175 things that you might not know about Gallipoli

Research tool for this page was "Gallipoli" by Les Carlyon, Pan Macmillan ISBN 0-7329-1128-1
1		In 1915 French soldiers at Cape Helles Gallipoli accidentally dug into a 3,400 year old graveyard. The bodies were in jars.
2		The population of the Gallipoli Peninsular (in 1915) was made up of Greeks, Jews, Gypsies & Muslims.
3		The Anzac area, unlike Suvla and Helles, has never been farmed. The country is too poor. One Anzac reported that it "wouldn't feed a bandicoot".
4		The were no Diggers at Gallipoli. The word Digger was not used to describe Anzac soldiers until 1916. It became common in 1917. At Gallipoli men were "Cobbers" or "Billjims" or "Kangaroos". Sometimes "Tommy Kangaroos". Details.
5		At one stage only 1 in 3 of the Turkish shells actually exploded. This was due to age. Later in the campaign the ammunition was of better quality and the new German howitzers were deadly. This helped the Allies come to the decision that Anzac was at risk in a prolonged campaign.
6		Australian artillery was restricted to 2 shells per gun per day at one stage, due to lack of ammunition.
7		Sir Ian Hamilton, C in C of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (MEF) had failed, during the Boer War, to have Winston Churchill decorated for bravery, even though it was probably justified. By the time of Gallipoli, Churchill was 1st Lord of the Admiralty and one of the architects of the Dardanelles naval campaign.
8		The "new" and effective Mills bombs (hand grenades) were delivered to Anzac just in time for the withdrawal. Until then the Anzacs mostly made their own "jam tin bombs" or used the scarce early model "egg" grenades. The Turks had always had an advantage in this department. They had more and better quality grenades, supplied by Germany.
9		Australia & New Zealand (3 Divisions) combined suffered fewer casualties than the British 29th Division which was only one of 11 British (or Anglo/Indian) Divisions at Gallipoli.
10		Sir Ian Hamilton was fluent in English, German, French and Hindustani. He believed cavalry obsolete (that opinion was pure heresy at the time). He was a poor judge of men and allowed underlings to dither. He was himself, in the absence of concise orders, a ditherer.
11		At the "feint" attack at Bulair in the north on 25th April the only man ashore was a New Zealander serving in the Royal Naval Division (RND). He swam ashore. He was awarded the DSO. Later he was awarded the VC. His name was Freyberg.
12		Winston Churchill had served in the Boer War, was a prisoner for a short time but escaped, and had later, as a Lieutenant in the 21st Lancers, taken part in the Charge at Omdurman in The Soudan (Sudan).
13		On his way to take command of the MEF Hamilton announced that it would be an "unlucky" campaign. He reached this decision because on their parting he had kissed his wife through her veil.
14		Before the war started Turkey closed the Dardanelles Straights. This trapped approximately 120 to 150 British civilian cargo ships in the Black Sea. Unable to get out they spent the rest of 1914 and the whole war trapped.
15		Before the declaration of war the Turkish Navy, under German control attacked Russian shipping. It was a German plan to force Russia to declare war against Turkey.
16		In September, 1914 Churchill asked for a plan for the Greeks to invade the Gallipoli Peninsular while the Royal Navy attacked the Dardanelles. The neutral Greeks were initially interested but later changed their minds.
17		In November 1914 the Turks announced a Jihad against the infidels (Germans excepted).
18		The First Sea Lord, Admiral "Jackie" Fisher estimated 200,000 men would be needed to launch a successful attack on Gallipoli in support of The Fleet. First Lord of the Admiralty Churchill thought 50,000 enough. 75,000 were sent, initially. It was no where near enough. Eventually 180,000 were not enough.
19		Birdwood thought Admiral Carden was short on energy and cabled Kitchener that Cape Helles looked like the best spot for a landing. Kitchener replied that the troops (currently on Lemnos) were to attack and occupy Constantinople (Istanbul) not Gallipoli. That was March 4, 1915.
20		The minesweepers sent to clear the Dardanelles were fishing trawlers with civilian crews. There was no spirit of "do or die" in them. They were averse to taking orders from the Royal Navy.
21		When the Turks were firing their mobile batteries they also had dummy guns set up firing black powder to make a lot of smoke. Often the Royal Navy gunners would target the dummy.
22		The British Cabinet, the War Council, the Admiralty and the Imperial General Staff: all important bodies. None of them had ordered a combined operation. It grew like Topsy as things went along. No one was truly in overall command.
23		Hamilton arrived in Alexandria in late March. At that stage he almost no staff. Within a month he had to stage the largest amphibious assault ever so far attempted in the modern world. He had to move 75,000 men from UK or Egypt to Mudros/Lemnos/Skyros and then to Gallipoli, he had to feed them, water them, provide all the necessary items of war and attack an entrenched enemy of six Divisions who knew he was coming. He had 5 Divisions. The fact that he actually got the men onto the beaches was his greatest.......and only triumph.
24		The 4 "British" Divisions should have had 304 artillery pieces. In fact they had 118. Ammunition supplies were desperately low from the beginning and the situation did not improve. The BEF in France had priority and there was not enough to go around.
25		The attacking troops had no hand grenades (bombs) and no mortars.
26		Many of the Turkish soldiers had no footwear. Instead they bound their feet with cloth. But they had plenty of bombs.
27		British Intelligence information about water supply on Gallipoli was 20 years old, and suggested that supplies were "scanty". In that they were correct.
28		Hamilton ruled against the empty ship's boats returning after landing troops being allowed to carry wounded. He was ignored by beach masters with hundreds of wounded clogging their beaches.
29		Rupert Brooke, poet and Sub-Lieutenant in the RND who wrote the lines "If I should die, think only this of me That there's some corner of a foreign field That is forever England" died 2 days before the landing; from a poisoned insect bite.
