9th Division's New Offensive (Satelberg);  Shaggy Ridge..........

"Night ambush of Japanese, Yaula" by VX93433

NINTH'S NEW OFFENSIVE

An essential preliminary to the relief of the 20th Brigade by the 26th Brigade in readiness for the attack on Satelberg was the elimination of the enemy pocket astride the Satelberg Road east of Jivevaneng. On the 30th of October the 2oth Brigade began a "squeezing" process, 2/17th Battalion exerting pressure and moving forward slowly from the west, and the 2/13th Battalion from the east. The enemy resisted strongly, but four days of fighting resulted in the enemy remnants withdrawing on the night of the 2nd/3rd of November. The 2/17th Battalion then attacked north of Jivevaneng, drove the enemy out, and cleared the whole area to the Siki River.

The relief was completed without incident by the 6th of November, and next morning Matilda tanks began to move to their assembly area near Jivevaneng. Great precautions were taken to keep their presence hidden from the enemy. Sections of the Satelberg Road under enemy observation were traversed by night, Lae noise of the tanks being covered by artillery fire. By the 9th of November the nine Matildas were in position in their assembly area.

The final plan for the attack was as follows:

The 26th Brigade was to capture the high ground running east and west through Satelberg and exploit towards Wareo, supported by three troops of tanks (nine tanks), artillery, engineers and Vickers machine-gunners.

The 20th and 24th Brigades were to continue their active fighting patrolling and to harass and distract the enemy, and the 4th Brigade was given an additional role of patrolling offensively to the west, and to try to locate the enemy's southern flank.

On D-1 day, the 2/4th Commando Squadron was to come under command of the 26th Brigade to take over Kumawa area and free the 2/23rd Battalion for offensive operations.

In addition, to create a further enemy dispersion of force and to protect the eastern flank of the 26th Brigade advance, 2oth Brigade was to use a company on D day to move into the Garabow area north of Jivevaneng and establish a base from which to patrol actively, particularly in the direction of Fior and the river-crossing in use by the enemy.

D day was the 17th of November.

Despite the severe losses suffered in the' counter-offensive and supply difficulties, the enemy had not, apparently, completely abandoned his object of retaking Finschhafen. At the time of the 26th Brigade attack his main concentrations were one regiment in the Satelberg area, a mixed force holding the west flank, one battalion in the Gusika area, and the "main force", comprising, at least two battalions in the Nongora area, held there for a further counter-offensive.

Our maintenance problems were extremely difficult during this phase. Heavy demands were made on fighting units for personnel to unload shipping and to clear the beaches. At one stage 800 men by day and 400 by night were continuously employed at Godowa and Kedain beaches.

Simultaneously an air base and a naval base for patrol torpedo boats were under construction in the Dreger Harbour area, and since all supplies, stores, equipment, vehicles, and personnel were landed at Godowa Beach from L.S.Ts, the beach became overcrowded. Heavy rain turned the vicinity into a quagmire, and vehicles had to be dragged from the beach by bulldozers and left in the mud.

The attack

In outline the 26th Brigade plan for the capture of Satelberg provided for a simultaneous advance by all three battalions. The first intermediate objective was Steeple Tree feature (2,600 feet), the junction of the Satelberg Road, and the north-west track from Kumawa.

A successful preliminary attack by two companies of the 2/48th Battalion with heavy artillery support on the 16th of November secured the track junction of Satelberg Road and the north-east track from Kumawa through Sisi. On the same day the 2/4th Commando Squadron relieved the 2/23rd Battalion at Kumawa, thus releasing the whole unit for the forthcoming attack. The 2/24th Battalion moved north-west, securing a bridgehead over the Siki River in preparation for its attack on Hill 2200, thence exploiting west up the spur towards Satelberg.

Heavy artillery, mortar and medium machine-gun concentrations at 7 a.m. on the 17th of November heralded the attack. The tanks advanced with the leading troops of the 2/48th Battalion, and fierce fighting developed astride the Satelberg Road. Stubborn enemy resistance and the uncompromising terrain slowed the advance. The road ran along a narrow ridge covered with a thick growth of bamboo, making infantry progress arduous and slow.

Four days of strenuous fighting and steady advance culminating in a final overpowering rush of assault secured Steeple Tree Hill, and the 2/48th Battalion linked with the 2/23rd Battalion which had overcome heavy opposition in its advance from Kumawa. The sudden appearance of tanks must have been a most unwelcome surprise to the enemy who had ready no effective counter.

To the north the 2/24th Battalion had taken Hill 2200 after severe fighting, but, in the face of determined Japanese resistance, favoured by the country, had had little success in exploiting to the westward. A further troop of tanks was allotted to this flank, and when the engineers had completed the jeeptrack from Katika to Hill 2200 they moved up in time for the final assault on Satelberg.

The division's offensive was developing, and complementary. thrusts were set in train. In order to cut the enemy's supply route Gusika-Warco, and also to obtain ground from which an attack could be developed against Wareo from the east, the 2/32nd Battalion less one company was ordered to advance and take high ground at Pabu - a timbered knoll astride the Gusika-Wareo track - and to control all tracks as far west as the Lakes. The move was a complete success, the position being taken against only slight opposition.

