Mahmut Şevket Paşa :  In 1908, when he was a Full general and Commander of the 3rd Army, he suppressed the Revolt of March 31 with his “ Operation Army”. Later he became the Defence Minister of Ottoman Empire. He is the pioneer of establishing First Air Branch in the Turkish Army in 1911. He resigned later on June 9, 1912. He became Defence Minister again on January23, 1913.  He was shot and killed on June 11,1913, while driving in his automobile, going up to Babıali, in Istanbul.

Turkish Air Operations - Dardanelles

From http://www.tayyareci.com/hvtarihi/canakkale/canak2.asp 

• Phases of the Campaign  
• Allied Attack
• Landings
• Suvla
• Turkish Victory

As for the air support, Türkish Forces have faced with an important but critical situation. Against the combined air force of the Allies comprising 40 aircraft, the Turks were relying on Bleriot, Rumpler B.1 and three more Albatros B.1 aircraft based at Yeşilköy Airfield, whose quality was still undetermined. Although vast requirement existed for these aircraft, the transportation of them to the Anatolian territories of Turkey would take weeks for the reason that the only means for navigation on a roadless - trackless field was by using camels or two- wheeled ox - carts. Due to this fact, as of the end of  June, the 1st Air Force Squadron had only 3 aircraft to operate.

During the Dardanelles War, transportation problem affected the Ottoman Air Forces. The squadron was forced to operate without bombs and spare parts. Problems encountered in the provision of aircraft and spare parts will limit the effectiveness of the Ottoman Air Forces while the war continues.

 It was quite a disputable decision to use combined fleet to force the Strait on sea. Although the authorities gave  warnings that the combined fleet couldn’t pass through the strait alone and so the campaign was to be realized by the land-navy cooperation.

Admiral Carden, heading the combined fleet from the beginning, failed in the operations he conducted night and day from February to March 1915. Either the deception of these failures or the possible difficulties to be met in future had negative impacts on his health. Consequently on 17 March, Admiral de Robeck, the aide of Carden, was appointed in place of him. 

Just the following day of Lt.Admiral de Robeck’s appointment to Mediterranean British Naval command, 18 huge battle ships (two British, one French) were organized as three naval divisions and set forth the Strait.

In this armada there were 48 aircraft, a new, untested, weapon of war. Its purpose, misunderstood, ill-defined, and uncoordinated; the airplane was a tragic disappointment, which, like the operation it was a part of, would discredit imaginative strategic thought throughout the war.(13)

  On march 18, 1915, the status of Turkish ground forces was as follows; 9th Infantry Division, , units in Gallipoli peninsula whose headquarters was in the Anatolian side named as left and right side departments, were under the command of 19th Division Command. This division (9th Division) with its HQ which was situated on the Anatolian side and in the Kalvert  farm, were organized to observe occasionally the inner side of the strait between Karantina and Kumkale, and the Aegean Sea coast between Kumkale and Kumburnu to defend especially Kumkale vicinity against enemy attacks.

While some units of 11th Infantry Division which came from Balıkesir and situated in Ezine with its HQ were to observe and to defend the Aegean coast part between Edremit bay except Kumburnu and Akçay harbor. The majority of division was positioned in the vicinity of Ezine to be used against the enemies’ ventures which could come from out of the strait regions.

On November 13, 1914, 7th and 18th Divisions and some of their units which were under the command of 3rd Army Corps whose headquarters was transformed from Dardanelle to Gallipoli were conducting the duty of observation and defending the coastal line from Koyun Port and Değirmenler to Karaçalı at Saroz bay.

At that time, Turks like their enemy counterpart neither completely conceived and appreciated the importance of military aviation potential nor understood this potential. However, while the war was becoming more violent, we shall see that insufficient Turkish air army evolved into an air force that was relied upon to carry out varied missions that contributed in part to the allied failure in the Dardanelles.

The initial mission of Turkish and German departments was reconnaissance. At the beginning of landing both sides conducted the bombing missions, however because of the limited capacity of bomb and primitive targeting methods, few missions were completed successfully. The air fight between both sides aircraft occurred seldomly in the last days of landing and most of damages on aircraft occurred because of mechanical defects and pilot’s faults.

To fully understand the contribution or lack of the aviation played on both sides during the legendary Dardanelles campaign, one has to examine the four distinctive phases of the enterprise, as the role of aircraft changed with each phase of battle. In phase one, the allied forces bombed the Turkish defenses while mine sweeping operations took place before the main attempt by an aircraft assisted invasion flotilla was launched to force the passage of the Dardanelles on March.