30		The English born Prime Minister of Australia, Joseph Cook, was a Liberal and had been at work since age 9, originally in the coal mines of the Midlands. He received total support from his Labour counterpart, Andrew Fisher, a Scot who had also been sent to work in the coal mines at age 9. It was he who uttered the well known pledge that Australia would defend Britain "to our last man and our last shilling".
31		The first proposal for a name for the newly formed Corps was the "Australasian Army Corps". The New Zealanders would have none of it, so A.& N.Z.A.C. (later ANZAC) came into being.
32		There is a Turkish word, "anjac" which means 'almost'. It seems appropriate for Gallipoli.
33		(Sir) John Monash, who was a minor player at Gallipoli but went on to greatness in France had university degrees in Law, Engineering and Arts. At Gallipoli he played chess to relax and could, from memory, draw the positions of Napoleon's troops at his famous battles.
34		Field Marshal Thomas "Tom" Blamey of WW2 fame (Australia's only Field Marshal ever) was a 31 year old school teacher on Bridges' staff at Gallipoli as a Major.
35		Major Richard Casey also served at Gallipoli. Later, as Lord Casey, he was Governor General of Australia.
36		(Sir) Charles Kingsford Smith, better known as "Smithy" the famous Australian aviator was a Light Horseman at Gallipoli.
37		Godley, in charge of the New Zealanders, was an Irishman in the British Army whose family was impoverished and who took the job of running the New Zealand Army when other wealthier officers had turned it down. He was a good (even very good) administrator and had the NZ Army ready for war in good time. He was not as well respected as a war time commander.
38		C E W Bean reports that on the first day at Anzac; Lieutenant Loutit's party was heading for 400 Plateau it chased a group of Turkish coastal sentries. 'As the Australians got in amongst them, the Turks threw down their rifles; but they were too many to capture, and were consequently shot.' Imagine the situation if that happened today. Some slimy reporter would stick a TV camera down their throats and accuse them of being "murderers" and the morning talk show TV presenters would rant and rave and decide that they were "un-Australian". Those same people currently "swoon" when Anzacs are mentioned.
39		The Turkish artillery battery at Gaba Tepe (Kaba Tepe) that some current historians talk about in awe as a "massive" danger to Australians moving across the Maidos Plain if they had landed in the correct place was actually 4 guns. 2 x 15 centimeter and 2 x 12 centimeter.
40		The Ceylon Planters Rifle Corps (C.P.R.C.) became a volunteer unit of the Ceylon Defence Force contingent and was formed in 1900. The C.P.R.C. sent a contingent consisting of 8 officers and 229 other ranks under the command of Major J. Hall Brown, to Egypt by sea in 1914 to defend the Suez Canal. On arrival the C.P.R.C. contingent was attached to the Australian & New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC). They fought at Anzac as the HQ guard.
41		One (under strength) Turkish Regiment (the 27th) initially opposed the Anzac landing. Only 2 companies (approx 200 men) and 4 guns were at Gaba Tepe (Kaba Tepe) which was the planned landing area. On the relatively flat land of that area they could not have held out against the 1,500 Anzacs in the first wave for more than an hour or two, if that. Two battalions of the 27th Regiment were in reserve at Eceabat but by the time they were brought up the balance of the first day-landers would have been in place so it would have been 15,000 Anzacs (roughly 15 battalions at full strength) against 3 under strength battalions of the 27th plus another 3 of the 57th Regiment. On 25 April there were 8,000 Anzacs ashore by 8am. At that stage there were 500 Turks opposing them. By the end of day there were 15,000 Anzacs ashore and 5,000 Turks in the area.
42		One of the great "what if's" of the whole campaign hinges on the landing area. "If" the Anzacs had been landed at and around Gaba Tepe (Kaba Tepe) as planned and had been able to spread across the Maidos Plain as planned the effects of Turkish artillery would have been greatly reduced. Instead of spending days trying to restore some sort of order to battalions hopelessly mixed up, lost and leaderless in impenetrable hill country the Battalions could have advanced thousands of yards and dug in to protect the beach-head and then advanced from there. Think of it this way. You are part of a group of 50 people going to an entertainment venue on a bus. The plan is that the bus pulls up at the front door of the venue, there is a short wait while your bone fides are checked and then everyone enters as a group and is seated. BUT........... The bus driver makes a mistake and pulls up at the rear door which is locked. When entry is gained everyone has to climb, in single file, two flights of stairs on the fire escape, in semi darkness and provide individual identification and ticketing information to the short sighted janitor and then enter the venue without seat numbers. They then find that they are on the wrong floor. Multiply that to 160 buses, a new one arriving every 4.5 minutes, give the janitor and a few of his mates a rifle to shoot you with and............ you have Anzac.
43		The feint at Bulair would have been much more successful had some troops actually gone ashore. Instead of sitting off shore and popping off the odd broadside, had the RND actually landed von Sanders, by his own admission, would have kept more than a Division in the area, denuding the forces operating in the south of vital (even critical) reinforcements. As it was he realized, when no troops tried to land, that it was a toothless feint and sent his troops south. To this day I do not know why you would send thousands of troops on boats as a feint if you don't intend them to land. The troops could have stayed home playing poker and the boats by them selves would get the same result.
44		The only effective cavalry operations at Gallipoli were Turkish and on the first day. They were used to great advantage as scouts and as "gallopers" delivering messages. After that first day the use of mounted troops dropped to insignificant to the outcome.
45		Most of the troops that were used against the Anzacs in the first few days were Arabs.
46		Gordon Bennett who ordered Australians at the Fall of Singapore in 1942 not to try to escape, and then escaped himself (destroying his career & reputation), was a Major at Gallipoli.
