|
After the crushing repulses of two large-scale
counter-attacks the Japanese commander withdrew his forces and
concentrated them in three main areas-Buka Passage in the north, Numa Numa and Kieta in the east, and the Buin-Mosigetta plains in the south.
The two American divisions were gradually withdrawn for operations in the Philippines;
and by the time the first of them-the 37th- had quitted Bougainville the Australian campaign was under way.
When the Australians, under Lieutenant General S. G. Savige, Commander of the Second Corps, assumed responsibility in November/December 1944, the main Japanese force was known to be concentrated in the south. From there the Japanese
17th Army Group controlled all enemy forces on Bougainville and the outer islands.
With the relief of the Americans the campaign developed into three separate drives, controlled and co-ordinated by Second Corps. In the north it was planned that the enemy should be forced into the narrow Bonis Peninsula and contained there. In the centre the seizure of Pearl Ridge would give command of the east-west trails and protection against any repetition of the vicious counter-attacks launched against the Americans in
March 1944. At the same time it would open the way for a future drive to the east coast. The main decisive battle, however, would occur in the south where the bulk of the Japanese force was located.
Under the command of General Savige were five Australian infantry brigades-the 7th,
15th and 29th (comprising the Third Division) and the 11th and 23rd, the
last named brigade being disposed as garrison troops on the islands of Emirau, Green and Treasury and at Munda in New Georgia. The Third Division was commanded by
Major-General W. Bridgeford. Air support came from the American First Marine Air Wing, the R.A.A.F. and the R.N.Z.A.F.
The first operational role undertaken by the Australians fell to the 2/8th Cavalry
Commando Squadron which took over the routine weekly patrol to Cape Moltke on the 7th of November 1944. The first change of note came on the 23rd of November when the
9th Battalion (under command of 7th Brigade) took over from the Americans in the
Doiabie area, some eight to eleven miles inland along the Numa Numa trail.
This placed our troops in typical ridge country. The role of the battalion was to exert continual pressure on the enemy and to make local advances towards Pearl Ridge, the commanding high ground in the area. Possession of this feature, with a force at Sisivie on the left flank, would give the Australians control of the only inland approach to Torokina.
Our force at Sisivie remained static except for the usual patrolling. The advance to Pearl Ridge stemmed from the important
Piaterapaia Ridge which rose out of the Doiabie River valley. This was the logical point for any for-ward movement as along it ran part of the Numa Numa trail leading from Torokina to the enemy base at Numa Numa on the east coast.
It was on Piaterapaia that the 9th Battalion struck the first blow of the Australian campaign. On the 29th of November a platoon of "D" Company moved across the fifty yards between their position on George Hill to attack the Japanese on the next knoll, Little George. In an hour's sharp fighting they took the position.
This success was followed by another on the 18th of December when "C" Company of the battalion, in a company attack, stormed the important Artillery Ridge-the next high feature before Pearl Ridge.
The enemy was present in considerable strength. The once dense tree and secondary growth had been blasted away over a long period by the concentrated fire of American 155-mm, guns back in the Laruma River valley. With the
binding vegetation gone, the shelling started landslides which made the already
precarious slopes more difficult to traverse.
The only line of approach was along a single track on either side of which the ridge fell sheer away. The start line, where the ridge splayed out, was reached without opposition owing to the effective neutralizing fire of the artillery, mortars, and medium machine guns. As the ascent proceeded, the support lifted. The loose soil on the slopes gave scant foothold on the flanks and the attackers floundered and scrambled, rather than climbed. Three Vickers on
neighbouring ridges kept firing until the last minute.
With the Australians only ten yards away the Japanese jumped from their pillboxes to man open weapon pits running along the entire rim of the knoll. Because of the steepness of the slope the attacking force could not bring fire to bear; nor could the enemy to any extent, without exposing themselves. The action quickly developed into a grenade battle. A hall of grenades rained down as the two platoons clambered to the summit. The attackers worked in twos and threes, with Owen guns and grenades. Selecting a weapon pit the Owen gunners heaved themselves over the rim and poured in fire while the other
men moved in and threw grenades. It was intense, bitter fighting. The new phosphorus grenades were used, their smoke blanketing the pillboxes while the infantry closed in for the kill. After nearly an hour's
fighting the position was ours. Enemy killed during the attack numbered thirty-five; and about twenty unburied and partly buried bodies were found. Our losses were five killed and ten wounded.
