In April 1944 United States forces landed without opposition in the
Aitape area, in conjunction with a landing at the main Japanese air base at Hollandia. The object of this operation was to secure and hold the Tadji airfield and to establish light naval facilities at Aitape to support further operations against the enemy. The primary task of the ground forces was the defence of the airfield and harbour, and ground operations were limited to those necessary for the adequate protection of the area.
Only minor actions took place up to July 1944, but the U.S. garrison was then reinforced and a strong defensive position was organized on the Driniumor River to meet an expected enemy attack. This came in
mid July and the U.S. troops were forced to withdraw. However, repeated counter-attacks restored the position and the enemy sustained heavy casualties. In further attacks during August the enemy forces around Aitape were thoroughly defeated, and the scattered remnants fled to the east and south to
join the main Japanese force between the mouth of the Sepik River and
Wewak.
From August to October 1944, when Australian forces began to take over, activity was confined to patrolling.
The Sixth Division (commanded by Major General J. E. S. Stevens) was to take over the American role of airfield and harbour defence and to carry out active patrolling. The advance unit of the division arrived late in October 1944. This was the 2/6th Cavalry Commando Regiment comprising the 2/7th, 2/9th and
2/10th Commando Squadrons. It took over from the Americans at Babiang and occupied outpost
positions at Aiterap, Kanti and Palauru. The Americans in the Driniumor River area were relieved by the 2/4th Battalion towards the end of November.
On the 3rd of November the Australians accounted for their first Japanese in the Aitape area. It was found that the enemy was in poor condition and that he was carrying out foraging patrols near the coast. Other parties had left the coastal area and had moved up into the foothills of the Torricelli mountains.
Patrols extended to the Suain plantation, Luain and as far east as the Danmap
River. Continuous contact quickly brought enemy casualties to sixty-four killed and seven captured at a loss of one killed and one
wounded. The Jap was not anxious to stay and fight, and when he did was hopelessly outclassed.
R.A.A.F . bombers Of 71 Wing were flying long hours on army co-operation strikes. Daily raids were made on the main supply bases of Wewak, Kairiru and Dagua, and soon the enemy was unable to use transport in daylight.
With increased activity on the coastal area, the Jap began to move into the foothills, and it
was obvious that an offensive would have to be launched to drive him out.
In the middle of November the arrival in the coastal area of the 2/4th Battalion of the 19th Brigade (commanded by Brigadier J. E. G. Martin) released the 2/7th Commando Squadron to move up the newly established line of communication from Nialu to Tong. The natives in this area were friendly and provided the long supply trains needed to get equipment and food to the troops.
| Enemy forced
farther into mountains |
With a base established at Tong, the 2/7th Commando patrols moved into the villages
and soon cleared a large area of the enemy who was then forced to move farther into
the mountains. The villages of Yambes were captured, and the patrol base
moved forward. The Japanese launched a -number of unsuccessful day and night attacks on Middle Yambes in an attempt to
regain the village, which was one of the vital outposts of the main Japanese force in the Maprik area.
Having cleared the Danmap area on the coast, and as far as Idakaibul, the 2/4th Battalion crossed the Danmap River on the 17th of December and began to drive the enemy towards the main positions on the Anumb River. The battalion pushed down the coast as far as Rocky Point, but a large party of the enemy was found in the rear. They occupied a position on high ground about 8oo yards from the east bank of the Danmap River, menacing our supply line. An
air strike was made and the Japs, vacating the positions, ran into a standing patrol and were annihilated.
As the supply position presented difficulties in the central sector, so it did on the coastal strip. The only road in the area was an old German one in a bad state
of disrepair. The divisional engineers were faced with the difficult task of establishing an efficient
line of communication down the coast. The monsoonal rains had started and the creeks and rivers were rising rapidly, making
bridge building a hazardous business. A road had to be made and widened to carry the heavy vehicles of the supply units. In a very short time a usable road was constructed.
Temporary bridges to be replaced by permanent ones when time and opportunity permitted were built. Extensive damage
was done to these temporary structures when the rivers and creeks rose after heavy rain in the mountains. The sappers were often working in floodwaters up to their necks repairing the damage.
The remainder of the 19th Brigade had arrived in the Aitape area while 2/4th Battalion was pushing down the coast to the Danmap River and had reached the Driniumor River. Patrols of the 2/8th Battalion moved up the last named as far as Afua.
Owing to bad weather the activity on the coast was limited to patrolling but, in the central sector, the 2/7th Commando Squadron was increasing its tally of enemy killed.
Two companies with support detachments from the 2/5th Battalion (known as Piperforce) moved up from the coast on the 16th of November and
established a headquarters in the Yambes villages. They relieved the 2/7th on the
21st of December.
In the latter half of December, the relief of 2/4th Battalion by the 2/11th was begun and the 2/8th moved forward from its base on the
Driniumor River to Suain plantation.
From its headquarters at Rocky Point the 2/11th Battalion sent strong fighting patrols as far as Matapau and on the ist of January 1945, this feature was secured. A squadron of the 2/4th Armoured Regiment had moved up the coast from the Aitape area and was in reserve at Rocky Point. The country was not well suited for tanks but they
proved useful for clearing small bodies of Japanese snipers from the escarpment overlooking the beach.
The 25-pounders of 2/3rd Field Regiment were in position to give covering fire from
the Rocky Point area. In the early hours of the 2nd of January they were called on to
support the infantry at Matapau. A small party of Japanese had attempted to infiltrate
the positions held by the 2/11th Battalion, and, when this had been proved impossible,
launched a full-scale attack. Artillery and concentrated small-arms fire broke up the enemy
attack. The Australians, quickly following up their advantage, pursued the fleeing Japs and
drove them from their positions.