47		On the first day only 1 Australian 18 pounder artillery piece was landed.
48		In despair, at the end of the first day Birdwood suggested withdrawal. In the confusion he forgot to address his note to anyone, advising of this. Hamilton did eventually get it, but almost by accident.
49		Ashmead Bartlett, the major correspondent at Gallipoli, said "Wars are only carried on and desperate enterprises carried out, owing to the lack of imagination amongst the rank and file".
50		There is only one word to accurately describe the first Anzac Day. Confusion.
51		Australian casualties on 25 April are estimated at 2,000 plus. The first reports of casualties in Australian newspapers was on May 1. It was reported that 22 Officers had been wounded and said that it was not known if any Australians had bee killed. May 2 the report was expanded to 18 dead and 15 wounded. There were reports of Turks burning villages as they retreated. It wasn't until May 8 that some small degree of accuracy was in print.
52		The Australian Department of Defence offered Britain the services of female Doctors for military hospitals in the Middle East. They were rejected by the British War Office. NO females allowed except as nurses.
53		The British forces landed at Y Beach were unopposed. Their leaders walked to within 500 yards of Krithia without seeing a single Turk. They did not advance but dug in at the beach and just above it and brewed tea. It was 3.00pm when they settled for the night. This gave the Turks time to bring up their forces and attack. That was 5.40pm. The Turks kept attacking. Hunter Weston ignored 4 calls for ammunition resupply. By 11.30 the next day the Brits had been forced to evacuate. Of the 2,000 put ashore unopposed, lazily led and poorly supported there were 697 dead. Thousands died in later unsuccessful attempts to capture Krithia.
54		Seaman George Sampson VC, one of the "6 VCs before breakfast" team received about 24 to 30 wounds on the day of landing. He worked for hours under fire recovering wounded in the boats at the V Beach. When he returned to his home town he was give a public reception to celebrate his VC. Some "do-gooder", not recognizing him in civilian clothing, handed him a white feather, the mark of cowardice.
55		At W Beach the 1,029 strong 1st Bn Lancashire Fusiliers landed in 32 cutters. 24 hours later there were 410 left.
56		Keneally VC won his award at V Beach on 25 April. It was gazetted in August. He was KIA on 28 June. His family was notified of his death in October.
57		At Kum Kale the French had no steel pickets to string barbed wire. They used Turkish bodies instead.
58		"Old Anzac", the area of land held during the whole campaign is about 400 acres in size.
59		By the end of day 2 (26th April) Anzac and Helles had gone from invasions to sieges.
60		Simpson of "and his donkey" fame had no rights of a non-combatant even though he and his nag both wore a red cross. He carried water forward to the troops on his sallies forth to pick up wounded so was actively taking part in the execution of the war.
61		Anzac troops had been issued with British 10 shilling notes overprinted in Arabic so they would have some spending power when they arrived in Constantinople.
62		Only 1 woman landed at Gallipoli. She came to pay her respects at a grave. Which grave is unknown (probably that of Doughty Wylie VC) and her identity has never been confirmed (probably his widow).
63		In the First battle of Krithia Hunter-Weston lost 3,000 men out of 13,500. In one afternoon.
64		Birdwood referred to the RN Marines as "Children under untrained Officers".
65		Lt. Col McNicoll was shot at, bayoneted and then arrested as a "spy" at Anzac, by men from the RND. The shooter missed McNicoll at near point blank range and killed his CO instead. An English WO and several privates were shot in the private war that started with RND men shooting each other. McNicoll was virtually unharmed.
66		One Australian soldier from 1st Division put up with his difficulties as long as he could. Several months. He then went to the Medical Officer, who diagnosed dysentery, a compound fracture of the arm, 2 gunshot wounds to the thigh and bullet wounds to the liver and diaphragm.
67		The "landing" phase of the campaign is officially 25 April to 3 May. 9 days. Casualties at Anzac in that time are estimated at 8,500 Anzacs and 600 Royal Marines. The number of dead in that time is put at 2,300.
68		On the night of the Turkish counter attack after First Krithia the Brits had 5 Lieutenant-Colonels (Battalion Commanders) killed.
69		Colonel Malone, the New Zealand hero, just before committing his troops at the Second Battle of Krithia said "It is a relief to get in where war is being waged scientifically and where we are clear of the Australians". The Wellington, Auckland & Canterbury Battalions were massacred in one of Hunter Weston's "scientific" advances into machine gun fire in daylight. They were pinned down, in the open still hundreds of yards from the enemy infantry. They were ordered to resume the attack and the Otago Battalion was thrown in as well. More slaughter to no avail. The despised Australians were thrown in to support the NZers. Later Malone admitted that "scientific" was not the word for British tactics. Whether he also changed his mind on how bad the Australians were is not recorded. The NZ Brigade with a nominal strength of 4,000 was reduced to 1,700 men. The Australians lost 1,056. Very "scientific".
70		A British Officer wrote that it was worth 10 years of tennis to watch the Dominion troops attack.
71		This is Krithia. The place that a few days back the 2,000 British troops who landed unopposed at Y Beach could have taken in that early afternoon without firing a shot, but who chose to brew up instead, is now responsible for thousands of names on War Memorials and much grief in the townships of two Dominions as well as the UK and France.
72		Hunter-Weston invested the lives of thousands of British, French, Senegalese, Australian & New Zealand men in his attempts at winning Achi Baba because he believed that from there he could control the Forts at the Dardanelles. He failed. Post war it became apparent that even had he won he would have achieved nothing. From Achi Baba the Forts are not visible.
73		At the time of Gallipoli the existence of antibiotics was not known. Blood transfusion had not been invented. If you were wounded you were on your own. You got well or you died.