In phase two, the Turks aided by aerial observation, repelled the Allies, forcing the Allied to carry out landing in an atmosphere of almost Crusading ardor on April 25th. The lack of proper craft and inadequate training in amphibious operations or close air support resulted in establishing a minor foothold with appalling losses. In phase three, the dogged Turkish resistance and improved air-ground support compelled the Allies in August to make further landing in Suvla Bay.

   This endeavor proved disastrous with a gain of only 350 yards on a mile front at a cost of over 4.000 men killed and several aircraft shot down by bolstered Turkish defense. In phase four, the allies decided to abandon the Dardanelles operation. This decision led to the final phase of the campaign, the withdrawal from Anzac Cove and Suvla Bay and of allied air units in December. Fifteen days later, Turkish forces supported by a powerful air forces was accepted as the dominant power in the region and Cape Helles (İlyas cape) was evacuated.

When the aircraft were being  distributed according to the mobilization plan, 1Lt Pilot Fazıl hat accomplished to land with the Nieuport on the airfield at Nara in his second try. However, later on Turks did not take advantage of this aircraft as required. In addition to this, an experienced pilot 1Lt Fazıl Bey succeeded in gathering  very important information by flying closely 150 meters over enemy fleet in Bozcaada and Limni regions on September and October 1914. It was understood that Turkey needed a reliable air reconnaissance capability during its neutrality while the tension with the allies increased. Because there was no possibility of making reconnaissance by a single aircraft, on October 19, 1914 Captain Savmi by two-seat seaplane named Mahmut Şevket Paşa was assigned to Dardanelles to support a single aircraft air power in strait. Captain Savmi was a new pilot who began pilotage training three months before that date. When he approached Dardanelles, because of engine failure he landed on sea around Şarköy. Seaplane was pulled to the shore through the aid received. The seaplane was sent to Air School in Yeşilköy afterwards. Two aircraft came from Constantinople to Dardanelles on a steamship named Ramazan on January 12, 1915.

One of the recently  received aircraft,  “Ertuğrul” (Bleriot XI-2) with, its pilot Cemal was able to fly some short missions to the mouth of Dardanelles. But he considered Bleriot in too poor condition to risk a flight to the offshore islands, Imbros, Lemnos and Tenedos where the Allied naval forces were gathering for the ground assault of 18 March. Consequently, vital intelligence as to the composition and movements of Allied forces were unknown by defending Fortress Command. Ertuğrul was withdrawn on 22 March from Dardanelles. Presumably it was sent by sea transport to Constantinople and scrapped.

1Lt Fazıl was the first pilot who succeeded in reconnaissance of the armada consisting of  British and French fleet which was gathering in the Lemnos island region to threaten the  Dardanelles Straits.

If one takes the date of March  18, 1915, as the point to examine the Allied and Turkish aviation forces available in the Dardanelles campaign, it can be easily seen  that Turkey was severely out numbered.

 3 Albatros B.I and 1 Rumpler B.I type of aircraft came to Yeşilköy from Germany in March 1915. Three of these aircraft would begin to service in Dardanelles. According to the reconnaissance report because of a special need one aircraft was sent to Fortress Command in Dardanelles. This Rumpler B.I type German aircraft with serial number 993/14, (Turkish Military Serial Number 1) arrived at the airfield Constructed 3 km far away from Dardanelles, at the night of 17th March. The commander of Fortress sent this aircraft to Allied Navy Forces at Bozcaada in the morning of 18th March for reconnaissance. There were 1Lt Servo Rumpler and Navy Capt. Schneider on the  aircraft. Mission was an important success. 

According to official flight report; at the entrance of Bozcaada harbour there were 14 battle ship including Queen Elizabeth and Inflexible battle ship, 2-4 Cruisers, 2 repair ship two hospital ship and ten fishing boats to sweep mines, and a number of destroyers and submarines.(21)

What Serno and Schneider saw was that British - French fleet was about to attack and to pass through Dardanelles strait. German officers recognized the importance of their observation and flew back to Dardanelles. Upon landing, went to admiral Usedom’s headquarter, the commander of straits, and gave him the intelligence report. At once, the drums and bagels of the Turkish Army sounded the call. The defense fortifications of the Dardanelles had been given the alarm.(22)

Mean while Plt.Lt.Cemal, on the Ertuğrul Ship (Bleroit), confirmed that the allied fleet was approaching to the mouth of the strait.

