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On
Active Service: a
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This page
is from the book
"Signals". The
Australian Corps of Signals story of WW2 |
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South West Pacific Area
of Operations.
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- Map of the Australian Territory of
Papua and the Mandated Territory of New Guinea circa 1942.
- Image is a thumbnail, Click to
enlarge. Size is approx one third of a
megabyte.
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"CHIEFSIGS" |
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THE threat to Australia and the return of the A.I.F. to help meet the possible invasion of their homeland began a new and important phase in the history of the Australian Corps of Signals. The beginning was centred around the Signal
Officer-in-Chief's Staff of the then designated G.H.Q. Australian Army and involved many months of arduous work, long-range planning and meticulous staff duties.
The organisation, efficiency and present day esprit de corps of Signals in the Australian Army grew from those days of faithful and loyal service which the S.O.-in-C. and his staff gave to the cause. Few realise that, during the first twelve months after the return of the A.I.F. from the Middle East, this staff was carrying out the planning, organisation and development of the Australian Corps of Signals by working twelve to fourteen hours of every day of the year without any of the usual breaks for recreation.
The forethought and planning was made possible by the vision and forcefulness of Brig. C. H. Simpson, C.B.E., M.C., V.D., die present Signal Officer-in-Chief. When it
was known that the A.I.F. would be returning to Australia, he had on his staff Lt-Col. D. Veron, Major D. Boden and Lieut. J. McConnell. This small staff had
been distributed over various convoys on the move of H.Q. I Aust. Corps back to
Australia.
On the assembly of all the convoys at Colombo, rearrangements were made in passenger lists and the staff was united the one transport. It promptly began
the planning and reorganisation of the Australian Corps of Signals for an
important part in the defence of Australia. Several points had to be considered, including the introduction of women into the Australian Corps of Signals for the first time in its history and the increase of personnel from 14,600 to over 24,000. A basic and flexible plan for future growth was
needed. Provision for reinforcement training and the modernisation and development of technical equipment had to be considered.
Complete plans were drawn up for the organisation of the new S.O.-in-C's staff, the various
C.S.O.s' staffs and the requirements of Army, Corps, L. of C. and Divisional Signals units. These plans were compiled and completed with the requirements of the reorganised Australian Army in mind. This new appreciation was tabled at the C.-in-C's conference in Melbourne and, with the exception of minor amendments, became the basis of the present Australian Corps of Signals.
After that conference, the augmenting of the S.O.in-C's staff became a matter of major importance. Disembarkation leave for its members arriving back was cancelled and the staff was assembled to get on with the tremendous task before it was too late. It can now be said that had this early start not been made the Corps would not have been ready in time to help meet the Japanese threat across the Owen Stanleys. Full results were achieved approximately a month before this threat and four months ahead of the estimated time calculated to complete the reorganisation.
Of the original members there now remain only
four - Major-General Simpson, Brig. Edwards, Colonel Boden and Lt-Col.
McCay - on the present-day staff. After the Japanese were thrown back the S.O.-in-C. looked ahead into the future and
visualized the necessity for wider scope. The staff
reorganised to provide for a flexible handling of the complex technical
problems which arose. The S.O.in-C. passed some of his responsibilities of a routine
nature on to other officers. The senior officers were allowed to make the future plans of the Corps unhampered by the
many minor problems with which planning is always allied.
To the average Signals officer and man iii the field or in the L. of C. areas, the only
results of the labors of the S.O.-in-C's staff are the technical instructions and
information which emanate from Allied Land Forces H.Q. Much of the information so distributed forms the basis for present-day jungle and long-distance
communications. Many instructions have been reprinted by other Dominions and Allied nations and accepted by them as authoritative.
Members of the staff have had to subjugate their opinions as to where they think their duties to the cause lie. All have at some time expressed the wish to serve in the forward areas where the results of their work are to be seen and appreciated. They have had battle experience, either in the desert or the jungle, and know the thrill of seeing their unit's name in the news. Today they are envious of the more fortunate members of the Corps. They know there is no one farther back on whom they can rely and knowing that put their utmost into the task of keeping those in front supplied with the latest development and information. |
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"Line out, jeep in." |
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EARLY DAYS OF FIRST ARMY
SIGNALS |
Signals First Aust. Army came into being when the H.Q. First Army was created to take over the operational duties of the defence of the north-eastern part of Australia and some of the surrounding islands. The early clays of the unit were spent in Adelaide where it was formed from elements of Signals I Aust. Corps and Base Area Signals, both of which had returned from the Middle East. The first Commanding Officer was Lt-Col. J. S. Davis.