The approaches to the position on all sides were up steep open kunai slopes. On the day after the capture several large parties of enemy were ambushed on the main track and almost completely annihilated. A determined attack by the enemy from the southwest at midday was repulsed with heavy losses. One company of the 2/32nd Battalion then began to exploit westward toward the Lakes, but encountered strong opposition. It was later known that the occupation of Pabu anticipated and partly dislocated enemy plans for a powerful counter-attack to relieve the pressure on Satelberg.

The enemy counter-attacks

A three-pronged counter-attack on our positions north of the Song River and at the  northern end of Scarlet Beach  was made on the 22nd of November. One enemy force attacked southwards from Bonga. This was defeated by one company of the 2/43rd Battalion, with enemy casualties eighty killed. A second and heavier attack by two battalions came from the north-west with the object of reaching the mouth of the Song River along its north bank, thus joining the enemy moving down the coastal track. 

Heavy artillery and mortar-fire dislocated the attack; and after heavy fighting west of North Hill, along the north bank of the Song and along the jeep-track which had been constructed to Pabu-and which the enemy had now cut - the Jap was finally driven out by evening. A third enemy group crossed the Song, but was driven off by patrols, artillery and mortar-fire from the 2/28th Battalion. Next day strong patrols, accompanied by forward observation officers, pursued and attacked the retreating enemy, engaging him with artillery-fire.

The Japanese lost heavily in men and equipment in this counter-attack, which was a complete failure.

Capture of Satelberg

Meanwhile the 26th Brigade was pressing on towards Satelberg, attacking along the  axis of the road. The 2/48th  Battalion, with tanks, was in

the lead and making rapid progress. By the 22nd of November it had reached the southern slopes of the Satelberg feature, about 6oo yards in a direct line from the summit. Here the enemy was met in strength, and a landslide across the road prevented the further use of tanks.

Strong patrols probed the enemy positions, and he was engaged by artillery, mortars and medium machine guns by day and night, while preparations were made for the final assault. On the 24th of November the advance was resumed, the 2/48th Battalion attacking uphill and the 2/23rd Battalion swinging westward to seize the 3200 feature to the north-west. Substantial progress was made by both battalions, after fierce fighting, and the 2/48th Battalion by nightfall was only 150 yards from the summit. It was in this action that Sergeant T. C. Derrick of the 2/48th Battalion won the Victoria Cross.

The final attack on Satelberg Heights was made next day. The three battalions attacked east, south and south-west; the enemy was completely routed, and by 1 p.m. the feature was in our hands.

Development of the advance

The next stage was to be the capture of the ridge Gusika-Wareo. The 24th Brigade was ordered to take Gusika and to  gain control of the area as far  west as the Lakes, while 26th Brigade was to exploit from Satelberg north towards Wareo.

The enemy counter-attack on the 22nd of November having cut the Pabu supply route, 2/32nd Battalion was maintained for several days by air dropping. Plans were now prepared to capture Pino Hill to open a new line of communication to Pabu farther to the east. Meanwhile the 2/32nd Battalion had ambushed several more enemy parties and inflicted heavy casualties, but was having casualties from the direct fire of several 75mm guns. On the 24th of November one company of the battalion returned to North Hill carrying the wounded.

A very determined enemy counter-attack was made from three directions against Pabu on the 26th of November. Artillery-fire broke up the thrust from the east before it developed, but heavy fighting lasting two and a half hours took place to the north-west and south-west before the attack collapsed.

The same morning Pino Hill was successfully assaulted by two companies of the 2/32nd Battalion supported by three Matildas. In the open kunai grass the tanks had freedom to manoeuvre, and the infantry moved along the jungle fringe to give effective close protection to them. A safe line of communication was thus opened to Pabu.

The right flank to the sea was then made safe by the capture of Gusika by the 2/28th Battalion. With one troop of Matildas in support, the advance was made along the narrow, muddy, coastal track. As the numerous creeks, constituted temporary tank obstacles, the infantry led the advance, followed by engineers with a bulldozer for the construction of tank crossings. When opposition was met the infantry engaged the enemy with mortars and artillery support, and waited for the tanks to come forward. An infantry assault, supported by tanks, was invariably decisive.

The 24th Brigade was now ready to turn west towards Wareo.

Meanwhile the 26th Brigade had been making rapid progress north of Satelberg. An attempt by an enemy force to hold the Song River crossing at the suspension bridge northeast of Fior was overcome by the 2 / 3 2nd Battalion who crossed the river lower down, then encircled and wiped out the enemy. On the 1st of December Kuanko was occupied.

Maintenance was the principal problem of the 26th Brigade at this time. Despite every effort the jeephead in dry weather had still reached only Palanko, and in wet weather the whole route almost as far back as Katika became impassable, and jeeps had to be towed by engineers' tractors. From Palanko to Kuanko was a three-day turn around for native carriers, and the 2/24th Battalion and all available natives had to be used to supply the 2/23rd Battalion. The 7/24th Battalion held Satelberg, while the 2/4th Commando Squadron was patrolling to the west of Mararuo.

