Bougainville to Borneo (Pt.3)

9th Division at Tarakan and North-West Borneo & 7th Division at Balikpapan

"Soldiers Eating" by VX93433

NINTH AUSTRALIAN DIVISION AT TARAKAN AND NORTH-WEST BORNEO

• North Borneo Campaign June & July 1945

• Tarakan Campaign
  • 1 May 1945 to 21 June 1945

Late in March 1945, planning elements of the Ninth Australian Division (commanded by Major-General G. F. Wootten) left the Atherton Tableland in advance of the rest of the division, and emplaned for Morotai. 

They were followed by the 26th Brigade Group, which moved from the mainland prepared for an immediate operation-the capture of Tarakan, a small island off the east coast of Borneo. 

The principal object was to capture the airfield for development and use in future operations on the mainland.

Tarakan Island is situated off the delta of Sesajap River in north-eastern Borneo. Before the war its oilfields produced yearly 6 million barrels of what was reputed to be the world's purest oil.

Transport was supplied by ships of Amphibious Group Six and support by units of Task Group 781 and R.A.A.F. Command, with 13 U.S. Army Air Force in support.

It was decided to make the landing at Lingkas beach. This would enable heavy mechanical equipment to be hurried up to the airfield along an existing surfaced road linking the port and field. There were several difficulties to be overcome. In addition to offshore obstacles, the gentle slope of the beach and the depth of mud would not permit the landing of heavy vehicles and guns until pontoon causeways had been placed and extensive beach exits constructed. In order to provide artillery support for the actual landing, the brigade commander decided to land one field battery at Sadau Island the day before the main landing with a protective force made up of the 2/4th Commando Squadron.

Sadau Island lies some 6,000 yards to the north-west of Lingkas beach. As the island had a good landing beach, no known obstacles and was believed to be very lightly held, little difficulty was expected in landing the battery. In fact, the island was found to be bare of enemy troops.

In outline the brigade commander's plan was as follows: On P-day minus one day, the landing of the field battery on Sadau Island and the breaching of the beach obstacles by the engineers; on P-day (the name given to the day of the landing) an assault landing by two battalions (2/23rd and 2/48th); 2/24th Battalion and the remainder of the force to be on call. Minesweeping was to be undertaken during the four days before the operation. It was anticipated that the enemy would endeavour to use burning oil in his defence of the beaches, but systematic bombing destroyed or breached every oil tank on the island.

P-day was originally fixed for the 29th Of April but was postponed to the ist of Alay because of more favourable tides. Rehearsals for the operation were held at Morotai and on Kokoja Island off the coast. On the 26th of April the force allotted for the Sadau Island landing and the breaching of the obstacles sailed from Morotai, followed the next day by the main assault convoy. It was not troubled by enemy aircraft, and the only attempted naval interference was one submarine (which was believed to have been sunk on the night before the main landing) and shore-based torpedoes fired into the transport area early on P-day. One of these torpedoes grazed a ship but did not explode.

The landing at Sadau Island went according to plan, and in three hours the guns of a battery of the 2/7th Field Regiment were firing in support of the engineers at Lingkas.

The breaching of the obstacles at Lingkas was a triumph for the sappers. Demolition parties drawn from 2/13th Field Company were given the task of making eight 30 foot gaps in four rows of underwater obstacles on Red and Green beaches, to let the assault troops through; and four 60-foot gaps on Yellow Beach for the passage of L.S.Ts.

Two breaching operations were made on the morning and afternoon of the day before the landings. The sappers moved to the beaches in L.C.V.Ps and L.V.Ts and struggled waist-deep through mud to place their charges. Detachments from the 2/3rd Pioneer Battalion acted as gun crews on the L.V.Ts, and covering fire was also given by 2-pounders from Sadau Island and warships. Smoke-laying aircraft were also used. Despite the heavy mud and sporadic sniping and mortar fire from the shore, the task was successfully carried out and the thoroughly exhausted sappers were evacuated without casualty. This achievement was one of the most vital contributing factors to the success of the whole operation.

On P-day, for an hour and a half, from first light, cruisers and destroyers poured shells into the beach area. From the land came flashes as rocket-firing gunboats ran close inshore to cover the assault craft, while four flights of heavy bombers dropped their bombs along the foreshore. On both beaches the leading waves of the assault battalions moved through the gaps in the obstacles to land practically dry-shod. There was no opposition from the beach itself or within the limits of the first objective. It was apparent that the Jap had withdrawn inland, although he could obviously have put up a very effective resistance to the landing on the beach itself from strongly built concrete pillboxes dug into the embankment.

Within an hour of landing the 2/48th Battalion struck some slight opposition on the feature immediately north-east of Lingkas tank farm, but continued to advance and secured its portion of the covering position later in the day.

Stiff resistance held up the 2/23rd Battalion on a ridge north-west of Milko, which was captured the next day. This enabled the battalion to advance northward and eastward, one company overcoming enemy resistance in the King's Cross area. By nightfall on the second day, apart from isolated pockets, the only part of the covering position not held was Hospital Ridge, where the enemy was strongly entrenched in bunkers and tunnels. This hold-up seriously affected the development of the beach maintenance area, as the road to the north of the contested feature was needed to complete a traffic circuit.

The same day the 2/48th Battalion occupied Lyons. Against some opposition the 2/24th Battalion advanced rapidly through Sturt, Wills, Frank and Essex, making successful use of tanks and flame-throwers. Many mines and booby-traps were encountered-on a far greater scale than previously encountered by Australian troops in the Pacific theatre-and in addition to a bomb-disposal platoon, sappers and R.A.A.F. engineers were kept busy clearing mined areas.

In the airfield area the going was hard owing to the terrain, stiff resistance, and the great number of mines, demolitions and booby traps. One company overcame these difficulties and occupied Airstrip Ridge. Another company cleared Anzac Highway, where the enemy ineffectively fired oil in a ditch as a defensive measure.

In the Peningki-Baroe area two tanks silenced a troublesome nest of heavy and light machine guns which had menaced vehicles moving along a section of Anzac Highway. The Japs fought desperately and the position was not finally cleared out until the next day.

The 2/48th Battalion had patrols advancing on Peter, Sykes and Butch. It was at Sykes that the Jap made one of his strongest counterattacks, but "C" Company held the ridge. The main feature in the centre of Tarakan township was strongly attacked by the 2/4th Commando Squadron and occupied after two days' heavy fighting.

Hospital Ridge was finally cleared on the third day, tanks assisting the infantry. This completed the occupation of the covering position, and opened up Collins Highway as a traffic circuit. On the same day, Brigadier Whitehead obtained approval to withdraw 2 /3rd Pioneer Battalion from 2nd Beach Group to relieve the 2/23rd Battalion, which then moved to the airfield area and came in contact with the enemy to the east and north-east.

In the afternoon a patrol of the 2/24th Battalion worked round to the west of Rippon, the dominating feature north of the airfield, and reported that the enemy had apparently abandoned it after two days of heavy artillery fire, giving us control of the airfield. Work began immediately to clear the field of bombs and mines in preparation for the use of mechanical equipment. This ended the first phase of the operation, after four days of hard fighting.

The next phase began with 2/4th Commando Squadron and 2/48th Battalion advancing in conjunction to clear the features Jones, Peter and Otway, and the low ground between Otway and the Tarakan feature. A simultaneous attack was then made on the high ground, the commandos moving along Snags Track to reach the objective without opposition; but the 2/48th's northward thrust was stopped at a difficult point along the ridge leading to the objective. After patrolling the area for some days, the battalion outflanked the enemy positions and in the subsequent attack occupied the ridge.

At the same time the 2/3rd Pioneer Battalion advanced with two companies eastward along John's Track and found enemy positions in depth on each side. Persistent attacks by the pioneers, supported by heavy artillery and naval concentrations and Napalm bomb air-strikes, had their reward on the 14th of May when the features Helen and Sadie were occupied. At the same time elements of the pioneers reached the coast and seized the Japanese defences.

Patrols of the 2/24th Battalion fanned out over a wide area to the west, north and east. Within four days one platoon had penetrated along the Anzac Highway as far as Djoeata, where they encountered enemy troops but cleared the village without much trouble.

The Netherlands infantry company had advanced southward along the road from Peningki area to Karoengan and by the 10th of May had reached the sawmills at Karoengan without seeing the enemy. This meant that the right flank was clear from District IV to Karoengan. On the 13th of May the company landed at Cape Pasir jetty without opposition and cleared the features Spike, Spear and Peach.

Sixteen days after the landing the Australian forces had cut through to the east coast, the Netherlands East Indies troops occupied the southern peninsula, and two-thirds of the island, including the Pamoesian and Djoeata oilfields, was in our hands.

At this stage a policy of extensive patrolling and ambushes coupled with harassing fire had the effect of confining enemy activities to very definite and limited areas, and threatening his freedom of movement above ground. A feature of the attacks on enemy strongholds was the co-operation and accuracy of supporting aircraft and artillery, and naval bombardment. In particular the dropping of inflammable belly tanks on Jap positions proved very effective as large burnt-out patches in vacated areas testified.

At night the enemy employed infiltration attacks extensively. Small parties, usually armed with explosives, endeavoured to pierce our lines with the intention of damaging installations, but they had very little success.

