|
From the General Commanding the
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.
To the Secretary of State for War, War Office, London, S.W.
General Headquarters, Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, 20th May, 1915.
My Lord,
I have the honour to submit my report on the operations in the Gallipoli
Peninsula up to and including the 5th May.
In accordance with your Lordship's instructions I left London on 13th
March with my General Staff by special train to Marseilles, and thence
in H.M.S. "Phaeton" to the scene of the naval operations in
the Eastern Mediterranean, reaching Tenedos on the 17th March shortly
after noon. Immediately on arrival I conferred with Vice-Admiral de
Robeck, Commanding the Eastern Mediterranean Fleet; General d'Amade,
Commanding the French Corps Expeditionnaire; and Centre Admiral
Guepratte, in command of the French Squadron.
At this conference past difficulties
were explained to me and the intention to make afresh attack on the
morrow was announced. The amphibious battle between warships and land
fortresses took place next day, the 18th of March. I witnessed these
stupendous events, and thereupon cabled your Lordship my reluctant
deduction that the co-operation of the whole of the force under my
command would be required to enable the Fleet effectively to force the
Dardanelles.
By that time I had already carried out a preliminary reconnaissance of
the north-western shore of the Gallipoli Peninsula, from its isthmus,
where it is spanned by the Bulair fortified lines, to Cape Helles, at
its extremest point. From Bulair this singular feature runs in a
south-westerly direction for 52 miles, attaining near its centre a
breadth of 12 miles. The northern coast of the northern half of the
promontory slopes downwards steeply to the Gulf of Xeros, in a chain of
hills, which extend as far as Cape Sulva.
The precipitous fall of these hills
precludes landing, except at a few narrow gullies, far too restricted
for any serious military movements. The southern half of the peninsula
is shaped like a badly-worn boot. The ankle lies between Kaba Tepe and
Kalkmaz Dagh; beneath the heel lie the cluster of forts at Kilid Bahr,
whilst the toe is that promontory, five miles in width, stretching from
Tekke Burnu to Sedd-el-Bahr. The three dominating features in this
southern section seemed to me to be : —
(1) Saribair Mountain, running up in a succession of almost
perpendicular escarpments to 970 feet. The whole mountain seemed to be a
network of ravines and covered with thick jungle.
(2) Kilid Bahr plateau, which rises, a natural fortification
artificially fortified, to a height of 700 feet to cover the forts of
the Narrows from an attack from the Aegean.
(3) Achi Babi, a hill 600 feet in height, dominating at long field gun
range what I have described as being the toe of the peninsula. A
peculiarity to be noted as regards this last southern sector is that
from Achi Babi to Cape Helles the ground is hollowed out like a spoon,
presenting only its outer edge's to direct fire from the sea. The inside
of the spoon appears to be open and undulating, but actually it is full
of spurs, nullahs and confused underfeatures.
Generally speaking the coast is
precipitous, and good landing-places are few. Just south of Tekke Burnu
is a small sandy bay (W), and half a mile north of it is another small
break in the cliffs (X). Two. miles further up the coast the mouth of a
stream indents these same cliffs (Y 2), and yet another mile and a half
up a scrub-covered gully looked as if active infantry might be able to
scramble up it on to heights not altogether dissimilar to those of
Abraham, by Quebec (Y). Inside Sedd-el- Bahr is a sandy beach (V), about
300 yards across, facing a semi-circle of steeply-rising ground, as the
flat bottom of a half-saucer faces the rim, a rim flanked on one side by
an old castle, on the other by a modern fort.
By Eski Hissarlik, on the east of
Morto Bay (S) was another small beach, which was however dominated by
the big guns from Asia. Turning northwards again, there are two good
landing places on either side of Kaba Tepe. Farther to the north of that
promontory the beach was supposed to be dangerous and difficult. In most
of these landing-places the trenches and lines of wire entanglements
were plainly visible from on board ship. What seemed to be gun
emplacements and infantry redoubts could also be made out through a
telescope, but of the full extent of these defences and of the forces
available to man them there was no possibility of judging except by
practical test.
Altogether the result of this and
subsequent reconnaissances was to convince me that nothing but a
thorough and systematic scheme for flinging the whole of the troops
under my command very rapidly ashore could be expected to meet with
success; whereas, on the other hand, a tentative or piecemeal programme
was bound to lead to disaster.
The landing of an army upon the theatre of operations I have
described—a theatre strongly garrisoned throughout, and prepared for
any such attempt—involved difficulties for which no precedent was
forthcoming in military history except possibly in the sinister legends
of Xerxes. The beaches were either so well defended by works and guns,
or else so restricted by nature that it did not seem possible, even by
two or three simultaneous landings, to pass the troops ashore quickly
enough to enable them to maintain themselves against the rapid
concentration and counterattack which the enemy was bound in such case
to attempt. It became necessary, therefore, not only to land
simultaneously at as many points as possible, but to threaten to land at
other points as well. The first of these necessities involved another
unavoidable if awkward contingency, the separation by considerable
intervals of the force.
The weather was also bound to play a vital part in my landing. Had it
been British weather there would have been no alternative but instantly
to give up the adventure. To land two or three thousand men, and then to
have to break off and leave them exposed for a week to the attacks of
34,000 regular troops, with a hundred guns at their back, was not an
eventuality to be lightly envisaged. Whatever happened the weather must
always remain an incalculable factor, but at least by delay till the end
of April we had a fair chance of several days of consecutive calm.
Before doing anything else I had to redistribute the troops on the
transports to suit the order of their disembarkation. The bulk of the
forces at my disposal had, perforce, been embarked without its having
been possible to pay due attention to the operation upon which I now
proposed that they should be launched. Owing to lack of facilities at
Mudros redistribution in that harbour was out of the question. With your
Lordship's approval, therefore, I ordered all the transports, except
those of the Australian Infantry Brigade and the details encamped at
Lemnos Island, to the Egyptian ports. On the 24th March I myself,
together with the General Staff, proceeded to Alexandria, where I
remained until 7th April, working out the allocation of troops to
transports in minutest detail as a prelude to the forthcoming
disembarkation. General d'Amade did likewise.