The H.Q. was established in a prosperous Queensland town. A boys' school and civilian homes in the vicinity were taken over. In a very short space of time, the busy H.Q. of a strong fighting force was established in such a way as to defy detection from the air. Camouflage instructions were strict and nothing which would tend to indicate the presence of anything unusual tolerated. The men camped in the local park under trees and in the local showground. Track discipline was enforced.
The Signals Office was opened in a pretty little brick bungalow just completed and occupied by the owner for a period of days only. In a short time, the dining room became the exchange, the nursery the test clerks' quarters and the lounge Command Group H.Q. of Signals First Aust. Army. Clerks and the draughtsman occupied the best bedroom and
front veranda, but throughout it all the new front lawn was watered regularly, the garden kept weeded and seedlings planted. The
townsfolk took all into their hearts and, in a very short lime, everyone had settled in. Within a few
months the Middle East veterans became part of the life of the town.
The area for which First Army was responsible covered some hundreds of thousands of square miles. In the main, civil communications were limited to one arterial route running tip along the exposed coastline with several spur lines serving the inland towns. As this main coastal route was exposed to enemy action, an alternative inland route was surveyed and the sections which required reconstruction were completed. Distances in this area were great. Few realised that, though it was 800 miles from Brisbane to Townsville, this distance was actually as far as from Gaza to Tobruch. The line sections under the direction of the C.O. and Major Geddes (O.C. No.
1 Company) completed the reconstruction well within the stipulated time. As the immediate threat
to the mainland diminished, other line routes were constructed until within a matter of months the line sections of Signals First Aust. Army were working over an area which covered half of Queensland.
While the line sections were out building routes, the operating section back at H.Q.
was busily engaged in fitting out and equipping the Signals Office. The C.S.O. (Brig. D. Veron) secured an old discarded automatic telephone system. This was
overhauled and repaired to such good effect that within a matter of days all branches of the H.Q. were given an efficient automatic inter-office telephone system. This
meant a saving in manpower, as well as quicker service. Wireless channels were
established and supervised by Major H. F. Lovett and the D.R.L.S. covered hundreds of miles daily. In a very short time.
the H.Q. was provided with an efficient signals communication system with
which to control and co-ordinate the far-flung command. |
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"Just can't put my
finger on it- but we've done something wrong, boys ! " |
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CORPS SIGNALS-MARK 1-NEW
GUINEA VERSION |
SIGNALS I Aust. Corps, commanded by Lt-Col. L. J. Wellman, said farewell to Adelaide on the 17th of April 1942 when the advance party left by road for Queensland. The main body followed the next day. The ultimate destination was Esk, the area of the new H.Q.
1 Aust. Corps, where reorganising, re-equipping and further training were the rules of the day.
Early in August, embarkation was once more in the air and on the 10th of August the advance party of five officers and seventy-eight men boarded their transport. Two days later the main body followed and the whole unit was destined for New Guinea.
At 0900 hours on the 18th of August, a small Signals Office came into operation at the foot of Horsley's Gap, a few miles from Moresby. It was manned by the advance party of Signals
1 Aust. Corps who had arrived in New Guinea the day before, together with the advance party of what was later to become New Guinea Force H.Q. This was to become the largest Signals Office in any A.I.F. operational area, spreading its tentacles from north to south and from east to west with wireless, line, D.R.L.S., and air communications.
The primary tasks were to establish communications with both 7 Aust. Div., which was going over the Owen Stanleys, and our forces at Milne Bay. The Signals Office was established in a tent with the switchboard in a slit trench. Communication to the 7th Division was by means of the main line strung precariously over the Kokoda Trail by the division's linemen.
On the 25th of August telegraphic communication was established with 7 Aust. DIv. through a Signals Office at Bisiatabu
by means of a D.111 line left behind by the division. It was decided to supplement this, by a
D.VIII cable. Arrangements were made for appropriate cable to be dropped from the air at Nauro,
Menari, Efogi and Myola, but only eight out of the fifty-two drums dropped were recovered. Eventually a fullerphone was installed at Myola working to base forty-five miles back.
The story of that link is one of men tolling through trackless country,
incessant rain, of climbing up and down steep mountain sides, across rivers and down dense gullies, only to see their work destroyed by lightning and broken down by trees hurled over in the fury of tropical
storms in one day alone 400 yards of cable were burnt to white ash.
A heavier line was built over the seventeen miles from Bisiatabu to a point one mile on the other side of Imita Ridge.. The job was finished eight days after commencement and in that time the barrow drums had to be dragged through mud eighteen inches deep and the cable then had to be laid with the aid of sticks thrust through the drums.