Enemy positions were steadily and progressively overcome, and by the end of May the Japs had been beaten back to the Fukukaku positions.

On the 3oth of May the brigade came under direct command of First Corps, as the Ninth Division was about to undertake the invasion of the Brunei Bay area on the northwest coast.

After a period of softening up a general advance began in all sectors on the I 4th of June. The main drive from the south-west by the 2/23rd Battalion penetrated the area, while co-ordinated attacks from the north-west by the 2/24th Battalion and from the south-east by the 2/48th Battalion cleaned out remaining enemy positions.

By the evening of the '5th of June the Fukukaku area was completely over-run and mopping up was almost complete. Organized resistance by the enemy as a force was ended and survivors retreated in independent groups to the north and the north-east. The remaining Japs were hunted by patrols, and many were captured attempting to leave by improvised rafts.

On the morning Of the 27th of June a colourful religious ceremony was held in the Pamoesian oilfields at the first pump to be restored. In accordance with the native practice a cow was slaughtered and its head buried near the pump house, the object of this being to bury all the evil spirits and ensure that no bad accidents occurred in the field.

Shortly after 10 a.m. on the 29th of June, the first plane - excluding the tiny Auster reconnaissance aircraft - landed on the Croydon strip, to be followed during the day by twenty Kittyhawks. Next day twelve Spitfires arrived, while two Lightnings which had been providing air cover for the great Seventh Division convoy en route to Balikpapan, came in to refuel.

In two months of unrelenting fighting the 26th Brigade had achieved its main objects, and by the 1st of July, 1,499 Japanese dead had been counted with an estimated additional dead of 235.Guerrilla forces dispatched thirty-nine and 314 had been taken prisoner total of 2,087.

The cost to our forces, however, had been considerable. The killed (Including Lieutenant T. C. Derrick. V.C.. D.C.M.. of the 2/48th Battalion) totalled 233, wounded 644, while 1,434 had been evacuated through sickness.

The next task of the Ninth Division was to capture and hold the Brunei Bay-Miri-Seria area of North Borneo to permit the establishment of an advanced fleet base in Brunei Bay, to recover and protect the oil and rubber resources there and re-establish British Government control in the occupied areas.

The operation was to be carried out by the division, less the 6th Brigade, Placed under command were certain corps, and British and U.S. troops, and units of the R.A.A.F. and U.S. Air Force and Navy. The landing in the Muara-Brooketon area was to be made by the 2oth Brigade (commanded by Brigadier W. J. V. Windeyer) with the 24th Brigade (Brigadier S. H. W. C. Porter) making a simultaneous landing on Labuan Island, prior to operations on the nearby mainland.

The embarkation of the force called for considerable organization. In all, five convoys left ports in the Philippines and Halmaheras to converge on Brunei Bay. The main assault convoy sailed from Morotai on the 4th of June 1945 and completed the voyage without incident. First light on Z-day (the 10th of June) saw two striking forces standing off the shores of Brunei Bay - long lines of ships stretching beyond the horizon, poised for an amphibious landing against Japanese-held British possessions.

For the landing on Brunei Peninsula the beach at Brooketon (designated Yellow Beach) was the best available. However, to reach it assault craft would have to pass through a narrow channel in Muara harbour, which meant that Muara Island would first have to be cleared of the enemy. It was finally decided to land near Brunei Bluff (Green Beach), and to take Yellow Beach by movement overland; also to make a simultaneous assault landing on the south-east end of Muara Island (White Beach), moving overland immediately to capture Red Beach, the most suitable for unloading stores.

The next phase of the brigade commander's plan called for the capture of Brooketon and the rest of Muara Island, followed by a drive along the road from Brooketon to Brunei. After the landing of heavy equipment and bulk stores on Yellow Beach, a detachment in small craft was to seize a suitable position on the banks of Brunei River to enable artillery to be landed to support a land advance from Brooketon to capture Brunei town.

The 2/7th Battalion was selected to land on Green Beach, the 2/15th on White Beach, and the 2/13th was to be held in reserve.

The Muara-Brooketon area is sandy and flat, with casuarina trees and some rain forest, but to the west are steep slopes covered with vegetation. Between these hills there is considerable cultivation including coconut and rubber plantations. Native villages are numerous, but there are few towns of any size or importance. Brunei, the capital of the State and seat of the Sultan, had a pre-war population of 1200, of whom only fourteen were Europeans.

It was difficult to estimate enemy strength, but the maximum was reckoned to be 2,000 to 2,500. In fact, it was found to consist of two depleted independent infantry battalions, amounting to about 450 men, with service units bringing the total to about 800. Enemy air and naval activity was negligible.

Naval and air support for the operation was on a comparatively large scale. The naval force included one light cruiser, four destroyers, gunboats and rocket-boats. Following the usual pattern there was to be a heavy bombardment of both assault beaches for one hour before the landing, followed by close support fire from the smaller craft just before the assault troops hit the shore. Air support was the responsibility of R.A.A.F. Command with elements of the 13th U.S. Air Force.

Both landings were unopposed. At 9. 15 a.m. on the 10th of June, the 2/I5th Battalion landed on White Beach at the south-cast end of Muara Island and found the enemy defences abandoned. The battalion pushed west and by last light was established at Lodono Point.

At Green Beach (Brunei Bluff) the 2/17th Battalion also met no organized opposition. Brooketon was captured, and at the end of the day the battalion had cleared all the area east of the general line Brunei-Yellow Beach. The 2/13th Battalion, the brigade reserve, had also landed at Green Beach and was established in the area Foochow-Derby.

The first night a truck containing eight Japs drove straight into the 2/I7th Battalion's for-ward company positions on the Brunei-Brooketon road. After our machine guns had dispatched seven of the occupants, the survivor informed his captors that the men in the truck had been ignorant of the landing. They had apparently regarded the naval and air bombardment as normal.

The advance of the 2/17th Battalion proceeded rapidly down the road towards Brunei, with two platoons of the 2/2nd Machine Gun Battalion and a troop of tanks in support. The tanks did not get far, being too heavy for the culverts. The marching infantry found the weather more troublesome than the enemy.

A water patrol of three barges manned by detachments of the 2/15th Battalion, engineer and artillery reconnaissance parties, and detachments of signals, medical and British Borneo Civil Affairs Unit moved up the Brunei River and landed three and a half miles east of Brunei. The next day a troop of 25-pounders was landed there and by noon the guns were in action.

Continuing its advance the 2/17th Battalion occupied the Brunei airfield. By the afternoon of the 13th of June the 2/I7th had captured the town of Brunei, mopping up small parties. The town had suffered severe damage from Allied air raids and enemy demolitions. Patrols released several natives found chained to stakes; eight others had died.

On the 16th of June a platoon of the 2/15th Battalion moving southward along the Limbang road ran into an ambush and suffered two casualties. The enemy position was shelled and the patrol continued until it reached Limbang River. A waterborne patrol then moved up the Pandaruan River accompanied by two American gunboats with orders to raid Limbang. It reached Terumi without contact and at 9.30 a.m. on the 17th of June it landed unopposed at a village, which for this operation was named Gyro. "A" Company, advancing along Limbang road, had sent a patrol forward to a village designated Gasolene. The next day the remainder of "B" Company moved by landing craft to Gyro. Late in the afternoon Limbang was occupied without contacting the enemy.

On the 15th of June a new phase of the Brunei operations had begun with the advance southward along the coast. Under orders to exploit along the road Brunei-Tutong, two companies of the 2/17th Battalion moved out of Brunei. Brigade headquarters was established in the residency at Brunei.

A rapid advance on foot was made towards Tutong. With "B" Company leading, and no opposition met with, eight miles along the road was covered on the '5th of June. Next day this company in trucks and jeeps advanced about twenty miles in less than six hours. By night Tutong was occupied.

The advance was resumed on the '7th of June. Next day "C" Company passed through "B" Company and with a platoon of the 2 /2nd Machine Gun Battalion, raced on towards Seria, where natives had reported the presence of enemy troops. During the day the company caught up with rear elements of the Japs, who fled on the appearance of our troops.

On the 19th of June "C" Company reached the mouth of the Lumut River without opposition. They continued the advance and made contact with the enemy late in the afternoon. By 8 p.m. the bridges over the Bira River on the outskirts of Seria had been secured, and on the 21st of June Seria was occupied again, without opposition.

Seria presented an amazing sight. The Japs had fired the oilfields shortly after the landing at Brooketon, and columns of black smoke could be seen from twenty miles away. In the town area the air was filled with smoke and a fine spray of oil, and there was a continuous hissing and rumbling from the fires, which burned like great blow-torches. At one stage thirty-one fires were counted.

On the 24th of June "A" Company resumed the advance and occupied Kuala Belait without opposition.

Back at Brooketon the 2/13th Battalion and two companies of the 2/15th had been held in preparation for a coastwise operation to outflank the enemy retreating from Brunei. At 9.30 a.m. on the 20th of June they made an unopposed landing at Lutong and by 3 p.m. had occupied the town and the peninsula to a point 3,000 yards south of the airstrip. For two days patrols searched the area without making contact with the enemy. They found the bodies of Javanese who had been bayoneted, and three Japs killed by natives.