The centre of interest now shifted from
the mountains to the southern sector. It was planned to make an early advance from our
forward positions at the Jaba River against the main enemy concentrations in
the south. But it was necessary first to find out where the Japanese were located and in what
strength they were. To do this it was decided to push down the coast towards the
enemy road-head at Mawaraka and at the same time extend inland to test the enemy
strength along the few existing tracks leading to the south. Troops of the
15th Battalion (of 29th Brigade) had taken over the Jaba
River line from the American division. On the northern bank of the river they faced the
enemy on the other side.
On the day following the Artillery Ridge attack the brigade commander (Brigadier R. F. Monaghan) pushed his troops across the river without opposition and made a landing from three barges some
4,000 yards down the coast. It was the first move of the campaign proper. The coastal drive to Mawaraka was on.
Towards the New Year our men began to meet well equipped infantry who had evidently moved up from the south. The spearhead of our advance was provided by the
15th Battalion with the 42nd and 47th Battalions pushing inland to establish firm bases on the south bank of the Jaba.
The country there was flat, with thick jungle, swamps, and a multitude of small streams criss-crossed by native pads. In the New Year the characteristic Japanese tactics of infiltration, ambush and attack came to the fore and the fighting began in earnest. Twenty-five-pounders came in as support but the flat nature of the country prevented the setting up of observation posts, and most of the shooting was done by forward observation officers working with infantry patrols.
On the 7th of January the 61st Battalion (7th Brigade) relieved the 47th Battalion on the Jaba so that it could take the lead in the brigade advance. At the Adele River our troops came within range of enemy artillery for the first time. On the 12th of January, preceded by an air strike, the 47th Battalion seized the mouth of the Hupai River and a log-crossing
800 yards inland. The brigade now began patrolling and consolidating, and patrols pushed forward to a sunken barge a few hundred yards north of Mawaraka. The 42nd Battalion took over and by the
18th of the month reached the objective. Mawaraka was occupied without opposition but
heavy fighting took place before the enemy was cleared from the Pallisade area along the road towards Mosigetta. The following day the
1st New Guinea Infantry Battalion pushed round Gazelle Harbour, turned Motupena Point, and overcame an enemy observation and listening post. The door was open for the drive inland.
While the resistance in the southern sector was increasing daily, although without sign of the formation of any general defensive line, the Australians turned once more to the inland sector about
Doiabie. On the 3oth of December 1944, all four rifle companies of the 25th Battalion
7th Brigade) which had taken over from the 9th Battalion converged on Pearl Ridge, the focal point. Two companies attacked from Artillery Ridge on the right flank, one in the centre, and the fourth to the rear to sit astride the enemy line of communication with Numa Numa.
Enemy fire pinned down the forward company advancing along Artillery Ridge. The men dug in and reorganized. The following day the main attack developed from the left and by mid-afternoon the enemy had been cleared. Five days later the
11th Brigade (under Brigadier Stevenson) took over the central and northern sectors and 26th Battalion took over the line.
With the fall of Mawaraka the next step was to clear the way to the Puriata. The task
'fell to 7th Brigade (under Brigadier J. Field) and on the 23rd of January the 29th Brigade was relieved. The first move was an inland thrust to secure Mosigetta and drive the enemy from the area. On the 25th of January Twen Force, comprising "C" and "D" Companies of 61st Battalion, pushed inland along the Pagana River in the direction of Kupon. Farther inland the commandos were denying the enemy the track
system running through Mosina, Nigitan, and Sisirual. The 9th Battalion left Mawaraka next day and struck, east towards Mosigetta along the south bank of the Hupai.
