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The Graveyards
of Gallipoli; A Digger
History Associate Site |
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A Tribute
to the Men of all the Nations that took part in the Gallipoli Campaign of
1915 |
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Section 6 of the Anzac Book
- Sir Ian Hamilton's Gallipoli Dispatches
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| This
page is an extract from The
Anzac Book |
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| THE following extracts from the
dispatches of Sir Ian Hamilton form a short official summary of the
history of Anzac: |
| The Landing
THE Australian and New Zealand Army
Corps sailed out of Mudros Bay on the afternoon of April 24, escorted
by the 2nd Squadron of the Fleet, under Rear-Admiral Thursby.
The rendezvous was reached just after half-past one in the morning of
the 25th, and there the 1.500 men who had been placed on board H.M.
ships before leaving Mudros were transferred to their boats. This
operation was carried out with remarkable expedition and in absolute
silence. Simultaneously the remaining 2,500
men of the covering force were transferred from their transports to
six destroyers. At 2.30 a.m. H.M. ships, together with the tows and
the destroyers, proceeded to within some four miles of the coast,
H.M.S. Queen (flying Rear-Admiral Thursby's flag) directing on a point
about a mile north of Kaba Tepe. At 1.30 a.m. orders to go ahead and
land were given to the tows, and at 4.10 a.m. the destroyers were
ordered to follow.
All these arrangements worked without a hitch, and were carried out in
complete orderliness and silence. No breath of wind ruffled the
surface of the sea, and every condition was favourable save for the
moon which, sinking behind the ships, may have silhouetted them inst
its orb, betraying them thus to watchers the shore.
A rugged and difficult part of the coast had been selected for the
landing, so difficult and rugged that I considered the Turks were not
at all likely to anticipate such a descent. Indeed, owing to the tows
having failed to maintain their exact direction, the actual point of
disembarkation was rather more than a mile north of that which I had
selected, and was more closely overhung by steeper cliffs.
Although-this accident increased the initial difficulty of driving the
enemy off the heights inland, it has since proved itself to have been
a blessing in disguise, inasmuch as the actual base of the force of
occupation has been much better defiladed from shell fire.
The beach on which the landing was actually effected is a very narrow
strip of sand, about 1,000 yards in length, bounded on the north and
the south by two small promontories. At its southern extremity a deep
ravine, with exceedingly steep, scrub-clad sides, runs inland in a
north-easterly direction. Near the northern end of the beach a small
but steep gully runs up into the hills at right angles to the shore.
Between the ravine and the gully the whole of the beach is backed by
the seaward face of the spur, which forms the north-western side of
the ravine.
From the top of the spur the ground
falls almost sheer except near the southern limit of the beach, where
gentler slopes give access to the mouth of the ravine behind. Further
inland lie in a tangled knot the under-features of Sari Dair,
separated by deep ravines, which take a most confusing diversity of
direction. Sharp spurs, covered with dense scrub, and falling away in
many places in precipitous sandy cliffs, radiate from the principal
mass of the mountain, from which they run north-west, west,
south-west, and south to the coast.
The boats approached the land in the silence and the darkness, and
they were close to the shore before the enemy stirred. Then about one
battalion of Turks was seen running along the beach. At this critical
moment the conduct of all ranks was most praiseworthy. Not a word was
spoken - everyone remained perfectly orderly and quiet awaiting the
enemy's fire, which sure enough opened, causing many casualties.
The moment the boats touched land
the Australians' turn had come. Like lightning they leapt ashore, and
each man as he did so went straight as his bayonet at the enemy. So
vigorous was the onslaught that the Turks made no attempt to withstand
it and fled from ridge to ridge pursued by the Australian infantry.
This attack was carried out by the 3rd Australian Brigade, under Major
(temporary Colonel) Sinclair Maclagan, D.S.O. The 1st and 2nd Brigades
followed promptly, and were all disembarked by 2 p.m. by which time
12,000 men and two batteries of Indian Mountain Artillery had been
landed. The disembarkation of further artillery was delayed owing to
the fact that the enemy's heavy guns opened on the anchorage and
forced the transports, which had been subjected to continuous shelling
from his field guns, to stand farther out to sea.
The broken ground, the thick scrub, the necessity for sending any
formed detachments post haste as they landed to the critical point
-all these led to confusion and mixing up of units. Eventually the
mixed crowd of fighting men, some advancing from the beach, others
falling back before the oncoming Turkish supports, solidified into a
semi-circular position with its right about a mile north of Gaba Tepe
and its left on the high ground over Fisherman's Hut.
During this period parties of the
9th and 10th Battalions charged and put out of action three of the
enemy's Krupp guns. During this period also the disembarkation of the
Australian Division was being followed by that of the New Zealand and
Australian Division (two brigades only).
From 11 a.m. to 3 p.m. the enemy now reinforced to a strength of
20,000 men, attacked the whole line, making a specially strong effort
against the 3rd Brigade and the left of the 2nd Brigade. This
counter-attack was however, handsomely repulsed with the help of the
guns o! H.M. ships. Between 5 and 6.30 p.m. a third most determined
counter-Attack against the 3rd Brigade, who held their ground with
more than equivalent stubbornness.
During the night again the Turks
made constant attacks; but in spite of all the line held firm. The
troops had had practically no rest on the night of the 24-25th ; they
had been fighting hard all day over most difficult country, and they
had been subjected to heavy shrapnel fire in the open. Their
casualties had been deplorably heavy. But, despite their losses and in
spite of their fatigue, the morning of the 26th found them still in
good heart and as full of fight as ever.
It is a consolation to know that the
Turks suffered still more seriously. Several times our machine guns
got onto them in close formation and the whole surrounding country is
still strewn with their dead of this date.
The reorganisation of units and
formations was impossible during the 26th and 27th owing to persistent
attacks. An advance was impossible until a reorganisation could be
effected, and it only remained to entrench the position gained and to
perfect the arrangements for bringing up ammunition, water and
supplies to the ridges-in itself a most difficult under-taking. Four
battalions of the Royal Naval Division were sent up to reinforce the
Army Corps on April 28 and 29.
May 2
On the night of May 2, a bold effort was made to
seize a commanding knoll in front of the centre of the line. The
enemy's enfilading machine guns were too scientifically posted, and
800 men were lost without advantage beyond the infliction of a
corresponding loss to the enemy. On May 4, an attempt to seize Kaba
Tepe was also unsuccessful, the barbed-wire here being something
beyond belief. But a number of minor operations were carried out, such
as the taking of Turkish observing station, the strengthening of
entrenchments, the reorganisation of units and the perfecting of
communication with the landing-place. Also a constant strain was
placed upon some of the best troops of
the enemy, who, to the number of 24,000, were constantly kept fighting
and being killed and wounded freely, as the Turkish sniper is no match
for the Kangaroo shooter even at his own game.