In the Yambes area Piperforce was carrying out long-range patrols and, assisted by
Beauforts of 71 Wing, had cleared a number of villages, driving the main body of the enemy to the Perembil group, where heavy bombing and strafing attacks were being made daily. The remainder of the 2/5th Battalion had moved up and the force was able to carry out a larger patrol
programme. Clearing of the villages continued, but the farther the enemy was driven into the
Torricellis, the harder the terrain and the more tenuous the lines of supply became. The Douglas transports carrying out the air dropping were working overtime, making five or six flights a day. Large parties of refugee natives as well as troops and the natives working on the supply lines had to be provided with food.
To have easier access to the native gardens the enemy was keeping to the villages, which were mostly situated on the ridge-tops. This made the task of the infantry a little easier, for while there were passable tracks on the ridges, the tangled undergrowth of the valleys was almost impenetrable.
On the coast patrols had penetrated as far as Niap, Malin and Walum, some miles inland on the Danmap River. These patrols were forming a link-up between the
19th Brigade troops on the coast, the 2/7th Commando Squadron which had moved to Lambuain and had begun patrolling east to Walum, and the 2/5th Battalion of the '7th Brigade (under the command of Brigadier
M. J. Moten) in the Yambes area.
In that area the enemy was holding , the Perembil villages in strength. The R.A.A.F. continued their softening up and on the 3rd of January, following a heavy air strike and mortaring, the infantry moved into Perembil. The enemy fled after a brief encounter. The equipment left in the village was in excellent order, and the dead Japs were found to be in good physical
condition - a contrast to the troops on the coast.
The Australians were consolidating when the enemy launched the first of a number of heavy counter-attacks. This was successfully beaten off and the enemy withdrew
leaving a number of dead. During the night three more counter-attacks were repulsed and the enemy finally withdrew from the vicinity of Perembil having lost another of the outpost villages.
The 2/11th Battalion captured Cape D)ueran on the 6th of January and, supported by accurate artillery fire and Matilda tanks of "C" Squadron, 2/4th Armoured Regiment, pushed on to attack a strongly defended position forward of the cape. Again the enemy was driven back.
Patrolling continued from the bases at Waluni and Idakaibul and a strong line of communication was established between these points and the Yambes area. Captured documents revealed that this line was to be denied to the Sixth Division, but the enemy was not sufficiently strong to
fulfill his intention.
In the mountains the 2/5th Battalion had
pushed forward their patrols. Two more of the enemy's strongpoints had been overcome and the garrisons forced to withdraw from positions at Asiling and Selni to Selnaua, where they were digging in.
The evacuation of wounded from the Walum area was proving more difficult than expected. The main patrol route was a
two day march over steep mountains and the alternative route was a four-day carry.
Tanks and artillery fire aided the
2/11th Battalion in the capture of Niap on the western extremity of Dogreto
Bay. This bay was later to play a big part in the push down the coast towards Wewak. Although the enemy was contesting the ground fiercely he was gradually being forced back to bases on the Anumb River. These bases were receiving constant attention from the Beauforts, and their store dumps were being systematically destroyed.
In the Torricellis the 2/5th Battalion captured Samisa. The battalion, based on Perembil, now had its companies and platoons disposed in a number of the villages surrounding the headquarters, and in this manner a large area was subjected to daily patrolling. The villages were yielding a considerable amount of food to the Japanese, but the natives, being deprived of their food, were seeking the protection of the Australians.
By the 16th of January the division had killed more than a thousand Japs, while a large number of others had wandered off into the jungle to die. Australian casualties had been remarkably light. and the rate of sickness from tropical diseases was
low.
On the coast the 2/11th Battalion pushed on and the Japanese strongpoint of Abau fell
after heavy fighting. In the Malin area patrols of the 2/9th Commando Squadron pushed east to cut the Jap lines of communication from the Anumb River through Mipel to Maprik, the main base in the Torricelli mountains.
Units of the 16th Brigade (commanded by Brigadier R. King) were now moving down the coast to relieve the 19th Brigade, which had been fighting for nearly ten weeks. The battalions were moving into position when heavy rain set in, and on the 26th of January, when the relief was almost completed, the Danmap River rose to an alarming degree and changed its course. The river was running at twenty
knots and a wall of water about two feet high swept through a defended area of the 2/3rd Battalion leaving men struggling for life in the water. This was the worst blow the elements had inflicted and the loss of life and equipment was heavy. Great damage had been done to the bridges and roads and the lines of communication down the coast were completely disrupted.
The supply problem was acute. The two Douglas transports allotted could not be expected to keep the supplies up to the brigades, as they were already fully occupied in dropping to the 2/5th Battalion and the commando squadrons as well as to scattered standing patrols. Consequently the L.C.Ts which were being used to offload shipping at Aitape were called on to do the job. These craft could carry
100 tons on each trip and made two or three trips weekly. This interfered considerably with the port working and they were withdrawn and the smaller
L.C.Ms were called forward, with the L.C.Ts running only emergency supplies.
In view of the uncertainty of the supply position, the coastal campaign was restricted to patrol activity and no further
advances were made until the engineers opened a road.
On the 29th of January the 16th Brigade relieved the 19th in the coastal area; 2/3rd Battalion took over the patrol bases of the 2 /8th; and 2/1st from the 2/11th.
| Stubborn enemy resistance |
As the 2/1st Battalion moved down the coast resistance stiffened and they were held down on the west side of Nimbum
Creek by Japanese in positions on the forward slopes of Nambut Hill, or Hill
800. The enemy launched a number of unsuccessful attacks, but finally withdrew to the hill.
Attacks failed to dislodge the enemy, and it was decided to take the ridge with two companies. One was to move along
Nimbum Creek taking the enemy in the rear, and the other to move up the slopes of the feature in a frontal attack.