Within a fortnight 61st Battalion had penetrated Nigitan and Mosina, and turned south towards the
9th Battalion objective. Seven days down the track from Mosina saw the 61st poised near Mievo, a few hundred yards north
of Mosigetta. Meanwhile along the Mawaraka-Mosigetta Road the going had not been easy for the
9th Battalion. Feeling a way through jungle swamps often shoulder-deep, pinned down in the mud, sleeping in water, and hampered by a supply line kept open only by the sweat of the native carriers and by the
tractor towed jeep trains, they broke into Mosigetta on the 16th of the month, half an hour ahead of the force moving down from
Kupon.
On the 24th of January, the 25th Battalion relieved the 47th on the Tavern River. The same day a platoon from "D" Company landed at Motupena Point and set off down the coast towards Toko. By the 3rd of February the platoon had closed to within half a mile of
Toko and established itself on a lagoon. That day another platoon landed from a barge and the force, carrying the sandbar at the point of the bayonet, swept into the area which was to become the base for divisional operations in southern Bougainville.
From Toko a reputedly "jeepable" track ran inland a few hundred yards above the Puriata in the direction of Darara on the No.
1 Government Road to Buin. This road was a continuation of the track south from Kupon through Mosigetta to Darara and on to the main Puriata ford. An eastward move from Toko towards
Darara would close the river crossing, cutting the escape route of the enemy retreating before the two battalions reorganizing at Mosigetta for the Daxara drive.
On the 10th of February "D" Company was ordered to take Darara. At first the push was one of platoon strength; two others remaining at Toko to
assist unloading through the heavy surf. It was not until the arrival of "A" Company and a platoon of the New Guinea Infantry Battalion that the position improved and the whole company got under way.
It was a nerve-racking job. Twice the force was ambushed and attacked, and once while split into groups the enemy swept in between. All the way the men had had to cut their own jeep track and on the 23rd of February "A" Company pushed through and drove the enemy from Darara. Patrols reached the Puriata and scaled the southern
fords. The enemy moved inland to escape across the northern fords, falling to the commandos in twos and threes.
The way had been cleared for a shortened line of communication. Within a fortnight 7th Brigade established headquarters at Toko.
More and more air dropping came to the fore. At Piva strip, Torokina, the men of the Air Maintenance Platoon worked late into the night stowing the para-packs and free-drop rations. To maintain the road between
Torokina and Toko engineers struggled against floods and a pounding surf which gnawed away at the coastline, washing out the road and breaking through the swamps.
With Toko-Darara in our hands Brigadier Field prepared to cross the Puriata. On the 2 5th of February 9th Battalion was withdrawn .or a well-earned rest at Motupena Point. From Mosigetta the 61st Battalion fought its way south-east, crossed the Puriata, and by the 15th of March was established in the Horinui region, threatening the approaches to No. 2 Government Road.
Early in January, 11th Brigade in the
northern sector established a base at Armin and moved on towards
Puto. The capture of Pearl Ridge in the central sector, the appearance of bulldozers, and the progress of our
supply road led the enemy to expect an eastern drive to Numa Numa.
Natives from
Teop on the enemy-held north-east coast reported the evacuation of troops from the
important for-them bases of Ratsua and Pora Pora down the coast to Numa Numa. These
reports and the fact that 11th Brigade had reached Puto without opposition suggested
that the enemy intended to evacuate the north entirely. However, by the middle of
the month, the 31/51st Battalion, between Puto and the Genga River, struck a hard
crust of Japanese resistance.
In a series of sharp engagements the enemy was driven north on to Tsimba Ridge to the Amphitheatre, a curved knoll
where the mountains pushed the coastal track into a narrow bottleneck against the sea. Here the ground, rising some sixty feet, runs inland over two hundred yards to a feature known as the Pimple. Before the ridge lay a native garden, behind was swampland. The enemy had constructed 300 yards of defensive positions with fire lanes covering every approach. Despite artillery concentrations from guns of the 4th Field Regiment, the enemy delayed our advance for three grim weeks.
On the 23rd of January the Australians brought up
a mountain gun and ripped away at the ridge. The enemy replied by shelling our forward troops. The fighting was intensified and two days later, after a wide flank move, we succeeded in establishing a force on the northern bank of the Genga River. For nearly two weeks this force held out in the face of repeated counter-attacks. On the 6th of February, under an artillery barrage and vicious fire from enemy guns, the Amphitheatre was forced and the way opened to Matchin Bay.