On the 23rd of June Miri was occupied without opposition by troops moving down from Lutong. As extensive patrolling around Miri yielded nothing it was clear that the enemy had evacuated before the landing, moving along the old Riam road.

This marked the limit of the 20th Brigade's southward thrust. The advance had been so rapid that at this stage, a fortnight after the landing, the brigade held ninety miles of coast and had moved round Brunei Bay as far as Limbang. Nowhere had the Jap made any attempt to put up a determined resistance. A feature of the campaign was the co-operation of the natives, who appeared to have a fervent hatred of the Japanese. The Dyaks, a primitive people living in the hills, were enthusiastic and successful guerrillas. Another feature of the operation was the unexpected number of Jap prisoners taken-at this stage totalling fifty. Counted dead were 122 while natives were reported to have killed between 75 and joo in the Limbang area.

Despite the low casualty rate, medical units were kept busy owing to the numbers of natives requiring attention. At Brunei, within five days of the landing, a detachment of the 2/13th Field Ambulance was treating 500 patients a day.

The rapid advance of the 2/17th Battalion and the wide dispersal of the brigade was a heavy strain on Signals resources, and introduced many supply problems. By putting a number of captured vehicles into running order, workshop units were able to assist in getting supplies to the troops. Some of the recaptured vehicles bore the Emu sign of the Eighth Australian Division.

The operation now entered into a phase of extensive patrol activity in all sectors. Parties moved by land and water along the coast and inland seeking the enemy, but in most cases the challenge remained unanswered. On the 5th of July, however, a mobile patrol in sandbagged jeeps with artillery support left Miri on a long-range reconnaissance of Riam road and was held up at a point 7,000 yards south-east of Miri by a force of nearly 100 Japs. Heavily armed, the enemy was very aggressive, leaving their dug-in position and attacking several times over open ground in attempts to outflank the patrol. After killing an estimated twenty-five Japs our troops withdrew, and the position was heavily shelled. When later examined by our troops it was found to have been occupied by approximately one company.

By the end of July patrols of the 2/15th Battalion had penetrated twelve miles along the Riam road, and had moved down to Dalam and Liku pumping stations and along Miri River without seeing any movement.

In the 2 /17th Battalion's area patrols pushed inland along the Belait River to Balai, where a patrol base was established. From this point our troops penetrated eight miles up the Menderam River without making contact, and along the Telingan River as far as Simpang. From here a patrol reached Menderam and moved on to Ridan on the 12th of July. On the Belait River Australians travelling in native canoes had reached Usong and found it deserted.

On the 15th of July a strong patrol, with H.M.A.S. Tigersnake and aircraft in support, pushed up the Baram River and landed unopposed at Ridan. The force then advanced to Marudi to find that the enemy had again decamped. A river patrol supported by a gunboat moved from Marudi and occupied Bakoeng without opposition. The patrols based on Marudi and Ridan were very active, and there were minor clashes with the enemy at points along the river.

In the Brunei-Limbang sector the 2/15th Battalion at Limbang quickly spread long tentacles inland along river and tracks covering a wide area. Patrols penetrated south-west along the winding Limbang River as far as Ukong. Farther west troops moving overland reached Abang and proceeded up Tutong River by native prahu to reach Rambai on the 13th of July. To the south-east, troops moved to Bangar on the Temburong River and patrols were sent east to Labu Estate. East of Limbang patrols ranged the Trusan and Lawas rivers from the two villages bearing those names. Company patrol bases were established at Bangar and Lawas, and parties scoured the surrounding tracks and waterways.

By the end of July patrols from the 2/15th Battalion had reached up the Temburong River as far south as Anggun, and to the northeast one of the patrols based on Lawas had made contact with troops of the 2/3rd Tank Attack Regiment at Sindumin, thirty-five miles across the map from Limbang and on the boundary of the two brigade areas~

Despite the continuous and vigorous long-range patrolling which had been maintained throughout the whole brigade area during this period there had been little contact with the enemy, and it was evident that the Japs had decided on a policy of evacuation of their areas as they came within the range of our patrols.

Simultaneously with the 20th Brigade landing, the 24th Brigade went ashore on  Labuan Island, strategically important because of its dominating position in the bay and the presence of an airfield built by the Japanese.

The island is roughly triangular, with the apex to the north and two large inlets in the base. The eastern inlet is Victoria Harbour, a sheltered deep-water port suitable for flying boats. The area of about thirty-five square miles is made up of hilly forest land to the west, grasslands and scrub to the east, and swamps to the south. Enemy land forces were estimated at 650 but information after the 
landing suggested 550 as being nearer the mark. Enemy air strength in the area was known to be limited, and it was expected that activity would be restricted to possible nuisance raids.

Our own forces consisted of two battalions of the brigade (the third being in reserve), a commando squadron, an armoured squadron, a field regiment including one troop of 4-2inch mortars, a light anti-aircraft troop, a field company, a machine-gun company and service troops. Also under command was a detachment of 727 Amphibian Tractor Battalion (U.S.), and, for the landing only, a number of corps, divisional, base, R.A.A.F. and U.S. units, and 1st Beach Group less a detachment with the 10th Brigade.

The brigade commander planned a landing on a beach on the south coast (designated Brown Beach) with a direct approach to the airfield up the peninsula. Two assault battalions were to be used, the 2/43rd Battalion on the right and the 2/28th Battalion on the left, supported by tanks and with the commando squadron in brigade reserve. Sappers from the 2/7th Field Company were to be included in the first assault wave to make a mine reconnaissance of the landing beach and beachhead.

Intensified air attacks began some weeks before the operation on an increasing scale. Naval bombardment began two days before Z-day and went on to culminate in a fierce barrage on Z-day itself with concentrated fire from rockets and mortars immediately before the landing.

Soon after dawn the bombardment began -first an hour's barrage from cruisers and destroyers, then rocket and mortar ships raced inshore ahead of the assault waves, firing on a fixed range so that their fire swept inland from the beach as the craft neared the shore. Escorted by fighters, medium and heavy bombers blanketed the target area. The first waves beached at 9-15 a.m. on time. The landing was unopposed and the infantry quickly pushed inland against slight opposition, and by 10.3o a.m. the battered town of Victoria was in our hands.

Shortly after 11.30 a.m. the Commander-in-Chief South-west Pacific Area (General MacArthur) went ashore from a U.S. cruiser, accompanied by the G.O.C. First Corps (Lieutenant-General Sir Leslie Morshead) and high-ranking officers of the three services.

The advance was maintained by both battalions, and by last light the airfield and Government House area had been secured, with the reservoir and pumping station intact. One troop of the 2 /11th Commando Squadron had landed unopposed on Hamilton Peninsula after naval bombardment and occupied the Ardle and Horel localities. The 2/12th Field Regiment had all its guns ashore and three troops were in action at points within 1,000 yards of the beach.

On the second day the 2/28th Battalion attacked on the left to clear the enemy from an area west of Flagstaff to MacArthur Road, while the 2/43rd Battalion moved to clear the area east of Labuan airfield. No opposition was encountered and for-ward elements of the battalion pushed north along Coal Point Road, two miles beyond the airfield. Although the enemy resisted stubbornly throughout the day. the 2/28th Battalion advanced and prepared to attack an enemy position between MacArthur Road and the airfield. Darkness delayed the attack until first light on the following day, when the battalion moved in with Matilda tanks to capture the position and continue the advance through to MacArthur Road.

Tanks were also used by the 2/43rd Battalion in a successful attack on an enemy position several hundred yards north-west of the airfield. After consolidating, the battalion spread to the west, one company capturing the junction of Hamilton and MacArthur roads. By last light the airfield was secured to east and west and the divisional covering position was held, with the enemy contained in a small area between the airfield and the mangrove swamps to the west. It was apparent that the bulk of enemy forces on the island had withdrawn to prepared positions along a ridge in this area in readiness for a last stand. During the day R.A.A.F. Beaufighters gave close support to the attack.

On the fourth day the 2/28th Battalion cleared the area through to the mangrove swamp, two companies containing the enemy position on the ridge while two more advanced north beyond the divisional covering position. The 2/43rd Battalion moved west to take Timbalai airstrip, capturing three features on the way, and finally patrolling to the coast. At one point elements of the battalion linked up with the commandos who had moved north after clearing Hamilton Peninsula.

From this day onwards extensive patrolling of the whole island was carried out while the enemy pocket north of the town was subjected to several attacks. On the 15th of June "A" Company of the 2/28th Battalion in a determined attack succeeded in driving the Japs off the ridge, killing thirty, but the
enemy still held a knoll dominating the ridge. "A" Company was later relieved by "C". On the 16th of June heavy air, naval and artillery bombardment was brought down on the position but the enemy clung tenaciously to well-prepared defences and only small advances were made. The infantry was handicapped by the exposed nature of the approaches to the ridge, and the fact that the surrounding
swamps and heavy jungle prevented the use of tanks. For the next two days the pounding from the air and ground continued, but the enemy fought back stubbornly.

On the night of the I 7th/ i8th of June several Jap attempts at infiltration were frustrated. Five Japs attacked a platoon of "C" Company and three who were killed had 30-pound aerial bombs strapped to their backs. The Japs also made use of aerial bombs as booby-traps suspended in the trees.

