Mines & The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915

http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/1998/summer/art6su98.htm

E Michael Golder

Failure of British diplomacy resulted in a treaty between Germany and Turkey, signed on 2 August 1914, that gave the Germans de facto control of the Dardanelles, the long and narrow passage between the Aegean and the Sea of Marmara (which is connected in turn to the Black Sea by the Bosporus). The Turks began mining the Dardanelles on 3 August, and the pace of their work accelerated when Rear Admiral Wilhelm Souchon of the German navy (who had commanded the cruisers Goeben and Breslau, "purchased" by the Turks after evading British patrols in the Mediterranean and arriving in Constantinople on the 13th) was appointed commander in chief of the Turkish navy on 15 August 1914. On 27 September the Turkish commandant responsible for the defense of the Dardanelles closed the strait by completing the minefields.

The Turks used the word "fortress" to describe their defenses, which consisted of outer, intermediate, and inner forts on both sides of the strait. The reality was quite different. Rear Admiral Souchon found poorly trained Turkish gunners with out-of-date equipment (old guns of different types and caliber, with poor range finding, fire observation, and control). He requested additional support, and approximately four hundred German naval artillerymen and mine warfare experts under the command of Vice Admiral Guido von Usedom were dispatched to Turkey. ²⁶ These men were integrated into the Turkish service, with the concurrence of Kaiser Wilhelm II, in order to maintain the appearance of Turkish neutrality. Von Usedom's Turkish military title was "Inspector General of Coastal Fortifications and Minefields." The actual command of the Dardanelles was given to another German vice admiral, an artillery expert who had accompanied Von Usedom to Turkey; his Turkish title was "Inspector of Coast Artillery."²⁷

During their initial inspections the Germans found that the shortage of large-caliber ammunition was so severe that, as Von Usedom reported in October 1914, there was only enough on hand to meet one major assault. Von Usedom determined that "he must trust mainly to the minefield for the protection of the Straits."²⁸ He expanded the initial Turkish mining effort, creating a defensive minefield of 343 mines in ten lines. The mine-lines were spaced at fairly regular intervals over the ten-thousand-yard approach to the narrowest part of the Dardanelles. The mines were defended by the fixed guns of the intermediate forts and by mobile artillery.

In Britain, the War Cabinet approved in December an operation to open the Dardanelles using only naval forces. Several factors had led to this decision. First, members of the cabinet, including the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, had become dissatisfied with the nation's commitment to a war of attrition in the trenches of France that did not attempt to take advantage of the mobility offered by the Royal Navy. Second, in Russia a lack of war materials (as well as major setbacks in battle) was preventing the numerical advantage of the Russian military from being used to help overcome the stalemate on the Western Front. In turn, the British Empire was faced with food shortages that could be partially alleviated by Russian wheat. Finally, more than 120 allied merchant ships were trapped in the Black Sea, exacerbating a shortage of shipping. The Secretary of State for War, Field Marshal (and Earl) Horatio Kitchener, argued that a successful naval attack on the Dardanelles would be equivalent to winning a campaign; also, the forces could be easily disengaged at any time if progress was unfavorable. ²⁹ Prime Minister Herbert Asquith agreed: "One must take a lot of risks in war. . . . Forcing the Dardanelles . . . presents such a unique opportunity that we ought to hazard a lot elsewhere rather than forgo it."³⁰

On 3 January 1915 Churchill queried Admiral Sir Sackville Carden, commanding the combined British and French battle squadron in the Mediterranean, "Do you consider the forcing of the Strait by ships alone a practicable operation? Importance of result would justify severe loss."³¹ The resulting plan was for the Royal Navy to force its way through the strait by destroying the Turkish defenses, which would also require clearing the minelines defended by the intermediate forts. Admiral Carden received additional battleships to optimize his force for coastal bombardment, but his total resources (in both ships and logistics) were few.

Royal Navy operations commenced on 19 February 1915. The outer forts were silenced on 25 February, but only after a delay of five days due to bad weather. The weather then caused another several days' interruption. On 1 and 2 March the Royal Navy attempted to bombard the intermediate forts at long range from outside the minelines. Before bad weather again halted operations on 3 March, Admiral Carden had become extremely concerned about the higher than anticipated rate of expenditure of ammunition and by ineffective seaplane spotting of the fall of shot. On 9 March he reported to Churchill that the force would concentrate on clearing the mines. The inner forts could not be reduced by long-range fire, and the battleships could not approach close enough to ensure their complete destruction until the mines had been swept.

The force's minesweepers were converted English trawlers manned by civilian fishermen. The trawlers operated in pairs about five hundred yards apart, sweeping with a single 2.5-inch wire and a one-ton, twelve-foot-long "kite" to regulate the wire's depth. ³² They were also fitted with steel plating for personnel protection. British minesweeping was ineffective on eight nights between 1 and 14 March; despite only minor losses, the trawlers repeatedly withdrew under harassing fire from the mobile batteries. Though civilian trawlermen, who formed the majority of the service's minesweeping crews, had done exceptional and heroic service clearing mines around England, they did not perform well under fire during night operations in the Dardanelles. The failure of minesweeping at night led Admiral Carden to plan a daylight action to silence the intermediate and inner forts and permit the minelines to be swept. The order was issued on 17 March by Admiral Sir John de Robeck, who had been second in command, Admiral Carden having been relieved due to ill health.

The operation commenced at 1130 on 18 March 1915. The battleships silenced the forts, and at approximately 1600 the trawlers moved forward to begin sweeping--only to withdraw again under fire from the mobile batteries, which had not been suppressed. ³³ By the end of the afternoon the British and French had lost six battleships, four to mines and two to gunfire. The British thought the mine losses were due to floating mines, for which they had been unprepared, but the ships had actually been destroyed by a new and undetected mineline. A Turkish mine expert, Lieutenant Colonel Geehl, had chosen an area in which he had observed the battleships routinely maneuvering during earlier bombardments; a small Turkish freighter, the Nousret, had laid twenty mines during the night of 8 March, when the British picket destroyer had been forced off station by bad weather. ³⁴

Admiral de Robeck's after-action report stated that he intended to renew the attack within three or four days, after a reorganization of the minesweeping force. Under the forceful leadership of his chief of staff, Commodore Roger Keyes, the civilian crews were replaced by volunteers from the battleships' survivors, and modifications were begun to fit eight destroyers with minesweeping gear. The War Cabinet strongly endorsed these efforts, especially since intercepts of German wireless communications indicated a serious shortage of ammunition in the forts. ³⁵ Admiral Sir John ("Jackie") Fisher, the First Sea Lord, immediately dispatched two more battleships as reinforcements and instructed de Robeck, "It appears important not to let the forts be repaired or to encourage enemy by an apparent suspension of the operation."³⁶

On 23 March Admiral de Robeck completely reversed his plan of action. After a conference with the senior Army officer on the scene (Sir Ian Hamilton), de Robeck proposed a joint operation in which the Army would secure the forts before the Navy tried to force a passage. Lord Fisher then changed his own position, refusing to challenge the judgment of the on-scene commander. Even with the support of Prime Minister Asquith and Lord Kitchener, Churchill could not get the cabinet to order de Robeck to renew the attack immediately. The decision to conduct a ground campaign led to the disaster known as Gallipoli. Copyright. 1998 by E. Michael Golda