In the last week of February the 31/5Ist Battalion was relieved by the 26th Battalion, fresh from the central sector, and the next day contact was resumed. By the ist of March forward elements were on the Compton River. The primary objective of the battalion was to clear the enemy from Soraken Peninsula which protruded northward some two miles into Matchin Bay.
| Offshore
islands manoeuvre |
It was then seen that the enemy intended to deny us a footing on the Bonis Peninsula.
On the 3rd of March an urgent message from a Corsair pilot patrolling the Ruri Bay area brought eight more planes roaring north from the Piva strip. After fifteen months of concealment, Japanese medium tanks had appeared! Heading across the Bonis Peninsula they were
spotted on the road to Soraken plantation. By accurate bombing with thousand-pounders three tanks were
destroyed and there were twenty enemy killed in & strafing. In a matter of hours the tanks would have menaced our for-ward troops. The second event of
importance was the reported threat to our flank by Japanese artillery directed from the offshore islands of Saposa and Talof. Finally the enemy began to concentrate in the Pora Pora Hills
dominating the track from Soraken to Ratsua.
On the night of the 5th of March "A" Company of the 26th Battalion embarked on the first of a series of amphibious operations which were to culminate in the crushing of Japanese resistance on the Soraken Peninsula. Troops went ashore on Saposa Island and within two days it was cleared. On the
10th they withdrew, leaving behind an infantry protected artillery observation post. The same night, farther to the north, native police boys cleared the enemy from Taiof. The threat to the flank disappeared.
In the meantime the battalion attacking up the coast had squeezed the main force into the defensive positions between the sea and where the Compton River
turned parallel to it. Under a withering fire "D" Company attacked the centre, gained some ground and dug in. The 25-pounders of 4th Field Regiment settled down to blast the enemy and on the night of the 16th/17th he fled the area. Meanwhile "A" Company again
went ashore unopposed, this time near the base of the plantation. The following day contact was made with "C" Company which had pushed in from the south. The Compton River was crossed and the enemy line of
communication cut.
| Counter-attack
in the south |
With supporting fire from mortars and
medium machine guns, "A" Company of the
25th Battalion breached the Puriata at Galvin's Crossing on the 4th of March and
established themselves two hundred yards south along the main road to Buin. At noon the
following day the enemy shelled the area and the battalion suffered its first artillery
casualty Pte Slater, after whom the knoll was named.
For several days "A" Company attempted to move down the road without success. It was decided to send "B" and "C" Companies across the river on the right flank to establish firm bases in gardens around Old Tokinot. Such a move would cut the Buin Road in the rear of the enemy and secure the Hatai track junction for a possible move up the track to link with the 61st Battalion in the
Horinui region. At the same time, "A" Company would, within two days, clear the road and contact the outflanking companies near the 'Junction. "B" and "C" Companies crossed the river and gained their objectives on the second day.
Experience at Tavera River, and along the track from Toko, had shown the enemy policy to be comprised of sporadic small-party attacks, evacuation under artillery pressure, and a general attitude of "a live soldier is better than a dead one". With this in mind "A" Company struck out for the
Hatai track to receive the first indication that the Japanese Sixth Division, under Major-General Kanda, had swung over to the attack.
While in the north in the first two weeks of March the enemy was being forced back on the Compton River, he seized the initiative in the south and gathered momentum for the drive which culminated in the attacks of Easter week.
North of Galvin's Crossing a patrol reported a four-days-old bivouac area estimated to have held eighty enemy troops. A jeep was ambushed. The enemy refused to budge under shelling. This had not happened before. On the '5th of March "A" Company fought its way across Kero Creek and with "D" Company In the rear held off three counter-attacks and a fourth the following day. It was now apparent that the road was solidly blocked. Though patrols from "B" Company at Tokinot had reached "A" Company a
permanent line of communication could not be maintained. The time had come to make a determined thrust down the road. "A" Company on the east and "D" Company on the west were to move down the axis and contact a force moving up from "B" Company. After fierce fighting contact was
made on the 19th. "A" Company went into a perimeter defence and "B" Company, turning about, made back for its firm base.
