, Moved
supplies inland and prevailed upon the small section of the A.I.F. there
to do like wise. Mason, a planter, also made preparations to stay.
In February the
Japanese occupied Lae and Salamaua, but this move had been foreseen and
Vial, an assistant district officer, was commissioned into the R.A.A.F.
and sent into the jungle. From a ridge near Salamaua he watched every
Jap movement and, for six months. gave warning by teleradio of every
Japanese attack on Port Moresby. These warnings were invaluable.
Eventually Japanese penetration forced the relinquishment of the post,
but by that time many additional spotter stations had been established
in Papua so that Port Moresby did not go unwarned.
In March the Japanese
occupied Buka Passage and the Shortland Islands. Read h2d already taken
to the jungle, but Good, on Buka, was killed by the Japanese, an
incautious news broadcast being a contributing factor.
The death of Good
brought the question of the status of the coast watchers to a head.
Those in the field were soon given rank or rating.
Shortly after this
General MacArthur assumed the supreme command in the Southwest Pacific
and it was decided that the coast watchers. with analogous organizations
should be placed under G.H.Q.'s direct command. as the Allied
Intelligence Bureau.
Plans at this time
envisaged an early attack on Rabaul and the coast watchers were given
the task of landing parties to make a preliminary scout survey of the
position. To observe native reaction to the Japanese invasion, Wright
was landed from a submarine about forty miles from Rabaul. He stayed
ashore for a week and was then picked up. His information indicated that
we would have no insuperable difficulties to overcome from the
indigenous population, so we prepared a small motor vessel for the trip.
However, the Jap beat us to the punch by landing at Buna. The task was
then given us to buoy and light the channel from Milne Bay to Oro Bay,
and this was successfully done, Ivan Champion acting as pilot for the
first vessels through.
Those coast watchers
who had remained after McCarthy had brought out troops from Rabaul were
concentrated at Saidor. on the New Guinea coast. Supplies were dropped
to them from aircraft. They collected stores, teleradios and launches
and were held in readiness for the future.
The Japs moved down
into the Solomons. Their first ships were reported by Kennedy. American
naval forces attacked them, developing into the Battle of the Coral Sea.
In spite of their losses, they occupied Tulagi and soon after commenced
constructing an airfield on Guadalcanal. There were four coast watchers
on Guadalcanal - Macfarlan, the N.I.O., Clemens, the district officer,
Rhoades, a planter, and Schroeder, a trader. There were also a few
miners who assisted. These kept watch on the Japanese developments,
sending natives right into the camp and reporting the progress the Japs
were making.
The Japanese also
extended their holdings from the Shortlands to Bum. which soon became a
major base. Mason moved down to overlook it, and gave a daily tally of
Japanese shipping in the harbour, Read continued to watch Buka Passage.
The Japs sent patrols out after them, but these gave up after a day or
two, and the coast watchers returned to their posts and continued
reporting.
Thus it was that,
before the American attack on Tulagi and Guadalcanal, the Japanese
positions were under observation and the ,strength of his forces known,
while the routes he would use for counter-attack and reinforcement were
also under surveillance. The nearest enemy air bases were at Rabaul and
Kavieng, and aircraft from these would fly over Bougainville on their
way to Guadalcanal and would be seen and reported by our men.
The American carriers were tied in to
our frequency so that they could receive warnings without delay. The
warnings themselves were in plain language and there were alternative
channels in case the direct reception was poor.
The attack achieved
perfect surprise. Tulagi and Guadalcanal were taken within hours and
transports moved in to discharge. Then came a signal from Mason on
Bougainville, stating that twenty-four torpedo bombers were on the way.
This gave two hours' warning, allowing ships to prepare to meet the
attack. Transports were got under way and destroyers were disposed with
their guns at the ready, so that the aircraft ran into a trap, all but
one being shot down. Next day Read gave warning of forty-five dive
bombers, who were met by carrier-borne fighters. The attack was broken
up with heavy casualties to the Jap and only one ship was hit. For the
next few days warnings preceded each attack, resulting in such high
Japanese losses that there was a lull until further air forces could be
flown in.
The warnings from
Bougainville had been vital. After the first week it became necessary to
withdraw the carriers to avoid submarine attack, leaving the beachhead
without air defence. Had the air attacks been unheralded, they must have
achieved considerable success and would have continued after air cover
had been withdrawn, so that the position could not have been built up to
stand the serious counter-attacks which later developed.
A week after the
landing on Guadalcanal, Mackenzie (who had been N.I.O. at Rabaul when it
was captured) and Train established themselves near the airfield. Soon
afterwards, Henderson Field became operative and American Grumman
fighters were flown in. By this time the Japanese had made good their
losses and the air attacks recommenced. Mackenzle received the warnings
and passed them on, so that again there were fighters in the sky to meet
the bombers.
In spite of their
losses the Japanese air attacks continued and the base was sometimes
shelled at night, while troops were landed to retake it. During this
time the coast watchers on Guadalcanal came in to the base, fortunately
without casualties.
The Japanese
counter-attack culminated in November when a large convoy set out,
preceded by a force, which included battleships, to land troops on
Guadalcanal. The concentration of shipping and its movement had been
observed by the coast watchers on Bougainville, so that forces were
ready to meet the attack, which was defeated with heavy losses.