Two Brigades sent to Helles
The many urgent calls for
reinforcements made during the previous critical fighting had forced
me to disorganise and mix together several of the formations in
the southern group, to the extent even of the French on our right
having a British battalion holding their own extremest right. For the
purposes
of the impending fight, it became therefore necessary to create
temporarily a Composite Division, consisting of the 2nd Australian and
New Zealand Infantry Brigades (withdrawn for the purpose from the
northern section) together with a Naval Brigade formed of the Plymouth
and Drake Battalions. The 29th Division was reconstituted into four
brigades, i.e. the 88th and 87th Brigades, the Lancashire Fusilier
Brigade (T.F.), and the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade. The French Corps
Expeditionnaire was reinforced by the 2nd Naval Brigade, and the new
Composite Division
formed my General Reserve.
During the three days (May 6/8th) our troops were destined to be very
severely tried. They were about to attack a series of positions
scientifically selected in advance which, although not yet joined up
into one line of entrenchment, were already strengthened by works on
their more important tactical features.
[After recounting the heavy fighting by which
the 29th Division made its advance on May 6 and 7, the dispatch
continues :]
The troops were now worn out ; the new lines needed consolidating, and
it was certain that fresh reinforcements were reaching the Turks.
Balancing the actual state of my own troops against the probable
condition of the Turks, I decided to call upon the men to make one
more push before the new enemy forces could get into touch with their
surroundings.
Orders were therefore issued to dig in at sundown on the line gained,
to maintain that line against counter-attack, and to prepare to
advance again next morning. The Lancashire Fusilier Brigade was
withdrawn into reserve, and its place on the left was taken by the
Brigade of New Zealanders.
General Headquarters were shifted to an entrenchment on a hill in rear
of the left of our line. Under my plan for the fresh attack, the New
Zealand Brigade was to advance through the line held during the night
by the 88th Brigade and press on towards Krithia. Simultaneously, the
87th Brigade was to threaten the works on the west of the ravine,
whilst endeavouring, by means of parties of scouts and volunteers, to
steal patches of ground from the areas dominated by the German
machine-guns.
Battle of Krithia
At 10.15 A.m. heavy fire from ships
and batteries was opened on the whole front, and at 10.30 a.m. the New
Zealand Brigade began to move, meeting with strenuous opposition from
the enemy, who had received his reinforcements. Supported by the fire
of the batteries and the machine-guns of the 88th Brigade, they pushed
forward on the right and advanced their centre beyond the fir trees,
but could make little further progress. By 1.30 p.m. about 200 yards
had been gained beyond the previously most advanced trenches of the
88th Brigade.
At this hour the French Corps reported they could not advance up the
crest of the spur west of Kereves Dere till further progress was made
by the British. At 4 p.m. I gave orders that the whole line,
reinforced by the 2nd Australian Brigade, would fix bayonets, slope
arms, and move on Krithia precisely at 5.30 p.m.
At 5.15 p.m. the ships' guns and our heavy artillery bombarded the
enemy's position for a quarter of an hour, and at 5.30 p.m. the field
guns opened a hot shrapnel fire to cover the infantry advance.
The co-operation of artillery and infantry in this attack was perfect,
the timing of the movement being carried out with great precision.
Some of the companies of the New Zealand regiments did not get their
orders in time, but acting on their own initiative they pushed on as
soon as the heavy howitzers ceased firing, thus making the whole
advance simultaneous.
The steady advance of the British
could be followed by the sparkle of their bayonets until the long
lines entered the smoke clouds. The French at first made no move,
then, their drums beating and bugles sounding the charge, they
suddenly darted forward in a swarm of skirmishers, which seemed in one
moment to cover the whole southern face of the ridge of the Kereves
Dere. Against these the Turkish gunners now turned their heaviest
pieces, and as the leading groups stormed the first Turkish redoubt
the ink-black bursts of high-explosive shells blotted out both
assailants and assailed.
The trial was too severe for the
Senegalese tirailleurs. They recoiled. They were rallied. Another rush
forward, another repulse, and then a small supporting column of French
soldiers was seen silhouetted against the s y as they charged upwards
along the crest of the ridge of the Kereves Dere, whilst elsewhere it
grew so dark that the whole of the battlefield became a blank.
Not until next morning did any reliable details come to hand of what
had happened. The New Zealanders' firing line had marched over the
cunningly concealed enemy's machineguns without seeing them, and
these, re-opening on our supports as they came up, caused them heavy
losses. But the first line pressed on and arrived within a few yards
of the Turkish trenches which had been holding up our advance beyond
the fir wood. There they dug themselves in.
The Australian Brigade had advanced through the Composite Brigade,
and, in spite of heavy losses from shrapnel, machine-gun, and rifle
fire, had progressed from 300 to 400 yards.
The determined valour shown by these two brigades, the New Zealand
Brigade, under Brigadier General F. E. Johnston, and the 2nd
Australian Infantry Brigade, under Brigadier General the Hon. J. W.
McCay, are worthy of particular praise. Their losses were
correspondingly heavy, but in spite of fierce counterattacks by
numerous fresh troops they stuck to what they had won with admirable
tenacity.
On the extreme left the 87th Brigade, under Major-General W. R.
Marshall, made a final and especially gallant effort to advance across
the smooth, bullet-swept area between the ravine and the sea, but once
more the enemy machine-guns thinned the ranks of the leading companies
of the South Wales Borderers, and again there was nothing for it but
to give ground. But when night closed in, the men of the 87th Brigade
of their own accord asked to be led forward, and achieved progress to
the extent of just about 200 yards. During the darkness the British
troops everywhere entrenched themselves on the line gained. On the
right the French column, last seen as it grew dark, had stormed and
still held the redoubt round which the fighting had centred.

[The 2nd Australian Infantry Brigade and New
Zealand Infantry Brigade were for three days in the trenches they had
dug, but on the completion of the push towards Krithia were
re-transferred to Anzac. The history of Anzac during the next three
months is told in the following extracts :]
Quinn's Post
Turning now to where the Australian
and New Zealand Army Corps were perched upon the cliffs of Sari Bair,
I must begin by explaining that their
role at this stage of the
operations was - first, to keep open a door leading to the vitals of
the Turkish position; secondly, to hold up as large a body as possible
of the enemy in front of them, so as to lessen the strain at Cape
Helles. Anzac, in fact, was cast to play second fiddle to Cape Helles,
a part out of harmony with the daredevil spirit animating those
warriors from the South, and so it has come about that, as your
Lordship will now see, the defensive of the Australians and New
Zealanders has always tended to take on the character of an attack.