Within sight of the junction the force bumped into enemy of unknown strength on the east of the road. The company commander went in to attack. The force, in patrol formation, was without bayonets, but they were borrowed from "D" Company platoons which were brought in behind. The Japs were in a deep defensive position, crescent-shaped. Attacking with bayonet, rifle, Bren and grenade, the first row was cleared and the enemy was forced to retire from the
second to the third before halting the Australians. It was then too late in the afternoon to increase the scale of attack, and although
skirmishing continued for the next two days it was not until the 22nd of March, after an Auster pilot had dropped an area sketch and the position had been plastered by artillery and air, that "A" Company cleared the position. In this attack Corporal (later Sergeant) Rattey won the Victoria Cross.
The following week the enemy began to reconnoitre all the approaches to the Puriata. jeeps were ambushed. Rear echelons and a gun position were raided. After diversionary attacks on our positions along the Puriata the first blow fell on "B" Company
of 25th Battalion, dug in hard against Anderson's junction, the comer of the
Buin Road and the track to Hatai. The night before Good Friday booby-traps were exploded about the "A" Company perimeter, some two hundred yards in the rear. The next morning the water patrol south to Dawe Creek was fired on and a patrol of twelve went out to investigate.
This patrol was still away when the attack broke, and after several attempts to regain its perimeter was eventually ordered to "A" Company. Thirty-one remained in the "B" Company pits.
Towards the middle of the morning sixteen enemy approached up the Buin Road. The first three were killed by the corner Bren-gunner. The remainder jumped into old enemy pits on the south-west side of the road. Half an
hour later a shower of grenades poured in from both sides of the junction. The enemy opened up with everything. There were four attacks that morning; each one was pepped up in intensity. For the fourth the enemy fixed bayonets and made an abortive banzai charge.
Reduced to twenty-eight and with ammunition low the defenders fell back on the "A" Company
perimeter with the enemy hard on their heels. The Vickers stopped the rush and the men, piling into the
communication trenches began to dig in furiously. That afternoon the enemy again
staged four attacks but all were repulsed. At night the Japanese set up the abandoned
"B" Company mortars, and by tapping our wires managed to range on "D" Company
which they plastered until morning. Night
attacks continued on the encircled companies whose combined strength totalled eighty-three. Later estimates placed the attacking
force at 550. All lines to battalion headquarters had been cut.
At 9 a.m. on Thursday and again on Good Friday advance tanks of "B" Squadron 2/4th Armoured Regiment went ashore at Toko from L.C.Ts. On Thursday night Brigadier Field ordered the tanks to the
Puriata. The following morning engineers of the 15th Field Company closed the three-ton truck bridge at Combes Crossing to traffic, and by
2.30 p.m. had a "tankable" bridge across the ditch. The tanks were delayed fifteen minutes. But the Puriata had flooded and although the level had fallen on Friday it was too high to ford the Matildas. The crews got to work and in half the time prescribed had
waterproofed their vehicles. BY 4.45 p.m. they were ready to cross. The first tank bogged and had to be abandoned. The other three crossed with the aid of a bulldozer, and moved on to 25th Battalion behind Slater's Knoll.
Next morning the tanks, escorted by infantry, engineers, and a bulldozer, set off for the invested companies. After surmounting all kinds of heart-breaking difficulties the track began to improve and the force pushed forward. In the perimeter the hard-pressed troops heard the engines roaring above the firing. Churning down the road the Matildas went in. Near the road the enemy broke, and sweeping into the open, were mown down by the infantry. Moving closer in, the tanks' guns blew open the fox-holes and
flayed the area with automatic fire while the infantry moved their wounded to the road.
Here the force split, one tank escorting the wounded back towards Slater's Knoll, the others advancing
with "B" Company to its old position to recover the heavy equipment. The force turned back and reached the other tank in time to beat off an attack on the wounded at a point where, earlier that afternoon, a jeep train had been ambushed. Too late to move farther, the men sheltered in the gutter along the road with the tanks drawn into the centre. The night passed quietly. The following day the weary companies returned to settle about the knoll, "C" Company withdrawing across the river from Old Tokinot to the Darara track.