Unfortunately the company moving along the creek was held up by heavy
fire and forced to withdraw.
More air strikes were made, and artillery and mortar fire brought down. Following the heavy barrage the infantry moved forward and drove the enemy back on to his second line of defence on the feature. Our troops consolidated their gains. A fierce counter-attack was repulsed with losses to the enemy. Our
casualties were negligible.
| The capture of Nambut
Ridge |
The Japs withdrew down a gully and up another steep feature which became
known as Jap Knoll. It was slightly lower than Nambut Hill, but
was covered with heavy scrub.
It was subjected to a number of air strikes, and again the infantry drove the enemy out. He withdrew again, this time to a feature known as Bunker Hill. One side was fairly steep with a track which could be covered easily by fire from the Jap positions which overlooked it. The other side was considered by the enemy to be unassailable, as it was a fifty to sixty foot rock-face dropping away sheer. The enemy did not even worry to site weapons to cover it, but concentrated on the only logical line of approach -the track.
A platoon of the 2/1st Battalion was sent around the base of the hill to the foot of the cliff and then began a perilous climb up the
cliff-face using trailing vines as assault ladders. Reaching the top they attacked the enemy from the rear and
completely wiped out the holding force. To distract attention during the ascent, covering fire was brought to bear from in front of the position. The clearing of Nambut Ridge and satellite features had taken three weeks. With this important feature clear, the 2/2nd Battalion pushed forward on to the high ground around the Anumb River.
After the fall of Samisa the headquarters Of 2/5th Battalion moved to this village and long-range patrols to the outlying villages continued.
The advance was slow in the thick country, mainly because supplies could not be kept up to the forward troops in sufficient quantity. It was impossible to provide sufficient native carriers to bring the supplies up from the coast, and the two transport planes were insufficient to meet the requirements of the units working away from the coastal roads. These planes did a sterling job.
As the enemy was forced back resistance became stiffer and better organized. The small bodies of troops were amalgamating into one command, and new troops had arrived, contesting our advance to a much greater extent than previously.
The general trend of Japanese movement was
towards Luwaite and Selnaua. Much in formation was being received from the natives who were
coming to the Australians for food and help. There were other factors which contributed to this swing to our side.
A patrol of "D" Company, 2/5th Battalion, investigating a burst of machine-gun fire,
found the skeletons of two natives who had been shot by the Japanese and all the flesh taken from the bodies.
Reports from patrols and natives stated that the enemy was withdrawing in the direction of Balif and preparing defences there. On the
15th of January a party of between eighty and one hundred Japanese had been forced out of the village of Maharinga by heavy air attacks and mortaring, and one platoon of
2/5th Battalion occupied the village. It was only on rare occasions that
forces larger than one platoon were used to take a village.
A detachment of Far Eastern Liaison Office, which had been operating in the area for some time, prepared surrender leaflets and these were dropped on the Japanese around
Balif. These told the Japs that they had been deserted by their commanders and that it was useless to continue the resistance. Surrender and propaganda leaflets were also fired from mortars.
The 2/7th Commando Squadron which had been operating in the
Walum area for
some time moved to Amam and contact patrols were sent out to link up with the 2/5th
Battalion. More villages were cleared of the enemy - Bullamita, Alumi and
Hambini - and again the enemy line of withdrawal was in the direction 6f the Balif group of villages.
Tactical reconnaissance by aircraft revealed enemy in almost every village as far as Maprik. It was estimated that there were about
2,000 in the Balif- Maprik area. Heavy air strikes were carried out on these villages daily, and in many cases the enemy evacuated them afterwards, leaving numbers of dead. The R.A.A.F. bombers
of 71 Wing were receiving help from the Combat Replacement Training Centre (American) at Nadzab, whose aircraft were bombing targets daily along the coast from Wewak and in the Balif area.
On the 10th of February a platoon
of 2/5th Battalion occupied the village of Balaga. Malahum, to the south-east of Balif, was also captured and held despite heavy counterattacks. The Japanese employed about fifty troops in this series of counter-attacks.
After Balif had fallen the main pocket of resistance moved in an easterly direction towards Maprik, but small parties were still to be found in almost every village.
With Nambut Hill clear of the enemy, the Australians began a drive along the coast towards the
Anumb River. On the 26th of February the 2/2nd Battalion crossed the river without opposition and, after patrolling the area, reported the west bank clear for some
1,500 yards from the coast. Shortly after the crossing a Japanese
75-mm. opened up on the patrols at point-blank range from near the Sowom villages.
With this exception enemy opposition was negligible. A large ammunition dump was captured on the east bank of the river. It appeared that the enemy had withdrawn to the Sowom villages to reorganize his defences.
Patrols of 2/3rd Machine Gun Battalion, which had been operating for some time as infantry, reported that the Japanese-named village of Arohemi (former headquarters of Major-General Aozu, the infantry
group commander of 41st Division) was clear of the enemy. Its evacuation indicated the intention of the enemy to fall back on his defences to the east of the Anumb River.
On the 25th of February H.M.A.S. Swan
bombarded enemy positions in the Sowom area, and on the night of the
26th/27th of February shelled targets around But. During the latter shoot Swan moved
in close to the shoreline and used her secondary armament, and the enemy replied
with 75-mm- fire without effect. On the morning of the 27th of February Swan
engaged targets in the Kauk area, and Beauforts of 71 Wing dealt with the 75-mm. gun.