The line held during the period under review by the Australian and New
Zealand Army Corps formed a rough semi-circle inland from the beach of
Anzac Cove, with a diameter of about 1,100 yards. The firing line is
everywhere close to the enemy's trenches, and in all sections of the
position sapping, counter sapping, and bomb attacks have been
incessant. The shelling both of the trenches and beaches has been
impartial and liberal. As many as 1,400 shells have fallen on Anzac
within the hour, and these of all calibers, from 11 inches to field
shrapnel. Around Quinn's Post, both above and below ground, the
contest has been particularly severe.
This section of the line is situated
on the circumference of the Anzac semi-circle at the farthest point
from its diameter. Here our fire trenches are mere ledges on the brink
of a sheer precipice falling 200 feet into the valley below. The
enemy's trenches are only a few feet distant.
On May 9 a night assault was delivered on the enemy's trenches in
front of Quinn's Post. The trenches were carried at the point of the
bayonet. At dawn on May 10 a strong counter-attack forced our troops
to fall back on Quinn's Post.
On the night of May 14-15 a sortie was made from Quinn's Post with the
object of filling in Turkish trenches in which bomb throwers were
active. The sortie, which cost us some 70 casualties, was not
successful.
On May 14, Lieutenant-General Sir W. R. Birdwood was slightly wounded,
but I am glad to say he was not obliged to relinquish the command of
his corps.
Death of General Bridges
On May 15 1 deeply regret to say
Major-General IV. T. Bridges, commanding the Australian Division,
received a severe wound, which proved fatal a few days later.
Sincere, and single-minded in his devotion to Australia and to duty,
his loss still stands out even amidst the hundreds of other brave
officers who have gone.
[General Bridges was succeeded by Major General
H. B. Walker. The 1st Australian Division was also commanded by
Major-General J. G. Legge, who afterwards organised and commanded the
2nd Australian Division.]
May 19
On May 18 Anzac was subjected to a
heavy bombardment from large caliber guns and howitzers. At midnight
of the 18th-19th the most violent rifle and machine-gun fire yet
experienced broke out along the front. Slackening from 3 a.m. to 4 a.m.
it then broke out again, and a heavy Turkish column assaulted the
left of No. 2 section. This assault was beaten off with loss. Another
attack was
delivered before daylight on the centre of this section ; it was
repeated four times and repulsed each time 'with very serious losses
to the enemy.
Simultaneously a heavy attack was
delivered on the north-east salient of No. 4 section, which was
repulsed and followed up, but the pressing of the counter-attack was
prevented by shrapnel. Attacks were also delivered on Quinn's Post,
Courtney's Post, and along the front of our right section. At about 5
a.m. the battle was fairly joined, and a furious cannonade was begun
by a large number of enemy guns, including 12-inch and 9.2-inch, and
other artillery that had not till then opened. By 9.30 a.m. the Turks
were pressing hard against the left of Courtney's and the right of
Quinn's Post. At 10 a.m. this attack, unable to face fire from the
right, swung round to the left, where it was severely handled by our
guns and the machine-guns of our left section. By 11 a.m. the enemy,
who were crowded together in the trenches beyond Quinn's Post, were
giving way under their heavy losses.
According to prisoners' reports 30,000 troops, including five fresh
regiments, were used against us. General Liman von Sanders was himself
in command. The enemy's casualties were heavy, as may be judged from
the fact that over 3,000 dead were lying in the open in view of our
trenches. A large proportion of these losses were due to our artillery
fire. Our casualties amounted to about 100 killed and 500 wounded,
including nine officers wounded.
The next four days were chiefly remarkable for the carrying through of
the negotiations for the suspension of arms, which actually took place
on May 24. The negotiations resulted in a suspension of arms from 7.30
a.m. to 4.30 p.m. on May 24. The procedure laid down for this
suspension of arms was, I am glad to inform your Lordship, correctly
observed on both sides,
The burial of the dead was finished about 3 p.m. Some 3,000 Turkish
dead were removed or buried in the area between the opposing lines.
The whole of these were killed on or since May 18. Many bodies of men
killed earlier were also buried.
From May 28 till June 5 the fighting seemed to concentrate itself
around Quinn's Post. Three enemy galleries had been detected there,
and work on them stopped by counter-mines, which killed twenty Turks
and injured thirty.
Quinn's Again
One gallery had, however, been over-
looked, and at 3.30 a.m. on May 29 a mine was sprung in or near the
centre of Quinn's Post. The explosion was followed by a very heavy
bomb attack, before which our left centre subsection fell back,
letting in a storming party of Turks. This isolated one
subsection on the left from the two other sub-sections on the right.
At 5.30 a.m. our counter-attack was launched, and by 6 a.m. the
position had been retaken with the bayonet by the 15th Australian
Infantry Battalion, led by Major Quinn, who was unfortunately killed.
All the enemy in the trench were killed or captured.
On May 30 preparations were made in Quinn's Post to attack and destroy
two enemy saps, the heads of which had reached within five yards of
our fire trench. Two storming parties of thirty-five men went forward
at 1p.m. cleared the sap heads and penetrated into the trenches
beyond, but they were gradually driven back by bombs, of which the
enemy seemed to have an unlimited supply.
During May 31 close fighting continued in front of Quinn's Post.
On June 1, an hour after dark, two sappers of the New Zealand
Engineers courageously crept out and laid a charge of gun-cotton
against a timber and sandbag bomb-proof. The structure was completely
demolished.
The Demonstrations
On June 4 three separate enterprises
were carried out by the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps. These
were undertaken in compliance with an order which I had issued that
the enemy's attention should be distracted during an attack I was
about to deliver in the southern zone.
First a demonstration in the direction of Kaba Tepe, the Navy
co-operating by bombarding the Turkish trenches.
At Quinn's Post an assault was delivered at 11 p.m. A party of sixty
men, accompanied by a bomb-throwing party on either flank, stormed the
enemy's trench. In the assault many Turks were bayoneted and
twenty-eight captured. At 6.30 a.m.. the trench had to be abandoned.