The enemy had shown his hand. Barbed
wire was rushed from Toko and a further supply air-dropped. Above battalion headquarters "B"
Company set about digging in on the knoll. Down the west bank to the south "D"
Company went into the perimeter with "A". They did not have long to wait. At 5 a.m.
on the 5th of April the Japs struck in force. Slater's Knoll, split left of centre by the
Buin Road, is hard against the west bank of the Puriata bend. Approaching from the
south, or enemy side, the terrain descends to a gully and rises quickly some thirty feet to a plateau approximately the size of two tennis courts. At the rear of the knoll the country drops abruptly to almost water-level; here battalion headquarters was established.
Striking in from the west a diversionary force hit battalion headquarters behind the knoll. It was quickly hurled back as the main attack developed. For an hour and twenty minutes the enemy swept up in waves. Forcing the centre, he came within four yards of the forward pits. The company held firm. The troops, determined not to let the enemy come any closer, fired standing upright in their pits. A small party attempting to cross the river were shot climbing the bank. Twenty-five-pounders joined in and by first light the sting had gone from the assault. The enemy, pinned down along the wire, could be hear4 digging in the gully. An enemy mortar opened close in, to be silenced by a Pita. All
morning mortar bombs and grenades crossed and criss-crossed the wire. Sporadic attacks were broken up and the
wounded were cleared away.
Below at headquarters the enemy had long broken contact. A little after midday two Matildas moved through the cutting and the men of "B" Company came out to mop up. Small enemy parties broke cover and were cut down. Enemy dead lay in heaps along the wire; they were found in an area two hundred yards square. The Puriata line was held.
Farther inland after wide patrolling, the 9th Battalion (which had
relieved 61st Battalion in the Horinui area) moved towards Rumiki and by the 27th of April was
established on the next water barrier, the Hongorai, near the northern ford.
After four months of fighting the weary 7th Brigade was relieved, and from the 13th of April the
15th Brigade, under the command of Brigadier H. H. Hammer, was set the task of clearing to the Hari.
The initial step was to secure Anderson's junction. With Matildas in support the 24th Battalion pushed down the road to Dawe Creek, and by the
17th of May the junction was in our hands. The advance moved on towards Shindou River and the 58/59th Battalion sent patrols along the Hatai track to contact 9th Battalion in the Rumiki area.
Fresh to the island, the 2/11th Field Regiment came in with "U" Heavy Battery to strengthen the artillery support already being given by the 2nd Field Regiment. The 24th
Battalion then began a series of tank-supported company leaps down the Buin Road and by the 7th of May was established on the west bank of the Hongorai River at the Buin Road ford. The advance was forced against positions which had to be blasted by artillery, tanks and Corsairs of the R.N.Z.A.F. Enemy 75-mm- guns appeared as anti-tank weapons, usually manned by suicide crews. Land mines, booby-traps and shells buried nose-uppermost were also planted along the tracks. When these proved ineffective an unsuccessful banzai attack was made on "D" Company of the 24th Battalion.
Meanwhile in the Rumiki area 57/60th Battalion had relieved the 9th Battalion and was deploying west of the
Hongorai on the axis of Commando Road. All battalions had been most active in their patrols and the area between Commando Road in the north and for several miles south of the Bum Road had been made untenable by the enemy. Thus he was forced
to concentrate his troops along the two main tracks. This was greatly to our advantage for they now became excellent targets for our planes and artillery.
Towards the end of May the 15th Brigade prepared to strike for the Hari River down the axis of the Buin Road and down Commando Road simultaneously.
The Jap had every intention of holding the Hari, but threatened with a bold wide
out flanking movement on the northern axis by 57/6oth Battalion, continually battered by our artillery and planes, and unbalanced
by a series of outflanking moves along the main road, by the 24th and 58/59th Battalions, his defences collapsed and a spectacular advance took our forces across the Hari to the Ogorata to within striking distance of the
Mobiai.