On the 1st April the remainder of the General Headquarters, which had
not been mobilised when I left England, arrived at Alexandria. Apart
from the re-arrangements of the troops, my visit to Egypt was not
without profit, since it afforded me opportunities of conferring with
the G.O.C. Egypt and of making myself acquainted with the troops, drawn
from all parts of the French Republic and of the British Empire, which
it was to be my privilege to command.
By the 7th April my preparations were sufficiently advanced to enable me
to return with my General Staff to Lemnos, so as to put the finishing
touches to my plan in close co-ordination with the Vice-Admiral
Commanding the Eastern Mediterranean Fleet. The covering force of the
29th Division left Mudros Harbour on the evening of 23rd April for the
five beaches, S, V, W, X, and Y. Of these, V, W, and X were to be main
landings, the landings at S and Y being made mainly to protect the
flanks, to disseminate the forces of the enemy, and to interrupt the
arrival of his reinforcements. The landings at S and Y were to take
place at dawn, whilst it was planned that the first troops for V, W, and
X beaches should reach the shore simultaneously at 5.30 a.m. after half
an hour's bombardment from the fleet.
The transports conveying the covering force arrived off Tenedos on the
morning of the 24th, and during the afternoon the troops were
transferred to the warships and fleet-sweepers in which they were to
approach the shore, About midnight these ships, each towing a number of
cutters and other small boats, silently slipped their cables and,
escorted by the 3rd Squadron of the Fleet, steamed slowly towards their
final rendezvous at Cape Helles. The rendezvous was reached just before
dawn on the 25th. The morning was absolutely still; there was no sign of
life on the shore; a thin veil of mist hung motionless over the
promontory; the surface of the sea was as smooth as glass.
The four battleships and four cruisers
which formed the 3rd Squadron at once took up the positions that had
been allotted to them, and at 5 a.m., it being then light enough to
fire, a violent bombardment of the enemy's defences was begun. Meanwhile
the troops were being rapidly transferred to the small boats in which
they were to be towed ashore. Not a move on the part of the enemy;
except for shells thrown from the Asiatic side of the Straits the guns
of the Fleet remained unanswered.
The detachment detailed for S beach (Eski Hissarlik
Point) consisted of the 2nd South Wales Borderers (less one company)
under Lieut.-Colonel Casson. Their landing was delayed by the current,
but by 7.30 a.m. it had been successfully effected at the cost of some
50 casualties, and Lieut.-Colonel Casson was able to establish his small
force on the high ground near De Totts Battery. Here he maintained
himself until the general advance on the 27th brought him into touch
with the main body.
The landing on Y beach was entrusted to the King's Own
Scottish Borderers and the Plymouth (Marine) Battalion, Royal Naval
Division, specially attached to the 29th Division for this task, the
whole under command of Lieut.- Colonel Koe. The beach at this point
consisted merely of a narrow strip of sand at the foot of a crumbling
scrub-covered cliff some 200 feet high immediately to the west of
Krithia. A number of small gullies running down the face of the cliff
facilitated the climb to the summit, and so impracticable had these
precipices appeared to the Turks that no steps had been taken to defend
them. Very different would it have been had we, as was at one time
intended, taken Y 2 for this landing.
There a large force of infantry,
entrenched up to their necks, and supported by machine and Hotchkiss
guns, were awaiting an attempt which could hardly have made good its
footing. But at Y both battalions were able in the first instance to
establish themselves on the heights, reserves of food, water and
ammunition were hauled up to the top of the cliff, and, in accordance
with the plan of operations, an endeavour was immediately made to gain
touch with the troops landing at X beach. Unfortunately, the enemy's
strong detachment from Y 2 interposed, our troops landing at X were
fully occupied in attacking the Turks immediately to their front, and
the attempt to join hands was not persevered with.
Later in the day a large force of
Turks were seen to be advancing upon the cliffs above Y beach from the
direction of Krithia, and Colonel Koe was obliged to entrench. From this
time onward his small force was subjected to strong and repeated
attacks, supported by field artillery, and owing to the configuration of
the ground, which here drops inland from the edge of the cliff, the guns
of the supporting ships could render him little assistance.
Throughout the afternoon and and through the night the Turks made
assault after assault upon the British line. They threw bombs into the
trenches, and, favoured by darkness, actually led a pony with a machine
gun on its back over the defences and were proceeding to come into
action in the middle of our position when they were bayoneted. The
British, repeatedly counter-charged with the bayonet, and always drove
off the enemy for the moment, but the Turks were in a vast superiority
and fresh troops took the place of those who temporarily fell back.
Colonel Koe (since died of wounds) had become a casualty early in the
day, and the number of officers and men killed and wounded during the
incessant fighting was very heavy. By 7 a.m. on the 26th only about half
of the King's Own Scottish Borderers remained to man the entrenchment
made for four times their number.
These brave fellows were absolutely
worn out with continuous fighting; it was doubtful if reinforcements
could reach them in time, and orders were issued for them to be
re-embarked. Thanks to H.M.S. "Goliath," "Dublin,"
"Amethyst," and "Sapphire," thanks also to the
devotion of a small rearguard of the King's Own Scottish Borderers,
which kept off the enemy from lining the cliff, the re-embarkation of
the whole of the troops, together with the wounded, stores and
ammunition, was safely accomplished, and both battalions were brought
round the southern end of the peninsula.
Deplorable as the heavy losses had
been, and unfortunate as was the tactical failure to make good so much
ground at the outset, yet, taking the operation as it stood, there can
be no doubt it has contributed greatly to the success of the main
attack, seeing that the plucky stand made at Y beach had detained heavy
columns of the enemy from arriving at the southern end of the peninsula
during what it will be seen was a very touch-and-go struggle.
The landing-place known as X beach consists of a strip
of sand some 200 yards long by 8 yards wide at the foot of a low cliff.