With this progress by the 24th and 26th Brigades the divisional commander decided that it would not be necessary, as originally intended, to commit the 20th Brigade to an attack on Wareo via Nongora. But to confuse the enemy, and to prevent concentration of his reserves, the 2/15th Battalion, 20th Brigade, was ordered to develop a third threat to Wareo by advancing to Nongora and to employ strong fighting patrols forward against enemy positions. This was done on the 1st of December, and the 2/15th Battalion continued to exert pressure in this area by active fighting patrols until the fall of Wareo on the 8th of December.

Capture of Gusika-Wareo

After the 2/24th Battalion had taken Peak Hill, with a long flanking movement, thus removing the enemy from the difficult approach north of line Kuanko, the 26th Brigade captured Warco on the 8th of December.

That day the 24th Brigade, moving west up the steep jungle track towards Wareo, and driving the enemy from successive positions by encircling attacks, captured Xmas Hills, the high ground at the Nongora track junction, and linked with the 2/15th Battalion patrols operating northward from Nongora.

Both brigades continued their pressure on the rearguards which were covering the enemy withdrawal along the Lakona track running north-east from Wareo, and despite fierce enemy resistance opened the Gusika-Wareo track on the 12th of December.

Fourth Brigade advance

Meanwhile preparations had been made for the 4th Brigade to drive northward along the coast from Gusika. It was expected that this threat to the enemy's coastal supply route would force him to abandon the whole Wareo position. This expectation was realized.

The objective given the 4th Brigade with two troops of tanks, a platoon of Papuan Infantry Battalion, and artillery and engineers in support, was the high ground at Fortification Point. The advance was to be made by bounds from one beach maintenance area to another.

On the 3rd of December the 22nd Battalion crossed the Kalueng River at Gusika to obtain a bridgehead to permit work on the establishment of the initial maintenance area, and to construct a vehicle crossing of the steep-sided river. Strong enemy defences, comprising solid bunkers protected by a minefield, were located about 700 yards beyond the river.

The advance began two days later, tanks moving at the rear of the leading infantry, to be called forward when strong opposition was met. One platoon of engineers, with a bulldozer, preceded the tanks.

The tanks went to the edge of the first minefield and by directing heavy fire at the bunkers assisted the 29/46th Battalion to break through. Thereafter the tanks were unable to keep up with the advance for some days. The enemy had produced an effective delaying device in tank-mines, boosted with large, prepared charges of picric acid, buried deep in the ground. A new track had to be cut.

The coastal advance of the 4th Brigade continued steadily, with the heaviest artillery support of the campaign; 47oo rounds were fired in one day. The enemy resisted strongly, mainly at creek-crossings in the coastal jungle. The 4th Brigade launched a succession of encircling and bypassing attacks, using strong artillery and mortar support. The enemy was forced to withdraw from one position after another.

The 20th Brigade followed close behind the 4th Brigade with the responsibility of protecting the left flank and rear, and of protecting rear beachheads as new maintenance beachheads were developed forward. It was also to be ready to move through and take up the advance.

The Matildas again demonstrated their value at Lakona. The 22nd Battalion had surrounded a party of about a hundred enemy in the coconuts at Cape Sibida. The enemy resisted desperately for two days and caused sixty casualties to three attacking infantry companies. Five Matildas, held up at creek crossings, arrived late in the evening and immediately attacked with one infantry company. Within an hour the entire enemy force was wiped out. A few Japs jumped to their deaths over the cliffs at Cape Sibida. Casualties to the attackers were six infantry wounded. No damage was done to the tanks.

The enemy was now in full retreat, though his rearguards continued to fight stubbornly. By the 20th of December, however, the 4th Brigade, with powerful support from tanks and artillery, had broken enemy resistance in the Masaweng River area, and had occupied the high ground at Fortification Point. The 20th Brigade, which had been following the 4th Brigade in divisional reserve, now prepared to move through and take up the pursuit.

Throughout the advance of the 4th Brigade supply and maintenance had worked as originally planned. E.S.B. amphibious scouts moved with the leading troops and selected suitable beaches. A beachhead group, including the Australian Army Service Corps and medical services, was then moved by barge to establish supply points, medical evacuation posts and other administrative installations. Supplies of rations and ammunition were brought forward by barge. Engineers maintained the jeep-track to the leading infantry on the coast, and the inland columns were supplied by native carriers.

Between the 20th and the 25th of December further reorganization took place to allow the advance to continue with two brigades the 2oth and the 26th. The 24th Brigade relieved the 26th Brigade in the Satelberg area and the latter moved to the coast to be ferried to Masaweng.

The pursuit of the retreating enemy was resumed on the 21st of December by the 20th Brigade which had moved through the 4th Brigade. From this point the advance proceeded rapidly in successive stages until the capture of Sio on the 15th of January 1944. On several occasions the advance had to be halted for one or two days to allow reserves to be put into the for-ward beaches, and for field guns to be brought up.

On the 2nd of January 1944, an American force landed at Saidor, blocking the coast track between Sio and Bogadjim, and increasing even more the enemy's supply difficulties.