74		John (Jack) Simpson (Kirkpatrick) of "and his donkey" fame had lost all 3 of his brothers as children to Scarlet Fever, a disease caused by a bacteria called group A streptococcus. In the days before antibiotics it was a frequent killer.
75		In mid May, von Sanders, normally the cold, logical planner took a leaf out of the book of Hunter-Weston and planned a frontal assault against entrenched machine guns and waiting riflemen. Like Hunter Weston's worst efforts it was a spectacular failure. Von Sanders threw somewhere in the vicinity of 35,000 men at the 12,500 Anzacs. Turks were forced to advance over up to 300 yards of flattish ground towards an enemy they could not see but who had clear line of sight to them. There was no surprise even though it was a dawn attack. It is impossible to mass 30 to 40 thousand men without the enemy knowing. It was a replay to the power of 100 the heroic and stupid charge at the Nek. At the Nek Australia lost 300 killed. In this operation the Turks lost 3,000 to 4,000 dead and another 7,000 plus wounded. When one considers the effect of gunshot wound, the absence of Turkish medical facilities and the low recovery rate of wounded soldiers of that era regardless of race/nationality it is probably fair to assume that roughly half of the wounded would not survive. If that is true the cost of the attack would be well over 6,000 deaths on the Turkish side. Von Sanders is quoted as saying it cost 9,000 dead although he might have been exaggerating. There were 160 Australians killed. Jacka won his VC. "Play ya again next Saturday" yelled one Anzac.
76		In the classic Hunter Weston style the Third Battle of Krithia was a daylight attack against artillery, machine guns and entrenched troops. The Collingwood Battalion of the Royal Naval Division was so badly shot up that there was no attempt made to reform it. It ceased to exist. The only Officer left alive was 18 years old. The other Battalions fared not much better. An Indian Battalion lost 23 of 29 Officers and 380 of 514 men. There were 4,500 British casualties, 2,000 French. There were no gains.
77		Of the 8 months of Anzac only 2 saw the casualty lists higher than the list of evacuations through illness. About 1,400 a week were being evacuated, ¾ because of illness.
78		Conversation (in part), mid June 1915, London; Kitchener and Ashmead Bartlett. K. 'But don't you think they (the Anzacs) might get on a bit and seize that Hill? (Hill 971) AB explained about the terrain, the gullies, the hills, the tangled mess. K. "Well, why don't they move south and take Kilitbahir & Achi Baba"? AB. "Because first they would have to take Gaba Tepe". K. "Why did they give it up?" AB. "They have never held it". So here we have the overall commander of the operation not knowing who holds what ground, 2 months after the landing. And we wonder why planning was so awful. To this day the AWM have photos with captions talking of landing artillery horses and other equipment for Gaba Tepe. The Anzacs never set foot on Gaba Tepe. They were meant to but the landing too far north put an end to that. Kitchener didn't know.
79		To this day song writers and singers wail about the landing of the Anzacs at Suvla Bay on the 25th April where "How well I remember that terrible day when our blood stained the sand and the water, and there in that hell that they called Suvla Bay, we were butchered like lambs at the slaughter" and "Johnny Turkey was ready, he had primed himself well he rained us with shot and he showered us with shell and in five minutes flat he had blown us to hell, he nearly blew us right back to Australia". Anzacs never landed at Suvla Bay. The Brits did, in August, not April, and were unopposed (with a few blokes of the RAN Bridging Train along to build piers). Great song, awful history lesson.
80		At Helles Hunter Weston threw the 156th Brigade into the fight with orders to take the Turkish trenches "at all costs". That is another of those typically understated British orders that means "If you don't win, don't come home". The 156th did not come home. The 8th Scottish lost 25 of 26 Officers and 400 men. All in 5 minutes. The 7th Scottish were thrown in immediately with no hope of achieving anything. Later what was left of the 2 battalions were rolled into one. The Brigade lost more than half it's men for no gain. 800 were KIA. 600 were WIA. British casualties for the 3 days were 3,800. Hunter Weston said he was glad for the opportunity to "blood the pups".
81		French General Gourand was badly wounded by shellfire and evacuated.
82		In their wild frontal attacks at Gully Ravine the Turks lost 16,000 troops between June 28 and July 5.
83		The Turks asked for a truce to bury the dead as had happened at Anzac. Hamilton refused. He believed that the ordinary Turkish soldier would be loath to attack over the bodies of his dead comrades.
84		Having destroyed the 156th Brigade Hunter Weston now turned his attention to the just landed 157th and 155th. He sent the 155th into the hot Gallipoli sun, in a frontal daylight attack in their heavy serge English winter uniforms. They were cut to ribbons with 60% losses. Unsure of what was happening (he was too far back to know) he threw the 157th in as well. They were slaughtered. Not deterred Hunter Weston ordered the near broken RND to attack again. They did. They were massacred. Hunter Weston relived an underling of his command to shift the blame. These attacks should never have been launched. Hunter Weston was too callous and too stupid not to and Hamilton was too weak a commander to stop it, even though he knew he should. And people wonder why Australians came to despise senior British Commanders.
85		Hunter Weston had butchered every Division he had been given. He had produced 12,500 casualties in 2 months for no gain. He now had a "break-down" and retired to write his memoirs. Of course a private soldier who had a "break-down" and left his post would be shot at dawn. Not so for Generals. When he left, his Divisions, with a nominal strength of 46,000 actually numbered 26,000. The Butcher of Helles had done his work. He later returned to lead a Division in France. It had greater casualties than any other, but who is surprised?