Buin had by this time
become the base from which shipping and aircraft moved against
Guadalcanal, so, as Mason could not see all that went on, measures were
taken to cover it. Two coast watchers were landed by submarine on Vella
Lavella and two on Choiseul; these had a perfect view of all that went
past. Soon afterwards the Japanese established a base at Munda, where
Kennedy's native scouts kept them under observation and another coast
watcher was inserted on Rendova Island, where he had a perfect view of
Munda airfield and harbour from a mountain.
During this time the
Buna campaign was being fought in New Guinea. Parties kept watch there
on the coast between Buna and Salamaua, calling up aircraft to attack
barges and landing parties so that the Japanese supply was utterly
disorganized.
Plans were in train at
this time to attack Salamaua and Lae as soon as Buna fell. To provide
air warnings to cover this operation parties were required on New
Britain along the routes which would be followed by the enemy aircraft.
The coast watchers from Saidor were dispatched to carry out this duty.
However, the Japanese occupied many of the points selected before Buna
fell, and four coast watchers were killed and the rest driven back to
Saidor. When Buna fell the troops were so exhausted by the campaign that
they were not fit for further operations, so no attack was made until
months later.
Fit personnel was sent
in to relieve the survivors of the New Britain operation. Two of the
latter were killed while returning, and the relief party itself was
shortly driven out. Another party, which had been overlooking
Finschafen, was also forced to retire, and a third landed on the Sepik
River to observe Wewak had to retreat as well. In all these cases men
were fired at from a few yards and had miraculous escapes, purely due to
the poor marksmanship of the Japs. My own health failed, and Commander
J. C. McManus took over the command.
The section of A.I.F.
on Bougainville was also relieved by submarine, at this time. They had
done little of positive value, but had been a force which had
discouraged Japanese patrols. Three additional coast watchers were
landed to assist Read and Mason, the latter having been driven away from
Buin. Many civilians, including missionaries, were evacuated at the same
time.
A further party, led
by Wright, was landed on New Britain to keep watch on the barges and
submarines running supplies from Rabaul to Lae.
In the Solomons, coast
watchers led reconnaissance parties to Munda and Rendova, scouting the
ground which was to be attacked. A further post was established on
Kolombangara, overlooking the airfield there. By this time, when
aircraft set out to attack Guadalcanal, they were reported by post after
post, so that we probably had a more accurate estimated time of arrival
than the Japs did themselves. Hardly a barge moved without being
reported and strafed.
A subsidiary
operation, which developed into one of importance, was the rescue of
shot down airmen. Throughout the Solomons, the natives were loyal and
helpful and would lead any American airman to the nearest post, where he
was cared for until he could be sent out by the aircraft or launch which
brought in supplies. Japanese airmen were killed by the natives. Later,
the survivors of U.S.S. Helena were cared for on Vella Lavella,
all being sent out safely, though there were numerous Japanese posts on
the island.
On Bougainville,
however, the Japanese decided to liquidate the coast watchers. Thousands
of troops must have been employed on the operation. They scoured the
country, intimidated the natives and succeeded in driving the coast
watchers from their posts, until evacuation became imperative. This was
carried out by submarine, after the loss of eight killed or made
prisoners. Read and Mason had been on the island for seventeen months.
In June 1943 the
advance against the Japanese commenced. In each case coast watchers
landed with the troops and set up a station to receive warnings of air
attacks, while others guided the troops through the just before the
Torokina landings, parties were again landed on Bougainville, while
reinforcements expanded the New Britain coast watchers until there were
five separate parties operating there.
Others landed at Long
and Rooke islands to see what the Japs there would do in reaction to the
Cape Gloucester and Arawe landings, while other parties operated in the
Sepik Valley.
A party landed at
Hollandia before the attack on it met with disaster, its leader and four
others being killed in action when their presence was discovered by the
enemy.
With the move forward
beyond New Guinea, the enemy forces in the latter area became impotent
except in defence, and coast watching, in the sense of obtaining
intelligence, came to an end. However, activities did not. Many natives
had served with the coast watchers and more could be easily obtained.
These were armed and used in guerrilla operations. This had been done to
a limited extent in the Solomons in the early days. but now it became
the principal occupation. In New Britain Japs retreating from Cape
Gloucester to Rabaul were ambushed and their small posts were wiped out
until the guerrillas actually held the island south of the Gazelle
Peninsula, so that our troops landed and built their base at Palmalmal
unopposed.
On Bougainville four
parties were continuously operating behind the enemy lines. They spotted
air targets and carried out a war of attrition in which they inflicted
more casual ties on the Japs than did the Australian troops on the
island.
The success of the
coast watchers was largely due to the experience of the personnel.
Nearly all were men who had lived in the country, who knew it and the
natives, and who felt at home in it. It is easier to teach a man how to
operate a teleradio or shoot a submachine gun than to teach him how to
live in the jungle. The men, experienced and actually known to the
natives, gained their help, for it would be impossible to conduct such
operations if the natives favoured the enemy.
Throughout, we had
ready co-operation from other Services. Aircraft dropped supplies to
parties and sometimes picked them up; submarines and PT. boats landed
them and took them off, always with a readiness and helpfulness which
cannot be obtained by merely ordering an operation to be carried out.
Without this co-operation the coast watchers would have been gravely
handicapped.
Lastly, there was help
from the enemy. He was so stupid that he did not realize the damage that
was being done to him and many times neglected to take measures against
us, and, by his own actions, alienated native sympathy. In fact, he was
invaluable.
Eric FELDT (R.A.N) |