Japanese rearguards offered spasmodic opposition, almost invariably from timbered creeks, but infantry pressure and artillery and mortar concentrations always forced them to withdraw overnight. Along the coast abandoned guns and dumps of equipment, ammunition, medical supplies, and engineer stores were found. Smashed enemy barges littered the beaches, evidence of the telling effect of the blows of our aircraft and patrol torpedo boats.

As we approached Sio an increasing number of enemy dead was found along the track. Many sick and wounded who were unable to keep pace with the retreat had been abandoned to their fate.

The main enemy supply base at Nambariwa was occupied on the 13th of January 194+ without opposition. It was a shambles from heavy bombings. Sio Mission was occupied on the 15th of January, and, while the whole area was being combed for enemy stragglers arrangements were made for salvaging the very large dumps of enemy material throughout the area.

The heavy casualties suffered in the land fighting and the utter dislocation of his supply system by widespread air and sea attacks, and the Saidor landing, had thoroughly demoralized the enemy. He was disorganized and in many cases starving. After the stem fighting about the Finschhafen Satelberg Wareo area, the campaign finished in an atmosphere of anti-climax.

The Ninth Division had completed its task. 2nd on the 20th of January 1944, H.Q. Nint1h, Australian Division handed over to H.Q. Fifth Australian Division.

Results of the campaign

The enemy's losses in the campaign were heavy. His forces forward of Sio under the command of H.Q. Twentieth Division totalled 12,635. Of this number about 7,750 became battle casualties. No allowance has been made for casualties from sickness, but of the remaining 4,885 it is known that fewer than 4,300 survived to withdraw from Sio towards Saidor. A large proportion of this force was
by then ineffective owing to wounds, sickness and exhaustion. This is borne out by the large number of dead found along the routes of withdrawal.

The Ninth Division's battle casualties were 66 officers and 962 other ranks, of whom 16 officers and 267 other ranks were killed.

SHAGGY RIDGE

While the Ninth Division was pursuing the enemy along the coast the Seventh, on the other side of the Finisterres, was preparing to seize Shaggy Ridge and open the way to the sea to join up with the coastal drive at Bogadjim-Madang.importance was known as The Pimple. The others, a few hundred yards away, became known as Intermediate Snipers Pimple, and Green Snipers Pimple. The sides of these pimples were pock-marked with foxholes and strongposts - a natural formidable fortress. The Jap was firmly entrenched on this all important high ground.

The 21st Brigade was to take The Pimple.

Gunners of the 2/4th Field Regiment dragged their 25-pounders on to the foothills of the Finisterres, and, shooting high over the hills, pounded the enemy positions on Shaggy Ridge. On the morning of the 27th of December before the infantry attack, 3,500 25pounder shells found their mark on this narrow neck of land. Trees and earth round the Jap positions spouted into the air.

A squadron of fighter-bombers pounded and zipped Shaggy Ridge in many dive bombing and strafing runs. The noise rolled up the valley in a hollow roar of thunder. Still the Jap held on desperately.

Then the infantry went in. A company of the 2/16th Battalion scaled the precipitous rock-face leading to The Pimple, fighting the Jap hand to hand, foxhole to foxhole, along a track so narrow that it afforded barely enough room for two men to move abreast. They fought on a one-man front, a sheer drop of thousands of feet on either side. Near the summit of The Pimple, where a strong enemy pillbox dominated the approach, our attack was halted. Our troops held their positions until the following day when Australian engineers supplied them with "block-busters" (canister of high explosive attached to normal M36 grenades). With these the infantry blasted the Japs from the pillbox and occupied it.

Some difficulty was experienced in dislodging stray Japs from foxholes in the almost sheer sides of The Pimple. One Jap, entrenched on the slope ten to fifteen feet below the knife-edge, had covered himself with a groundsheet. Grenades were dropped on to his position but these he simply knocked off the groundsheet to slide farther down the slope before exploding harmlessly. With some ingenuity the men of the 2/16th Battalion laced a grenade to a length of bamboo. With a cord tied to the safety pin, the grenade was lowered down the cliff face close to the Jap, where it was held for nearly three seconds after the safety pin had been released. The treatment was drastic but effective.

Over this attack hovered a small aircraft - a Piper Cub. In the cockpit of this Piper Cub a flash of red could be seen - the well known cap of Major General Vasey, who was commanding this operation. Every man of the attacking force had confidence in General Vasey. He was always present when things were happening - if not on foot he could be seen in the Piper Cub.

The Pimple, now in our hands, had taken a tremendous pasting. Though previously thickly clad with trees and undergrowth, this feature was now pathetically bare. Our artillery and air force had been deadly accurate.

Entrenched on The Pimple, troops of the 2/16th Battalion were exposed to sniping from Jap positions on Intermediate Snipers Pimple, which was within shouting distance. Supplies had to be carried up, and casualties evacuated down this steep razor-back. Enemy mountain-guns on a nearby feature continually harassed our position but the 2/16th Battalion held on.