On the 13th of May a company from the 24th Battalion crossed to the east bank of the Hongorai and dug in near the ford. The
15th Brigade decided to hold the enemy at the ford and create a diversion north of the junction of the Hongorai and Pororei rivers while at the same time the 24th and 58/59th Battalions were to cross the river south of the Buin Road and attempt to come in behind the main enemy defences which dominated the ford. Meanwhile, the
57/60th Battalion would continue the advance down Commando Road and link up with the battalions advancing along the Bum Road.
| Strong enemy resistance encountered |
On the 17th of May the 57/60th Battalion began its advance after an air attack by
thirty-two aircraft and preceded by successive artillery concentrations. After some resistance the enemy withdrew to the south.
The for-ward company settled down and the rear advanced through it to Huda River. Another force, completing a wide outflanking move, came in from the north to attack a strong position astride the road about half a mile south-cast of the Huda. The enemy resisted fiercely and the position was occupied only after a fierce fight. A third force moving to cut the line of retreat broke through to the Torobiru, completing an advance of 3700 yards in one day. Two days later, the battalion, entrenched along the river, threw out a company to within 500 yards of the Uso-Oso junction and Winchester junction. Another patrol moving back cleared
Tiger track to the Hongorai.
In the meantime, on the Buin Road, the company Of 24th Battalion across the Hongorai on the main road was confronted with a strong force dug in on Egan's Ridge. Against the ridge Corsairs of the R.N.Z.A.F. mounted an eight-day attack which Put 381 aircraft over the area. The
enemy was led to expect a frontal assault down t6 road and an outflanking move to the north via Martin's
crossing but under cover of the intense air and artillery attacks on Egan's
Ridge a bulldozer cleared a secret track to Mayberry's crossing south of the river Junction. The enemy failed to discover the presence of the track, the noise of the
dozer working being covered by the air and artillery bombardments. On the
20th the 24th Battalion with a troop of tanks crossed the river north of Mayberry's crossing and advanced north-east to cut the Buin Road on either side of the
Pororei ford. Next day the 58/59th Battalion with two troops of tanks crossed the river at Mayberry's crossing, and, advancing over difficult country against determined opposition, reached Aitara track to cut the road on the enemy side of the Pororei. "B" Company settled down at the Aitara junction and an armoured force moved back along the Bum Road to contact "A" Company Of 24th Battalion at the Pororei ford. En route the point tank opened up on the enemy position and when the infantry went in they found a 75-mm- gun sighted in the direction of Egan's Ridge. The enemy had been taken in the rear. In the meantime, another armoured force in the 24th Battalion area cleared back towards the Hongorai and after a preliminary bombardment
"C" Company, which had crossed at the ford, moved up to the ridge. In a two-days' sweep the
Hongorai and Pororei had been crossed, the track cleared to Rusei and the southern end of Hammer Road secured.
| Northern and
southern forces link up |
In the north the 57/60th Battalion had cleared the Uso-Oso track junction and the
lateral link was opened when patrols from 24th and 58/59th Battalions contacted 57/6oth
Battalion near Winchester junction. The opening of this lateral link increased the effectiveness of the force pushing along the Commando Road. Medical evacuation was reduced by eight hours and it was now possible to supply the 57/6oth Battalion from the main artery. Further, it enabled tanks to move up in support for the drive on the
Tai Tai gardens.
Around Tai Tai the Japanese had some 3 000 acres under cultivation. On the
2nd of June the 57/6oth Battalion took the first step in its capture. Employing the same tactics of direct approach and flank attack the force swept down on the
Tai Tai track junction and on the 10th of June came out below Amio.
On the Buin Road the 58/59th was jabbing for the Mamagota Junction. Subject to daily
attacks and a host of obstacles including mines, booby-traps, tank ditches, and rough terrain, the troops gained a position west of the
Tomoi. For the first time in the campaign the bridge-laying Scissors tank was employed. On the 3rd of June the
Tomoi was crossed and the battalion moved to within i 5oo yards of Mamagota junction. Two days later it was in our hands, and by the end of the week the northern and southern forces had made contact. The brigade poised before the Hari.
| The
Hari-0gorata crossing |
With prisoners reporting 1500 Japanese dug
in east of the Hari, supporting arms began
plastering known positions. As
at the Hongorai River another encircling move was planned with a frontal assault along the road by 58/59th Battalion. From the north the 57/6oth was to go through the jungle to the east and south in a wide arc to cut the enemy's line of retreat on the east of the Ogorata River near Rusei. Farther still to the north, an armoured patrol known as Scott Force was to thrust along Commando Road in the direction of
Kingori as north flank protection.