Before the assault began, enemies’ aircraft which couldn’t recognize the mines reported that the area was mine free. At that time, it was believed that the mines located at a depth of  8m in the sea could be seen from an altitude of 1000 meter. However, aircraft could recognize those which were close to the sea surface. Mines could not be seen due to rough sea.(23)

The armada which consisted of British and French ships bombing the external side of Dardanelles since February 1915 started the main attack on March 18, 1915. In this well-known phase of Dardanelles campaign, the mines which were laid by Nusrat mine ship and the allied mine ship couldn’t being recognized by the enemy. This played very important role. Allied ship; Bouvet, Irresistible and Ocean sank and Gaulois, Suffren, Inflexible were heavily damaged.(24)

The Allied Navy Artillery capable of horizontal bombing had an insufficient ability over the Turkish artillery and forces. Additionally, it was difficult to observe the effect of the shells on the target. But the bombshells of Turkish artillery which had an ability of bombing with high projectile created heavy damage the thin armour at the deck of warships on the sea. Allied artillery fires from war ship out of range of Turkish artillery on the land became more effective after they had an ability of observing the bombing distance and direction.(25)

At 16.00 hours, Cemal and Raşit Osman Tayyar, by getting on Bleroit (Ertuğrul), made a reconnaissance out of strait. In the evening Seidler and Navy Capt Hüseyin Sedat together with Rumpler made a second reconnaissance. They flew to 80 km west for reconnaissance of Limni and during this reconnaissance they recognized that the enemy withdrew definitely. In the following days, rain and storm prevented the reconnaissance. On March 22, one of British navy aircraft was hit by Turkish artillery and crashed down at Saroz Bay. Because of the failure of allied air forces, a fixed balloon ship, weighed 3500 tons and named Manica, came to Dardanelles from England on March 22. On March 26, Serno and Schneider flew for reconnaissance and in the evening Schneider and Hüseyin Sedat repeated the reconnaissance and flew up to Limni.  According to their report, it was understood that there would be no new naval attack. At the end of the same day, they returned to İstanbul. Meanwhile two Albatros B1 arrived in Dardanelles.(26)

The unit which provided the presence of British air force in Gallipoli was the third squadron of Royal Navy Air Service (R.N.A.S) which came to Bozcaada under the command of squadron Chief Charles Samson in March. At the early days of Gallipoli Campaign, they conducted the reconnaissance mission, they dropped the bombs at the right time. During Navy campaign and landing, they were charged with the target acquisition and organizing long range artillery firings.(27)  

On April 25, 1915, when the French and British forces landed on the Gallipoli peninsula, sea war turned into ground war. A squadron consisting of 8 Escadrille M.F 98T aircraft to support French forces was allocated on Bozcaada.

At the beginning of Gallipoli war, allies used a new war weapon during the reconnaissance activities. As long as air condition permits, all the aircraft available  at Bozcaada flew twice or three times a day. This included a dangerous flight more than 17 ½ miles at open sea. Their missions were to determine Turkish defense positions, correct the map coordinate and take photos. Notice that the duty of taking photos was conducted by Pilot Lt.C.H.Butler who used a modified German Goertz compact photo camera. While ground aircraft continued to operate from Bozcaada, HMS Ark Royal used navy aircraft in İzmir and Enez regions to conduct of long range reconnaissance missions.(28)

British carrier, Ark Royal moved to Aegean Sea by carrying the  6 seaplanes on February 1 st. In addition, it was carrying 4 army aircraft (Sop with Tabloid). On February 17th the ship had arrived at Tenedos (Bozcaada) near Lemnos, the main air base for English-French squadron. Lemnos, Bozcaada and other islands were under Turkish sovereignty, however these were occupied by Greeks at the end of the First Balkan war. The dispute between Greece and Ottoman Empire pertaining to the sovereignty of these Islands was continuing. Greek Prime Minister Venizelos started to have control over these islands by assigning them to the Allied Navy, which is a fait accomplishment.(29)

However, the arrival of German U-boats (submarines) forced the ship to move slowly and it was vulnerable to attacks. HMS Arc Royal to leave for open sea. On June 12th, HMS, was sent to Mudros Harbour and later to Salonika to perform as an aircraft base ship. HMS Bon-my-Chree, which was newer and equipped with five faster seaplanes two of them were  capable of launching special torpedoes, took the place of HMS Arc royal. During this period, the Royal Navy carried out bombing on Turkish positions. It must be noted that at this time aircraft artillery spotting was newly being tested. For a successful spotting of ground targets, airmen were using a rudimentary wireless code to record the fall of each round. 