86		At Suvla the new landings were to be overseen by Sir Frederick Stopford. He was a "dug-out". That is, a bloke dug out of retirement to help fill the holes in the General Officer ranks with "chaps" that had "the right attitude". Not these young whipper-snappers from the Western Front who had learned a thing or two about how the new war had to be fought. Oh no, let's get some one who made his reputation on horseback chasing Fuzzy Wuzzies with spears. What, none left? OK let's get good old Freddie Stopford. He is 61, he has never commanded men in action before and he retired in 1909. Sounds perfect for Gallipoli. I mean how hard can it be? Just waltz up to Constantinople and wave the flag. The cowardly Turks will crumble. The Anzacs and Hunter Weston must have got it wrong. Good old Freddie will fix it.
87		Mustafa Kemal took his superior officer to a high spot and pointed out exactly how and where the Anzacs would try to break out of Anzac in the offensive that he felt in his water was coming. He was precisely accurate. The only thing he was not sure of was the dates. His superior Officer scoffed and said it couldn't be done. The Allies named it "The August Offensive". It was timed to coincide with the landings at Suvla. It was nearly done. Only 2 men stopped it being successful. One was called Kemal. The other? Stopford.
88		The August Offensive required Landing at Suvla and the taking of the hills of Anafarta (Chocolate Hills, W Hills, Scimitar Hill) with a push south into the Sari Bair Range. (20 British battalions against 3 Turkish). Gaining a foothold at Teke (Tekke) Tepe, the highest point at Suvla/Anafarta Taking of Hill Q (as a feint or distraction) Taking of the Nek (as a feint or distraction) Taking of Lone Pine (as a feint or distraction) Taking of Hill 971 (as a feint or distraction) Taking of Chunuk Bair (as a feint or distraction) Feint attacks at Helles with no real objective (up to 4,000 casualties acceptable to the British planners).
89		The Suvla landings were made, unopposed. Out of 20,000 landed only 1 British serviceman was killed. A naval rating. He was hit by a stray bullet. The Brits then brewed up for a couple of days because of imprecise and sloppy orders. Most people blame Stopford. He didn't help, surely. He is partly to blame, no doubt. Kemal blames (or thanks) Hamilton for issuing imprecise orders and not insisting that Stopford actually do something. The wasted time allowed the Turks to rush reinforcements to the area and eventually cost hundreds, perhaps thousands, of British lives. And that is not to mention the Australian lives lost at the Nek and elsewhere "protecting" the British landing at Suvla with feint attacks and the nearly 4,000 British casualties at Helles.
90		Crompton MacKenzie: "All our leaders suffer from an exaggerated sensitiveness over the feelings of other leaders". (After Hamilton refused to tell Kitchener the truth about Gallipoli in case it upset him. Wouldn't it have been good if they "wasted" some of their sensitiveness on the lives of soldiers)
91		The feint attacks at Helles were not successful in pinning down the Turkish reserves but did provide another 3,469 British casualties. The spirit of Hunter Weston was alive and well.
92		Lone Pine, the most heavily defended of the targets was the "surprise" victory. This was due to careful (Australian) planning. No plain unadulterated frontal assault. Oh no. Tunnels were pushed out and blown at the last moment to allow men a crater to take cover in. Sap trenches pushed out towards the Turkish positions to reduce the killing zone that the Aussies had to traverse from 100 yards to 40. Artillery bombardment for 3 days to cut the wire. Here, against the "rules" laid down by Hunter Weston and others the Anzacs were allowed to actually come to grips with the enemy before they started dying. Here the Turks died as well, as a result. The Aussies prevailed in a dirty hand to hand fight below ground that lasted several days. Here possibly was the longed for breakout, but it was not to be. There were no reinforcements to take advantage of the fact that a hole had been smashed in the wall. Once more the Turks got a reprieve.
93		Ivor Margetts, after Lone Pine: "...describe the stench that the men were eating, fighting and sleeping in. I counted 7,965,382,165,073,982 flies who walked first on the perspiring live men and then, so as to cool their feet, they walked on the dead ones."
94		The infamous Australian charge of the 8th and 10th Light Horse Regiments at the Nek was preceded a few days earlier by a Turkish charge that was just as silly.
95		Peter Weirs' famous movie "Gallipoli" was unfair to the Brits in that it indicated that they were responsible for ordering the later and obviously useless 3rd and 4th frontal attacks at the Nek to continue. The blame for those orders falls on 2 Australian officers, "Bull" Antill and Hughes. Hughes was soon repatriated to Australia and retirement on "health grounds". Antill went on in Palestine to further prove that he was flawed as a commander. In France his "health broke" and he was repatriated to Australia. In the way these things are done he got a KCMG and a pension. His soldiers got headstones.
96		When Stopford's troops started to earn their keep they took more casualties than there were Turks. There were 1,500 Turks opposing them. They had no machine guns and no artillery. The Brits took 1,700 casualties. Let's have another frontal assault.
97		Willmer (German leader of Turks at Suvla) to von Sanders, about Stopford's Brits.: "No energetic attacks on the enemy's part have taken place. On the contrary, the enemy is advancing timidly". For this Australians are being ordered to charge entrenched machine guns at the Nek and Lone Pine.
98		Hundreds of men on both sides were killed and wounded in the lead up to the taking of Chunuk Bair. When the big day arrived it was anti-climactic. Chunuk Bair was virtually undefended, thanks mainly to the barrage laid down by Anzac and naval artillery. Three Turks were killed, 20 taken prisoner and Chunuk Bair was ours.
99		At Alai Tepe 3 of Monash's AIF Battalions, the 14th, 15th & 16th were cut to pieces by 4 machine guns that were not able to be counter attacked. When the machine guns finished the Turkish artillery took over and rained shrapnel on the Brigade who withdrew under fire and terrible conditions. There were 765 casualties. 15 Bn AIF started the day with 850 men. It ended it with 280.
100		It was probably Monash's worst day of the war. His men were not where he thought they were, he (uncharacteristically) stayed in the rear instead of getting up where he could see what was happening and he was out of touch with his Battalion commanders for long periods because telephone lines were cut. That terrible day does not feature in Monash's diaries. It is as though he wiped it from his mind.