On June 5 a sortie was made by two officers and 100 men of the 1st
Australian Infantry, the objective being the destruction of a
machinegun in a trench (known as German Officer's Trench). The
darkness of the trench and its overhead cover prevented the use of the
bayonet, but some damage was done by shooting (down over the parapet.
The aim of this gallant assault being attained, the party withdrew in
good order with their wounded. Casualties in all were thirty-six.
Enver's Attack
On the night of June 29-30 the
Turks, acting, as we afterwards ascertained, under the direct personal
order of Enver Pasha to drive us all into the sea, made a big attack
on the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, principally on that
portion of the line which was under the command of Major General Sir
A. J. Godley. From midnight till 1.30 a.m. a fire of musketry and guns
of greatest intensity was poured upon our trenches. A heavy column
then advanced to the assault, and was completely crumpled up by the
musketry and machine-guns of the 7th and 8th Light Horse. An hour
later another grand attack took place against our left and left
centre, and was equally cut to pieces by our artillery and rifle fire.
The enemy's casualties may be judged by the fact that in areas
directly exposed to view between 400 and 500 were actually seen to
fall.
Suvla and Sari Bair-The Great
Battle of August
From the very first I had hoped that
by landing a force under the heights of Sari Bair we should be able to
strangle the Turkish communications to the southwards, whether
by land or sea, and so clear the Narrows for the Fleet.
Owing to the enemy's superiority, both in numbers and in position
owing to under-estimates of the strength of the original entrenchments
prepared and sited under German direction ; owing to the constant
dwindling of the units of my force through wastage ; owing also to the
intricacy and difficulty of the terrain, these hopes had not hitherto
borne fruit. But they were well founded. So much at least had clearly
enough been demonstrated by the desperate and costly nature of the
Turkish attacks. The Australians and New Zealanders had rooted
themselves in very near to the vitals of the enemy. By their tenacity
and courage they still held open the doorway from which one strong
thrust forward might give us command of the Narrows.
Before a man of the reinforcements had arrived my mind was made up
as to their employment, and by means of a vigorous offensive from
Anzac, combined with a surprise landing to the north of it, I meant to
try and win through to Maidos, leaving behind me a well-protected line
of communications starting from the bay of Suvla.
Reinforcements
On the nights of August 4, 5, and 6,
the reinforcing troops were shipped into Anzac very silently at the
darkest hours. Then, still silently, they were tucked away from enemy
aeroplanes or observatories in their prepared hiding-places. The whole
sea route lay open to the 'view of the Turks upon Achi Baba's summit
and Battleship Hill. Aeroplanes could count every tent and every ship
at Mudros or at Imbros. Within rifle fire of Anzac's open beach
hostile riflemen were looking out across the Aegean no more than
twenty feet from our opposing lines. Every modern appliance of
telescope, telegraph, wireless was at the disposal of the enemy. Yet
the instructions worked out at General Headquarters in the minutest
detail (the result of conferences with the Royal Navy, which were
attended by Brigadier-General Skeen, of General Birdwood's staff) were
such that the scheme was carried through without a hitch.
The troops now at the disposal of General Birdwood amounted in round
numbers to 37,000 rifles and seventy-two guns, with naval support from
two cruisers, four monitors, and two destroyers. Under the scheme
these troops were to be divided into two main portions. The task of
holding the existing Anzac position and of making frontal assaults
there from, was assigned to the Australian Division (plus the 1st and
3rd Light Horse Brigades and two battalions of the 40th Brigade ;
that of assaulting the Chunuk Bair ridge was entrusted to the New
Zealand and Australian Division (less the 1st and 3rd Light Horse
Brigades), to the 13th Division (less five battalions), and to the
29th Indian Infantry Brigade and to the Indian Mountain Artillery
Brigade. The 29th Brigade of the 10th Division (less one battalion)
and the 38th Brigade were held in reserve.
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The Assault on Lone Pine
During August 4, 5, and 6, the works
oil the enemy's left and centre were subjected to a slow bombardment,
and on the afternoon of August 6 an assault was made upon the
formidable Lone Pine entrenchment. The work consisted of a strong
point d'appui on the south-western end of a plateau, where it
confronted, at distances varying from 60 to 120 yards, the salient in
the line of our trenches named by us the Pimple. The entrenchment was
evidently very strong; it was entangled with wire, and provided with
overhead cover.
The detailed scheme of attack was worked out with care and forethought
by Major-General H. B. Walker, commanding 1st Australian Division, and
his thoroughness contributed, I consider, largely to the success of
the enterprise.
The action commenced at 4.30 p.m. with a continuous and heavy
bombardment of the Lone Pine and adjacent trenches, H.M.S. Bacchante
assisting by searching the valleys to the north-east and east, and the
monitors by shelling the enemy's batteries south of Gaba Tepe. The
assault had been entrusted to the 1st Australian Brigade (Brigadier
General N. M. Smyth), and punctually at 5.30 p.m. it was carried out
by the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Australian Battalions, the 1st Battalion
forming the brigade reserve.
Two lines left their trenches simultaneously, and were closely
followed up by a third. The rush across the open was a regular race
against death, which came in the shape of a hail of shell and rifle
bullets from front and from either flank. But the Australians had
firmly resolved to reach the enemy's trenches, and in this
determination they became for the moment invincible. The barbed wire
entanglement was reached and was surmounted. Then came a terrible
moment, when it seemed as though it would be physically impossible to
penetrate into the trenches.
The overhead cover of stout pine
beams resisted all individual efforts to move it, and the loopholes
continued to spit fire. Groups of our men then bodily lifted up the
beams and individual soldiers leaped down into the semi-darkened
galleries amongst the Turks. By 5.47 p.m. the 3rd and 4th Battalions
were well into the enemy's vitals, and a few minutes later the
reserves of the 2nd Battalion advanced over their parados, and
driving out, killing, or capturing the occupants, made good the whole
of the trenches. The reserve companies of the 3rd and 4th Battalions
followed, and at 6.20 p.m. the 1st Battalion (in reserve) was launched
to consolidate the position.
Counter-attack at Lone Pine
At once the Turks made it plain, as
they have never ceased to do since, that they had no intention of
acquiescing in the capture of this capital work. At 7.0 p.m. a
determined and violent counter-attack began.
For seven hours these counter-attacks continued. All this time
consolidation was being attempted, although the presence of so many
Turkish prisoners hampered movement and constituted an actual danger.
In beating off these desperate counter-attacks very heavy casualties
were suffered by the Australians. Part of the 12th Battalion, the
reserve of the 3rd Brigade, had therefore to be thrown into the melee.