Pressure on the pocket was Intens1fied, and on the 19th of June eighty 8-inch shells from H.M.A.S. Shropshire rained down on the position, with another forty-eight rounds the following day. This was followed by low flying Mitchells dropping Napalm and 500 pound high-explosive bombs. Little change took place during the day, but that night the enemy commander apparently realized that the situation was hopeless and decided on a desperate attempt to break out with the idea of inflicting a maximum of damage before the inevitable end. 

At 10 p.m. on the night of the 20th/21st of June two suicide parties, each about fifty strong, crept out of the pocket down to the town area, one party moving along the edge of the swamp and down North Road, the other across to the airfield and then south. At 4 a.m. an attack was made on the beach maintenance area. The Japs achieved surprise and managed to inflict some casualties, but our troops quickly recovered and wiped them out before much damage could be done. At daylight the beach area was littered with the bodies of forty-nine Japs. Other enemy troops were killed near the airfield.

The day after the suicide attack the pocket was entirely reduced in an attack by the infantry with flame-throwing tanks and artillery support. A total of ninety enemy dead was counted, and there was hardly a tree or square yard of ground which was not scarred from the terrific weight of fire power which had been concentrated on this last enemy stronghold.

Apart from isolated and disorganized parties of enemy which were later quickly mopped up, the capture of the island was complete. Preparations were immediately made for further operations on the mainland. Landings were to be made next at two points along the northern reaches of Brunei Bay for a drive on Beaufort-terminus of the railway lines from Weston and Jesselton.

On the 17th of June a force made up of the 2/32nd Battalion Group (the divisional reserve which had remained afloat for some days after Z-day) moved from Labuan to land unopposed at Weston. Moving inland our troops found signs of recent occupation, but no enemy was seen up to a point 2,000 yards south-west of Weston. A patrol to Lingkungan reported the village clear of enemy and natives.

During the next week watercraft patrols reached along the Bukau River and up the Padas River to a point beyond Karang, while land patrols reached as far north as Naparan without contacting the enemy.

Two days after the Weston landing a force went ashore unopposed on Mempakul beach at the northern tip of Brunei Bay, preceded by an artillery bombardment of a troop of 3.7 anti-aircraft guns and one battery of 25 pounders firing from Labuan.

This force, which was to form the northern arm of the drive on Beaufort, consisted of the 7/43rd Battalion less two companies, the 2/11th Commando Squadron, one troop of the 2/12th Field Regiment and a detachment of the 2/16th Field Company. A covering position was quickly obtained from Menumbok through to the coast, and the commandos moved ahead to contact the enemy about a mile beyond. The enemy withdrew overnight. Portion of our force moved by barge up the Klias River to land at a point near Menumbok. Other troops pushed forward overland, the commandos reaching Malikai in two days.

On the 23rd of June a further landing was made, this time by a patrol from "D" Company of the 2/43rd Battalion at Sabang on the west coast of Klias Peninsula, to establish a base for exploitation farther north. They moved inland to link up at Karaka with the 2/11th Commando Squadron which had reached the village by an overland route. An amphibious patrol travelling north from Sabang landed near Cape Nosong, and one section moved east to Kuala Penyu, the other north to Tidong, without sighting the enemy.

On the night of the 23rd/24th of June part of the force moved up the Klias River to Kota Klias and overland to Kandu, in a direct line north-west of Beaufort. Only a few Japs were encountered. On the 2 5th of June patrols of the 2/43rd Battalion moved unopposed to reach Woodford Estate, to the west of Beaufort, and also a point on the railway line three miles to the south-west of the town.

The stage was now reached for a regrouping of our forces for the attack on Beaufort. A crafthead was established on the Padas River at a point a few miles west of Beaufort to which Brigade Tactical Headquarters had advanced, and the Padas River became the line of communication for the brigade.

On the 27th of June enemy resistance, not co-ordinated, nevertheless stubborn, was encountered north-west of the ferry across the Padas River, and on the railway line south of Bingkul. Troops moved north of Beaufort in a wide outflanking movement, and others struck bitter resistance from the Japs in positions north-east of the town. Before midday on the 28th of June all organized resistance in Beaufort ceased, and the 2/43rd Battalion fought into the town, capturing much enemy equipment. While mopping up was still going on our forces began to spread along the railway lines, the 2/28th Battalion pushing north and the 2/32nd Battalion patrolling southward on the Weston line.

Our forces regrouped on the 5th of July and advances continued along the three railway lines. The following day, elements of the 2/32nd Battalion reached Membakut and patrolled along the Damit River to the mouth, thence along the coast to the Bongawan River. On the 9th of July a landing was made on the coast a few miles north of Kimanis, and two days later they were joined by troops who had followed the railway, without contacting the enemy. At the same stage, the troops advancing east along the Beaufort-Tenom line had reached the southern bend of the line, where they killed a small party of Japs. To the south our troops had been attacked in the Lumadan area, but the enemy was driven off.

The enemy opposed our advance all the way from Beaufort to the cast, and in many encounters he suffered heavy losses. Reserve forces in the Beaufort area had a few minor clashes with the enemy. Very few enemy were now reported to be in the Klias and Weston areas.

In the north, at the same time that our forces linked at Kimanis, a company landing from L.C.Ms brought the advance to within five miles of Papar. Two days later this coastal force reached the mouth of the Papar River while troops advancing overland from the south occupied the deserted village of Papar, where opposition was negligible. This area was consolidated and before long standing patrols were established in the north and east of the village. Papar marked the limit of the brigade's exploitation to the north.

By the end of July the brigade was in a static position in control of a coastal strip seventy miles long, with continuous patrolling going on in several sectors.

A feature of the 24th Brigade's operations on the mainland had been the speed of advance and concentrations. This speed had been maintained by making the most effective use of

railways and water-ways in overcoming formidable supply problems. Particularly noteworthy was the ingenuity of engineers and workshop mechanics in improvising equipment to produce a strange but effective collection of rolling stock; jeeps mounted on flanged wheels, trolley cars, flat-tops, and recaptured civilian locomotives and carriages.

At the end of July 863 Japs had been killed with a further fifty-seven estimated killed; our own casualties were forty-seven killed and 144 wounded.

Reviewing the progress of the operation on a divisional basis, the Ninth Division had within a few weeks of the landing secured all its objectives-the strategically vital Labuan Island and Brunei Bay, and control of 180 miles of coast stretching from Miri in the south to Papar in the north, including the valuable oilfields of Seria and Lutong. The enemy had been forced inland into difficult country and denied access to supplies. 

At the Japanese cessation of hostilities the division had begun the next task of moving inland to regain control of all productive areas such as rice-fields and rubber plantations, and to consolidate these areas so that the native population could be returned to their villages to assist in food production. With the division was the British Borneo Civil Affairs Unit, which had detachments operating with units to organize local resources and to help rehabilitate the native population.

"NX124490"

"Banyan Knoll, Bougainville" by NX37175

SEVENTH AUSTRALIAN DIVISION AT BALIKPAPAN

• Balikpapan Campaign
  • July 1945

Pleasantly situated on an excellent bay in south-east Borneo, Balikpapan was once the second largest refining  and exporting centre of petroleum in the Far East, with an annual output of 18,000,000 barrels. Most of the installations were destroyed or damaged by the Dutch in 1941 before they evacuated the island. Under Japanese control rehabilitation was intense, and by 1943 many of the refining units were in operation, though at reduced capacities. 

The Japanese had had plenty of time to fortify Balikpapan-they had held it since January 1942. The Ninth Division landings at Tarakan, Brunei and Labuan had warned them of the type of assault to expect. Aerial photographs and information through intelligence channels showed powerful defences.

An offshore underwater obstacle of coconut logs laced together, three deep, starting north of Manggar, had been extended westward along the coast to include Klandasan. Extensive anti-tank ditches had been constructed. Trench networks on the ridges north of the beaches had been extended and improved. In the Klandasan area alone fifty tunnel entrances had been detected. Extensive land mines and booby-traps were expected. Several heavy coast defence guns had been located. Jap anti-aircraft defences-described by our Air Force as the heaviest yet encountered in the South-west Pacific area-had already taken toll of our bombers. The majority of the weapons were of a dual-purpose type, capable also of being used for coastal defence.

There was a strong possibility of the enemy using a burning-oil defence on the beaches. The pipeline from Sambodja to Balikpapan runs parallel to and within 300 yards of the beach. Flows of oil from points along this pipeline, and from the refineries themselves, could be ignited and directed to the beaches with devastating effect. To counter this our bombers were directed to destroy large sections of the pipeline before the landing.

A triple minefield protected the harbour and sea approaches. The latest Allied acoustic mines had been dropped from the air to complicate the existing Dutch and Japanese fields. It meant a long and hazardous )ob for the minesweepers because our mines are particularly difficult to sweep.

Japanese strength in the Balikpapan area was estimated to be 3,900 with reinforcements of another 1,500 at Samarinda, sixty miles to the north-east. In addition to these troops 4,500 civilian labourers, made up of Japanese, Formosans and Indonesians, were thought to be in the Balikpapan-Samarinda localities.

The initial planning for the operations was carried out at Kairi on the Atherton Tableland. Here, during April and May 1945, a small team, under the direction of Major General Milford, made plans for the initial assault. Four possible landing beaches were in the area. Of these Manggar and Klandasan were the most suitable.