The frontal assault met tenacious resistance from strong enemy rearguards and the
advance was halted. "A" Company, after clearing many mines and booby-traps, crossed the
Peperu, but struck the enemy on an escarpment and came under heavy fire. A
dozer, trying to clear a path, might have had to be abandoned if it were not for the covering
artillery support during which a tank retrieved it. Towards dusk the company pushed up and occupied the ridge temporarily evacuated by the enemy. Both "B" and "D" Companies struck trouble. Although "B" Company broke through on the following day to the main Hari ford no further progress could be made. So, on the 7th of June the 58/59th Battalion was occupying the west bank of the Hari river from the ford northwards to Hari
No. 3, and was opposed by the enemy in strong positions along the east bank.
The companies settled down to patrolling and a new plan was evolved. This aimed at pushing Pike Force ("A" and "C" Companies) across the river near Pepib with the object of descending on the road at Hari No. i. "B" Company would then move through and open the road. Finally "D" Company, with tanks, would cut the axis between Pike Force and the ford. The attack fell as planned. The fords were subjected to bombardment from artillery, mortars and planes, while tank diversionaries with 24th Battalion were sent south across the river-a move calculated to delude the enemy into thinking that the
Hongorai crossing was about to be repeated. Pike Force cut the road without sighting a single enemy. "D" Company forced the steep bank at Hari
No. 3, and, cutting the road, moved back to trap the enemy at the main ford. "B" Company crossed the river, linked with "D" and the battalion moved through to consolidate on the Ogorata. The entire operation lasted three days. The Hari had been crossed.
Simultaneously in the north 57/6oth Battalion cut a path through unmapped territory east towards the Ogorata. At 8 a.m. on the second day the force struck Barret's track and a two-hour fight with the enemy ensued. Troops were deployed to hold the lateral tracks and while the fighting was hottest the main body crossed into the jungle on the far side, moved 5oo yards farther east and wheeled to the south. Farther to the north Scott Force had been ordered to slow down in order not to
warn the enemy of the move. The force turned down Barret's track with orders to
find the 57/60th communication wires and rejoin.
Brushes with the enemy continued and on the night of the 13th of June the weary battalion settled down to sleep in the water, the ground being too boggy for digging in. In thirteen days the force had moved 13,000 yards, and the next day the road was cut without opposition cast of
Rusei.
By the 16th of June the two battalions had linked on the road, with the 24th Battalion
moving up in rear. Stores the came down the road and the 57/6oth, supported by tanks and 2/11th Field Regiment, prepared to thrust for the
Mobiai.
Late in the afternoon "B" Company set off. Four hundred yards from the start point the leading tank, tracking round a corner, received three direct hits from a 150-mm. gun. The enemy then began shelling the road. The company reorganized and struck at the high ground on the left, only to be forced back. All night
artillery and mortars pounded the defences across the depression. Next day the bulldozer broke down, and while it was being repaired patrols combed the area. A
two company right flank encirclement got under way after the usual air bombardment. Without much opposition it cut the road behind the defence position. The following day the advance continued under heavy enemy mortar fire. On the 23rd of June "A" Company of the 57/6oth dug in on the Mobiai.
Meanwhile, far to the north above Musakaka, and near the commandos at
Morokia- Mori, a self-contained force known as Atkinson Force had been patrolling across the
Mobiai and Mivo. Operating since the 7th of June, in country thick with enemy, the force continued to supply valuable information of enemy movement on the outer flank. "C" Company of the 24th Battalion (Grahame Force) was five days late relieving them, due to continual enemy attacks. In the last prolonged attack "C" Company, down to its last grenades, was ready to retire when the "sky train" came over and
dropped ammunition into the perimeter.
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