While work on the line was going ahead, a D.R.L.S. was being conducted from the various test points, native police boys being used as D.Rs. The operators were on the job for eighteen and twenty hours each day.
During September, the 2/2nd Line Section maintained lines over the twenty-five miles between Rouna Pass and Owers' Corner. A 200-lb. copper pair was added to the existing line from Bisiatabu back to 17
Mile and a permanent line of 200-lb. copper was built from Bisiatabu forward to Ilolo. Late in October work was started on a 200-lb. galvanised-iron wire which was tree-slung from Ilolo forward. The A.A.S.C's "flying
fox" at Owers' Corner and a jeep in the Goldie River Valley both came in handy on this task.
When the "flying fox" broke and the Goldie River bridge was destroyed, one hundred natives carried wire, insulators and rations from Owers' Corner. A party of 400 native stretcher bearers on their way forward were used to carry stores, but they were new recruits and thought that insulators were valueless stones so they dropped 260 of them in the jungle together with two and a half miles of wire. Some of the wire was found later but the insulators had to be marked off strength.
It was decided that the 2/3rd Line Section would start working from Kokoda back towards the line creeping out from N.G.F. H.Q. A detachment was flown to Kokoda and started to work on the wiring of the Signals Office there. The track party arrived on the 27th of November and this party began to work back to meet the galvanised-iron line from the south.
Clearing the jungle was a Herculean task. Sometimes ten trees would have to be felled before the right one would fall. After weeks of chopping, the axes lost their edges and files had to be obtained. Christmas Day was spent in sharpening the axes.
In thirty-one days the line was connected with the galvanised-iron wire coming
from N.G.F. and Kokoda was in direct communication with Moresby by a solid
and reliable line.
It was not long after that malaria began to make itself felt and in twelve days the strength of one line party was reduced
by- fifty per cent. For months the men of the line parties had worked under heartbreaking conditions and were physically exhausted.
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had been buried m the obscurity of the jungle, they had been responsible for
uninterrupted communications to the fighting men in the forward areas. Still, it was with a
sigh of relief that they handed over to Signals New Guinea L. of C. and returned to Moresby on the 19th of February 1943.
While the line was being built over the ranges, the Signals Office at Horsley's Gap daily grew bigger. Detachments were sent to Kokoda and Wairope.
On the 17th of November 1942, a composite line and wireless detachment under Capt. Kennedy set sail, ready to take over at Buna when it fell. The plan did not eventuate and the party returned to Moresby.
On the 29th of November, Capt. N1cKeon left Kokoda with five operators and walked to
Popondetta, a trip that took five days. Three weeks later Advance N.G.F. H.Q. decided to move to Dobodura.
At an appointed hour the Signals Office at
Popondetta was dismantled and one line from Operations was left working to 7 Aust. Div. and the fullerphone was left through to Moresby and 7 Aust. Div. In pouring rain, equipment was piled on to the jeeps and taken to the airstrip.
Then it was decided that it was too wet to move
and everything had to be taken back and re-installed. The Signals Office was working again within an hour and a half. |
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The following morning the move really took place. Some flew over but the main party walked. It took them thirteen hours to walk twenty-five miles while those who flew got there in six minutes.
The Signals Office was similar to that at
Popondetta. Despatch riders, when not on foot, struggled along the kunai tracks on push bikes. One D.R. was ordered to deliver a secret despatch personally to an officer at the H.Q. of an American division
which had recently moved into the area. The D.R. had to cross a river, so he left his clothes on one side and swam across clad only in his hat and belt with pistol attached.
Dressed like this, he calmly delivered the despatch to a slightly incredulous officer.
Once the Sambogi Creek flooded, rose seven or eight feet in two hours and carried away the entire trunk line system, in addition to bridges and trees. One man tied twine around his waist and swam the swollen torrent pulling the end of the broken cable across. In spite of this and similar troubles the record transmission of a message from Moresby to Dobodura was created when a message was sent from Dobodura, received at Kokoda and retransmitted to Moresby in four minutes. While one operator at Kokoda was receiving, another was looking over his shoulder, transmitting at the same time. Not quite in accordance with Vol. V but it was a high priority message. The unit functioned at Dobodura until February 1943 when the
Americans took over.