Twelve hours later, on the 7th, another
effort was made by the enemy, being resumed at midnight and proceeding
intermittently till dawn. At an early period of this last
counter-attack the 4th Battalion were forced by bombs to relinquish a
portion of a trench, but later on, led by their commanding officer,
Lieutenant Colonel McNaghten, they killed every Turk who had got in.
At 5 a.m. on August 9, the enemy made a sudden attempt to storm from
the east and south-cast after a feint of tire attack from the north.
The 7th Battalion bore the brunt of the shock, and handled the attack
so vigorously that by 7.45 a.m. there were clear signs of
demoralisation in the enemy's ranks. But although this marked the end
of counterattacks on the large scale, the bombing and sniping
continued, though in less volume, throughout this day and night, and
lasted till August 12, when it at last became manifest that we had
gained complete ascendancy.
Thus was Lone Pine taken and held. The
Turks were in great force and very full of fight, yet one weak
Australian brigade, numbering at the outset but 2,000 rifles, and
supported only by two weak battalions, carried the work under the eyes
of a whole enemy division. The irresistible dash and daring of
officers and men in the initial charge were a glory to Australia. In
one corner eight Turks and six Australians were found lying as they
had bayoneted one another. To make room for the fighting men, the dead
were ranged in rows on either side of the gangway. After the first
violence of the counter-attacks had abated, 1,000 corpses -our own and
Turkish - were dragged out from the trenches.
The Lone Pine attack drew all the local
enemy reserves towards it, and may be held, more than any other cause,
to have been the reason that the Suvla Bay landing was so lightly
opposed. Our captures in this feat of arms amounted to 134 prisoners,
seven machine-guns, and a large quantity of ammunition and equipment.
The Nek, Baby 700 and German
Officer's Trench Attacked
Other frontal attacks from the
existing Anzac positions were not so fortunate. They
included an attack upon the work known as German Officer's Trench, on
the extreme right of our line, at midnight on August 6-7, also
assaults on the Nek and Baby 700 trenches opposite the centre of our
line, delivered at 4.30 a.m. on the 7th, The 2nd Australian Brigade
did all that men could do; the
Light Horse only accepted their repulse after losing three-fourths of
that devoted band 'who so bravely sallied forth. All that day, as the
result of these most gallant attacks.
Turkish reserves on Battleship Hill
were being held back to meet any dangerous development along the front
of the old Anzac line and so were not available to meet our main
enterprise, which I will now endeavour to describe.
The Main Push
The first step in the real push-the
step which above all others was to count-was the night attack on
the summits of the Sari Bair ridge.
It was our object to effect a lodgment along the crest of the high
main ridge with two columns of troops, but, seeing the nature of the
ground and the dispositions of the enemy, the effort had to be made by
stages. We were bound, in fact, to undertake a double subsidiary
operation before we could hope to launch these attacks with any real
prospect of success. The two assaulting columns, which were to work up
three ravines to the storm of the high ridge, were to be preceded by
two covering columns. One of these was to capture the enemy's
positions commanding the foothills, first to open the mouths of the
ravines, secondly to cover the right flank of another covering force
whilst it marched along the beach.
The other covering column was
to strike far out to the north until, from a hill called Damakjelik
Bair, it could at the same time facilitate the landing of the 9th
Corps at Nibrunesi Point, and guard the left flank of the column
assaulting Sari Bair front any forces of the enemy which might be
assembled in the Anafarta valley.
The whole of this big attack was placed under the command of
Major-General Sir A. J. Godley, General Officer Commanding New Zealand
and Australian Division. The two covering and the two assaulting
columns were organised as follows :
Right Covering Column, under Brigadier General A. H. Russell.-New
Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade, the Otago Mounted Rifles Regiment, the
Maori Contingent and New Zealand Field Troop.
Right Assaulting Column, under Brigadier General F. E. Johnston.-New
Zealand Infantry Brigade, Indian Mountain Battery (less one section),
one Company New Zealand Engineers.
Left Covering Column, under Brigadier General J. 1-1.
Travers.-Headquarters 40th Brigade, half the 72nd Field Company, 4th
Battalion South Wales Borderers, and 5th Battalion Wiltshire Regiment.
Left Assaulting Column, under Brigadier General (now Major-General) H.
V. Cox.29th Indian Infantry Brigade, 4th Australian Infantry Brigade,
Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), one Company New Zealand
Engineers.
Divisional Reserve.-6tb Battalion South Lancashire Regiment and 8th
Battalion Welsh Regiment (Pioneers) at Chailak Dere, and the 39th
Infantry Brigade and half 72nd Field Company at Aghyl Dere.
In the Foothills
The right covering column bad to
clear the Turks oft from their right flank positions upon Old No. 3
Post and Table Top. Old No. 3 Post connected with Table Top by a razor
back. Working parties had done their best with unstinted material to
convert this commanding point into an impregnable redoubt. Two lines
of fire trench, very heavily entangled, protected its southern face.
Table Top is a steep-sided, flat-topped hill, close on 400 feet above
sea level. The sides of the hill are mostly sheer and quite
'impracticable.
Amongst other stratagems the Anzac troops, assisted by H.M.S. Colne,
had long and carefully been educating' the Turks how they should lose
Old No. 3 Post, which could hardly have been rushed by simple force of
arms. Every night, exactly at 9 p.m., H.M.S. Colne threw the beams of
her searchlight on to the redoubt, and opened fire upon it for exactly
ten minutes. Then, after a ten minutes' interval, came a second
illumination and bombardment, commencing always at 9.20 and ending
precisely at 9.30 p.m.
The idea was that, after successive nights of such practice, the enemy
would get into the habit of taking the searchlight as a hint to clear
out until the shelling v,-as at an end. But on the eventful night of
the 6th, the sound of their footsteps drowned by the loud cannonade,
unseen as they crept along in that darkest shadow which fringes a
searchlight's beam came the right covering column. At 9.30 the light
switched off, and instantly our men poured out
of the scrub jungle and into the redoubt. By 11 p.m. the whole series
of surrounding entrenchments were ours I
The remainder of the right covering column
carried on with their attack upon Bauchop's Hill and the Chailak Dere.
By 10 p.m. the northernmost point, with its machine-gun, was captured,
and by 1 o'clock in the morning the whole of Bauchop's Hill, a maze of
ridge and ravine, everywhere entrenched, was fairly in our hands.