In the period 3rd November 1944 to 27th February 1945, the division had killed
1,776 enemy and captured thirty-seven. Allowing for wounded, total Japanese casualties could be set down at about
2,500.
Relief of the 2/5th Battalion by the 2/7th began on the 21st of February.
The 2/7th immediately took over the
extensive patrolling programme, and within a few days cleared out a large
pocket in the Malahum-Ilahop area, where between two and three hundred obstinate and well-armed
Japanese had been holding up our advance.
Natives stated that the enemy was occupying
and fortifying villages to the west of Maprik. This indicated that he intended to oppose
strongly our advance to the south, where there were a number of well-stocked native
gardens. Food had become his chief consideration as it was now impossible for supplies to
be brought into the area owing to the patrolling of the infantry and the 2/7th Commando
Squadron. These patrols were rapidly raising the total number of enemy casualties. In four patrol clashes in two days, fifty-three Japanese were killed of seventy-three encountered.
The advance down the coast from the Anumb River continued. The 2/2nd Battalion captured the Sowom villages and moved forward to Simbi Creek, where some opposition was encountered. The clearing of this obstacle left only one large waterway-the Ninahau River-before But. A patrol moving towards the coast from the south passed through the But-Ninahau River area and encountered only a few small parties of Japanese. It appeared that the enemy was evacuating the But positions and was retiring towards Dagua.
| Important position secured |
The main body of the 2/2nd Battalion moved
forward and concentrated in the Sowom villages; patrols pushed across the N1nahau River and
as far east as Gilagmar Creek.
Crossing the flooded river was hazardous. After a number of heavy patrol clashes over the river the battalion fought its way through to But, captured the jetty, the airstrip and the mission. The position was secured on the
17th of March.
The capture of this important area yielded a large amount of equipment, artillery
pieces, arms and stores, and a large dump of oil and petrol.
With the capture of the But jetty L.C.Ms came ashore and unloaded stores. The beach at But was ideal for landing barges, and the supply dump grew rapidly.
In the inland sector the 2/7th Commando Squadron, which had moved back into the
hills after a brief spell on the coast, was in position at House Cop against which the enemy
launched a number of counter-attacks. One company of 2/6th Battalion took over on the 16th of March.
The 2/10th Commando Squadron had arrived in the Milak villages and ran into heavy opposition. Strong attacks were thrown against them and, although these were repulsed, they sustained a number of casualties. This squadron was also relieved towards the end of March by a company
of 2/6th Battalion. Heavy fighting continued in the area for some time before the enemy was driven back into the Kuminibus group due north of Maprik.
The 2/7th Battalion continued its patrolling in the Balif-Suanambe-Ami area. Tactical reconnaissance planes of the R.A.A.F. reported large bodies of enemy troops on the Sepik River. The R.A.A.F. carried out a successful attack on an unusual target on the Sepik: a canoe-building yard.
The Maprik area was still the scene of intense patrol activity and a number of heavy clashes occurred, but the enemy still held many closely linked villages in the Kuminibus group and around Maprik itself.
Activity around Milak increased and the Jap threw fresh troops into his fierce
counter attacks with no result except the whittling down of his strength. By the 2oth of March the score of enemy killed had reached
2,200 with forty-two prisoners.
On the 21st of March the 2/2nd Battalion on the coastal strip pushed through and captured the Dagua airstrip which was littered with wrecked planes. This rapid advance bypassed a number of Japanese positions in the coastal ranges between But and
Dagua.
As this ground was vital to the
enemy's defence plan opposition was expected. Reports came in from natives to confirm that there were large parties of enemy troops in the area and an important head-quarters at the Wonginara Mission, the last
named protected by about 200 troops. Captured documents had stressed the
importance of this area and the bulk of the 2/3rd Battalion
was dispatched into the hills to deal with the opposition.
The defence of the mission was well planned. The enemy was dug in on five knolls commanding the Dagua-Wonginara Mission track and had artillery which continually harassed our troops. The track led through Tokoku pass, and all tracks leading into
it were defended with fixed positions and ambushes. After heavy artillery fire and raids by Beauforts, four of the five positions were captured by 2/2nd Battalion. Patrols
of 2/3rd Battalion had penetrated to the west and rear of Tokoku pass and cleared the Wonginara Mission area, forcing the enemy to withdraw in the direction of Liwo, where he had a large number of reserve troops. By the 6th of April the pass had been cleared.
In the Maprik area the enemy continued strongly to resist the division's advance and progress was slow. The patrols had cleared the enemy from the villages of Ilaheta,
Suanambe and Lahinga 2 and held off heavy counterattacks. On the 26th of March, moving in after a heavy mortaring of the village, the Australians drove the enemy from Aupik 2,
which had been an enemy strongpoint for some time.
The Jap continued to fall back on Maprik taking care not to be outflanked. The country was well suited for the type of warfare he was employing. He appeared to be concentrating west of Maprik, but a rapid advance by our troops through
Abungai forced him to redispose and take up positions only 2,000 yards from the Maprik Government Mission. The attack was closing on Maprik.
In the Dagua area our troops had consolidated and were mopping up stragglers of the force which had defended the Tokoku pass and Wonginara Mission, before continuing the drive down the coast to the main Japanese stronghold of Wewak.
The 2/1st Battalion, which had taken over as the forward battalion, now began to push down the coast. After some opposition Cape Karawop and the village itself were captured on the 13th of April; a couple of days later Wisling and Old Kumudu. Wisling had at one stage been the headquarters of General Adachi, commander of the
18th Japanese Army.