There were two ideas about how Balikpapan should be taken. One was to land on the coast at Manggar and advance along twelve miles of narrow coastal plain to the main objective, the other to land right in the thick of the Jap defences at Klandasan, two miles from Balikpapan. Less resistance was expected in the first stages at Manggar, but the enemy would then adjust his defences against a threat from a known direction, thus prolonging the campaign. 

The more daring alternative - to land in the heart of the enemy defences at Klandasan - was chosen, while an alternative plan allowed for a landing at Manggar should Klandasan prove to be too powerfully defended. At Klandasan it was hoped to achieve quick results by seizing the keypoint of the enemy's defences in the initial assault, thus disorganizing his force, shortening the campaign and saving lives.

Three brigade groups of the Seventh Division were to be committed-the first time in its history that the complete division had fought as one force. The 18th and 21st Brigades were to land side by side in the initial beach assault, while the 25th Brigade was to remain offshore as a floating reserve. These Brigades were commanded by Brigadiers F. 0. Chilton, 1. N. Dougherty, and K. W. Eather respectively.

The target date for the landing was fixed for the 1st of July -F-day. 

Unit by unit the division arrived at Morotai in the Halmaheras during June. Here  the planning was finalized.

Almost on arrival, troops began to re-embark on ships of the assault convoy. Day by day thousands of soldiers went on to diesel-driven barges which scurried across the bay to the three L.S.1s, H.M.A.Ss Manoora, Kanimbla and Westralia, or to L.S.Ts or the many other types of craft. Heavy field guns, flame-thrower tanks, Matilda tanks, motor vehicles, heavy engineering equipment all went the same way.

The 24th of June, two days before setting off for Borneo, saw the assault convoy steaming a short way up the coast from Morotai to rehearse on a smaller scale the amphibious landing.

About midday on the 26th of June the largest convoy to carry an Australian invasion force left Morotai and sailed due west for the coast of Borneo. There were more than 200 ships sailing in battle formation.

Troops were told about our strength, the weight of our assault, armour, support, even the number of rounds of shellfire to, be laid down on the objectives before the landing.

They were kept informed of the progress made by our minesweepers and the underwater demolition teams. Sixteen days before the target date minesweepers had begun the hazardous task of sweeping a passage through the triple minefield off Balikpapan. They came under constant fire from the enemy's heavy guns. Our destroyers engaged the enemy shore guns and the minesweepers carried out their task successfully, but not without loss.

Although Australian sappers; had been trained in underwater demolition tasks, the U.S. Navy had taken over responsibility for all obstacles below high-water mark. Two days before F-day specially trained U.S. underwater demolition teams blasted a gap 8oo yards wide and another 6oo yards to 650 yards in the three rows of the offshore timber obstacle. This was accomplished by approaching in a landing craft, transferring to rubber boats and then swimming the last 300 yards to the obstacle, taking explosives and other equipment with them. The explosives were attached to the timber barricade and detonated electrically. The same day Australian engineer parties ensured that the beach was free of mines.

At 3 a.m. on the ist of July a dull red glow on the horizon a few points to starboard could  be seen from the an-nada-it was Balikpapan on fire-a result of the rapidly increasing tempo of our air and naval bombardment.

A few miles to go and "action stations" sounded-day was breaking. Before dawn the thunder of guns from combined Australian, American and Dutch warships and the drone of heavy bombers overhead told of the opening of our assault.

Dawn unveiled a terrifying scene. The whole shoreline was blanketed in smoke patterned with tongues of flame shooting hundreds of feet upwards. The beachhead and rolling inland hills were erupting and rocking under the impact of hundreds of tons of high explosive shells and aerial bombs.

H-hour for the beach assault was set for 9 a.m. At 7 a.m. the assault troops descended to the landing craft by rope nets. They were eight and a half miles from the shore at the entrance to a 500-yard-wide channel through the minefields.

For two hours the sea was a congested mass of small craft maneuvering into their respective assault waves. Then rocket ships went into action. In two sweeps along the waterfront they plastered the 2,000 yards of landing beach.

As H-hour drew closer our barrage increased. To every 230 square yards of the actual landing beach the Navy hurled an average of one shell or rocket. Never before in the Pacific had Australians seen such a tremendous and spectacular display. There was some ineffectual reply to our shellfire. Flak from enemy anti-aircraft fire patterned the smoke shrouded sky.

Five minutes before 9 a.m. the first assault wave of three infantry, battalions hit the beach - the 2/10th and 2/12th Battalions of the 18th Brigade on the left and beside them the 2/27th Battalion of the 21st Brigade. Ramps of the assault craft banged down on a bewildering scene of desolation. Against a background of black smoke and burning oil stood shell-splintered coconut palms and the rubble of brick buildings, while native huts were burning fiercely.

A few scattered shots harassed the beachhead but the landing was practically unopposed. The enemy had withdrawn to his tunnels, pillboxes and entrenchments which pockmarked the dominating features some hundreds of yards inland.

Troops and heavy mechanical equipment poured on to the narrow beachhead. Every man knew his job, every vehicle and piece of heavy equipment had its allotted place. Engineers were looking for and delousing mines; signallers were running telephone wire; wireless sets were in operation. Matildas and flame-thrower tanks ploughed across the beach and inland to support the infantry.

Bridge-laying tanks and bridging equipment capable of spanning 160-foot gaps were brought ashore in early waves. Bulldozers cleared passages from the beach to the main highway which runs parallel to the beach from the town proper to the air-strips, and on to the oilfields of Sambodja. The late Major General George Alan Vasey, loved by every man who had fought with him, was remembered here. The highway was given his name - Vasey Highway.

For the first time Australian short 25pounder guns complete with ammunition and gun crews were landed in D.U.K.Ws (amphibious craft) which rapidly moved to the areas already selected for gun positions. An hour after landing, shells from eight 25pounders were whistling over the heads of our advancing infantry to thicken up the naval fire.

In direct wireless communication with the warships were Naval Bombardment Shore Fire Control Parties. From vantage points with our forward troops these parties accurately directed broadsides from cruisers and destroyers on to the enemy's defensive positions.

Six-pounder tank attack guns and 4.2-inch mortars, manned by gunners of the 2/2nd Tank Attack Regiment, were brought ashore in L.V.Ts which hit the beach with the assaulting infantry. They were in action forty minutes later. The 4.2-inch mortars blasted the enemy on dominating features farther inland while the 6-pounders closely supported the infantry in knocking out bunker positions at a few hundred yards' range.

To protect the rapidly expanding mass of equipment in this confined area the infantry  was advancing faster against

opposition which was lighter than expected. Only fifteen minutes after landing the three assaulting infantry battalions had penetrated 800 yards across the beach plain to the pipeline running parallel to the beach. This marked the first phase of the operation: the beachhead had been secured.

On the left flank nearer the town proper and the oil refineries, the 2/10th Battalion swung to the west, advancing through the rubble of houses on the outskirts of the residential area, Klandasan. The objective was an abrupt feature named Parramatta-a ridge 300 feet high, running 1,500 yards due north, on which the enemy's defences commanded the entire Klandasan beach.

Parramatta Ridge was a Japanese fortress. At the top was a cunning trench system, while a hundred feet below were vast intercommunicating honeycomb tunnels. On the seaward side, sheltered in concrete and armoured emplacements, were two 120-mm. naval guns. Our shells had shaken the Japanese out of this fortress, razed every vestige of forest, pitted it from top to bottom with craters, and made the way easy for the infantry.

At the southernmost point of Parramatta Ridge was Hill 87- "C" Company of the 2/10th Battalion launched an attack against the enemy on this feature. With tank support the advance would have been difficult enough, but the tanks of the 2/1st Armoured Regiment had bogged down near the beach and could not be brought forward in time. With heavy support Of 25-pounders and 4.2-inch mortars, "C" Company captured Hill 87 by 1 p.m. The enemy had been strongly emplaced in tunnels on this hill and their sniper fire was accurate.

By this time the tanks had passed the boggy ground near the coast by moving along Vasey Highway through Petersham Junction, reaching Hill 87 in time to support "C" Company's further advance north along Parramatta Ridge. While the infantry were mopping up around enemy bunker positions and native huts, two tanks-a Matilda and a flame -thrower-moved forward 100 yards in front of a platoon of "C" Company. The Matilda blasted open bunker positions with its 2-pounder gun and through the openings the second tank shot jets of flame. Infantry cleaned up what was left. Enemy opposition was determined, but by 2.20 p.m. Parramatta Ridge was completely in our hands.

During the afternoon the 2/9th Battalion progressively relieved the remainder of the 2/10th in the initial beachhead area, allowing them to concentrate on Parramatta Ridge with "C" Company.

Meanwhile, in the centre between the 2/10th and 2/27th Battalions, the 2/I2th Battalion had cleared the firmly entrenched enemy from prominent features to a depth of 1,500 yards.

On the right flank the 2/27th Battalion had advanced forward of the pipeline to capture features Romilly and Rottnest, which menaced the beachhead. One company then swung to the east dealing with isolated bunker positions, while patrols cleared the area to the Klandasan Besar River.