The troops to be landed here were the 1st Royal Fusiliers, who were to
be towed ashore from H.M.S. " Implacable " in two parties,
half a battalion at a time, together with a beach working party found by
the Anson Battalion, Royal Naval Division. About 6 a.m. H.M.S.
"Implacable," with a boldness much admired by the Army, stood
quite close in to the beach, firing very rapidly with every gun she
could bring to bear. Thus seconded, the Royal Fusiliers made good their
landing with but little loss.
The battalion then advanced to attack
the Turkish trenches on the Hill 114, situated between V and W beaches,
but were heavily counter-attacked and forced, to give ground. Two more
battalions of the 87th Brigade soon followed them, and by evening the
troops had established themselves in an entrenched position extending
from half a mile round the landing-place and as far south as Hill 114.
Here they were in touch with the Lancashire Fusiliers, who had landed on
W beach. Brigadier-General Marshall, commanding the 87th Brigade, had
been wounded during the day's fighting, but continued in command of the
brigade.
The landing on V beach was planned to take place on the
following lines: — As soon as the enemy's defences had been heavily
bombarded by the fleet, three companies of the Dublin Fusiliers were to
be towed ashore. They were to be closely followed by the collier
"River Clyde" (Commander Unwin, R.N.), carrying between decks
the balance of the Dublin Fusiliers, the Munster Fusiliers, half a
battalion of the Hampshire Regiment, the West Riding Field Company, and
other details. The "River Clyde" had been specially prepared
for the rapid disembarkation of her complement, and large openings for
the exit of the troops had been cut in her sides, giving on to a wide
gang-plank by which the men could pass rapidly into lighters which she
had in tow.
As soon as the first tows had reached
land the "River Clyde" was to be run straight ashore. Her
lighters were to be placed in position to form a gangway between the
ship and the beach, and by this means it was hoped that 2,000 men could
be thrown ashore with the utmost rapidity. Further, to assist in
covering the landing, a battery of machine guns, protected by sandbags,
had been mounted in her bows. The remainder of the covering force
detailed for this beach was then to follow in tows from the attendant
battleships.
V beach is situated immediately to the west of Sedd-el-Bar. Between the
bluff on which stands Sedd-el-Bahr village and that which is crowned by
No. 1 Fort the ground forms a very regular amphitheatre of three or four
hundred yards radius. The slopes down to the beach are slightly concave,
so that the whole area contained within the limits of this natural
amphitheatre, whose grassy terraces rise gently to a height of a hundred
feet above the shore, can be swept by the fire of a defender. The beach
itself is a sandy strip some 10 yards wide and 350 yards long, backed
along almost the whole of its extent by a low sandy escarpment about 4
feet high, where the ground falls nearly sheer down to the beach.
The slight shelter afforded by this
escarpment played no small part in the operations of the succeeding
thirty-two hours. At the south-eastern extremity of the beach, between
the shore and the village, stands the old fort of Sedd-el-Bahr, a
battered ruin with wide breaches in its walls and mounds of fallen
masonry within and around it. On the ridge to the north, overlooking the
amphitheatre, stands a ruined barrack. Both of these buildings, as well
as No.1 Fort, had been long bombarded by the fleet, and the guns of the
forts had been put out of action; but their crumbled walls and the
ruined outskirts of the village afforded cover for riflemen, while from
the terraced slopes already described the defenders were able to command
the open beach, as a stage is overlooked from the balconies of a
theatre.
On the very margin of the beach a
strong barbed-wire entanglement, made of heavier metal and longer barbs
than I have ever seen elsewhere, ran right across from the old fort of
Sedd-el-Bahr to the foot of the northwestern headland. Two-thirds of the
way up the ridge a second and even stronger entanglement crossed the
amphitheatre, passing in front of the old barrack and ending in the
outskirts of the village. A third transverse entanglement, joining these
two, ran up the hill near the eastern end of the beach, and almost at
right angles to it.
Above the upper entanglement the
ground was scored with the enemy's trenches, in one of which four
pom-poms were emplaced; in others were dummy pom-poms to draw fire,
while the debris of the shattered buildings on either flank afforded
cover and concealment for a number of machine guns, which brought a
cross-fire to bear on the ground already swept by rifle fire from the
ridge. Needless to say, the difficulties in the way of previous
reconnaissance had rendered it impossible to obtain detailed information
with regard either to the locality or to the enemy's preparations.
As often happens in war, the actual course of events did not quite
correspond with the intentions of the Commander. The "River Clyde" came into position off Sedd-el-Bahr in advance of the tows, and,
just as the latter reached the shore, Commander Unwin beached his ship
also. Whilst the boats and the collier were approaching the landing
place the Turks made no sign. Up to the very last moment it appeared as
if the landing was to be unopposed. But the moment the first boat
touched bottom the storm broke a tornado of fire swept over the beach,
the incoming boats, and the collier. The Dublin Fusiliers and the naval
boats' crews suffered exceedingly heavy losses while still in the
boats.
Those who succeeded in landing and in
crossing the strip of sand managed to gain some cover when they reached
the low escarpment on the further side. None of the boats, however, were
able to get off again, and they and their crews were destroyed upon the
beach. Now came the moment for the '' River Clyde " to pour forth
her living freight; but grievous delay was caused here by the difficulty
of placing the lighters in position between the ship and the shore. A
strong current hindered the work and the enemy's fire was so intense
that almost every man engaged upon it was immediately shot. Owing,
however, to the splendid gallantry of the naval working party, the
lighters were eventually placed in position, and then the disembarkation
began.
A company of the Munster Fusiliers led
the way; but, short as was the distance, few of the men ever reached the
farther side of the beach through the hail of bullets which poured down
upon them from both flanks and the front. As the second company
followed, the extemporized pier of lighters gave way in the current. The
end nearest to the shore drifted into deep water, and many men who had
escaped being shot were drowned by the weight of their equipment in
trying to swim from the lighter to the beach. Undaunted workers were
still forthcoming, the lighters were again brought into position, and
the third company of the Munster Fusiliers rushed ashore, suffering
heaviest loss this time from shrapnel as well as from rifle, pom-pom,
and machine-gun fire.