Patrols from the 2/1st Battalion pushed forward as far as Boiken, the site of an old German mission. Wewak's days were numbered. In the hinterland mountains security patrols continued to account for stragglers in the rear areas and they recovered ten escaped Indian prisoners.
Meanwhile in the Maprik area our patrols were closing in on the mission from three
sides. Wora had been reoccupied by the enemy, but was again cleared, and the enemy was driven from
Gwanginan, Kulkuil and Chiginambu. Finally, on the 22nd of April, patrols moved into Maprik, encountering little
opposition. The R.A.A.F. had softened up the villages and the area was pitted with bomb
craters; the emergency landing ground was overgrown with heavy kunai grass.
The enemy was still gradually withdrawing towards the Sepik River, where large concentrations of troops and numerous camps had been reported. Aircraft from the Combat Replacement Training Centre at Nadzab were devoting much attention to this area.
By the 19th of April the enemy's casualties had risen to more than 3,000 killed and
fifty-nine prisoners. Intelligence estimated his strength then as 9,650 combat and
6,000 base troops, of which 11,000 were "effectives".
| Islands receive
attention |
A number of islands off the coast near Wewak were occupied by the enemy. Some
sheltered heavy artillery, including a battery of naval guns on Kairiru Island. These were sited within range of the mainland and it was important that as many as possible should be silenced before the main advance on the fortress of Wewak was undertaken.
Royal Australian Navy sloops, corvettes and motor launches, in
conjunction with the R.A.A.F., were used to neutralize these guns. At a later date
155-mm. "Long Toms" were brought up on the mainland and they added their heavy fire.
An effort had been made earlier to estimate the strength of the enemy on Muschu Island, and a small party of special troops was landed by night. Unfortunately, they were intercepted and forced to fight it out. They were unable to
get back to their boats and all but one were captured or killed. The survivor brought back information of considerable value.
The area near Wewak, has a number of important topographical features. The coastline is irregular, with capes
jutting out from the shoreline, and the enemy had prepared extensive defensive positions on these headlands. Bunkers had been constructed and the natural caves reinforced to provide strong fire positions. Artillery had been brought up and sited to cover the limited approaches.
Large quantities of stores were being poured into the supply dumps at But and Karawop, and a large assortment of supporting arms was brought forward, including tanks, flamethrowers and heavy artillery.
The 16th Brigade still provided the forward troops, but the 19th was moving up to take over the offensive in the Hawain River area for the final advance into Wewak itself. The 2/6th Commando Regiment had been brought up from Aitape and was training around But for an amphibious attack on Dove Bay, to the east of Wewak.
On the 27th of April the infantry crossed the Hawain River, where the 2/4th Battalion passed through the bridgehead which the 2/2nd Battalion had established. This brought them within twelve miles of Wewak in an advance supported by Matilda tanks.
Around Maprik the 17th Brigade battalions were driving the enemy to the east and south. Reliable native information indicated that the main body of the 41st Division was concentrating in the villages to the
east.
The advance on Wewak began on the 3rd
of May. By 1 p.m. the troops had moved from the Hawain River to
Cape Pus and captured it with little opposition. About a mile farther on the first real contact was made. The
enemy fled. On the 4th of May Cape Wom fell. In the advance from Cape Pus to Cape
Wom about a hundred graves had been found, and also the bodies of fifty recently killed
Japs: evidence of the accuracy of our artillery, bombing and naval fire.
The advance of the coastal force had reached the Minga Creek crossing by the 8th of May. The bridge had been
destroyed and was under fire from enemy guns on Wewak Point. There was also considerable small-arms fire. Despite this the sappers carried on with the job of erecting a temporary bridge to enable the tanks to get through.
A patrol of the 2/4th Battalion moved out on the night of the 8th/9th of May to reconnoitre approaches to Wewak Point. The patrol report stated that the only possible line of approach was up a sand spit twenty yards wide, bordered on one side by sea and on the other by an impassable swamp. This spit was under direct fire from a
20-mm. gun sited on the side of Wewak Point. If the attack was to be carried out with few casualties it was imperative that this position should be captured as soon as possible after the lifting of the preliminary barrage. On the night of the
9th/10th of May bridging of the creek was completed and the tanks moved into position.
The attack on Wewak Point was timed for first light, but heavy rain and bad light put the start time back to
6.10a.m. Under a barrage by tanks and artillery the infantry moved tip, crossed the narrow spit and over-ran the
20mm. gun before it had time to open fire. By 6.10a.m. the first objective had been gained and rapid exploitation quickly secured a strong platoon position at the south-eastern base of the headland.
The enemy was well dug in and was resisting strongly. But the infantry, supported by
tanks and flame-throwers, wiped out the pockets. Snipers were very active. Positions
which could not be reached from the land were dealt with by the naval force. In some
cases the cliff-face was collapsed on the de-
fenders, sealing them in the vaults they themselves had constructed. By nightfall
the greater part of the headland had been seized. The attack was renewed at first light on the
11th of May, and by noon
the headland had been cleared of the Japanese garrison which had been defending this stronghold only three escaped.
Resistance had been fierce and fanatical. The men of the 2/4th Battalion who had carried out the final assault were justly proud when they hoisted the Union Jack on a shell-scarred observation tower
overlooking what had once been a strong Japanese base.
After the fall of Wewak and its airstrip infantry patrols pushed forward as far as
Wirui Creek. From here an attack was to be launched on the second strong-post
- Wirui Mission - from which the Japs had been shelling our troops during the advance on Wewak Point and the capture of the airstrip.