However, due to severe shortage of trained observers, Royal Navy was obliged to send up the volunteers to serve as telegraphers. Since these naval aircraft were overwhelmed with missions such as map plotting, observation, photograph taking and mine spotting for the fleet, the main responsibility of artillery spotting was carried out HMS Manica balloon ship, the first British kite balloon to observe  actions on every front. The duties carried out by the balloon were primarily spotting enemy guns to HMS Baccante. The balloons  Monica and later HMS Hector were to perform invaluable work, being able to remain aloft throughout the day, regardless of the surface weather. They were much appreciated by the battle fleet and remained to the end of the campaign.

In Gallipoli, there was another test in addition to the first realization of air photographing and naval artillery spotting. After HMS Arc Royal left the area and was assigned as aircraft repair ship, two of Sopwith Schneider seaplanes were assigned to HMS Dories and Minerva cruisers. The seaplanes were lashed on open decks and lowered into water by steam crane to carry out spotting and observation. Unfortunately, the system failed, since while the aircraft were still abroad, shocks and vibrations of the ship’s guns caused structural crack in the airframes. On one occasion, the muzzle flash from one of the guns on HMS Dories “set its aircraft on fire.” The experiment was suspended and remaining aircrafts were sent to Mudros. 

Because of the different type of aircraft being employed, maintenance was the biggest problem. The cumbersome Brequet, which produced creaky sounds due to its steel-fuselage, was below even the standards of 1913. This disadvantage resulted in longer flight hours for other aircraft and therefore standard ten hours maintenance and repairs duration became inadequate for effective flights. Limited numbers of spare parts and lack of interchangeable parts; though being the same types hampered the air arm. Furthermore, it was found out that certain aircraft, such as the renowned pre-war racing Sopwith Tabloid, was impractical for reconnaissance due to poor forward and downward visibility. At the beginning, Tabloids were in the battlefield with Lewis machine guns assembled on their wings.

Because there were no Turkish and German aircraft at the beginning of the war the tabloits became useless. Because there were no use to keep them,  they were returned to Mudros Shortly afterwards, Ottoman Air Force was established and continued in the region without getting serious threats. In addition, the engines of Maurice-Farman aircraft, constituting the brain body of Allied Air Strength were excessively fatigue and many aircraft were not able to produce enough power even to carry two crewmen and equipment abroad. Therefore, they operated with only one pilot who was forced to fly at low speed over hostile fire and make mental notes to convey upon his return to the fleet and later the ground forces. That situation created physical pressure as well as psychological one on the aviator. Also 75.h.p Farmans were found to be suffering engine metal fatigue.

 As for the Turkish side, the first aircraft squadron, also which was reinforced with Turkish and German observers and a few aircraft, continued reconnaissance and bombarding duties toward British and French forces on the offshore islands. Bombs were dropped by hand. Aircraft armament was negligible. The first aircraft to be equipped with machine guns, at the rear cockpit were received circa on the August 1915. The average strength of this squadron based in Çanakkale was around four aircraft.(31 

On April 25, 1915 the landing of Allied Forces at Cape Helles on the tip of the Gallipoli peninsula and at Suvla Bay   necessitated new air reconnaissance attempts. Turkish Army was positioned in an area from Saros Gulf to Besike Harbour and was ready to face British - French forces commanded by General Ian Hamilton. Also it was composed of 5th, 7th, 19th, 9th, 13th and 11th Divisions and Gallipoli and Çanakkale battalions. The army was waiting for the landing but which part would be landed on was unknown.

Knowing the region very well, Mustafa Kemal believed that the allied landing would occur from two possible places. The first one was Cape Helles (Seddülbahir), on the southern tip of the peninsula. The enemy would be able to control the two coasts of the peninsula through its naval artillery troops. The second one was Kaba Hill, at the western shore. This place was the easiest part to land on the eastern shore of the strait. However, Liman Von Sanders’ estimated differently. According to him, the landing would be made from two places. The first one was the Asian coast of Çanakkale Strait. Therefore he assigned two of the divisions around Truva. The other one was narrow Bolayır passage at the southern part. Two divisions were assigned to this region. One of the  remaining two divisions was sent to Cape Helles. The remaining division, 19th division which was controlled by Liman Von Sanders and commanded by Mustafa Kemal was being left near Maydos as a reserve This division would be ready to be sent to south, north or west according to the directions of the attacks. Mustafa Kemal was satisfied with his mission and decided on Boğalı, a village at the southern part of the strait and near both coasts, as the headquarters. He settled there and waited for the possible landing as well as making preparations for the defense.