101		At Chunuk Bair Malone dug his trenches on the reverse slope. This was in response to a recent War Office pamphlet from the Western Front suggesting that this was the best response to modern artillery. He had discussed it with others before the battle. Some agreed, others did not. He was castigated for doing so but the truth is that while the New Zealanders occupied Chunuk Bair they held it against all comers. Only after they were replaced did Chunuk Bair fall to the Turks.
102		When the NZers were relieved at Chunuk Bair they left behind dead and wounded in the hundreds. The Wellingtons started the day with 760. By night 49 remained on their feet. The Welch (who had been in support) had lost 417 and the Gloucesters 350. Every Officer and every Sergeant in the Gloucesters had been made a casualty.
103		Some of those wounded on August 8 took 3 days to get to the beach and medical attention. In some areas it took 6 men to carry a wounded man and there were not enough Stretcher Bearers to handle the task. Most of the time they were under fire. Nothing like it was seen in Allied armies until Australian wounded of the Kokoda Trail in Papua New Guinea in WW2 had to spend days walking out to get medical attention. But at least they had way stations where they got a meal and a drink of tea and a place to sleep. At Gallipoli they got none of those things.
104		When the wounded did get to the beach there was no guarantee that medical attention was forthcoming. Cutter and lighter crews had to go from ship to ship begging that the wounded be taken off. On the ships the "operating theatres" were butcher shops with medical staff working round the clock, fighting gangrene and septicemia and the need to do hundreds of amputations with insufficient equipment, no drugs and an unending supply of smashed bodies. It was worse, far worse, than after the Landing. "...it was a shock to me when four lighters pulled up alongside and we saw poor shattered figures, with bloody bandages, grimy faces and dirty clothes... men were dying every minute ... lighters kept coming alongside with their burden of suffering humanity and the man in charge would shout - 'for God's sake take this lot, we've been going about from ship to ship... no-one will have us, and more men are dying. 'We worked, one and all, until we could no longer tell what we were seeing or doing, all day and all night, picking out the cases where the dreaded gangrene had set in ... Even the clean open decks stank with the horrid smell of gangrenous flesh ... The operating room ... was a stinking, bloody shambles ... One of a group of 57 who had lain on the beach, exposed to the elements and Turkish shelling, all the previous day and night awaiting transport to a hospital ship called out, "We are being murdered". He was not wrong.
105		As the battle raged at Chunuk Bair Malone was killed by friendly artillery fire, probably Royal Navy, possibly Anzac artillery.
106		At Hill Q which adjoins Chunuk Bair Major Allanson had 6th Gurkhas and some men from South Lancashire Regiment and some from Warwickshire Regiment. Amongst them was a bloke called "Bill" Slim. He would become famous as Sir William Slim in the India/Burma Campaign of WW2 and later he became Governor General of Australia. They took the hill. The Gurkhas were withdrawn and Allanson was told to retire. No reinforcements were available. As Allanson's men swept the ridge top of Hill Q they chased the Turks down the hill. The Royal Navy mistook them for Turks and shelled them with high explosive shells. Allanson was recommended for the VC but was awarded the DSO.
107		When Kemal re-took Chunuk Bair he did so with a massive surprise frontal assault. Against the New Army boys, untried, poorly led and only just trained it was hugely successful. They broke and ran. Running did them no good, there was no safe place to run to. One Battalion eventually had 5 survivors. Others ceased to exist. The Turks kept going and also overran the Allied troops at The Farm. There were 2,000 Allied troops at Chunuk Bair and 3,000 at the Farm. Most were young inexperienced New Army men. Hampshires, Royal Irish Rifles, Warwickshires, Wiltshires, East Lancs and Loyal North Lancs were all intermingled. There were very few survivors. In 1919 CEW Bean said that nowhere on the Peninsular did the bodies lie so close together as they did here. Thousands of bodies were never identified. Hundreds, possibly thousands, were never buried.
108		Approximately 400 New Army men who ran towards the Turks with their hands in the air to surrender were fired on by New Zealand machine gunners under the orders of Temperly. So now Anzac was reduced to New Zealanders shooting British soldiers in the back. The inmates had finally taken over the asylum.
109		The biggest difference between Turkish leadership and British/Australian/New Zealand leadership was a willingness to get up to the front line and actually view the terrain. If you wanted to see Kemal you moved forward. To see the Generals on the British side you moved to the rear. This "disease" even affected some of the better up and coming Officers. Monash did not spend as much time at the front as he later would in France. It is no surprise that in France he was a better, more effective leader. Generals sat in the relative safety of HQ and issued orders about attacking strong-points that they had never seen over country they did not understand to men who were doing things HQ had no awareness of....e.g. HQ sent a eulogy to be read at Malone's burial apparently oblivious to the fact that the battle for Chunuk Bair was still raging and was balanced on a knife's edge. One order from a general safely ensconced well behind the lines required the Aussies to charge to the sound of "loud cheering". Yeah right, lets cheer the Turkish machine gunners, the Turkish artillerymen and lets keep a special cheer for that Turkish rifleman who is aiming at you. Come on "Hip Hip ................ When Kemal launched the successful counter attack at Chunuk Bair he was right out in front of his army. He knew what he was ordering men to do, he was there, leading, armed with a whip and a huge belief in himself and his army. At Suvla, von Sanders was out riding over the country over which he would lead his counter attack. Allied Generals were in HQ worrying over typewriter ribbons and about not giving offence to brother Officers. Von Sanders sacked underlings who wanted to dilly-dally. So did Kemal. Hamilton accepted their unwillingness to execute his plans and direct refusals to carry out his orders. Stopford was chief amongst the unwilling and he should have been relieved of his command immediately and replaced with someone who would carry out plans and obey orders. He wasn't. Men died as a result.