The 2/16th Battalion landed on the heels of the 2/27th Battalion and passing through the captured Romilly feature occupied ridges to the north and east of Rottnest against mortar and machine-gun fire. Stray Japs with rifles scattered throughout the area had to be dug out before the advance could continue. From these captured features the 2/i6th launched attacks against firmly entrenched enemy on Malang feature, 2000 yards north of the beachhead. Malang was in our hands by 4 p.m.

During this time the 2/14th Battalion and the 2/7th Cavalry Commando Regiment had landed and passed through the 2/27th Battalion, swinging east to cross the Klandasan Besar River. A high feature on the far bank was captured by the 2/14th against light opposition, while the 2/7th Commando Regiment advanced to the north-east occupying the same ridge 1,000 yards farther inland.

Sappers moved with the attacking infantry, marking minefields to allow the infantry to advance freely. Behind the advancing troops more engineers were finding and delousing numerous heavy mines and booby-traps. So thorough was their work that these Jap defences caused few casualties among our troops.

When night fell on the battlefields at Balikpapan after that first day's fighting the Seventh Division had over-run numerous heavily defended localities, captured many enemy antiaircraft and machine guns, denied him the high ground from which serious interference could have been caused to the unloading of stores, and split open the crust of defences protecting the town itself and the docks area. Only spasmodic shells and mortar bombs harassed the beachhead and few found their mark.

The bold strategy had been eminently successful, and careful planning had saved casualties during that vital first day. Our casualties were twenty-two killed and seventy-four wounded. The Japanese had suffered ten times that number, and more.

Then followed a thunderous night of naval and artillery shelling, night bombing, mortar  and machine-gun fire to which the enemy sporadically replied. The whole northern half of the sky was bright, then brilliant red. Star shells illuminated the battle areas, revealing infiltrating parties of Japanese which clashed with our patrols.

As dawn broke more than 300 Japanese dead lay scattered about Parramatta Ridge many as the result of the night's patrol clashes. Beside some of the bodies were long wooden spears with sharp points of metal - a primitive weapon, but efficient in the dark.

Below Parramatta nestles the former lovely Dutch suburb, Klandasan, with street upon street of neat brick villas, now shell-splintered ruins. It was thought that the enemy would fight house-to-house and street-to-street, but less than a dozen remained with a few natives in ruined Klandasan that morning. The natives' pitifully emaciated from starvation, lay exhausted among their own dead, too weak to move. The few stray Japanese were mopped up by the 2/9th Battalion, which had advanced through the Santosa barracks area.

Many tunnel entrances led into the hills near Santosa barracks and Klandasan. Some of these tunnels. particularly those of the Jap commanders. were comfortably furnished. The bypassing of these tunnels would have left our rear open to attack. Matildas and a flame-throwing frog, supporting the 2/9th's advance, supplied the answer: fierce jets of flame from the frog roared into the dark openings, while the Matildas demolished the entrances with 2-pounder shells, bottling up the occupants.

Silhouetted on a ridge against an oil-blackened sky to the west of Parramatta were the blasted and tangled installations of the oil-cracking plant. Along this ridge to the right, large squat oil storage tanks were set on a tabletop feature: Tank Plateau. Not one of these tanks had escaped our bombardment.

During the second morning's fighting a large storage tank burst. A great sea of blazing oil roared down the valley between Tank Plateau and Parramatta Ridge, where our patrols were active. The whole valley became an inferno. So terrific was the heat that our men on the ridge threw themselves on the ground, pressing their faces against the earth and escaping the fire.

Following a heavy artillery and mortar concentration that afternoon a company of the 2/10th Battalion skirted the valley and mounted the southern slopes of the cracking-plant feature. A 6-pounder tank-attack gun supporting this attack accurately sniped four machine-gun posts, destroying them with direct hits.

North of Parramatta. two companies of the 2/10th Battalion had pushed the enemy from a high feature overlooking the town and harbour: Newcastle feature. The division was now well placed to launch an attack on Balikpapan itself.

Morning of the 2nd of July had seen the reserve infantry brigade - the 25th - beaching and moving inland to relieve units of the two assault brigades in the central sector. This enabled the 18th to concentrate its entire force for an attack on the town, and the 2/1st to make a successful thrust east along Vasey Highway.

With the 2/7th Commando Regiment protecting its left flank, the 2/14th Battalion rapidly advanced along Vasey Highway against scattered opposition. On the left flank our dismounted cavalry was held up by strongly entrenched enemy in the foothills about 1,000 yards north of the highway, but the 2/14th continued to advance, enveloping Sepinggang airstrip by 11a.m. on the 2nd of July. The airstrip was soon secured. It was badly cratered, but work began immediately and it was serviceable for Auster scout planes by midday the following day.

Back on the Klandasan beach and for some distance inland huge ordnance and engineer dumps were rapidly expanding. Vehicles of all descriptions - bulldozers, Alligators, graders, heavy trucks and jeeps - cluttered the roads awaiting movement to the dispersal areas.

Large floating docks which had been brought 800 miles in the assault convoy, now spanned the shallow water between the beach and the landing ships. All day and most of the night landing craft ferried equipment ashore, while L.S.Ts and L.C.Ts disgorged hundreds of tons of cargo.

On the 18th Brigade front, the 2/12th Battalion had relieved the 2/10th's companies on  Newcastle feature - our fore most point to Balikpapan township.

From this 300-foot eminence, through gaps in the smoke on the morning of that third day's fighting, one could look down on the devastated thoroughfares and built-up areas less than half a mile away. In the left foreground was the thousand-yard-long Tank Plateau, smoking after its terrific pounding. Across the town the harbour front with its many broken piers; rising above the outrunning tide were the funnels and masts of a Japanese warship and the broken hulls of many -small craft. To the right, beside a muddy inner harbour, was old Kerosene Tank Farm. On the far right, two miles away, the old Dutch Barracks, and on the far left, Cape Toekoeng and Signal Hill.

At 9 a.m. the 18th Brigade launched a three pronged attack on Balikpapan. On the left, supported by a troop of Matildas and a flame throwing frog, the 2/9th Battalion captured a Japanese radar station on Signal Hill, and advancing around Cape Toekoeng, cleared the harbour front north to the old oil refinery.

Advancing through the twisted, white-hot refining installations, and across Tank Plateau, the 2/10th Battalion occupied the town area to the power-house, north of the 2/9th.

To complete the occupation of Balikpapan the 2/12th Battalion had pushed north-west from Newcastle to clear the industrial area, Pandansari. Heavy mortaring and shelling from dual-purpose anti-aircraft guns on two nearby features, Nail and Nurse, delayed the 2/12th's advance to Pandansari. The enemy's fire was quickly silenced by the Navy and 25-pounders of the 2/4th Field Regiment. A company of the 2/12th Battalion with tank support then attacked Nail feature, securing it during the late afternoon.

Except for a few scattered Japanese snipers in bunker positions, who were routed by flame-throwers and mopped up by the infantry, Balikpapan had been evacuated by the enemy. All that remained was an eerie, deserted mass of crumbling mortar and the charred skeletons of power plants, factories and business houses. Huge storage tanks had collapsed centrally and lay flattened. Telephone posts and broken wires drunkenly lined the main highway along the waterfront and there were many damaged motor cars; locomotives used for hauling long lines of coal to the wharves had been brought to a standstill. 

Beside the road were shattered oil-pipes from which oil still dribbled to feed the diminishing flames. Evidence of Japanese atrocities was found in the swampy area near the Dutch Barracks -the headless bodies of natives with their hands tied behind their backs. Sepinggang, too, had been the scene of a bloody massacre. Near a large mass grave a native was found with his neck one-third severed by a stroke of a samurai sword. While still alive he had been roughly buried with a bunch of decapitated and mutilated comrades. Picking at the earth with his hands the native managed to crawl away. He lived to tell the story.

With Auster scout planes using the Sepinggang strip, the 21st Brigade's next objective  lay six miles to the north-east  -Manggar airfield, the second largest in Borneo.

Relieved by the 2127th Battalion at Sepinggang on the 3rd of July, the 2/14th Battalion advanced farther along Vasey Highway. The bitumen surface of this coastal road was badly cratered and bridges over the many small streams had been blown. The area between the road and the coast had been heavily mined and booby-trapped. As the infantry advanced these were deloused by engineers, who immediately began to repair the bridges and road.

On the far bank of Batakan-ketjil the 2/14th Battalion encountered a small enemy force in two pillboxes. With naval-fire support "C" Company of the 2/I4th quickly drove the enemy from their pillboxes, and the following morning our advance continued.

Based at Sepinggang with the 2/27th Battalion, the 2/7th Cavalry Commando Regiment was patrolling vigorously inland to a depth Of 2,000 yards giving left flank protection to the 2/14th.

The 2/14th Battalion met little opposition approaching the Manggar Besar River during late afternoon of the 4th of July. On the northern bank of this river the airstrip runs parallel to the coast and beside the Vasey Highway. The bridge spanning Manggar Besar had been demolished at both ends, but two companies of the 2/14th Battalion pushed across the river. "B" Company secured the bridgehead on the northern bank while "A" Company advanced to the far end of the airstrip, quickly setting up a road block.