On the morning of April the 25th, enemy forces started to land on the dunes, as Mustafa Kemal had estimated before British troops approached from Cape Helles and Australian and New Zealander troops from the northern skirts of Kaba Hill. At the same time, two deceiving  maneuvers were done; French troops attacked on Asian Coast and Royal Naval Division made a performance assault in Bolayir Von Sanders was deceived by these assaults. He thought that Central Power Forces wanted to surround his troops by using the narrowest part of the peninsula. With this assumption in his mind, he sent one of the divisions to Bolayır. He himself went there along with his suite. As a result, the forces were driven off the main battle field. Although, later on, he sent General Esat, the commander of an army corps, to block a possible assault from south, but this troop wasn’t reinforced.

When the landing was initiated by heavy naval bombings, Pilot Garber and Captain Hüseyin Sedat flew for reconnaissance. This reconnaissance Covering an area from saroz Gulf to Anatolia coast lasted 3 hours and 45 carriage ship were spotted. A few of them were being bombarded. It was observed that battleships were leaving and a so-called landing was being performed towards Saroz. Unfortunately since aircraft squadron was under the command of Fortress Commander, the results of this reconnaissance was not be able to be conveyed to 5th Army in time. Because the aircraft  have some mal functions, they could not have flown again. The reconnaissance performed on April 27th, 28th and 29th indicated that the enemy’s main military forces had already landed on Seddülbahir and Ari Burnu. It was also observed that there were fake landings on Beşike Harbor, Kumkale and Bolayır.

The bombs thrown out of the aircraft by hand under ground fire were not effective, and limited numbers of aircraft and ammunition did not cause much damage and loss on the enemy’s side. For example an observer on the English armored cruiser Euryalus undertaking fire support and reconnaissance off a Cape Helles landing beach noted that an aircraft flew over the battleship on April 30th and dropped bombs exploding in the water, on undesirable result.. However the information gained by the aircraft regarding Allied troop locations, strength, movement, artillery positions and supply points must have been more beneficial and more valuable the results of their bombardments for the Turkish army.

Having woken up on the morning of April 25th, Mustafa Kemal found himself in the center of the war. He sent a cavalry company to Kocaçimen Hill for reconnaissance since he had realized that they would face a great and intense enemy attack towards Conkbayırı and that the ridges of Sarıbayır and especially Conkbayırı would be the key places for Turkish defense. Considering the fact that only one battalion was not enough and there would be a requirement for a division, Mustafa Kemal assumed the responsibility and gave an order exceeding his authority. He sent 57th regiment to Kocaçimen Hill along with a mountain battery. Having sensed that they would face the main assault, Mustafa Kemal engaged most of Von Sanders’s reserve troops into the battle and he was not mistaken.

Australians and New Zealanders were able to land on Arıburnu following a more steep and 1,5 km farther northern route, as opposed to their plans and the estimate of Turkish, which was the landing on Kaba Hill. This place would be called as Anzac Cove from that time on. While going towards Conkbayır, together with his suite in order to observe the advancing forces of Anzacs, Mustafa Kemal came across a company of soldiers retreating. This group was the outpost company sent there to observe enemy’s landing, and the only force to resist the enemy’s attacks. He was closer to the enemy than the group he assigned to resist the enemy should be. He uttered: “Don’t run away from the enemy”. The soldiers reacted, “We have no ammunition left”. Hearing these words, he shouted. “You have got your bayonets” and ordered them to lay down after attaching their bayonets on to their guns. As he himself mentioned “when they laid down, so did the enemies, thus we saved a minutes’ time. May be, this hesitation by Anzacs changed the destiny of the war; They had to fight against the approaching 57th regiment. At the beginning of this battle, he transmitted  the order: “I am not ordering you solely to attack. I am ordering you to die. New commanders and soldiers may take over our mission until the time we die.” Almost all the personnel and staff of the 57th Regiment became honorable martyrs.