When the detachments returned to Moresby they did not recognise the Signals Office. It had grown from one switchboard with three subscribers to a large
grass-roofed building in which the operators handled forty-four trunk lines and 174 local lines. On the Morse channels, both line and wireless, as many as 50,000 groups were sent in a day. The wireless system had grown to embrace all parts of the peninsula and went as far back as the mainland. In addition, an air-letter service operated to a time table, weather permitting,
and a Signals courier accompanied the despatches.
Some members of the unit encountered unusual duties. It fell to the lot of a wireless detachment to accompany an independent company on a reconnaissance of a new track leading from Rigo through to Kokoda. Despite new and hazardous country and terrific atmospheric conditions, communications were maintained with H.Q.
By March the entire unit was concentrated at Moresby, enjoying dry weather and normal sunshine as a relief from the fetid conditions of the mountains. In April an air raid took place in which an estimated number of one hundred enemy planes participated. Bombs fell into a B.I.P.O.D. area and set fire to a dump of petrol. Volunteers were called for and members of the unit flocked to the scene and gave valuable help in moving hundreds of drums of precious fuel to safety. It was a farewell gesture to New Guinea because the entire unit was reassembled back in Australia and on leave shortly afterwards.
Preparation was necessary for future campaigns. The health of the unit had suffered. Over 230 men had contracted malaria. The rehabilitation and re-equipping of this much experienced unit is now complete and everyone waits with confidence for the next engagement.

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"Mud in your eye,
George" |
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"B" CORPS SIGNALS IN NEW
GUINEA |
From a humble beginning in a North Sydney drill hall in 1936, "B" Aust. Corps Signals moved to New Guinea in June 1943 to play a vital part in providing communications for the divisions which did so much towards sweeping the Japanese out of Salamaua, the Huon Peninsula, the Ramu Valley and their northern strongholds on the island.
The unit was formed in 1936 and based at the Carlow Street drill hall, North Sydney. The original commander was Major L. J. Wellman who remained in command until the outbreak of war when the unit expanded into Eastern Command Signals. Long periods of training followed until early in 1942 when 2 Aust. Corps came into existence. "B" Aust.. Corps Signals served the H.Q. of this formation at its various locations.
In June "B" Aust. Corps Signals sailed for New Guinea under the command of Lt-Col. H. L. Moulds. The
New Guinea position in the S.W.P.A. at around this time gave promise of victories to come. The
Japanese had been forced back over the Owen Stanley Range to beyond the Sanananda-Buna area. The
first successful steps in the Salamaua campaign had been taken. However, the
Japanese were still firmly entrenched in the Huon Peninsula and beyond. In August;
the unit was flown to Dobodura and at
first attached to I Aust. Corps until the arrival of its parent body. The area was
frequently swamped by rain water in a matter of five minutes. At other times the
atmosphere was muggy and oppressive.
Hardly a single member of the unit escaped some sort of physical trouble
- skin rashes, dengue fever, yellow jaundice, malaria or scrub typhus.
Capt. Elkin, O.C. of a line section, paid the supreme sacrifice while on the job. His section was engaged in laying a line from Dobodura to Morobe. It would be difficult to exaggerate the tiring nature of the work and the physical fatigue it caused. Capt. Elkin underestimated the extent of an illness he had contracted. He overtaxed his strength and died of scrub typhus. In so doing, he upheld the finest tradition of Signals. Very few men saw the line right through. Eventually It was completed but only after heavy casualties from sickness.
At the end of September, an advance party from the unit moved by barge to Lae. The purpose of this move was to establish closer contact with the 7th Division in the Ramu Valley and the 9th Division advancing up the Huon Peninsula. For the next three months, "B" Aust. Corps Signals handled heavy wireless traffic to the fighting divisions. A link was also established to the United States First Air Task Force, ensuring close cooperation between the ground and air forces.
As the Huon Peninsula campaign drove the Japanese northward, Corps H.Q. was moved to Finschhafen. A Finschhafen line was constructed
for and beyond ward to the 9th Division, which was subsequently relieved by the 5th Division at Sio.
At no stage was "B" Aust. Corps Signals operating as a whole unit. A plague of dengue fever swept through the various sections at Katika. Already diminished in
strength, they had to function with a majority of their personnel incapacitated by illness. Despite this fact, Signals communications were never impaired at any stage.
Another important task undertaken during this period was the laying of line communications in the Markham Valley. Under tropical conditions this type of work involved exceptional difficulty. The oppressive heat, hilly country, dense jungle and transport difficulties all combined to make the linemen's job an unenviable one. In addition, vital communications were established with the Sixth U.S. Army. By efficiently performing all duties, "B" Aust. Corps Signals have in some measure discharged part of the debt which civilization owes to those who will never return. |
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