On the 11th of May, at the same time as the battle for Wewak Point was in progress, "Farida Force", comprising commandos, artillery, medium machine guns and mortars, made a seaborne landing in Dove Bay, some miles to the east of Wewak, with the intention of seizing the coast road, thereby cutting one of the possible lines of withdrawal of the enemy from the Wewak area. The landing was supported by units of the Royal Australian Navy including H.M.A.Ss Hobart,
Warramunga, Arunta, Swan, and Colac; five motor launches and H.M.S. Newfoundland from the Royal Navy; Beaufort air support was provided.
Heavy bombers and strafing planes from Combat Replacement Training Centre at Nadzab had also been an important
factor in the preliminary bombardment. H-hour was fixed at 8.30 a.m. on the
11th of May. Before the first wave went ashore the shoreline was heavily bombarded, and during the actual operation the small craft closed in to the shore subjecting the Jap defences to a hail of fire. The first wave grounded on time, a bridgehead was rapidly seized and the second and third waves set off for the shore.
Patrols immediately pushed out from the beachhead and cut the road. Simultaneously another patrol pushing west along the coast encountered a force of about fifty Japs in the vicinity of Forok Point. With supporting fire from the Navy, the Australians attacked and drove the enemy from the position.
On the 14th of May, Farida Force, moving west along the coast to link up with the 19th Brigade, captured
Mandi village and patrolled as far as the Forok village. The advance continued
in the direction of the Brandi River, where the link-up was to take place.
Before the attack on Wewak Point a force was sent inland to cut the main road from Wewak to
Sauri - another line of
withdrawal. The units which carried out this task were the 2/11th Battalion and the 2/7th
Commando Squadron. This force had been successful in cutting Big Road one mile north-east of the Sauri villages, which were strongly defended.
| Enemy garrison annihilated |
The troops which had advanced down the coast from Wewak Point moved into position to attack the enemy in Wirui Mission on the 13th of May, and next day a successful attack was launched on Mission Hill, which commanded the whole of the
Wewak plantation, the airstrip and the ground to the foot of Wewak Point. Resistance here was also particularly stubborn. but fortunately the ground permitted the use of tanks. When the summit of Mission Hill was captured, it was found that the enemy was even more strongly dug in on a spur running north-west on the main feature, and it was not until the i5th of May that the whole area was reported clear. The enemy garrison was annihilated. Our casualties were light.
Forces moving east between Wirui and Sauri encountered stubborn resistance on a feature known as
710. After a heavy artillery barrage an attack was launched. The enemy repulsed it, but was unable to cope with another later in the day. He counter-attacked fiercely but
unsuccessfully.
Kereru was captured on the 16th of May, but casualties were suffered when an electrically controlled minefield of aerial bombs was exploded by the Japanese.
A further attack on the Saurl villages was made with the support of flame-throwers, and the enemy was driven from the area.
On the 17th of May, the 2/8th Battalion, which had taken over the coastal strip from the 2/4th, moved in with the support of tanks and artillery and captured Cape
Boram. The Boram 'drome and mission were captured by the 20th of May, after meeting strong opposition from the high ground south of the 'drome.
The area in and around Wewak now came to life. Engineers tolled at bridges and pushed roads through the
tangled undergrowth. Bulldozers to scraped great loads of coral for road
surfacing into lines of waiting trucks, camp sites were surveyed and buildings begun. The
hard beach back to Cape Wom became a busy highway.
On Boram strip the enemy soon began harassing tactics from nearby bunker positions on high ground to the south and it was not until a heavy mortar and artillery concentration had been loosed on the position that an attack could be made.
This was successful.
On the 22nd of May patrols from the main force and Farida Force linked up at the mouth of the Brandi River.
The Australians now concentrated on Koigin and, although reports indicated that the village was strongly held, it was captured on the 25th of May by the 2/4th Battalion. The enemy left behind another radio station and
much signal equipment. More shells fell among our troops near Wewak strip; later in the day the
Japs shelled the strip itself and Brandi plantation. Barges unloading at the newly established Wewak beachhead also came under fire.
In clashes on the 710 feature a force of seventy Japs withstood assaults, but a final attack resulted in twenty being killed and the capture of more machine guns. In the Mandi area a patrol was ambushed, but a later Japanese attack was repulsed with losses.
The enemy was extremely aggressive.
Back in the Koigin area further enemy positions were attacked and cleared after Australian guns had blasted them. At Mandi, however two heavy assaults were needed to clear another
strongpoint - thirty-two enemy were left dead. The summit of a feature
known to the Japs as South-west Mountain was the next position to be captured.
In this phase of operations-covering two weeks-the enemy consistently harassed our
positions by small raiding parties and patrols. He gave no thought to surrendering, although a few sick and wounded stragglers wandered into our positions.
An important event in the inland war was the building of Hayfield airstrip. This had
long been one of the main objects of our operations because Douglas transports could then
land supplies and fly out in less than an hour the sick and wounded across the mountains to the 2/11th General Hospital at Aitape. The match out took about nine days. The strip was built with picks, shovels and entrenching tools.
Some improvised rollers were put into service, dragged by manpower. Our troops and native men and women tolled on day after sweltering day. The first plane landed on the almost completed strip
early on the morning of the 7th of June.
Meanwhile our advance continued eastward across the back-breaking razor-backs of the Torricelli mountains to within
1,000 yards of the important Yamil group of villages. The war here was another battle of the ridges; each ridge formed a natural defensive position for the enemy. Our troops had to fight for every inch of ground. As each position became untenable the
enemy withdrew to the next spur, where he took up similar positions.