Then the enemy staged his first determined stand in this sector. From many gun emplacements, set in a group of ridges overlooking the northern end of the airstrip, he opened fire on our force. "A" Company had established a perimeter at the northern end of the  strip, and held it despite the  shrapnel bursting low over  their heads, fired from an enemy anti-aircraft gun only 800 yards away.

"B" Company moved back across the Manggar Besar and established a firm block on the southern side of the river. The guns of a small naval unit, standing offshore, quickly countered the enemy artillery. A naval bombardment officer, in direct wireless communication with the warships, had climbed a rickety 100 foot control tower on the airstrip and, from this vantage point, accurately directed the gunfire.

Meantime 25-pounders of the 2/5th Field Regiment had been hauled forward and joined in the fierce duel between the Navy and the enemy's heavy shore guns.

At nightfall "B" Company of the 2/14th was able to move for-ward again to occupy the western side of the strip, protecting our left flank. For five days the battle raged-five days of heavy shelling and counter-shelling, both the enemy and our guns firing over open sights.

Three Matilda tanks, put ashore from L.C.Ms on the beach east of the Manggar Besar, during the second day of the battle, were hit by the enemy's heaviest gun, a 155-mm., at point-blank range. One Matilda was badly damaged while the other two were destroyed in flames.

This 155-mm. coastal defence gun was set into the hillside and protected by heavy steel doors, against which our shells were at first ineffective. But our artillery were not to be beaten. During the night they moved a 25pounder forward to within 500 yards of the enemy gun. At first light they opened fire, placing direct hits through the steel doors of the emplacement and destroying the gun and crew.

Then "D" Company of the 2/14th Battalion, relieving "A" Company at the far edge of the airstrip, assaulted and captured the gun emplacement. Twice during the night that followed the enemy. counter-attacked the newly won gun position, one attack lasting an hour and a half. Twice he was repulsed by the Australians.

Five minutes after midnight the enemy vainly counter-attacked our other for-ward company, "C" Company, which had advanced iooo yards along Vasey Highway to the end of the strip during the day.

Even more formidable were the enemy's counter-attacks during the following night between 8 p.m. and 1 a.m. Torrential rain had filled the fox-holes and shell-holes. Our infantry beat off these attacks although many Japanese got to within a few yards of our fox-holes.

The enemy's heavy shelling had prevented repair work on the bridge over the Manggar Besar. With some ingenuity the sappers had partly solved the problem by building a wire-mesh foot-bridge underneath the actual bridge, slung from girders between the pylons.

The 9th of July saw the last of Japanese resistance at Manggar. The Navy and artillery continued to hammer his positions. Then, guided by mortar smoke bombs, Liberators blasted his defences with 1,000-pound bombs. The planes were scarcely off the area when our mortars and artillery opened up again, quickly followed by fire from a cruiser and two destroyers. After a brief lull six Lightnings flashed over the ridge in a trial run, circled and then returned, diving steeply. Belly tanks of Napalm tumbled down. There was a vivid flash and a deluge of fire enveloped the enemy held area. The Lightnings came back at treetop level in a strafing run.

A patrol of the 2/14th Battalion went in without firing a shot.

While the battle for Manggar strip had raged, the other two battalions of the 2/1st Brigade-the 2/16th and 2/27th-made further advances to the north-east of Sepinggang, and with the 2/7th Cavalry Commando Regiment had patrolled vigorously north of Vasey Highway.

A mile and a half across the harbour from Balikpapan lies Cape Penadjam, a swampy area  with a ruined sawmill forty to fifty native houses, and an oriental theatre.

Penadjam was not important to us commercially, but it could menace shipping in Balikpapan Bay. It was only of strategic value to the Japanese as an antiaircraft centre to protect Balikpapan. It had lost this value when we captured the oil refineries.

Although it was reported that the Japanese had evacuated Penadjam two days previously no chances could be taken, and it was subjected to a terrific pounding before the landing. Seaplanes strafed the township and the Navy bombarded the beach. Artillery from Balikpapan laid down a heavy creeping barrage as the 2/9th Battalion and men of the 2/7th Cavalry Commando Regiment in Alligators streamed across the bay in single file a mile long. About 200 yards from the shore the Alligators wheeled and sped towards the beach in waves at two to three minute intervals.

Tank support had been given to the 2/9th Battalion, but two Matildas bogged down in twelve feet of mud in the swampy beach area. The troops landed at r p.m. and the town was occupied without loss. Within an hour the infantry had fanned out, securing all initial objectives. The enemy had not been sighted, but a 5-inch coastal gun opened up on our forces. This gun was knocked out by naval fire and captured by "C" Company of the 2/9th Battalion that afternoon. Patrols pushed a mile to the north and south without contacting the enemy.

Patrols south of the Sesoempoe River during the following day located deserted machine guns, while patrols to the west captured a single Japanese. In this area the enemy was withdrawing by launch and barge along the Riko River.

By now the enemy had been ousted from all positions menacing the harbour. He had  been pushed out of the town  and had lost the two airstrips. It was apparent that he was trying to withdraw the remnants of his force to the Batochampar area on the road to Samarinda-Milford Highway.

Milford Highway was a road of craters and shattered houses, lined with burnt-out cars and trucks. On the features beside the road were knocked-out heavy guns and searchlights.

The low hills and spurs of this terrain resembled the northern rivers of New South Wales or the banana country north of Brisbane. Cultivation frequently lined the sides of the hills; but many were bald from mortaring, bombing and shellfire.

The enemy was strongly entrenched on these hills and spurs. Here the 25th Brigade struck him - and kept on striking him, day after day. Our tactics were hit and probe - hit him hard with the full weight of our artillery and air strength, then probe with infantry and dismounted cavalry patrols to ascertain his strength and positions.

Australian artillery fired at the rate of 5,000 shells a day, while the 2/25th, 2/31st and 2/33rd Battalions of the 25th Brigade were closely supported by 6-pounder tank attack guns and heavy mortars.

The Japs stayed in their bunker positions during the day, but at night small parties infiltrated through our lines. During the night of the 17th/18th of July a party of Japanese approached the headquarters of the 2/33rd Battalion by creeping down Milford Highway. As they entered the area they fired a flare to give them visibility. A sharp hand-to-hand skirmish developed. Here again the Japanese used their long spears, but to no effect. Dawn disclosed thirteen Japanese bodies. Japanese infiltration in another battalion area met a similar fate that night.

For three days the enemy stood in his strong positions running across Milford Highway. Then he cracked and the 9th of July saw one of the biggest advances since our first assault. Probing slowly forward in the morning the advance gathered momentum and by 4 p.m. 3,000 yards had been covered on a 2,000-yard front, placing our forward troops some five and a half miles north of Balikpapan. Faster than the advance was the enemy's retreat. By nightfall he was moving so fast that contact had been lost.

Large quantities of food and equipment were captured in the day's advance. Two heavy anti-aircraft guns which had been hurling shells at our forces were captured. They had been knocked out by direct hits in a duel with 25-pounders of the 2/4th Field Regiment. Results of the accuracy and weight of the artillery barrage were borne out by the number of Japanese dead throughout the captured area.

Milford Highway was extensively mined and booby-trapped. That evening three 1,000 pound bombs were exploded simultaneously in the middle of the road as an infantry platoon of the 2/31st Battalion was advancing. Many other heavy bombs lay beside the road but the Japs did not get a chance to use them against us.

Already the engineers were hastily repairing the section of Milford Highway captured that day. The tireless work of the sappers kept the road open to jeeps and tracked vehicles at all times. Not once were the rations and stores held up.

On the left flank a squadron of the 2/7th Cavalry Commando Regiment was patrolling east to harass the enemy's lines of communication. Farther to the left Netherlands East Indies troops were unopposed in a 3ooo-yard advance to a position four miles north of Pandansari.

The 25th Brigade pressed its advantage the following morning. Set on a jungle-clad hill to the left of the road, were the Cello barracks. Supported by Matilda tanks and a flame-throwing frog, "D" Company of the 2/31st Battalion stormed this hill killing fifty Japs without suffering a fatality. Right of Milford Highway "C" Company of the same battalion occupied another high feature.

That afternoon artillery, mortars and tanks paved the way for a further half-mile advance by "D" Company. In the day's advances two tanks had knocked out three gun positions, and Japanese in six bunkers had been ousted by the flame-throwing frog.

Later in the afternoon "A" Company was to attack another dominating feature, Coke Spur. A two and a half hours' barrage by 25pounders and a close supporting 6-pounder tank attack gun, combined with 4.2 and 3inch mortars, opened the attack. On a lower explosive key crackled the 2-pounders and machine guns of two Matilda tanks, lined up on the highway with the flame-thrower.

The barrage cut out and the three tanks crawled for-ward. Bunched close behind them were three infantry sections. A short distance ahead the road turned to the left, went down through a small cutting and on to a level at the bottom of Coke Spur.

Then it happened! From both sides of the jungle and from Coke Spur itself the road was swept by enemy machine-gun fire. The infantry could not advance. To retreat meant being caught and hemmed in by the cutting, through which the Jap had allowed them to advance. The artillery re-opened and the tanks blazed away at close range, but the enemy was strongly emplaced. The battle continued for an hour and a half. Practically the whole infantry platoon was wiped out in that confined ambush area. One tank stood by giving covering fire, while one Matilda, and then the other, crawled back, each carrying three wounded men on the deck. Back on the other side of the cutting the tank commander had been killed. There were many volunteers to go in and bring out the wounded.