110		In the 4 days of the August Offensive, on 3 fronts Hamilton had 25,000 casualties for no gains, none at all. His diary records him thinking "Oh well, never say die". Perhaps he should have said that to the dead and wounded to see what they thought.
111		The Turks believed that the Maori were cannibals, a belief reinforced when they saw a Haka performed for Godley. Their newspapers printed the story as true.
112		After all this slaughter on three fronts the Australian newspapers reported that "the most brilliant work yet carried out in this war" had happened at the Suvla landings. If they knew of the 25,000 casualties, and they probably didn't, they failed to report them.
113		The August Offensive was over. Another failure filled with "what if's". What if Stopford had attacked instead of brewing tea. What if Stopford had actually landed to find out what was happening? What if the battalions at Hill Q and Chunuk Bair had not got lost before getting to their objectives. What if ....what if...what if. It was over. The campaign would now gradually wind down to 3 sieges going nowhere. The last great hope was dead. After this it was only a matter of time. Men would still die but there was no longer any point.
114		Godley refused to believe his battle field commanders about the numbers of casualties. He called the reports "cock and bull". It is little wonder that Australia and New Zealand started to think about replacing the British senior officers that had been foisted on them with home grown versions. Birdwood kept his reputation but that was likely more due to the fact that the troops liked him than for his command decisions. Godley was a dud and his men knew it. Hamilton, Stopford, Hunter Weston et al were despised as hide bound, inefficient, callous members of a class and a club that belonged in the past. No one mourned their passing. As the war progressed the thought of putting Anzac troops under direct British command started to smell like last weeks fish. Fromelles, Third Ypres, "The Blood Tub" and other battles yet to come reinforced the growing belief that Australians and New Zealanders could not be worse off under their own Officers then they were under the "chaps" that refused to get dirty boots and worried more about their memoirs than their men.
115		Stopford tried another attack at Suvla. Initial gains were made but the following day the Turks counter attacked and the Brits had to retire. Another 2,000 casualties. The British Brigade Commander's calls for reinforcements were ignored by his HQ. They were in a tizz because Stopford had been sacked. At long last Hamilton had done what he should have done before the landing when Stopford had shown such depression and expressed his belief that the campaign would fail.
116		Hamilton's time was rapidly running out. He had tens of thousands of casualties and nothing, nothing at all, to show for them. He was now timidly asking for the numbers of troops that he should have demanded months earlier. Now the people who had sent him there were getting ready to cut him loose. Nobody likes a loser, even if they helped him lose.
117		Stopford was replaced with a fighting General (de Lisle) who quickly realized that the Divisions had been so poorly handled as to need major work rebuilding them and their espirit de corps. Two Divisional Commanders and one Brigade Commander at Suvla were replaced. The 2nd Mounted Division ( a dismounted Yeomanry Division) was brought in but it was all too little too late. The Turks owned the heights and their confidence was high. Defence is easy at Gallipoli. Get on the heights and you own your enemy. If only....if only Stopford had taken the heights when they were undefended in that first 48 hours. If only...
118		Hamilton asked for 45,000 troops to bring his Divisions up to strength and ANOTHER 50,000 new troops to give him superiority over the Turks. God only knows what he would have done with them but London had lost interest in him.
119		De Lisle, who had replaced Stopford now attacked Scimitar Hill and Hill 60. Both were a waste of time and men. Nothing hinged on them. In Korea over 35 years later the Americans would invest hundreds of lives and much prestige in the Battle of Hamburger Hill. After they had won, they walked away from it as being of no strategic value. Scimitar Hill and Hill 60 might have been the practice runs.
120		Scimitar Hill, the same one that the Brits had held and then walked away from became another killing ground, with the Turks now holding the high ground. The Irish troops of the 29th Division briefly captured and held Scimitar again but had to retire. 2nd Mounted briefly took the hill but they too had to retire. Potts won his VC here.
121		5,300 more casualties were added to the butcher's bill for no reward at Scimitar Hill. Here died three VC winners from the South African wars. Churchill called it the "largest battle of the Gallipoli Peninsular". He was wrong. Hill 60 was coming.
122		The attacking force at Hill 60 was a cobbled together mess. Monash's 13th, 14th, 15th & 16th Bns. AIF, (down to 1,400 from 4,000), 2 Regiments of the New Zealand Rifles (each 200 men), the 29th Indian Brigade (1,300 men) and 3 New Army battalions, one with only 330 men. A greater mish-mash is hard to imagine. The 13th AIF were sent in first. 110 were killed or wounded within minutes and more were hit a bit later. The 14th Bn suffered in the same way as the second wave. Godley sent in the 18th Bn. (newly arrived) to make up the losses. They were to be thrown in with "bombs and bayonets" only. When someone explained to Cox that they had no bombs they were told to do what they could. "Make do". The idea of ordering men to attack machine guns with nothing other than rifles & bayonets is criminal stupidity. No artillery support, no machine gun support, nothing. CRIMINAL STUPIDITY. 750 men went into the charge. 383 did not come out whole. Half were dead. A battalion ruined, for what? So a General could report that he was attacking.
123		Birdwood attacked Hill 60 again and this time he added the 9th Light Horse and the 10th Light Horse Regiments. They captured the Turkish trenches and THEN found out that they only went half way around the hill. The Turks still had the other half. They counter attacked... On Hill 60 the Allies took 2,500 casualties. Monash's 4,000 man Brigade was now down to 968 men. Four Regiments of the NZMR were down to a total of 365 between them all. The 18th Battalion of 1004 men could muster only 386 men after 11 days. Monash was not impressed. He wrote to Godley and asked that some of his survivors be taken out of the front line. He was castigated by Godley for using defeatist language. "Survivors" was not an acceptable word. Would lower moral, don't you know. I wonder if he thought losing 3,000 men out of 4,000 helped morale.