The drive on the Yamil-Ulupu area was also strongly opposed by the enemy. It
was necessary to drive them from numerous well prepared and well-sited positions and the advance was slowed down.
The 2/7th Battalion, relieved by the 2/5th Battalion towards the end of May, advanced eastwards from Maprik towards Yamil and Ulupu, while the 2/6th moved on Yamil from the north.
Dogged fighting continued. The most important objective was the Yamil group of villages with its potential landing ground. On the
20th of May after continual harassing patrols, the Australians attacked Jamei
and gained a footing on the ridge. However the defending Japs pinned them down and it Was not until five days later that intensive patrolling to the flanks and rear of the
position made possible another attack which resulted in the capture of the cliff-top and enabled the troops to exploit north-east
along the ridge to within 1,000 yards of Jamei 1.
Mendamen and the Kalabo group were cleared in quick succession, but further advances were resisted by the enemy holding positions to the north-east. Troops of the 2/1st
Tank Attack Regiment, acting as infantry, attacked sixty enemy in the Mirau area on the 24th of May. They met with determined resistance, but thirty-two Japs were killed by the gunners and the position occupied. North of Kalabo a large village was cleared, followed by the remainder of this group.
Patrols probing towards Yamil reported that every line of advance was guarded. On the 31st of May some high ground overlooking Yamil was, however, occupied without opposition, although the enemy made two attacks on discovering our move. On the 4th of June the main track to Yamil was cut.
Infantry of the 17th Brigade, advancing from the north-west and south-west, closed in on Yamil
1. Early in the morning of the 9th of June "A" Company of the 2/6th Battalion, less two platoons, moved in suddenly and
occupied a position on a spur which commanded Yamil 1. Next day, after an attack by Beauforts, the assault began. Our troops attacked with heavy mortar and Vickers gun support, eventually capturing the village and ground overlooking Yamil 2 and other enemy-held areas in the vicinity.
Yamil 3 was the objective on the 12th of June when troops of the 2/5th Battalion closed in. By nightfall the operation had been successful and a patrol operating to the north reported that the northern end of the emergency landing ground was clear. This strip was important.
Its capture meant a sorely needed air link with Hayfield.
Main drives in the coastal sector were in the first few days of June directed towards the enemy's principal positions on Mount Tazaki and Mount Shiburangu. Aggressive patrolling resulted in the capture of an extensive position
1,000 yards south-west of Kolgin by troops of the 2/4th Battalion, which on the 6th of June stormed and captured another elaborately constructed strongpoint.
Patrols kept up pressure on the enemy on the rugged slopes of Tazaki and Shiburangu, and with air strikes and accurate bombardment destroyed many isolated strongpoints. On the
11th of June the 2/4th Battalion attacked and occupied a strongly held position; Hill 2, an important feature
1,000 yards north of Shiburangu, was attacked by a company of the 2/8th Battalion. Heavy fighting continued during the morning, but the position was finally taken. Five days later the 2/4th Battalion captured another enemy hill position
1,200 yards south-east of Koigin.
| Artillery pieces flown in |
At Yamil the Hayfield airstrip link with Aitape had enabled artillery to be brought in by plane. The Jap first felt its presence when his positions around Yamil 2 and 4 were shelled. On the
15th of June 2/5th Battalion troops attacked Yamil 2. The defenders resisted stubbornly but finally withdrew to new positions on high ground south of the village, from which they were driven. Village after village fell in the path of our advance; bitter patrol clashes took place over a wide area.
The way was now open for the assault on Mount Tazaki and Mount Shiburangu and the attack was opened in the early hours of the 22nd of June by two companies of the 2/4th Battalion. The enemy offered fierce and determined resistance as the Australians advanced after the bombardment by artillery
- and R.A.A.F. Beauforts. The first objective, a crest 300 yards north-west of the main feature, was taken by "B" Company. From this point the enemy was engaged to screen a flanking movement by "D"
Company which developed into the final phase of the attack. After some hours of close fighting the Japs were driven from the position. Tazaki was completely in our hands at 6 p.m.
The 2/8th Battalion then began preparing to move against Shiburangu, the highest
feature in the Prince Alexander Ranges south of Wewak. It not only commanded the whole area but included strong positions west of Big Road, thus depriving us of the use of the road to any extent farther south than Winn
Mission. Shiburangu was the key position for our drive inland to link up with the inland force. On the 19th of June Middle Knoll,
south-east of Sauri, was captured and patrolling towards the main feature became
aggressive.
In the Yamil area our operations continued with the capture of Yamil 4. The emergency landing ground was also completed and light
aircraft began using the strip.
On the morning of the 26th of June thirty-six Beauforts attacked Mount Shiburangu. At
7.30 a.m. next morning the Beauforts again roared in, but this time when the bombing had finished the Japs received no respite. Artillery at Wewak opened fire, and in thirty minutes more than
5,000 shells from
forty-eight guns screamed into the positions. Then "C" Company of the 2/8th Battalion moved to the foot of the feature. The first opposition was encountered shortly after the climb began, when heavy fire from bunker positions atop the mountain pinned down the whole company.
To counter this a platoon was ordered to work around to the right flank, climb the cliff-face and storm the position. As the platoon set off heavy fire was directed at the Japs from the temporary company position, while simultaneously "C" Company of the 2/2nd Battalion made a diversionary move south along Big Road. The men of the platoon climbed 700 yards in a circling movement up the tangled mountainside-a grade of about one in three. Without losing a man they reached the top and bore down on the surprised enemy with machine guns and grenades. This was the signal for a general advance by the remainder of "C" Company.