Farther along Shaggy Ridge, three hundred and fifty yards north of Green Snipers Pimple, sprouted another "pimple"-the highest point on this precarious ridge. A platoon, commanded by Lieutenant S. M. McCaughey, set out to cut the knife-edge track behind the enemy by taking this feature. Easing themselves along the steep slope below the knife edge, this platoon succeeded in outflanking the enemy on Intermediate Snipers Pimple and Green Snipers Pimple, and attacked this fourth, "pimple". After a grim struggle the highest point on Shaggy Ridge fell to a handful of Australians, taking the name of the platoon commander who was killed by Jap mountain gun fire after the position had been taken McCaughey's Knoll. But there was no way of maintaining supplies to this platoon, and it was impossible to evacuate casualties. The men withdrew to the area of The Pimple.

As infantry pushed forward in the Shaggy Ridge area, our lines of communication forward of Dumpu were rapidly being improved.

The engineers assisted by infantry battalions in reserve, constructed roads and bridges, and improved the airstrips. Miles of roads appeared around the Dumpu area leading to the airstrips, hospitals, and the fifteen miles to Kesawai where the Ramu River ran into impassable swamps.

Supply was still a major problem. A great part of the distance to Shaggy Ridge had to be covered on foot. Forward of Bebei, on the western bank of the Faria River, supplies were carried by natives.

With the limited equipment available, construction of a road through the hilly terrain forward of Bebei appeared impossible. But early in December the 2/2nd Australian Pioneer Battalion accepted the challenge, and commenced to hew this road. Later, the 2/6th Field Company took over the job, and, assisted by all available troops in the area, pushed a road through the Lakes Area to Guy's Post.

The second battle

Our forces had been whittled down by hard campaigning in this malaria-ridden country. It was decided to relieve them. This relief was effected early in January 1944, by the 18th and 15th Brigades. The 21st and 25th Brigades were flown to Moresby and thence moved to the mainland. The 2/2nd Pioneer
Battalion remained in the area, coming under the command of the 18th Brigade which had
relieved the 21st Brigade in the Shaggy Ridge area.

Here the Faria River which flows south into the Ramu, and the Mindjim River flowing north into Astrolabe Bay, are divided by a feature which rises to 4,800 feet above sea-level -the Mindjim-Faria Divide, also known as Kankiryo Saddle. The mule-track, which joins the motor road from Bogadjim, reaches its highest point where it crosses Kankiryo Saddle. Located in this area are three villages - Prothero One, Prothero Two and Kankiryo. This was the key position of the enemy's whole defence in the area - his supply dumps, hospitals and headquarters. He was entrenched in the general area of Shaggy Ridge, Kankiryo Saddle and east of the Faria River, north of Mainstream Junction. He had to be prized out of this difficult terrain.

The 18th Brigade front faced in a northerly direction tracing a rough line from Tom's Post, Johns's Knoll, Shaggy Ridge, Lake Hill, Brian Hill to Herald Hill. Its role was to hold this line of localities and gain control forward by active patrolling, ensuring by raids and harassing tactics that no major enemy withdrawals could take place undetected. Lastly it was to occupy Kankiryo Saddle, and the high ground to the north and south of it.

There were many issues involved to accomplish this, the difficult terrain, the problem of supply, and the possibility of driving the enemy back to stronger positions on Kankiryo Saddle being the major ones.

To achieve quick and decisive results it was decided that a wide encircling movement on our left flank via the Mene River and Canning's Saddle would have to be made, while the main attack would be against the Prothero area, which appeared to dominate both Kankiryo Saddle and the north-west end of Shaggy Ridge. If the attack on Prothero were possible, it was considered that appropriately timed, subsidiary and diversionary attacks could be launched across Cam's Saddle against the enemy's left flank and along Shaggy Ridge, thus making the operation a three-pronged attack on the Kankiryo feature.

In preparation for this attack, patrols from the 2/2nd Pioneer Battalion and the 2/12th Infantry Battalion probed the area of Canning's Saddle in an endeavour to find a route to the Prothero feature. Meantime the 2/9th Infantry Battalion located an easier approach via Geyton Hill along the Mene River to Canning's Saddle. Two companies of the 2/12th Battalion were moved to this area where they commenced the construction of a track west of the Mene River.

The element of surprise was all important to the success of this attack. Precautions were taken to ensure that the enemy did not suspect our intention of attacking Prothero. Reconnaissance patrols were carefully regulated, artillery registrations were avoided and protective screens were used to prevent enemy patrols observing our new track constructions.

Supply was still a major problem. Before the attack could be made the engineers had to complete the jeep-track to Guy's Post; existing tracks had to be improved, and lines of communication shortened.  A reserve of supplies had to be built up in f forward areas so that as many native carriers as possible could be released for the attacking battalions.  Arrangements had to be made for air drop in on Canning's Saddle. Artillery played an important part in the operation.

The available guns, ten standard and two light 25-pounders of the 2/4th Field Regiment, were moved to the Lakes-Guy's Post area to enable them to fire at closer and more effective ranges.

Heavy air strikes commenced three days before the attack and continued until the day after. These strikes were designed to soften up the enemy defences, and to cover the concentration of the attacking battalions. Enemy positions to within one hundred yards of our troops on Shaggy Ridge were accurately bombed.