For a space the attempt to land was
discontinued. When it was resumed the lighters again drifted into deep
water, with Brigadier-General Napier, Captain Costeker, his Brigade
Major, and a number of men of the Hampshire Regiment on board. There was
nothing for them all but to lie down on the lighters, and it was here
that General Napier and Captain Costeker were killed. At this time,
between 10 and 11 a.m., about 1,000 men had left the collier, and of
these nearly half had been killed or wounded before they could reach the
little cover afforded by the steep, sandy bank at the top of the beach.
Further attempts to disembark were now given up. Had the troops all been
in open boats but few of them would have lived to tell the tale. But,
most fortunately, the collier was so constructed as to afford fairly
efficient protection to the men who were still on board, and, so long as
they made no attempt to land, they suffered comparatively little loss.
Throughout the remainder of the day there was practically no change in
the position of affairs. The situation was probably saved by the
machine-guns on the "River Clyde," which did valuable service
in keeping down the enemy's fire and in preventing any attempt on their
part to. launch a counter-attack. One half-company of the Dublin
Fusiliers, which had., been landed at a. camber just east of Seddel-
Bahr village, was, unable to work its way across to V beach, and by
mid-day had only twenty-five men left. It was proposed to divert to Y
beach that part of the main body which had been intended to land on V
beach; but this would have involved considerable delay owing to the
distance, and the main body was diverted to W beach, where the
Lancashire Fusiliers had already effected a landing. Late in the
afternoon part of the Worcestershire Regiment and the Lancashire
Fusiliers worked across the high ground from W beach, and seemed likely
to relieve the situation by taking the defenders of V beach in flank.
The pressure on their own front, however, and the numerous, barbed-wire
entanglements which intervened, checked this advance, and at nightfall
the Turkish garrison still held their ground.
Just before dark some small parties of our men made their way along, the
shore to the outer walls of the Old Fort, and when night had fallen the
remainder of the infantry from, the collier were landed. A good force
was now available for attack, but our troops were at such a cruel
disadvantage as to position, and the fire of the enemy was still so
accurate in the bright moonlight that all attempts to clear the fort,
and the outskirts of the village during the night failed one after the
other. The wounded who were able to do so without support returned to
the collier under cover of darkness; but otherwise the situation at
daybreak on the 26th was the same as it had been on the previous day
except that the troops first landed were becoming very exhausted.
Twenty-four hours after the disembarkation began there were ashore on V
beach the survivors of the Dublin and Munster Fusiliers and of two
companies of the Hampshire Regiment. The Brigadier and his Brigade-Major
had been killed; Lieutenant-Colonel Carrington Smith, commanding the
Hampshire Regiment, had been killed and the adjutant had been wounded.
The Adjutant of the Munster Fusiliers was wounded, and the great
majority of the senior officers were either wounded or killed. The
remnant of the landing-party still crouched on the beach beneath the
shelter of the sandy escarpment which had saved so many lives.
With them were two officers of my
General Staff—Lieutenant-Colonel Doughty-Wylie and Lieutenant-Colonel
Williams. These two officers, who had landed from the "River
Clyde'' had been striving, with conspicuous contempt for danger, to keep
all their comrades in good heart during this day and night of ceaseless
imminent peril. Now that it was daylight once more. Lieutenant- Colonels
Doughty-Wylie and Williams set to work to organise an attack on the hill
above the beach. Any soldier who has endeavoured to pull scattered units
together after they have been dominated for many consecutive hours by
close and continuous fire will be able to take the measure of their
difficulties.
Fortunately, General Hunter Weston had
arranged with Rear-Admiral Wemyss about this same time for a heavy,
bombardment to be opened by the ships upon the Old Fort, Sedd-el-Bahr
Village, the Old Castle north of the village, and on the ground leading
up from the beach. Under cover of this bombardment, and led by
Lieutenant-Colonel Doughty-Wylie and Captain Walford, Brigade-Major
R.A., the troops gained a footing in the village by 10 a.m. They
encountered a most stubborn opposition and suffered heavy losses from
the fire of well-concealed riflemen and machine-guns. Undeterred by the
resistance, and supported by the naval gunfire, they pushed forward, and
soon after midday they penetrated to the northern edge of the village,
whence they were in a position to attack the Old Castle and Hill
141.
During this advance Captain Walford
was killed. Lieutenant-Colonel Doughty-Wylie had most gallantly led the
attack all the way up from the beach through the west side of the
village, under a galling fire. And now, when, owing so largely to his
own inspiring example and intrepid courage, the position, had almost
been gained, he was killed while leading the last assault. But the
attack was pushed forward without wavering, and, fighting their way
across the open with great dash, the troops gained the summit and
occupied the Old Castle, and Hill 141 before 2 p.m.
W beach consists, of a strip of deep, powdery, sand
some 350 yards long and from 15 to 40 yards wide, situated immediately
south of Tekke Burnu, where a small gully, running down to the sea opens
out a break in the cliffs. On either flank of the beach the ground rises
precipitously but, in the centre, a number of sand dunes afford a more
gradual access to the ridge overlooking the sea. Much time and.
ingenuity had been employed by the Turks in turning this landing place
into a death trap. Close to the water's edge a broad wire entanglement
extended the whole length of the shore, and a supplementary barbed
network lay concealed under the surface of the sea in the shallows. Land
mines and sea mines had been laid. The high ground overlooking the beach
was strongly fortified with trenches to which the gully afforded a
natural covered approach.
A number of machine guns also were
cunningly tucked away into holes in the cliff so as to be immune from a
naval bombardment whilst they were converging their fire on the wire
entanglements. The crest of the hill overlooking the beach was in its
turn commanded by high ground to the north-west and south-east, and
especially by two strong infantry redoubts near point 138. Both these
redoubts were protected by wire entanglements about 20 feet broad, and
could be approached only by a bare glacis-like slope leading up from the
high ground above W beach or from the Cape Helles lighthouse. In
addition, another separate entanglement ran down from these two redoubts
to the edge of the cliff near the lighthouse, making intercommunication
between V and W beaches impossible until these redoubts had been
captured. So strong, in fact, were the defences of W beach that the
Turks may well have considered them impregnable, and it is my firm
conviction that no finer feat of arms has ever been achieved by the
British soldier—or any other soldier—than the storming of these
trenches from open boats on the morning of 25th April.