124		Throssell of the deadly charge at the Nek also fought here. It was as bad as anything he had seen. Men fired their rifles until they overheated, threw them down and used another from the dead or wounded. Bombs were exchanged in great numbers. Throssell and others held the trench, against the odds. He was awarded the Victoria Cross (VC). He and his brother later fought in the Battle of Gaza in Palestine. His brother was KIA. Throssell returned to Australia and committed suicide in 1933,aged 49, financially broken.
125		"Suvla Generals" is a term used to describe timid leadership. "Loitering without intent" some called it. Suvla is a blot on the British copy book that can never be erased. In a campaign full of stupidity and missed chances Suvla stands out as the worst of a bad bunch. It is hard to find anything good to say about the Suvla Campaign and the best that can be said is that the ordinary British Tommy Atkins did as well as he was allowed to do. Suvla stands out a Campaign that killed more existing VC winners (3) than it created (1).
126		Now Hamilton had lost the confidence even of his staff. They no longer believed he was up to the job. (Slow learners). The King had lost faith in him and many people in London were becoming openly critical. It was suggested by PM Asquith that Hamilton and his staff be court martialled and dismissed from the Army.
127		Bulgaria, long neutral, now decided Turkey would win at Gallipoli so entered the war on the side of Germany and the Central Powers. That meant that Britain had to open another new front at Salonika to help protect Serbia.
128		Keith Murdoch (father of the current world wide media magnate Rupert) now enters the picture. He went to Gallipoli (Anzac) and after writing a few innocuous pieces met Ashmead Bartlett. After discussions he came to the conclusion that Australians were being misused.
129		Ashmead Bartlett called the August Offensive "the most ghastly and costly fiasco in our history since Bannockburn". He also said "the muddles and mismanagement beat anything in our military history". Although the letter in which he said these things did not reach the Prime Minister (Hamilton had it intercepted) he had already sown his seed in Murdoch's brain. Murdoch, who was not suspected, had already gone to London. He wrote his own letter; different wording, different style, same message. It was to go to the Australian Prime Minister. British PM Asquith got hold of a copy and had it printed as a State Paper in the UK which significantly increased it's power to destroy Hamilton.
130		by Keith Murdoch. "The conceit and self-complacency of the red feather men are equalled only by their incapacity. Along the line of communications, and especially at Mudros, are countless high officers and conceited young cubs who are plainly only playing at war. What can you expect of men who have never worked seriously, who have lived for their appearance and for social distinction and self-satisfaction, and who are now called on to conduct a gigantic war? Kitchener has a terrible task in getting pure work out of these men, whose motives can never be pure, for they are unchangeably selfish ... appointments to the general staff are made from motives of friendship and social influence. Australians now loathe and detest any Englishmen wearing red". Of this, Hamilton later said, "No gentleman would have said it and no gentleman will believe it." It might be noted that most Australians do not now and did not then aspire to be that sort of "gentleman".
131		Ashmead Bartlett, who more than any other person revealed the truth of the enormity of the mistakes at Gallipoli, was referred to by the Australian Prime Minister as an "undesirable". Billy Hughes, the new Australian Prime Minister (who liked to be called the "Little Digger") announced to the Parliament that it was not Australia's job to direct the war, merely to provide the troops well kitted out and well fed. Decisions on how they should be used was up to the Imperial Government. The ultimate in cannon fodder. The newspapers agreed. Britain knew best. Such cowardly forelock tugging subservience is hard to comprehend today.
132		Hamilton was asked for an estimate of casualties in an evacuation. He said 50%.
133		Kitchener sent a 64 word cable that Hamilton was told to decode personally. It was barely polite. It took 62 too many words. It meant "YOU'RE SACKED".
134		Sir Charles Munro was appointed as Hamilton's replacement. He was a capable, fighting soldier, ready to make up his mind and then go for his objective. In short, he was all that Hamilton was not. One wonders what might have happened had he been given the job in the first place. He thought Gallipoli should be evacuated but put off his decision until he had seen for himself what was what.
135		October evacuations at Gallipoli were 600 per day because of illness. There were now 114,000 men at Gallipoli (including the new 2nd Division AIF). If all units were up to strength there would have been 200,000. Winter was on the way and Gallipoli winters are awful. The Army ordered 5,000 tons of galvanised iron and as much timber as could be obtained to roof the trenches. Trench pumps were ordered.
136		Munro arrived on 28 October. His new staff presented him with a proposal to invade and force the Narrows. They estimated it would need 400,000 men.
137		Munro toured the beach-heads. He was amazed at how un-military things were. At Anzac with it's particular problems, it's funny little piers, it's stockpiles on the beach, it's dugouts, he remarked, "It's like Alice in Wonderland. Curiouser and curiouser."
138		Munro immediately recommended evacuation. He correctly identified the problems at Anzac and elsewhere as "holding only the fringe" and noted that the Turks had "all the advantages of position and powers of observation of our movements". The General Staff agreed with him.
139		Churchill was outraged. "He came, he saw, he capitulated" Churchill wrote of Munro, unfairly. Kitchener was outraged. He wanted to have another go at forcing the Dardanelles. Birdwood was the only local commander who agreed and he did so, not because he thought they could win, he had resigned himself to not winning, but because of possible "loss of face" in the Middle East if they withdrew. In other words, throw good money after bad in the same way a desperate gambler does. Except here the money was men's lives.
140		Munro believed that losses might go as high as 40% in an evacuation.
141		The War Cabinet (without Churchill) decided to send Kitchener to evaluate the situation. So, at long last the architect was to actually see the land on which he had built a house of cards.
142