Kitchener of Khartoum, architect of disaster at Gallipoli

Field Marshal Horatio Herbert Kitchener, 1st Earl Kitchener of Khartoum & of Broome (1850-1916).
Kitchener of Khartoum, massive, square-headed, russet cheeked and cross-eyed. There was a 'mystic union' between him and the British people after he won the battle of Omdurman in 1898 and was seen to have avenged the killing of Charles Gordon. During the Great War, Kitchener was secretive, made up policy as he went along, tried to be a Commander-in-Chief and a Cabinet Minister at the same time, and generally failed to live up to the promise he had never shown. Les Carlyon, "Gallipoli" ISBN0-7329-11228-1

Lord Kitchener of Khartoum (1850-1916)

Kitchener's Biography

The Kitchener Memorial at Horse Guards, London UK.

Best known for his famous recruitment posters bearing his heavily mustachioed face and pointing hand over the legend, 'Your country needs you', as Secretary of State for war at the beginning of World War I Kitchener organized armies on an unprecedented scale and became a symbol of the national will to win.

Commissioned in the Royal Engineers, in 1886 Kitchener was appointed governor of the British Red Sea territories and subsequently became commander in chief of the Egyptian army in 1892. In 1898 he crushed the separatist Sudanese forces of al-Mahdi in the Battle of Omdurman and then occupied the nearby city of Khartoum, where his success saw him ennobled in 1898.

In 1900 he became commander in chief of the Boer War, where he fought the guerrillas by burning farms and herding women and children into disease-ridden concentration camps. These ruthless measures helped weaken resistance and bring British victory.

On returning to England in 1902 he was created Viscount Kitchener and was appointed commander in chief in India. In September 1911 he became the proconsul of Egypt, ruling there and in the Sudan until August 1914.

When war broke out, Kitchener was on leave in England and reluctantly accepted an appointment to the cabinet as Secretary of State for War. Flying in the face of popular opinion, he warned that the conflict would be decided by Britain's last 1,000,000 men.

He rapidly enlisted and trained vast numbers of volunteers for a succession of entirely new 'Kitchener armies'. His "New Army" was only partly successful. It created the numbers but the quality of training, indeed the quality of recruit, left a lot to be desired.

By the end of 1915 he was convinced of the need for military conscription, but never publicly advocated it, deferring to Prime Minister Asquith's belief that it was not yet politically practicable.

Kitchener at Anzac after inspecting the front lines with French& British Officers.

In his recruitment of soldiers, planning of strategy and mobilisation of industry, Kitchener was handicapped by bureaucracy and his own dislike for teamwork and delegation. His cabinet associates did not share the public's worship of Kitchener and gradually relieved him of his responsibilities for industrial mobilisation and then strategy.

He was killed by drowning in 1916 when HMS Hampshire was sunk by a German mine while taking him to Russia.

Kitchener, Hamilton & "Breaker" Morant, Boer War

One of the Boer commandos' most provocative tactics was to steal the uniforms of captured troops and masquerade as British soldiers in order to gain a tactical advantage in battle; in response Kitchener ordered that Boers found wearing British uniforms were to be tried on the spot and the sentence, death, confirmed by the commanding officer.

This order ( which Kitchener later denied issuing) led to the famous Breaker Morant case, in which several Australian soldiers, including the celebrated horseman and bush poet Lt. Harry 'Breaker' Morant, were arrested and court-martialled for shooting Boer prisoners and civilians including children and also the murder of a German Missionary.

Morant and another Australian, Lt Peter Handcock, were found guilty, sentenced to death and shot by firing squad at Pietersburg on February 27, 1902. Their death warrants were personally signed by Kitchener. The trial and execution remain controversial, especially in Australia, where it is widely believed that the court-martial was flawed, that Kitchener disappeared on tour immediately following the trial, to remove any chance of a last-minute appeal, and that Morant and Handcock were scapegoats who unfairly took the blame for the killings in order to cover up the extent of Kitcheners 'no prisoners' policy.

This situation has been exacerbated by the loss of the court-martial documents relating to the case, leaving only a book written by one of the men found guilty, George Witton, as primary evidence of the proceedings.

During this time Hamilton was Kitchener's Chief of Staff and chief apologist.

It was Kitchener who "invented" the Concentration Camp. During the Boer War he "concentrated" tens of thousands of Boer women & children into camps that had inadequate facilities. Although there was no deliberate attempt to kill inmates huge numbers died as a result of disease.

Kitchener's failings in the Gallipoli Campaign.

Kitcheners first and major mistake in the Gallipoli Campaign was in his appointment of Hamilton as the commander of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force. He had worked with Hamilton who had been his Chief of Staff in the Boer War so he should have been aware of Hamilton's strengths and weaknesses. Strong command was not in Hamilton's armoury. He was a poet, a dreamer. He was the sort of man who makes a good deputy but a poor leader. Kitchener knew that but appointed him anyway. Gallipoli, in his mind, was a side show against an unworthy enemy.

Leaders of the Greek Army informed Kitchener that he would need 150,000 men to take Gallipoli. Lord Kitchener concluded that only half that number was needed. Kitchener sent the experienced British 29th Division to join the troops from Australia, New Zealand and French colonial troops on Lemnos. Information soon reached the Turkish commander, Liman von Sanders, about the arrival of the 70,000 troops on the island. Sanders knew an attack was imminent and he began positioning his 84,000 troops along the coast where he expected the landings to take place.

It is said that the relationship between Kitchener and Hamilton was similar to a Headmaster and Prefect relationship. Hamilton was overawed by and a little frightened of Kitchener. Kitchener did not issue clear and concise orders to Hamilton and just let him drift. Hamilton came away from the meeting that put him in charge of the largest naval invasion in modern times (up till then) with no clear understanding of his task or what Kitchener expected.

Kitchener was more concerned with the fighting on the Western Front. While that is understandable the result was that the Gallipoli Campaign was starved of vital supplies. For example, at one stage Anzac gunners were reduced to being able to fire 2 rounds per day. The artillery ammunition was being stockpiled in France for Second Ypres. All other supplies were kept to a bare minimum.

Kitchener often asked Hamilton questions but did not demand answers. He allowed Hamilton to procrastinate, something he would not have allowed in a campaign that held his interest.