Through continuous assaults under the enemy’s curtain of fire, they rose to the rank of immortality in the history of Turkish army. In the afternoon, Anzacs began to get fired and around  midnight British commander-in-chief Sir Ian Hamilton received the message sent by Anzac commander General Birdwood. The commander had accepted the defeat and had suggested an immediate  retreat. On the contrary, Hamilton ordered them to resist the enemy regardless of the possible results. Thus on this day of life and death, the presence of Mustafa Kemal as the commander of Turkish Forces was the greatest factor in the victory gained. Hamilton, who observed the maneuvers from the ship called Queen Elizabeth had written the following sentences in his “Gallipoli Diary”:

“Despite the numerous brutal strokes we hit the mountains were pregnant with Turks who were born one and another. In various places one can see the approaching lines; moving points on the green land; on the ridges of Sarıbayır, the point following each other  on a wide red land resembling a scar --- here is an other line of points --- another over there --- They are approaching and they  disappear and they are emerging again. They are attacking to the highest and the most central parts of our positions by approaching like waves following each other. As well as the roaring sounds of heavy guns, one can hear rattling sounds of gun machines and rifles; the sounds resembling a hailstone falling on the roof of a conservatory on a stormy night, when thunders echoed everywhere… then the fire abated. The attack had been repulsed. We were able to stand where we were. Quite a few points went back on the grassy land. The others had taken their places in the realms of darliness”

After intense clashes, in the late June, Turkish Army stopped the Allied advance up the peninsula. Again in the late June and early July, 1st Aircraft Squadron was transferred from the control of the control of the Çanakkale Fortress Command to 5th Army. This squadron carried on reconnaissance mission on the offshore islands held by the enemy by using the airfield newly located at the Galata.

On July 5, a small naval aviation unit consisting of two GOTHA naval aircraft and German Naval aircraft received from Germany was given to the command of Fortress command. This group, called German Navy Special Detachment Naval Aircraft Group, started reconnaissance on July 5th . On July 13th four new aircraft reinforced the 1st squadron. The first commander of the 1st squadron was German Lieutenant Ludwig Preussner. The successive commander was Captain Tahsin.  

Reinforced by new troops, the enemy wanted to cut off the bonds between Istanbul and Turkish Army by advancing towards Kabatepe-Maydos line after the occupation of Conkbayırı-Kocaçimen line and to make Anafartalar a military-base by landing there through the remaining troops. Thus at the night of August 6/7, the landing on Anafartalar and on the northern parts of Arıburnu had started.(38)

To accompany the Allied invasion of Suvla By on August 6/7 additional aircraft joined 2nd  R.N.A.S squadron. There were four out standing Bristol scouts, six B.E 2c’s and Cauldron 6.3, and six highly-rated Morone parasols among the aircraft in this squadron. With this increasing  number of aircraft, the Allies had a squadron of 48 aircraft. On the other hand, 1st Aircraft Squadron based in Çanakkale diminished to only eight serviceable aircraft whose dependability was hampered by

the conditions in the region. The main problem that faced the Ottoman air units was the distribution and delivery of aircraft. The problem of making bombs and getting hand tools was solved by building a depot in Bakırköy and employing some craftsman in Istanbul. The craftsmen were quite skilled in forging. Although to build a real aircraft was beyond their skill and available resources, some of them were employed to build propeller and jigs.

Whilst coping with the invasion force of the Allies, the 1st squadron, which the Turks had to use, supported the 5th Army in the August battles.(39)

Serno, who was commanding the Turkish Air Force, was planning sending and administration of Turkish planes from Germany to Turkey with the German Headquarters. There was a small military airfield at Herkulesbad - Czernohavitz, south of Mehadya which is at the intersection of the Austrian, Hungary and Romanian border. The aircraft were to be brought there, then sent from Bulgaria to Lom Polanka where they were to be secretly sent in boxes to Istanbul, or loaded on a train at the border station Orşova, and dispatched to Turkey from the Romanian border to Bulgaria by showing the parts as Greek origin. Transportation was provided in November with Bulgaria entered the war in the beginning of October. There were no transportation problems thereafter. As for the seaplanes; Germans allocated 5 small seaplanes (Gotha WD 1 type) to Turkey in June. Three of them being modified amphibious by putting wheels under the floaters and flown to Lom-Polanka from Maccedonia and then disassembled there and brought to Turkey in June. The other two were brought to Turkey in September. The Turkish naval pilots in Germany brought 3 new Gotha WD 2 aircraft the same way. 8 new seaplanes were obtained by this way at that year.(40)

The three fronts on the Gallipoli peninsula were: the first front at the entrance of the strait, at the Rumelian side, south cape and between the Seddülbahir fortification and Tekeburnu. The depth was about 5 miles and the length was about 3,5 miles . At the Central, the Arıburnu front which was 5 miles from Cape Süngü to Conkbayırı and 3,5 miles from Conkbayırı to Azmakdere. And the 3-mile Anafartalar front above Azmakdere. Hundreds of people were fighting on these narrow lines. On the night of 8/9 August Mustafa Kemal was assigned to Command the Anafartalar Front Group upon an order from the Army Headquarter. The next day at sunrise, the battle was to begin.