The attack along the Chailak Dere was not so
cleanly carried out-made, indeed, just about as ugly a start as any
enemy could wish. Pressing eagerly forward through the night, the
little column of stormers found themselves held up by a barbed-wire
erection of unexampled height, depth, and solidity, which completely
closed the only practicable entrance to the ravine. Here that splendid
body of men, the Otago Mounted Rifles, lost some of their bravest and
their best, but in the end, when things were beginning to seem
desperate, a passage was forced through the stubborn obstacle with
most conspicuous and cool courage by Captain Shera and a party of New
Zealand Engineers, supported by the Maoris, who showed themselves
worthy descendants of the warriors of the Gate Pah. Thus was the mouth
of the Chailak Dere opened in time to admit of the unopposed entry of
the right assaulting column.
Table Top
Simultaneously the attack on
Table Top had been launched under cover of a heavy bombardment from
H.M.S. Colne. No general on peace (time) manoeuvres would ask troops
to attempt so breakneck an enterprise. The angle of Table Top's ascent
is recognised in our regulations as " impracticable for
infantry." But neither Turks nor angles of ascent were destined
to stop Russell or his New Zealanders that night. The scarped heights
were scaled, the plateau was carried by midnight. With this brilliant
feat the task of the right covering force was at an end. Its attacks
had been made with the bayonet and bomb only ; magazines were empty by
order; hardly a rifle shot had been fired. Some 150 prisoners were
captured as well as many rifles and much equipment, ammunition and
stores. No words can do justice to the achievement of Brigadier
General Russell and his men. There are exploits which must be seen to
be realised.
The right assaulting column bad entered the two
southerly ravines - Sazli Beit Dere and Chailak Dere-by midnight. At
1.30 a.m. began a hotly-contested fight for the trenches on the lower
part of Rhododendron Spur, whilst the Chailak Dere column pressed
steadily up the valley against the enemy.
The left covering column, under Brigadier General Travers, after
marching along the beach to No. 3 Outpost, resumed its northerly
advance as soon as the attack on Bauchop's Hill had developed. Every
trench encountered was instantly rushed by the Borderers, until,
having reached the predetermined spot, the whole column was
unhesitatingly launched at Damakjelik Bair. By 1.30 a.m. the whole of
the hill was occupied, thus safeguarding the left rear of the whole of
the Anzac attack.
On the Far left.
The left assaulting column crossed
the Chailak Dere at 12.30 a.m., and entered the Aghyl Dere at the
heels of the left covering column. The surprise, on this side, was
complete. Two Turkish officers were caught in their pajamas ; enemy
arms and ammunition were scattered in every direction.
The grand attack was now in full swing, but the country gave new
sensations in cliff climbing even to officers and men who had
graduated over the goat tracks of Anzac. The darkness of the night,
the density of the scrub, bands and knees progress up the spurs, sheer
physical fatigue, exhaustion of the spirit caused by repeated
hairbreadth escapes from the hail of random bullets-all these combined
to take the edge off the energies of our troops.
At last, after advancing some
distance up the Aghyl Dere, the column split up into two parts. The
4th Australian Brigade struggled, fighting hard as they went, up to
the north of the northern fork of the Aghyl Dere, making for Hill 305
(Koja Chemen Tepe). The 29th Indian Infantry Brigade scrambled up the
southern fork of the Aghyl Dere and the spurs north of it to the
attack of a portion of the Sari Bair ridge known as Hill Q.
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Dawn broke
and the crest line was not yet in our hands, although, considering all
things, the left assaulting column had made a marvelous advance. The
4th Australian Infantry Brigade was on the line of the Asma Dere (the
next ravine north of the Aghyl Dere) and the 29th Indian Infantry
Brigade held the ridge west of the Farm below Chunuk Bair and along
the spurs to the north-east. The enemy had been flung back from ridge
to ridge ; an excellent line for the renewal of the attack had been
secured, and (except for the exhaustion of the troops) the auspices
were propitious.
Turning to the right assaulting column, one battalion, the Canterbury
Infantry Battalion, clambered slowly up the Sazli Beit Dere. The
remainder of the force, led by the Otago Battalion, wound their way
amongst the pitfalls and forced their passage through the scrub of the
Chailak Dere, where fierce opposition forced them ere long to deploy.
Here, too, the hopeless country was the main hindrance, and it was not
until 5.45 a.m. that the bulk of the column joined the Canterbury
Battalion on the lower slopes of Rhododendron Spur. Eventually they
entrenched on the top of Rhododendron Spur, a quarter of a mile short
of Chunuk Bair-i.e. of victory.
End of August 7th
At 9.30 a.m. the two assaulting
columns pressed forward whilst our guns pounded the enemy moving along
the Battleship Hill spurs. But in spite of all their efforts
their increasing exhaustion as opposed to the gathering strength of
the enemy's fresh troops began to tell-they had shot their bolt. So
all day they clung to what they had captured and strove to make ready
for the night. All had suffered heavily and all were very tired.
So ended the first phase of the fighting for the Chunuk Bair ridge.
Our aims had not fully been attained, and the help we had hoped for
from Suvla had not been forthcoming. Yet I fully endorse the words of
General Birdwood when he says : "The troops had performed a feat
which is without parallel."
Great kudos is due to Major-Generals Godley and Shaw for their
arrangements ; to Generals Russell, Johnston, Cox, and Travers for
their leading ; but most of all, as every one of these officers will
gladly admit, to the rank and file for their fighting. Nor may I omit
to add that the true destroyer spirit with which H.M.S. Colne
(Commander Claude Seymour, R.N.) and H.M.S. Chelmer (Commander Hugh T.
England, R.N.) backed us up will live in the grateful memories of the
Army.
The Second Attack
In the course of this afternoon
(August 7th) reconnaissance's of Sari Bair were carried out and the
troops were got into shape for a fresh advance in three columns,
to take place in the early morning.
The columns were composed as follows:
Right Column, Brigadier-General F. E. Johnston.-26th Indian Mountain
Battery (less one section), Auckland Mounted Rifles, New Zealand
Infantry Brigade, two battalions 13th Division, and the Maori
Contingent.
Centre and Left Columns, Major-General H. V. Cox.-21st Indian Mountain
Battery (less one section), 4th Australian Brigade, 39th Infantry
Brigade (less one battalion), with 6th Battalion South Lancashire
Regiment attached, and the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade.
The right column was to climb up the Chunuk Bair ridge ; the left
column was to make for the prolongation of the ridge north-east to
Koja Chemen Tepe, the topmost peak of the range.