The landing at W had been entrusted to the 1st Battalion Lancashire
Fusiliers (Major Bishop) and it was to the complete lack of the senses
of danger or of fear of this daring battalion that we owed our
astonishing success. As in the case of the landing at X, the
disembarkation had been delayed for half an hour, but at 6 a.m. the
whole battalion approached the shore together, towed by eight picket
boats in line abreast, each picket boat pulling four ship's cutters. As
soon as shallow water was reached, the tows were cast off and the boats
were at once rowed to the shore. Three companies headed for the beach
and a company on the left of the line made for a small ledge of rock
immediately under the cliff at Tekke Burnu. Brigadier-General Hare,
commanding the 88th Brigade, accompanied this latter party, which
escaped the cross fire brought to bear upon the beach, and was also in a
better position than the rest of the battalion to turn the wire
entanglements.
While the troops were approaching the
shore no shot had been fired from the enemy's trenches, but as soon as
the first boat touched the ground a hurricane of lead swept over the
battalion. Gallantly led by their officers, the Fusiliers literally
hurled themselves ashore and, fired at from right, left and centre,
commenced hacking their way through the wire. A long line of men was at
once mown down as by a scythe, but the remainder were not to be denied.
Covered by the fire of the warships, which had now closed right in to
the shore, and helped by the flanking fire of the company on the extreme
left, they broke through the entanglements and collected under the
cliffs on either side of the beach. Here the companies were rapidly
reformed, and set forth to storm the enemy's entrenchments wherever they
could find them.
In making these attacks the bulk of the battalion moved up towards Hill
114 whilst a small party worked down towards the trenches on the Cape
Helles side of the landing-place. Several land mines were exploded by
the Turks during the advance, but the determination of the troops was in
no way affected. By 10 a.m. three lines of hostile trenches were in our
hands, and our hold on the beach was assured.
About 9.30 a.m. more infantry had
begun to disembark, and two hours later a junction was effected on Hill
114 with the troops who had landed on X beach. On the right, owing to
the strength of the redoubt on Hill 138, little progress could be made.
The small party of Lancashire Fusiliers which had advanced in this
direction succeeded in reaching the edge of the wire entanglements, but
were not strong enough to do more, and it was here that Major Frankland,
Brigade Major of the 86th Infantry Brigade, who had gone forward to make
a personal reconnaissance, was unfortunately killed. Brigadier-General
Hare had been wounded earlier in the day, and Colonel Woolly-Dod,
General Staff 29th Division, was now sent ashore to take command at W
beach and organise a further advance.
At 2 p.m., after the ground near Hill 138 had been subjected to a heavy
bombardment, the Worcester Regiment advanced to the assault. Several men
of this battalion rushed forward with great spirit to cut passages
through the entanglement; some were killed, others persevered, and by 4
p.m. the hill and redoubt were captured. An attempt was now made to join
hands with the troops on V beach, who could make no headway at all
against the dominating defences of the enemy. To help them out the 86th
Brigade pushed forward in an easterly direction along the cliff. There
is a limit however to the storming of barbed-wire entanglements. More of
these barred the way. Again the heroic wire-cutters came out. Through
glasses they could be seen quietly snipping away under. Again some of
them fell. The fire pouring out of No. 1 fort grew hotter and hotter,
until the troops, now thoroughly exhausted by a sleepless night and by
the long day's fighting under a hot sun, had to rest on their laurels
for a while.
When night fell, the British position in front of W beach extended from
just east of Cape Helles lighthouse, through Hill 138, to Hill 114.
Practically every man had to be thrown into the trenches to hold this
line, and the only available reserves on this part of our front were the
2nd London Field Company R.E. and a platoon of the Anson Battalion,
which had been landed as a beach working party. During the night several
strong and determined counter-attacks were made, all successfully
repulsed without loss of ground. Meanwhile the disembarkation of the
remainder of the division was proceeding on W and X beaches.
The Australian and New Zealand Army Corps sailed out of
Mudros Bay on the afternoon of April 24th, escorted by the 2nd Squadron
of the Fleet, under Bear-Admiral Thursby. The rendezvous was reached
just after half-past one in the morning of the 25th, and there the 1,500
men who had been placed on board H.M. ships before leaving Mudros were
transferred to their boats. This operation was carried out with
remarkable expedition, and in absolute silence. Simultaneously the
remaining 2,500 men of the covering force were transferred from their
transports to six destroyers. At 2.30 a.m. H.M. ships, together with the
tows and the destroyers, proceeded to within some four miles of the
coast, H.M.S. " Queen " (flying Rear-Admiral Thursby's flag)
directing on a point about a mile north of Kaba Tepe. At 3.30 a.m.
orders to go ahead and land were given to the tows, and at 4.10 a.m. the
destroyers were ordered to follow.
All these arrangements worked without
a hitch, and were carried out in complete orderliness and silence. No
breath of wind ruffled the surface of the sea, and every condition was
favourable save for the moon, which, sinking behind the ships, may have
silhouetted them against its orb, betraying them thus to watchers on the
shore. A rugged and difficult part of the coast had been selected for
the landing, so difficult and rugged that I considered the Turks were
not at all likely to anticipate such a descent. Indeed, owing to the
tows having failed to maintain their exact direction the actual point of
disembarkation was rather more than a mile north of that which I had
selected, and was more closely overhung by steeper cliffs. Although this
accident increased the initial difficulty of driving the enemy off the
heights inland, it has since proved itself to have been a blessing in
disguise, inasmuch as the actual base of the force of occupation has
been much better defiladed from shell fire.