On the 10th August Mustafa Kemal commanded the greatest, bloodiest battle of the Dardanelles Campaign. Australian Alan Moorehead stated in his book ,“ Gallipoli” which was published in 1956 “The existence of the young and genius Turkish Chief (M. Kemal) was one of the worst things that happened to the Allied force in history.” (41)

“Fliegerabteilung 1” continued to provide air support to the 5th Army for the remaining of the Dardanelles Campaign. Its flying personnel were a mixed group of German and Turkish army pilots and observers, and included at least one naval observer. Some personnel seem to have  rotated between the unit and the Yeşilköy air school. The quality of information provided by written reconnaissance reports was improved by excellent photography after cameras were received by the unit in autumn.

On the 18th September, seaplanes observed Marmara Sea and Midilli. In September Captain Körner, the unit commander reported during a reconnaissance flight that he saw a decrease in the number of the forces at Gallipoli. On the 27th September Lieutenant Pressner and Ketlembeil shut and dropped an enemy aircraft for the first time in an air battle.(42)

The intense usage of planes during active war service reduced the number of operational aircraft. The Abteilung, therefore, during September - October withdrawn  its remaining Rumpler B.I’s and obtained from Yeşilköy four Albatros C.I’s. Two of the older Albatros B.I type were received during November.(43)

On 30th  November, while flying with AK-1 Albatros aircraft, 1st Lieutenant Ali Rıza and Observer Orhan, got into a battle with a French aircraft over Kabatepe, shut the French aircraft petrol tank and the aircraft fell in flames between İntepe-Helles.(44)

Encouraged by Germany’s lightning victories on the Eastern front, Bulgaria signed a secret agreement on September 6, 1915, to join the Central Powers. At last the influx of supplies including land and sea planes would be available to the Ottoman Empire. While it appeared that this war material would make its way to the Turkish and German forces in the Dardanelles, the Allies were confident that it would take time to send such goods through hostile Serbia. However, a month later, a combined Austria-German and Bulgarian attacks on Serbia forced the Allies to move to Salonika, Greece and open a second front in Macedonia. This would have a negative effect on the Allied air forces at Gallipoli. With the opening of the Bulgarian borders, Ottoman air strength increased. By late September a new seaplane station was set up on the south shore of the straits near Çanakkale. 5 Gotha WD-2 seaplanes armed with machine guns made night bombing raids on Imbros and Teredos’s air-fields and camps. The machine guns proved too heavy for the inadequate powered aircraft and were removed. In all, 150 flights were being made and 200 bombs dropped. 

On the August 10 Conkbayırı Battle showed that the landing troops had no chance in the Gallipoli peninsula by the land battles. Thus, no group from Great Britain and Australia, New Zealand and India which participated under Great Britons command could go back to the hills they abandoned on the 10th August. Never again could an enemy watch the Çanakkale strait from the Conkbayırı line, Besimtepe, Kocaçimen. The enemies tried unsuccessful attempts. The Allied Force attacked Anafartalar for the second time on 13th  August after receiving reinforcements, but all the attacks were driven back.

On 15-17 August they lost the 3rd Anafartalar Battle on the Anafartalar front, Kanlıtepe, Aslanlıtepe and Kireçtepe. At the last Anafatalar Battle on 21-22 August, 6 enemy divisions participated. All the ship launched heavy fire against the Turkish territory. But this attack was unsuccessful too. Thus the conclusion began showing itself. The enemies stopped all their attacks.(45)

The battle at Çanakkale was stuck at the trenches. Because Mustafa Kemal had no doubt that the enemy would withdraw. He proposed to attack but the higher commander rejected stating that “they had no force or men to spare”. Mustafa Kemal, thinking that they had lost a great chance, resigned on the 10th  December 1915. Liman Von Sanders who respected Mustafa Kemal rejected his resignation. After arriving to Istanbul Mustafa Kemal learned that the enemies abandoned Çanakkale with no harm. (19 December 1915) (46)

The first step of the retreat  for the Allied Forces was the departure  of the HMS Ark Royal and several of its seaplanes to Salonika. The R.N.A.S. was then forced to leave the area of Suvla Bay and begin operations to aid the Greeks in securing Bulgarian Thrace and be in a position to attack Bulgarian lines of communications from the air.