The operation had been carefully planned. Confident of complete success the entire brigade, commanded by Brigadier F. 0. Chilton, was to be employed in this attack, leaving no reserves.

On the right flank the 2/10th Battalion was to capture Cam's Saddle, exploit to Faria Ridge and thence south to Mainstream Junction. The 2/12th Battalion having captured the Prothero feature, was to move back in a southerly direction along Shaggy Ridge, then north across Kankiryo Saddle. Once the 2/12th Battalion had captured Prothero, the 2/9th Battalion was to attack north along Shaggy Ridge where it would link up with the 2/12th Battalion. The final phase of the operation - the capture of a high feature known as the 4100 feature, commanding the northern side of Kankiryo Saddle-was dependent upon the progress of the initial attacks.

During the 18th/19th of January the 18th Brigade battalions moved into their positions ready for the attack. The 2/12th Battalion began its flanking approach march to Prothero. Moving silently along deep ravines, hauling themselves by ropes and lawyer vines up cliff-faces, the troops outflanked the Jap. So difficult was this terrain that it took three days to cover eight or nine miles.

On the 2oth of January, as planned, the balloon went up. "A" Company of the 2/10th Battalion, supported by artillery-fire, advanced west along Cam's Saddle, and after minor engagements cleared the enemy from that feature.

Pushing forward from the area of Geyton's Hill one company of the 2/12th Battalion silently climbed a steep razor-back ridge, the only possible approach to Prothero One. A second company was to pass through and secure the saddle between Prothero One and Prothero Two while a third company secured the northern slopes of Prothero One. Two companies of the  2/2nd Pioneer Battalion were to protect the battalion's left flank by securing the western slopes of Prothero One and holding Canning's Saddle. A plan for close artillery support had been arranged, but this was to be used only if the surprise value of our silent attack was lost.

The attack was successfully silent till the leading elements of the 2/12th Battalion reached a point one
hundred yards from the summit of Prothero One. Here the Japs had prepared a demolition charge on the razor-back of the Prothero feature. The enemy failed to blow the charge, but succeeded in warning a party of Japs farther up the slope. This party was manning a 75-mm. gun which had been engaging the 2/9th Battalion on Shaggy Ridge. The gun was immediately swung around to fire at point-blank range on the attacking company of the 2/17th Battalion. The razor-back ridge which had forced our troops to advance on a one-man front offered absolutely no protection. It was impossible to dodge this deadly fire at such close range.

Forward with his attacking troops the battalion commander, Lieut.-Colonel C. F. Bourrie, was wounded by a shell-burst. Forty seven of our men were wounded during this action and ten were killed. Wounded had to be carried back along the hazardous route. Lowered down the cliff-faces, suspended by ropes and lawyer vines, these casualties took three hours to reach the aid post.

With exemplary determination "D" Company clambered up the steep sides of the Prothero feature to the gun-position. Around the gun in fierce hand-to-hand fighting its crew of sixteen Japs was wiped out, and the gun, intact with ammunition, was captured.

Taking advantage of a dive-bombing strike forward of The Pimple on Shaggy Ridge, the 2/9th Battalion advanced up the steep slope of Green Snipers Pimple, and hurled the enemy from it. Twice the enemy counter-attacked, but the position was firmly held and they were repulsed.

On the following day, supported by accurate artillery-fire, "D" Company of the 2/12th Battalion attacked Prothero Two. The Jap was ousted, and the battalion pushed south to Shaggy Ridge.

"D" Company of the 2/9th Battalion continued to advance north along Shaggy Ridge. Its next objective was McCaughey's Knoll, the very peak of Shaggy Ridge. Though only three hundred and fifty yards from Green Snipers Pimple the advance took two hours.

To attack along the track which followed this knife-edge would have been very costly. To attack his flank from the almost sheer sides of the ridge seemed an impossibility. The Jap was "sitting pretty" on McCaughey's Knoll, happy in the thought that the precipitous slopes on either side protected his flanks. He was soon to be disillusioned. Clinging to the mud, our troops edged along the cliff-face below the track - a drop of hundreds of feet with little to break their fall. They advanced to within forty yards of their objective before the Jap became aware of their presence. In the face of heavy machine-gun fire "D" Company clambered up the side of McCaughey's Knoll to assault the enemy.

With McCaughey's Knoll in our hands the remnants of the enemy retreated along Shaggy Ridge towards the advancing 2/12th Battalion. The Jap on Shaggy Ridge was sandwiched between these two battalions. By nightfall the 2/9th and 2/12th Battalions were only 900 yards apart, but both battalions were held up by machine-gun fire and subject to periodic shelling.

During the night the trapped Jap force on Shaggy Ridge attempted to break through the 2/12th Battalion but was held. The following morning in a series of minor outflanking attacks the 2/9th Battalion exterminated the remaining enemy on Shaggy Ridge, linking up with the 2/12th Battalion shortly after midday.

Then "B" Company, 2/12th Battalion, turned about, moving north across Kankiryo Saddle, but did not come in contact with the enemy till the evening of the 23rd of January. Here the Jap was strongly emplaced in well prepared defences including pillboxes, but, under pressure from this company, withdrew northward. A fighting patrol followed him. Equipment captured here included 2 37-mm. Q.F. gun.