The beach on which the landing was actually effected is a very narrow
strip of sand, about 1,000 yards in length, bounded on the north and the
south by two small promontories. At its southern extremity a deep
ravine, with exceedingly steep, scrub-clad sides, runs inland in a
north-easterly direction. Near the northern end of the beach a, small
but steep gully runs up into the hills at right angles to the shore.
Between the ravine and the gully the whole of the beach is backed by the
seaward face of the spur which forms the north-western side of the
ravine. From the top of the spur the ground falls almost sheer, except
near the southern limit of the beach, where gentler slopes give access
to the mouth of the ravine behind. Further inland lie in a tangled knot
the under-features of Saribair, separated by deep ravines, which take a
most confusing diversity of direction. Sharp spurs, covered with dense
scrub, and falling away in many places in precipitous sandy cliffs,
radiate from the principal mass of the mountain, from which they run
north-west, west, south-west, and south to the coast.
The boats approached the land in the silence and the darkness, and they
were close to the shore before the enemy stirred. Then about one
battalion of Turks was seen running along the beach to intercept the
lines of boats. At this so critical a moment the conduct of all ranks
was most praiseworthy. Not a word was spoken — everyone remained
perfectly orderly and quiet awaiting the enemy's fire, which sure enough
opened, causing many casualties. The moment the boats touched land the
Australians' turn had come. Like lightning they leapt ashore, and each
man as he did so went straight as his bayonet at the enemy. So vigorous
was the onslaught that the Turks made no attempt to withstand it and
fled from ridge to ridge pursued by the Australian infantry.
This attack was carried out by the 3rd
Australian Brigade, under Major (temporary Colonel) Sinclair Maclagan,
D.S.O. The 1st and 2nd Brigades followed promptly, and were all
disembarked by 2 p.m., by which time 12,000 men and two batteries of
Indian Mountain Artillery had been landed. The disembarkation of further
artillery was delayed owing to the fact that the enemy's heavy guns
opened on the anchorage and forced the transports, which had been
subjected to continuous shelling from his field guns, to stand further
out to sea. The broken ground, the thick scrub, the necessity for
sending any formed detachments post haste as they landed to the critical
point of the moment, the headlong valour of scattered groups of the men
who had pressed far further into the peninsula than had been intended—
all these led to confusion and mixing up of units.
Eventually the mixed crowd of fighting
men, some advancing from the beach, others falling back before the
oncoming Turkish supports, solidified into a semi-circular position with
its right about a mile north of Kaba Tepe and its left on the high
ground over Fisherman's Hut. During this, period parties of the 9th and
10th Battalions charged and put out of action three of the enemy's Krupp
guns. During this period also the disembarkation of the Australian
Division was being followed by that of the New Zealand and Australian
Division (two brigades only).
From 11 a.m. to 3 p.m. the enemy, now reinforced to a strength of 20,000
men, attacked the whole line, making a specially strong effort against
the 3rd Brigade and the left of the 2nd brigade. This counter-attack
was, however, handsomely repulsed with the help of the guns of H.M.
snips. Between 5 and 6.30 p.m. a third most determined counter-attack
was made against the 3rd Brigade, who held their ground with more than
equivalent stubbornness. During the night again the Turks made constant
attacks, and the 8th Battalion repelled a bayonet charge; but in spite
of all the line held firm.
The troops had had practically no rest
on the night of the 24 /25th; they had been fighting hard all day over
most difficult country, and they had been subjected to heavy shrapnel
fire in the open. Their casualties had been deplorably heavy. But,
despite their losses and in spite of their fatigue, the morning of the
26th found them still in good heart and as full of fight as ever. It is
a consolation to know that the Turks suffered still more seriously.
Several times our machine guns got on to them in close formation, and
the whole surrounding country is still strewn with their dead of this
date. The reorganisation of units and formations was impossible during
the 26th and 27th owing to persistent attacks. An advance was impossible
until a reorganisation could be effected, and it only remained to
entrench the position gained and to perfect the arrangements for
bringing up ammunition, water, and supplies to the ridges—in itself a
most difficult undertaking.
Four battalions of the Royal Naval Division were sent up to reinforce
the Army Corps on the 28th and 29th April.
On the night of May 2nd a bold effort was made to seize a commanding
knoll in front of the centre of the line. The enemy's enfilading machine
guns were too scientifically posted, and 800 men were lost without
advantage beyond the infliction of a corresponding loss to the enemy. On
May 4th an attempt to seize Kaba Tepe was also unsuccessful, the
barbed-wire here being something, beyond belief. But a number of minor
operations have been carried out, such as the taking, of a Turkish
observing station; the strengthening of entrenchments; the
reorganisation of units; and the perfecting of communication with the
landing place.
Also a constant strain has been placed
upon some of the best troops of the enemy who, to the number of 24,000,
are constantly kept fighting and being killed and wounded freely, as the
Turkish sniper is no match for the Kangaroo shooter, even at his own
game. The assistance of the Royal Navy, here as elsewhere, has been
invaluable. The whole of the arrangements have been in Admiral Thursby's
hands, and I trust I may be permitted to say what a trusty and powerful
friend he has proved himself to be to the Australian and. New Zealand
Army Corps.
Concurrently with the British landings a regiment of the French
Corps was successfully disembarked at Kum Kale under the guns
of the French fleet, and remained ashore till the morning of the 26th,
when they were reembarked. 500 prisoners were captured by the French on
this day. This operation drew the fire of the Asiatic guns from Morto
Bay and V beach on to Kum Kale, and contributed largely to the success
of the British landings. On the evening of the 26th the main
disembarkation of the French Corps was begun, V beach being allotted to
our Allies for this purpose, and it was arranged that the French should
hold the portion of the front between the telegraph wire and the sea.
The following day I ordered a general advance to a line stretching from
Hill 236 near Eski Hissarlik Point to the mouth of the stream two miles'
north of Tekke Burnu. This advance, which was commenced at midday, was
completed without opposition, and the troops at once consolidated their
new line. The forward movement relieved the growing congestion on the
beaches, and by giving us possession of several new wells afforded a
temporary solution to the water problem, which had hitherto been causing
me much anxiety.