The attack was timed for 4.15 A.m. At the first faint glimmer of dawn
observers saw figures moving against the sky-line of Chunuk Bair. Were
they our own men, or were they the Turks ? Telescopes were anxiously
adjusted ; the light grew stronger; men were seen climbing up from our
side of the ridge ; they were our own fellows-the topmost summit was
ours I
Chunuk Bair Gained
On the right, General Johnston's
column, headed by the Wellington Battalion and supported by the 7th
Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment, the Auckland Mounted Rifles
Regiment, the 8th Welsh Pioneers, and the Maori Contingent, the whole
most gallantly led by Lieutenant-Colonel W. G. Malone, had raced one
another up the steep. Nothing could check them. On they went, until,
with a last determined rush, they fixed themselves firmly on the
south-western slopes and crest of the main knoll known as the height
of Chunuk Bair. With deep regret I have to add that the brave
Lieutenant-Colonel Malone fell mortally wounded as he was marking out
the line to be held.
In the centre the 39th Infantry Brigade and the 29th Indian Brigade
moved along, the gullies leading up to the Sari Bair ridge. So
murderous was the enemy's fire that little progress could be made,
though some ground was gained on the spurs to the north-east of the
Farm.
On the left the 4th Australian Brigade advanced from the Asmak Dere
against the lower slopes of Abdul Rahman Bair (a spur running due
north from Koja Chemen Tepe) with the intention of wheeling to its
right and advancing up the spur. Cunningly placed Turkish machine-guns
and a strong entrenched body of infantry were ready for this move, and
the brigade were unable to get on. At last, on the approach of heavy
columns of the enemy, the Australians, virtually surrounded, and
having already suffered losses of over 1,000, were withdrawn to their
original position.
In the afternoon the battle slackened, excepting always at Lone Pine,
where the enemy were still coming on in mass, and being mown down by
our fire. Elsewhere the troops were busy digging and getting up water
and food, no child's play, with their wretched lines of communication
running within musketry range of the enemy.
At 4.30 a.m. on August 9th, the Chunuk Bair ridge and Hill Q were
heavily shelled. At 5.16 A.m. this tremendous bombardment was to be
switched off on to the flanks and reverse slopes of the heights.
The columns for the renewed attack were composed as follows:
No. 1 Column, Brigadier-General F. E. Johnston.-26th Indian Mountain
Battery (less one section), the Auckland and Wellington Mounted Rifles
Regiments, the New Zealand Infantry Brigade, and two battalions of the
13th Division.
No. 2 Column, Major-General H. V. Cux.21st Indian Mountain Battery
(less one section), 4th Australian Brigade, 39th Brigade (less the 7th
Gloucesters, relieved), with the 6th Battalion South Lancashire
Regiment attached, and the Indian Infantry Brigade.
No. 3 Column, Brigadier-General A. H. Baldwin, commanding 38th
Infantry Brigade. -Two battalions each from the 38th and 29th Brigades
and one from the 40th Brigade.
General Baldwin's column had assembled in the Chailak Dere, and was
moving up towards General Johnston's headquarters. But in spite of all
precautions, the darkness, the rough scrub-covered country, its sheer
steepness, so delayed the column that Baldwin, owing to the darkness
and the awful country, lost his way -through no fault of his own.
The Gurkhas on Top
And now, under that fine leader,
Major C. G. L. Allanson, the 6th Gurkhas of the 29th Indian Infantry
Brigade pressed up the slopes of Sari
Bair, crowned the heights of the col between Chunuk Bair and Hill Q,
viewed far beneath them the waters of the Hellespont, viewed the
Asiatic shores along which motor transport was bringing supplies to
the lighters. But the fortune of war was against us. At this supreme
moment Baldwin's- column was still a long way from our trenches on the
crest. And instead of Baldwin's support came suddenly a salvo of heavy
shells.
The Turkish commander saw his chance; and the South Lancashires and
Gurkhas, who had seen the promised land, were forced backwards over
the crest.
That evening from Chunuk Bair the line ran down to the Farm and almost
due north to the Asma Dere southern watershed, whence it continued
westward to the sea near Asmak Kuyu. On the right the Australian
Division was still holding its line and Lone Pine was still being
furiously attacked. The 1st Australian Brigade was now reduced from
2,900 to 1,000, and the total casualties up to 8 p.m. on the 9th
amounted to about 8,500. But the troops were still in extraordinarily
good heart
During the night of the 9th-10th the New Zealand and New Army troops
on Chunuk Bair were relieved. For three days and three nights they had
been ceaselessly fighting. They were half dead with fatigue. Their
lines or communication, started from sea level, ran across trackless
ridges and ravines to an altitude of 800 ft., and were exposed all the
way to snipers' fire and artillery bombardment. It had become
imperative, therefore, to get them enough food, water, and rest ; and
for this purpose it was imperative also to withdraw them. Chunuk Bair,
which they had so magnificently held, was now handed over to two
battalions of the 13th Division.
A great Turkish Attack
At daybreak on Tuesday, August 10,
the Turks delivered a grand attack from the line Chunuk Bair - Hill Q
against these two battalions, already weakened in numbers, though not
in spirit, by previous fighting. First our men were shelled by every
enemy gun, and then at 5.30 a.m., were assaulted by a huge column,
consisting of no less than a full division plus a regiment of three
battalions. The North Lancashire men were simply overwhelmed in their
shallow trenches by sheer weight of numbers, whilst the Wilts, who
were caught out in the open, were literally almost annihilated. The
ponderous mass of the enemy swept over the crest.
Now it was our turn. The warships
and the New Zealand and Australian Artillery, the Indian Mounted
Artillery Brigade, and the 69th Brigade Royal Field Artillery were
getting the chance of a lifetime. As the successive solid lines of
Turks topped the crest of the ridge gaps were torn through their
formation. They became exposed not only to the full blast of the guns,
but also to a battery of ten machine-guns belonging to the New Zealand
Infantry Brigade, which played upon their serried ranks at close range
until the barrels were red-hot. Enormous losses were inflicted,
especially by these ten machine-guns ; and of the swarms which had
once fairly crossed the crest line only the merest handful ever
straggled back to their own side of Chunuk Bair.
At this same time strong forces of the enemy
were hurled against the Farm, where there arose a conflict so deadly
that it may be considered as the climax of the four days' fighting for
the ridge. Portions of our line were pierced and the troops driven
clean down the hill. At the foot of the hill the men were rallied
by Staff Captain Street, who was there
supervising the transport of food and water. Without a word,
unhesitatingly, they followed him back to the Farm, where they plunged
again into the midst of that series of struggles in which generals
fought in the ranks and men dropped their scientific weapons and
caught one another by the throat.