By 12-30 p.m. the top of the feature was finally occupied. The remaining enemy hurriedly withdrew to another lower hill feature which was named The Blot. From the top of Shiburangu it was possible to see as far north as Aitape and southwards to the Sepik River-a distance of about 200 miles.
The inland force was reinforced at this stage by the 2nd New Guinea Infantry Battalion-a native unit led by white officers and N.C.0s. On the 2nd of July Kunvingi
Mission, twelve miles south of Maprik, was attacked and occupied by these troops.
The battle in the coastal sector continued. The 2/8th Battalion paused for the night on The Blot before pushing on down Big Road.
On the morning of the 15th of July they left The Blot, crossed Big Road and by nightfall
were atop a new height dubbed Snow Knoll.
In the Maprik -area the 2/5th and 2/6th Battalions, supported by Beauforts, were converging on the
Ilipem villages. On the afternoon of the 16th of July the 2/5th Battalion moved in on
Ilipem 2. At nightfall the action was still locked, the Jap resisting stubbornly from strong defensive positions. Next morning more ground was slowly gained but the Jap was clinging tenaciously to his positions.
North-east of Ilipem the 2/6th Battalion was also meeting an enemy determined to stand and fight. Air support was called in and our troops moved in to take an important knoll.
Meanwhile in the coastal sector our troops had come to the main Jap positions barring progress along Big Road. The 2/8th Battalion had occupied Ambrauri I and the following
morning - the 17th of July - patrols pushed a thousand yards down the road towards Ambrauri 2. At a feature known as St Patrick's they received their first setback for the last few days. The enemy was well
dug in and had the road taped with well-directed fire. The patrols withdrew. In the afternoon they again went forward but were repulsed. On the morning of the
21st of July artillery and mortars saturated the enemy positions. The infantry moved through St Patrick's and pushed on for another
600 yards. Some 400 yards away across a deep ravine, perched on a razor-back ridge, was the main
Ambrauri village. It was the next stop.
Back inland the battle for Ilipem was still being bitterly fought, but on the morning of the i8th of July the village was
finally cleared. Farther to the south of Ilipem, the 2/5th Battalion was probing the defences of the Uhipu villages. In both sectors we were encountering stiff opposition, but the Japs' determination not to give ground was proving costly. In two days' fighting, on the 21st and
22nd of July, they lost ninety-seven killed and two prisoners, for one Australian killed and twelve wounded.
On the drive in from the coastal area along Big Road, 19th Brigade handed over to the 16th and returned to the beaches for a
well earned rest. The 2/2nd Battalion moved into the Ambrauri area, sending out patrols to clear the approaches.
Inland the 17th Brigade was still on the heels of the retreating enemy. By the end of July the 16th was in complete control of its area, and ready to begin the advance to meet the
17th.
There had been a fortnight of fine weather during which the engineers pushed the roads into the mountains back of Wewak. A
well-surfaced road stretched to the crest of the Prince Alexanders, only a
few thousand yards behind the main forward troops. Three weeks before, the infantry
had fought their way up steep slopes to take this crest. Now three-ton trucks drove
up the same slopes to keep the infantry supplied.
Beyond the road-head, well down the southern slopes of the Prince
Alexanders, the 2/2nd Battalion was in fast pursuit of the enemy. On the 4th of August they came up against the first organized resistance at a feature known as Rindogim, meeting fire
from a heavy machine gun and mortars. The infantry spread out and, having located the machine gun, knocked it out with accurate Bren fire. The enemy withdrew: During the night they came back in nuisance raids, sneaking close to the perimeter and hurling grenades.
The advance now lay parallel with the Prince Alexanders, rising steeply on the right, and headed due west to link up with the 17th Brigade moving east from Maprik. The 2/2nd Battalion crossed Tambafain Creek, and came under heavy fire from two positions on the eastern slopes of the Numoikum feature. On the 6th of August artillery poured shells into the
Numoikum group, and following the barrage "A" Company, using flamethrowers, attacked and cleared four villages. Next day the remaining two villages of the group were occupied.
Farther to the east, on the front of the 8th Brigade (commanded by Brigadier M. A. Fergusson), covering the
Mandi Brandi-Mount Tazaki area, our troops were in almost constant contact with small parties of the enemy. In the Mandi sector the enemy
was still using a 105-mm. gun, but his shelling was ineffective.
Moving east from Maprik, the 17th Brigade was making steady progress against determined opposition. The 2/5th Battalion came up against strong defences on
Gwenik Hill, just before the Kaboibus village group. Air support was called in and on the 31st
of July, following a strike by thirteen Beauforts, the battalion attacked and took the feature. From here the advance continued westward and on the 2nd of August, after driving the enemy from a well-sited line of up to
150 fox-holes, our troops captured the Kaboibus group.
North of this group the 2/6th Battalion was making steady progress through difficult
country and against stubborn pockets of resistance.
In the first week of August the 2/7th Battalion moved south-east from the Ulebilum
villages to Sigora. Keeping clear of enemy-occupied and preceded by a day's march
by a company of the 2nd New Guinea Infantry Battalion which had control of the area,
the force passed through Gwalip, maintaining
a steady rate of progress. RAAF Boomerangs roved ahead watching for Jap movement, giving
warning by dropped messages so that it could be bypassed.
The third night out heavy rains fell, and all the next day the journey was across
flooded creeks. But there was no slackening in the speed, and on the 8th of August-five days after leaving Ulebilum-the battalion had reached and captured the landing strip and village at Kairivu. They were astride the Jap
main line of communication, and watching him being pushed from the cast and the west. The link-up of the brigades was almost
complete when the Japs' surrender talks began.
"VX22526"
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