On the right flank forward elements of the 2/10th Battalion had maintained pressure against the enemy on Faria Spur. Late in the evening the Jap withdrew north-west along the spur, and our troops occupied his defences for the night. Meantime, "B" Company had exploited southwards making contact with a wired position on the southern end of Faria Spur. The company attacked late in the afternoon but was forced to withdraw and consolidate for the night.

Next day the 2/10th Battalion hammered the Jap from his wired position and occupied it at midday. To the north-west "D" Company again made contact with the enemy in extensive well-prepared positions including pillboxes 1,500 yards north-west of the junction of Faria Spur and Cam's Saddle. In view of the failing light "D" Company gave it up for the night.

On the 24th of January the final phase of this operation-the capture of feature 4100 which commanded the northern side of Kankiryo Saddle commenced.

Under the threat of the 2/12th Battalion's encircling attack, and in face of pressure maintained by the 2/10th Battalion, the enemy withdrew his main force from the defended locality on Faria Spur. "D" Company of the 2/10th Battalion attacked late that afternoon and cleared the rearguard party. Contact with the enemy was regained farther up the spur on the south-east slopes of the 4100 feature.

During the morning "B" Company, 2/I2th Battalion, attempted to advance up the southern slopes of the 4100 feature, but found that the enemy had reoccupied this locality. A fighting patrol of the 2/12th Battalion, moving north-west along the Mindjim Valley from Prothero One, inflicted casualties on the enemy, and captured a 75-mm- gun and a 20-mm. dual-purpose gun and large quantities of supplies. Another strong patrol from the 2/12th Battalion cleared the enemy from pillboxes south-east of Kankiryo Saddle at the headwaters of the Faria River. But no progress was made against the enemy defences on the slopes of the 4100 feature that day.

Next day the 2/9th Battalion carried out offensive operations against the Jap on the 4100 feature. "C" and "D" Companies, in a wide outflanking movement across the end of the Mindjim Valley and around the enemy's right flank, caught him by surprise, and captured the summit Of 4100 feature against light opposition. The forward elements of this force continued to advance to the south-east, making contact with the rear of the enemy's main defence locality. "C" Company carried out a probing attack but was repulsed.

At this stage it became apparent that our map of the locality was very inaccurate, and considerable difficulty was experienced in determining the relative positions of the forward elements of our three battalions as well as the nature of the ground. Artillery-fire was difficult to control. When an artillery forward observation officer with one battalion attempted to register on targets to his immediate front fire would be stopped by F.O.Os with other battalions. The relative positions of our battalions were finally established by air reconnaissance, forward troops firing mortar flares so that their positions could be determined.

It became obvious that we had closed in on the enemy along three narrow steep-sided ridges which all met at a feature later known as Crater Hill. The enemy was holding these three ridges radiating from Crater Hill.

Although virtually surrounded, the Jap apparently intended to fight it out. On this crazy terrain his defences had been well prepared. Many built-up bunkers were bristling with automatic weapons. An attack would have proved very costly for us; hence, for the time being it was decided to hold the Jap in siege.

While close contact and harassing tactics prevented his withdrawal, heavy artillery concentrations, mortar-fire and dive-bombing attacks were directed on Crater Hill to soften the enemy's defences before a final assault was launched.

During the 27th/28th of January the 18th Brigade battalions regrouped in preparation for this assault. The 2/9th Battalion took over the responsibility of the southern slopes of the 4100 feature and Kankiryo Saddle while the 2/12th Battalion was disposed to hold the Protheros and Shaggy Ridge. The 2/10th Battalion continued to maintain contact with the enemy on the south-eastern slope of the 4100 feature.

Small parties of the enemy were attempting to get out between our localities, but constant probing attacks found the enemy still holding his position strongly.

At daybreak on the 31st of January "C" Company of the 2/10th Battalion, in a probing patrol, found the enemy's defensive fire to be much weaker than usual. An attack was immediately pressed home. Taking the enemy completely by surprise our patrol occupied the Japs' forward defences. The enemy promptly counter-attacked, but our forces held on, inflicting heavy casualties, and, taking advantage of his confusion, advanced a further 600 yards.

The 2/9th Battalion attacking from the north and a south-easterly attack by the 2/10th Battalion both met strong resistance and were unable to gain ground.

Early the following day our forward companies closed in on Crater Hill, and "D" Company of the 2/9th Battalion occupied the feature at 8.3o a.m., capturing much valuable equipment including two heavy guns.

Strong fighting patrols pursued the retreating enemy down the Mindjim Valley as far as Paipa. Some enemy were located, but other patrols covered considerable distances throughout the area forward of Kankiryo Saddle without sighting any Japanese.

During this operation 244 Japs had been buried by our troops. Several enemy mass graves had been located but the bodies were not counted. Of the total enemy force estimated at 790, it is considered that at least 500 were either killed or wounded. Our casualties were 46 killed and 147 wounded. Among the quantities of captured equipment were 75-mm., 70-mm., 37-mm. and 20-mm. guns.