By the evening of the 27th the Allied forces had established themselves
on a line some three miles long, which stretched from the mouth of the
nullah, 3,200 yards north-east of Tekke Burnu, to Eski Hissarlik Point,
the three brigades of the 29th Division less two battalions' on the left
and in the centre, with four French battalions on the right, and beyond
them again the South Wales Borderers on the extreme right. Owing to
casualties this line was somewhat thinly held. Still, it was so vital to
make what headway we could before the enemy recovered himself and
received fresh reinforcements that it was decided to push on as quickly
as possible. Orders were therefore issued for a general advance to
commence at 8 a.m. next day.
The 29th Division were to march on Krithia, with their left brigade
leading, the French were directed to extend their left in conformity
with the British movements and to retain their right on the coast-line
south of the Kereves Dere. The advance commenced at 8 a.m. on the 28th,
and was carried out with commendable vigour, despite the fact that from
the moment of landing the troops had been unable to obtain any proper
rest. The 87th Brigade, with which had been incorporated the Drake
Battalion, Royal Naval Division, in the place of the King's Own Scottish
Borderers and South Wales Borderers, pushed on rapidly, and by 10 a.m.
had advanced some two miles. Here the further progress of the Border
regiment was barred by a strong work on the left flank.
They halted to concentrate and make
dispositions to attack it, and at that moment had to withstand a
determined counter-attack by the Turks. Aided by heavy gun fire from
H.M.S. " Queen Elizabeth," they succeeded in beating off the
attack, but they made no further progress that day, and when night fell
entrenched themselves on the ground they had gained in the morning. The
Inniskilling Fusiliers, who advanced with their right on the Krithia
ravine, reached a point about three-quarters of a mile southwest of
Krithia. This was, however, the farthest limit attained, and later on in
the day
they fell back into line with other corps. The 88th Brigade on the right
of the 87th progressed steadily until about 11.30 a.m., when the
stubbornness of the opposition, coupled with a dearth of ammunition,
brought their advance to a standstill.
The 86th Brigade, under
Lieutenant-Colonel Casson, which had been held in reserve, were
thereupon ordered to push forward through the 88th Brigade in the
direction of Krithia. The movement commenced at about 1 p.m., but though
small reconnoitering parties got to within a few hundred yards of
Krithia, the main body of the brigade did not get beyond the line held
by the 88th Brigade. Meanwhile, the French had also pushed on in the
face of strong opposition along the spurs on the western bank of the
Kereves Dere, and had got to within a mile of Krithia with their right
thrown back and their left in touch with the 88th Brigade.
Here they were unable to make further
progress; gradually the strength of the resistance made itself felt, and
our Allies were forced during the afternoon to give ground. By 2 p.m.
the whole of the troops with the exception of the Drake Battalion had
been absorbed into the firing line. The men were exhausted, and the few
guns landed at the time were unable to afford them adequate artillery
support. The small amount of transport available did not suffice to
maintain the supply of munitions, and cartridges were running short
despite all efforts to push them up from the landing-places. Hopes of
getting a footing on Achi Babi had now perforce to be abandoned—at
least for this occasion.
The best that could be expected was
that we should be able to maintain what we had won, and when at 3 p.m.
the Turks made a determined counter-attack with the bayonet against the
centre and right of our line, even this seemed exceedingly doubtful.
Actually a partial retirement did take place. The French were also
forced back, and at 6 p.m. orders were issued for our troops to entrench
themselves as best they could in the positions they then held, with
their right flank thrown back so as to maintain connection with our
Allies. In this retirement the right flank of the 88th Brigade was
temporarily uncovered, and the Worcester Regiment suffered
severely.
Had it been possible to push in
reinforcements in men, artillery and munitions during the day, Krithia
should have fallen, and much subsequent fighting for its capture would
have been avoided. Two days later this would have been feasible, but I
had to reckon with the certainty that the enemy would, in that same
time, have received proportionately greater support. I was faced by the
usual choice of evils, and although the result was not what I had hoped,
I have no reason to believe that hesitation and delay would better have
answered my purpose. For, after all, we had pushed forward quite
appreciably on the whole.
The line eventually held by our troops on the night of the 28th ran from
a point on the coast three miles north-west of Tekke Burnu to a point
one mile north of Eski Hissarlik, whence it was continued by the French
south-east to the coast. Much inevitable mixing of units of the 86th and
88th Brigades had occurred during the day's fighting, and there was a
dangerous reentrant in the line at the junction of the 87th and 88th
Brigades near the Krithia nullah. The French had lost heavily,
especially in officers, and required time to re-organise.
The 29th April was consequently spent in straightening the line, and in
consolidating and strengthening the positions gained. There was a
certain amount of artillery and musketry fire, but nothing serious.
Similarly, on the 30th, no advance was made, nor was any attack
delivered by the enemy. The landing of the bulk of the artillery was
completed, and a readjustment of the line took place, the portion held
by the French being somewhat increased. Two more battalions of the Royal
Naval Division had been disembarked, and these, together with three
battalions of the 88th Brigade withdrawn from the line, were formed into
a reserve.
This reserve was increased on the 1st May by the addition of the 29th
Indian Infantry Brigade, which released the three battalions of the 88th
Brigade to return to the trenches. The Corps Expeditionnaire d'Orient
had disembarked the whole of their infantry and all but two of their
batteries by the same evening. At 10 p.m. the Turks opened a hot shell
fire upon our position, and half an hour later, just before the rise of
the moon, they delivered a series of desperate attacks. Their formation
was in three solid lines, the men in the front rank being deprived of
ammunition to make them rely only upon the bayonet.