By 10 a.m. the effort of the enemy was
spent. Soon their shattered remnants began to trickle back, and by
night, except prisoners or wounded, no live Turk was left upon our
side of the slope.
End of the Battle of Sari Bair
By evening the total casualties of
General Birdwood's force had reached 12,000, and included a very large
proportion of officers. The 13th Division of the New Army, under
Major-General Shaw, had alone lost 6,000 out of a grand total of
10,500. Baldwin was gone, and all his staff. Ten commanding officers
out of thirteen had disappeared from the fighting effectives. The
Warwicks and the Worcesters had lost literally every single officer.
But physically, though Birdwood's
forces were prepared to hold all they had got, they were now too
exhausted to attack-at least until they had rested and reorganised.
The enemy's positions were now being
rapidly entrenched, and, as I could not depend on receiving
reinforcing drafts, I was faced with the danger that if I could not
drive the Turks back I might lose so many men that .1 would find
myself unable to hold the very extensive new area of ground which had
been gained. I therefore decided to mass every available man against
Ismail Oglu Tepe, a sine qua non to my plans whether as a first step
towards clearing the valley, or, if this proved impossible, towards
securing Suvla Bay and Anzac Cove from shell fire.
The same day, a force consisting of two battalions of New Zealand
Mounted Rifles, two battalions of the 29th Irish Brigade, the 4th
South Wales Borderers, and 29th Indian Infantry Brigade, the whole
under the command of Major-General H. V. Cox, was working
independently to support the main attack.
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| Hill 60: First
Assault
General Cox divided his force into
three sections ; the left section to press forward and establish
a permanent hold on the existing lightly-held out-post line
covering the junction of the 11th Division with the Anzac front; the
centre section to seize the well at Kabak Kuyu, an asset of utmost
value, whether to ourselves or the enemy ; the right section to attack
and capture the Turkish trenches on the north-east side of the Kaiajik
Aghala.
The advance of the left section was a success after a brisk engagement
the well at Kabak Kuyu was seized by the Indian Brigade, and, by 4.30,
the right column, under Brigadier General Russell, under heavy fire,
effected a lodgment on the Kaiajik Aghala, where our men entrenched
and began to dig communications across the Kaiajik Dere towards the
lines of the 4th Australian Brigade south of the Dere. A pretty stiff
bomb fight ensued, in which General Russell's troops held their own
through the night against superior force.
At 6 a.m. on the morning of
August 22, General Russell, reinforced by the newly-arrived l8th
Australian Battalion, attacked the summit of the Kaiajik Aghala. The
Australians carried 150 yards of the trenches, losing heavily in so
doing, and were then forced to fall back again owing to enfilade fire,
though in the meantime the New Zealand Mounted Rifles managed, in
spite of constant counter-attacks, to make good another 80 yards.
A counter-attack in strength launched by the Turks at 10 a.m. was
repulsed ; the new line from the Kaiajik Aghala to Susuk Kuyu was
gradually strengthened, and eventually joined on to the right of the
9th Army Corps, thereby materially improving the whole situation.
During this action the 4th Australian Brigade, which remained facing
the Turks on the upper part of the Kaiajik Aghala, was able to inflict
several hundred casualties on the enemy as they retreated or
endeavored to reinforce.
The last days of the month were illumined by a brilliant affair
carried through by the troops under General Birdwood's command. Our
object was to complete the capture of Hill 60 north of the Kaiajik
Aghala, commenced by Major-General Cox on August 21. Hill 60
overlooked the Biyuk Anafarta valley, and was therefore tactically a
very important feature.
Second Assault
The conduct of the attack was again
entrusted to Major-General Cox, at whose disposal were placed
detachments from the 4th and 5th Australian Brigades, the New Zealand
Mounted Rifles Brigade, and the 5th Connaught Rangers. The advance was
timed to take place at 5 p.m. on August 27, after the heaviest
artillery bombardment we could afford. This bombardment seemed
effective ; but the moment the assailants broke cover they were
greeted by an exceedingly hot fire from the enemy field guns, rifles
and machine-guns, followed after a brief interval by a shower of heavy
shell, some of which, most happily, pitched into the trenches of the
Turks.
On the right the detachment
from the 4th and 5th Australian Brigades could make no headway against
a battery of machine-guns which confronted them. In the centre the New
Zealanders made a most determined onslaught, and carried one side of
the topmost knoll. Hand-to-hand fighting continued here till 9.30 p.m., when it was reported that nine-tenths of the summit had been
gained.
On the left the 250 men of the 5th Connaught
Rangers excited the admiration of all beholders by the swiftness and
cohesion of their charge. In five minutes they had carried their
objective, the northern Turkish communications, when they at once set
to and began a lively bomb fight along the trenches against strong
parties which came hurrying up from the enemy supports and afterwards
from their reserves. At midnight fresh troops were to have
strengthened our grip upon the hill, but before that hour the Irishmen
had been out-bombed, and the 9th Australian Light Horse, who had made
a most plucky attempt to recapture the lost communication trench, had
been repulsed.
Luckily, the New Zealand Mounted
Rifles refused to recognise that they were worsted. Nothing would
shift them. All that night and all next day, through bombing, bayonet
charges, musketry, shrapnel, and heavy shell they hung on to their 150
yards of trench. At 1 a.m. on August 29, the 10th Light Horse made
another attack on the lost communication trenches to the left, carried
them, and finally held them. This gave us complete command of the
under feature, an outlook over the Anafarta Sagir valley, and safer
lateral communications between Anzac and SuvIa Bay.
Three Turkish machine-guns and forty-six prisoners were taken, as well
as three trench mortars, 300 Turkish rifles, 60,000 rounds of
ammunition, and 500 bombs. Four hundred acres were added to the
territories of Anzac.
And now, before affixing to this dispatch my final signature as
Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, let me
first pay tribute to the everlasting memory of my dear comrades who
will return no more. Next, let me thank each and all, Generals, Staff,
Regimental Leaders, and rank and file, for their wonderful loyalty,
patience, and self sacrifice.
So I bid them all farewell with a special God-speed to the campaigners
who have served with me right through from the terrible yet most
glorious earlier days-the incomparable 29th Division; the young
veterans of the Naval Division; the ever-victorious Australians and
New Zealanders; the stout East Lancs, and my own brave
fellow-countrymen of the Lowland Division of Scotland.
|
IAN HAMILTON,
General, Commander-in-Chief
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force. |
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