Our attack had been brought to a standstill - the dead had to be left where they lay on the road. There was later evidence that the Japs had booby-trapped the bodies, but lives could not be risked in bringing them in. Nor could lives be wasted in another assault against Coke Spur. It was better to wait and let the artillery blast the enemy from his bunkers - a lengthy business, but time was not so important.

The same day in this sector troopers of the 2/7th Commando Regiment had encountered another ambush position - this time with overwhelming success. Eight of the twenty Japanese who lay in wait for these troopers were killed. The commandos had no casualties.

On Milford Highway our northerly advance was held up. For twelve days the Jap clung tenaciously to his strong pillbox and bunker positions strategically placed between the commanding features Chair and Coke, on either side of the highway. It was twelve days of heavy shelling, constant patrolling and nerve-racking infiltration at night.

A slow grinding-down process was involved. The infantry could have pushed the Jap from his pillboxes and bunkers days before they eventually over-ran them, but were not prepared to waste lives in doing it.

While the artillery and mortars pounded the enemy's defences and lines of communication, the infantry began to outflank him in preparation for a general squeeze. On the 14th of July the 2/25th Battalion, after relieving the 2/31st as point battalion astride Milford Highway, pushed two companies around the enemy's flanks on both sides of the road. The envelopment continued during the following day with the two companies firmly established on Cart and Calm features, to the outside and slightly in rear of the enemy on Chair and Coke.

The 2/33rd Battalion moved forward on the 16th of July taking over responsibility for the east side of the highway, allowing the 2/5th to concentrate on its outflanking movement to the west.

To the rear of the enemy's defences our commandos were active. Pushing through the thick rain forest and tangled vegetation on the 13th of July a commando patrol had skirted the enemy's right flank and reached a point overlooking his line of communication on Milford Highway. Late that afternoon an enemy patrol twenty strong approached the position. Our men withdrew and ambushed the Japanese, killing nine without loss. Day after day our ambush parties took toll of the Japanese along his lines of communication.

Farther west and nine miles north of Balikpapan, Netherlands East Indies troops were steadily moving along a water pipeline to a pumping station on the Wain Besar River. No enemy had been contacted in this area.

The enemy was reacting violently to our encircling pressure on his positions astride Milford Highway. By day he sent out strong fighting patrols; by night suicide parties charged the forward companies with swords and spears. All his attacks were repulsed with heavy casualties to the Japanese.

The night of the 17th/18th of July saw the fiercest night attack. Two 2/25th Battalion Company fronts and the headquarters of the 2/33rd Battalion were scenes of bloody hand-to-hand clashes. The Japs succeeded in knocking out one 4.2-inch mortar and inflicted some casualties, but the count of enemy dead the following morning showed no fewer than fifty-three, with an estimated additional sixteen.

Our pressure on the enemy gradually increased. Slowly an encircling movement squeezed him from his bunkers and pillboxes astride the highway. Pockets of resistance were cleared. One of these pockets on the left flank contained ten Japs in a cave. Infantry of the 2/25th Battalion quickly cleared this with a flame-thrower.

Then on the 22nd of July after his twelve day stand, the enemy broke contact. Patrols from the 2/25th and 2/33rd Battalions found his positions unoccupied and the 2/31st Battalion advanced 2,000 yards north along Milford Highway.

This placed the battalion outside the perimeter which had been laid down in the original order: "to capture and hold Balikpapan area". Though no further advances were ordered, the only means of securing this perimeter was by constant offensive patrolling. The Japs had not evacuated the area. Every day there were patrol Clashes, and at night he continued his infiltration tactics.

North of Manggar the 21st Brigade had pushed farther along Vasey Highway on the way to Sambodja, the third  largest oilfield in Borneo.

Covered by a smoke screen, three more Matilda tanks had been landed at Manggar to support the advance. When the enemy's guns had been silenced, engineers quickly repaired the demolished portions of the Manggar Bridge and supplies were brought forward by jeeps.

In the area north-west of the Sepinggang airstrip the 2/16th Battalion had advanced 1,000 yards against heavy opposition. An interesting series of moves and counter-moves preceded this advance. Two miles from the airstrip in a maze of steep hills the enemy had held a feature called Gate. After a heavy concentration of mortars and machine guns the Japanese had withdrawn on the evening of the 8th of July.

An enemy counter-attack forced the 2/16th to retire, but soon after our artillery brought down heavy fire on the feature ousting the Japanese. The battalion again occupied Gate the following morning and probed forward.

The enemy was encountered on many other features in this area, but artillery was directed on his positions and infantry cleared the remaining Japs. Our advance in this area had forced back the left flank of the enemy retreating on Batochampar.

On Vasey Highway the 2/27th Battalion had relieved the 2/I4th as point battalion and had advanced beyond the Adjiraden River. Only native refugees flocking to our lines were met by the 2/27th. Many had come from Sambodja, fifteen miles from Manggar. A number of them were suffering from gunshot wounds and burnt feet-a Japanese method of preventing them from being of use to us.

The 2/27th continued their unopposed advance during the following days, reaching the village of Bangsal and patrolling for-ward to Amborawang, eleven miles along the coast from Manggar and twenty-three miles from Balikpapan. Patrols inland from Vasey Highway failed to find the enemy.

A special reconnaissance party penetrated the heart of Sambodja on the 14th of July and observed a party of Japanese supervising the burning of the village by pro-enemy police-boys.

Four days later a patrol in strength occupied Sambodja, while another strong patrol cut their way through the jungle west of Amborawang to build a road block on a track leading from Sambodja to the Batochampar area.

Long-range patrols secured our perimeter in the Sambodja area and parties of Japanese were mopped up behind our lines in the vicinity of Manggar. The enemy continued to infiltrate at night and harass our lines of communication, but he caused little damage and invariably suffered losses.

Based on Penadjam, across the bay from Balikpapan, the 2/9th Battalion and elements of the 2/7th Commando Regiment were patrolling extensively to secure the harbour for shipping. Overland patrols probed south to the Bandjermasin Road, while water patrols scoured the Riko River and upper reaches of Balikpapan Bay.

Supplied by barge along the river and water-ways leading into it, scattered parties of Japanese still resisted in the Riko area. L.C.M. gunboats carrying out river patrols were successful in sinking many enemy barges, and his water activities were confined to the hours of darkness.

One river patrol set an unusual ambush for the enemy's river movement by night. The patrol had captured a 300-ton ship, laden with a cargo of coal and oil, where it had run aground some six miles up the Riko River. An armed party was left aboard the captured vessel that night. The ruse worked -a large enemy barge carrying about forty Japanese and towing five prahus approached the stranded vessel, and at close range the Australian patrol opened up. Bombs from a Pita gun gutted the barge and the enemy craft was swept by small-arms fire.

On the northern point of the Riko River mouth elements of the 2/9th Battalion landed at Djinabora during the 8th of July. Some 600 natives and Chinese were reported in this area but no Japanese. This force was withdrawn to Penadjam on the 14th of July.

Opposite Djinabora, on the Balikpapan side of the bay a company of the 2/9th Battalion made another unopposed landing at a small settlement about 100 yards north of Cape Teloktebang. One platoon was left to occupy the area and the remainder of the company returned to Penadjam. From these positions, eight and a half miles north of the harbour entrance, any enemy attempt to penetrate Balikpapan Bay by launch or barge from the rivers to the north could be forestalled.

Upper Balikpapan Bay is a network of waterways, which the enemy was using as evacuation and supply routes for his scattered force in the Penadjam and Riko area, He had also appreciated their value to us as a potential line of advance to outflank his force astride Milford Highway. To prevent our use of

the area he had established a block near Tempadoeng at the mouth of the Balikpapan River where it flows into the upper reaches of the bay.

A force known as Buckforce, which consisted of a tactical headquarters and two companies from the 2/1st Pioneer Battalion, and elements of supporting arms, occupied Djinabora on the 20th of July. This force moved to Tempadoeng the next day. From this forward base, patrols operated throughout the area, particularly to the east towards Milford Highway, to harass the enemy's lines of communication in front of the 25th Brigade.

In an area called Tandjong Batoe a scout plane checking a report about Indian prisoners saw a white sheet stretched on the ground bearing the inscription: "Indian P.W." A patrol of the Pioneers was sent out. Guided by the plane they found sixty-three Indian prisoners, who had suffered badly in Japanese hands for three and a half years.

It became increasingly evident that the enemy was withdrawing his entire force north from the Balikpapan-Manggar area to a concentration area in the vicinity of Sepakoe. He had fallen back on the Manggar and Batochampar fronts and was evacuating the remnants of his Penadjam force via the Sepakoe and Sema rivers. An evacuation route to Samarinda, farther north, had been prepared, and under pressure he would, perhaps, have made full use of it. Our long-range patrols throughout the area constantly clashed with delaying parties of the enemy which were covering his main withdrawal. It was not the Australians' intention to advance farther or to extend their perimeter. Long-range patrols operated to gain information and to maintain offensive action against the enemy so that the perimeter would be secure. This was the situation when hostilities ceased.

"VX18229"

Continued on chapter 12

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