By the 26th October, the Austria-German forces met the Bulgarians and effectively split Serbia in two, hence putting Serbia out of the war and opening the “Orient Line2” from Berlin to Baghdad. In the meantime, the Allied failure at Suvla Bay put political pressure on those in charge to abandon the Dardanelles adventure. Lord Kitchener visited Gallipoli on the 14th  November to survey the situation for himself. 

Less than a month later, a joint French-British agreement was made to abandon the campaign. On December 12th, evacuation began in Suvla Bay and lasted until the 20th. Nine days later No.3 Squadron R.N.A.S. was ordered back to Great Britain. The next stage of the Allied evacuation was to remove troops from the Cape Helles area and the tip of the Gallipoli peninsula. Despite the Allied evacuation overlooked by No.2 squadron R.N.A.S. in conjunction with and kite balloons from the balloon ships, Hector and Canning remained active in keeping the Ottoman Air Force at bay. On the evening of the 10th  January 1916 this squadron and the French Escadrille M.F.98 T left with of the Allied forces from Gallipoli.

During the allied retreat, the Ottoman Air Force conducted excellent reconnaissance missions. Observation reports and aerial photographs revealed beyond doubt the Allied preparations for withdrawal. Although Turkish seaplanes made only a brief appearance in Suvla Bay, they assisted the Imperial German Navy by watching the Sea of Marmara for enemy submarines and providing a protective  aerial observation of Bosphorus entrance to the Black Sea. The seaplanes  sent out over the Gallipoli peninsula were ordered to bomb the Anzac camps and artillery positions. During the evacuation period, seventeen observation flights, carried out mostly at night. A large number of fires were observed revealing to the Turks that the invasion force was destroying supplies prior to evacuation. During this time the Turkish air units dropped 32 bombs and recorded 17 direct hits on camps at Sedd ul Bahr. In addition hits were scored with two supply sheds at Mudros Bay, one aircraft hanger at Tenedos was damaged, and four hits were round on enemy shipping. On January 4. 1916, shortly after the final evacuation Vıze-flugmeister Schubert shot down one of the Maurice-Farman aircraft from Escadrille MF 98 T.(47)

Meanwhile Major Siegert, commissioner of German Air Force, together with Major Serno inspected the Çanakkale front (Albatros C1 and serial no: 577). Siegert participated in the flight together with Pilot Faller with an A-12 reconnaissance flight. At the after flight Meeting Siegert agreed in the thought that the English troops would withdraw in 2-3 days. Siegert stated in the memoir he wrote that Turkey could have captured a few thousand prisoners of war, and that there couldn't have been a better situation, and he returned to Istanbul on 6 January and explained the situation to Enver Pasha, but neither Enver Pasha nor Major Feldman, the chief of operation branch, agreed with him. 

With the completion of the Allied retreat from the Dardanelles, the aerial defense of the entire coast from the Gulf of Enos to Smyrna and to the gulf of Auxandretta was assigned to the Dardanelles Squadron. Fliegerabteilung 1 based at Galata, by ordering to keep a watchful eye on the coast in case the Allies ever decided to once again attempt to invade Turkish soil. 

Although used for a short time at the battles at the Çanakkale front, the importance of the Fokker Staffel aircrafts in the future of the Ottoman air battles was great. The Fokkers served successfully at the Gallipoli front.  

In September 1915 1, and in December 1915 3 German Fokker aircraft arrived at the Çanakkale front. The Staffels allocated at the Galata base on the Gallipoli peninsula under Pilot Lieutenant Hans Joachim Buddecke’s command. The pilots of these aircraft were German. On 6 January 1916 Lieutenant Theodor Jakob Croneiss was hit by a enemy aircraft at Seddülbahir. These aircraft were extremely successful. Lieutenant Hand Buddecke hit 4 enemy aircraft, including the 5 aircraft that the other pilots (Schuz, Meinecke and Muhra) hit, 9 planes were hit against 1 loss. 

In January 1916 the Fokkers were put under the command of the 6th Aircraft unit operation Command under the command of the 5th Army. Even after the Allied forces left Gallipoli the Fokkers greatly damaged the English seaplanes. 6 enemy aircraft were hit on the last days of the war. 

This was the aeronautical situation in the Dardanelles peninsula, as the last Allied troops slipped into the night of January 10, 1916.