The officers were served out with
coloured Bengal lights to fire from their pistols, red indicating to the
Turkish guns that they were to lengthen their range; white that our
front trenches had been stormed; green that our main position had been
carried. The Turkish attack was to crawl on hands and knees until the
time came for the final rush to be made. An eloquent hortative was
signed Von Zowenstern and addressed to the Turkish rank and file who
were called upon, by one mighty effort, to fling us all back into the
sea. " Attack the enemy with the bayonet and utterly destroy
him! '' We shall not retire one step; for, if we do, our religion, our
country and our nation will perish! "Soldiers! The world is looking
at you! Your only hope of salvation is to bring this battle to a
successful issue or gloriously to give up your life in the attempt!
''.
The first momentum of this ponderous onslaught fell upon the right of
the 86th Brigade, an unlucky spot, seeing all the officers thereabouts
had already been killed or wounded. So when the Turks came right on
without firing and charged into the trenches with the bayonet they made
an ugly gap in the line. This gap was instantly filled by the 5th Royal
Scots (Territorials), who faced to their flank and
executed a brilliant bayonet charge against the enemy, and by the Essex
Regiment detached for the purpose by the Officer Commanding 88th
Brigade. The rest of the British line held its own with comparative
ease, and it was not found necessary to employ any portion of the
reserve.
The storm next broke in fullest
violence against the French left, which was held by the Senegalese.
Behind them were two British Field Artillery Brigades and a Howitzer
Battery. After several charges and counter-charges the Senegalese began
to give ground and a company of the Worcester Regiment and some gunners
were sent forward to hold the gap. Later, a second company of the
Worcester Regiment was also sent up, and the position was then
maintained for the remainder of the night, although, about 2 a.m., it
was found necessary to despatch one battalion Royal Naval Division to.
strengthen the extreme right of the French,
About 5 a.m. a counter-offensive was
ordered, and the whole line began to advance. By 7.30 a.m. the British
left had gained some 500 yards, and the centre had pushed the enemy back
and inflicted heavy losses. The right also had gained some ground in
conjunction with the French left, but the remainder of the French, line
was unable to progress. As the British centre and left were now
subjected to heavy cross fire from concealed machine guns, it was found
impossible to maintain the ground gained, and therefore, about 11 a.m.,
the whole line withdrew to its former trenches. The net result of the
operations was the repulse of the Turks and the infliction upon them of
very heavy losses. At first we had them fairly on the run, and had it
not been for those inventions of the devil—machine guns and barbed
wire—which suit the Turkish character and tactics to perfection, we
should not have stopped short of the crest of Achi Babi. As it was, all
brigades reported great numbers of dead Turks in front of their lines,
and 350 prisoners were left in our hands.
On the 2nd, during the day, the enemy remained quiet, burying his dead
under a red crescent flag, a work with which we did not interfere.
Shortly after 9 p.m., however, they made another attack against the
whole allied line, their chief effort being made against the French
front, where the ground favoured their approach. The attack was repulsed
with loss.
During the night 3rd/4th the French front was again subjected to a heavy
attack, which they were able to repulse without assistance from my
general reserve. The day of the 4th was spent in reorganisation, and a
portion of the line held by the French, who had lost heavily during the
previous night's fighting, was taken over by the 2nd Naval Brigade. The
night passed quietly.
During the 5th the Lancashire Fusilier Brigade of the East Lancashire
Division was disembarked and placed in reserve behind the British left.
Orders were issued for an advance to be carried out next day, and these
and the three days' battle which ensued, will be dealt with in my next
despatch.
The losses, exclusive of the French, during the period covered by this
despatch were, I regret to say, very severe, numbering: —
177 Officers and 1,990 other
ranks killed,
412 Officers and 7,807 other ranks wounded,
13 Officers and 3,580 other ranks missing.
From a technical point of view it is
interesting to note that my Administrative Staff had not reached Mudros
by the time when the landings were finally arranged. All the highly
elaborate work involved by these landings was put through by my General
Staff working in collaboration with Commodore Roger Kayes, C.B., M.V.O.,
and the Naval Transport Officers allotted for the purpose by
Vice-Admiral de Robeck. Navy and Army carried out these combined duties
with that perfect harmony which was indeed absolutely essential to
success.
Throughout the events I have chronicled the Royal Navy has been father
and mother to the Army. Not one of us but realises how much he owes to
Vice-Admiral de Robeck; to the warships, French and British; to the
destroyers, mine sweepers, picket boats, and to all their dauntless
crews, who took no thought of themselves, but risked everything to give
their soldier comrades a fair run in at the enemy.
Throughout these preparations and operations Monsieur le General d'Amade
has given me the benefit of his wide experiences of war, and has
afforded me, always, the most loyal and energetic support. The landing
of Kum Kale planned by me as a mere diversion to distract the attention
of the enemy was transformed by the Commander of the Corps
Expeditionnaire de l'Orient into a brilliant operation, which secured
some substantial results. During the fighting which followed the landing
of the French Division at Sedd-el-Bahr no troops could have acquitted
themselves more creditably under very trying circumstances, and under
very heavy losses, than those working under the orders of Monsieur le
General d'Amade.
Lieutenant-General Sir W. R. Birdwood, K.C.S.L, C.B., C.I.E., D.S.O.,
was in command of the detached landing of the Australian and New Zealand
Army Corps above Kaba Tepe, as well as during the subsequent fighting.
The fact of his having been responsible for the execution of these
difficult and hazardous operations—operations which were crowned with
a very remarkable success— speaks, I think, for itself.
Major-General A. G. Hunter-Weston, C.B., D.S.O., was tried very highly,
not only during the landings, but more especially in the day and night
attacks and counter attacks which ensued. Untiring, resourceful and ever
more cheerful as the outlook (on occasion) grew darker, he possesses, in
my opinion, very special qualifications as a Commander of troops in the
field.
Major-General W. P. Braithwaite, C.B., is the best Chief of the General
Staff it has ever been my fortune to encounter in war. I will not pile
epithets upon him. I can say no more than what I have said, and I can
certainly say no less.
I have many other names to bring to notice for the period under review,
and these will form the subject of a separate report at an early date.
I have the honour to be
Your Lordship's most obedient Servant,
IAN HAMILTON, General,
Commanding Mediterranean Expeditionary Force
|