As a diversion, while the 18th Brigade attacked in the Shaggy Ridge-Kankiryo Saddle area, the 15th Brigade had raided the Japs' right flank forward of Kesawai.

During the latter part of January, the 57/60th Australian Infantry Battalion had pushed north to Isariba and Ketoba to raid enemy defences in the Mateloi-Kisa area. It reached a position to the west of Mateloi One, but the enemy in this area was not engaged till the 4th of February. The 57/60th Battalion attacked and the Japanese counterattacked. This counter-attack was successfully repulsed, and, having achieved its object, the 57/60th Battalion withdrew to the Kesawai area according to plan.

With the capture of Shaggy Ridge and Kankiryo Saddle, Japanese domination of the Ramu Valley was completely eliminated and the way opened for Australian troops to move through to Bogadjim, and thence up the coast to Madang and Alexishafen.

ADVANCE ALONG THE COAST 

The experienced leader of the Fifth was Major General A. H. Ramsay, who had commanded the artillery of the Ninth Division in the Middle East.

Up to this time the formation had not operated as a complete division. Elements of the division had gained battle experience in New Guinea in the action at Milne Bay in August 1942. In those early days the 7th Brigade, led by Brigadier J. Field under command of the Eleventh Australian Division, played its part in the rout of the Japanese forces in that area. 

For the most part the men were raw troops, though their officers included several with experience in the Middle East. 

This difficult journey through rugged, barely penetrable country called for the maximum of endurance, stamina and determination on the part of every officer and soldier of the division. Once more the wild and inhospitable terrain of New Guinea, now a commonplace with the veteran soldier campaigning on the island, was to prove the major obstacle to the drive westward of our forces.

From Sio to Saidor, where on the 2nd of January 1944, American forces had established a perimeter defence, the country consisted of a narrow coastal belt extending inland no more than a mile in its widest part, and intersected with numerous rivers and swamps. A natural obstacle to heavily equipped Australian troops, the treacherous lip of land disappeared beneath the feet of rugged unmapped mountains, rearing up to heights of between 4,000 and 6,000 feet.

When the division began its move, the "north-west" season had just begun. Aerial reconnaissance disclosed that all the rivers, swollen by torrential downpours, were in full flood. Tracks, the very few of them, were impassable to any form of wheeled traffic. The vital task of pushing forward the formation's supplies confronted the divisional commander. So it was decided to place under command for the purpose of the advance a company of American barges.

This decision brought new problems in its train. Pilots of reconnaissance aircraft flying over the area reported that sheltered beachheads for barge landings along the proposed route were not plentiful. It was agreed finally that the advance should be made in a series of bounds - each designed to carry troops forward to secure beachheads. In this way a constant flow of supplies would be provided. That this plan did not always work was due to the vagaries of weather now notorious for unpredictability rather than to any breakdown in organization.

Major resistance from the Japanese was not expected. The primary object of the task set the Fifth Division was to endeavour to maintain contact with the enemy, harrying and accelerating his retreat and allowing him no time to halt and consolidate defensive positions.

Our troops could look with confidence to full support from the air. The aggressive policy of smashing Japanese bases and airfields which formed so important a part of the general coordinated plan of attack was bringing rich rewards as our forces pushed onward. Concentrated bombing had deprived the enemy of airstrips at Nadzab and Lae, and his army air arm was a pale shadow of a once powerful weapon.

On the 21stt of January 1944, the 4th Battalion relieved the 2/17th Battalion. Three days tater, supported by a troop of the 2/14th Field Regiment, and engineers of the 8th Field Company, the battalion and its attached troops began its long march.

The men of the 4th Battalion were inexperienced in battle. This inexperience combined with the sheer difficulty of natural obstacles caused an initial delay of three days when reached the Kwama River, which, swollen to almost double its width and crocodile-infested, had, somehow, to be crossed Valuable time was lost in probing channels which might lead across the barrier. Finally, strong swimmers. dragging a tow-wire with them, battled their way to the far side, and hauled in their wire to which a rope had been attached. The rope was secured to trees on either side of the rapid Kwama, and so the remainder of the force crossed, clinging tenaciously to the slender thread which alone prevented their being swept away by the rushing waters.

The battalion was quick to learn by their experience, and from this point on it maintained a rate of progress so rapid that the supply column found difficulty in keeping up with the forward troops. It was a miserable journey. Incessant rain pelted through the vegetation creating a morass underfoot. Sometimes, when they halted for the night, the men would find themselves literally floating out of their blankets. Heavy seas too were pounding the coastline and the supply barges, struggling to maintain supplies for the advancing landing columns, were frequently unable to breast the beaches to land their precious supplies. Reserve stores had to be used, and, at one period, when supplies could not get through, the men were on reduced rations. This imposed added strain on troops who were at times struggling through mud that was waist-high.

During the move the unit signals performed yeoman service, maintaining contact with the rear, at all times. They were the means of relieving the difficult supply position when they transmitted a request for the dropping of air-borne supplies. The efficiency of air transport of army supplies was amply demonstrated here. There was an immediate response to an appeal for supplies from the air, and eighty-two per cent of all supplies dropped were recovered. Giant air transports dropped food, tobacco and copies of Guinea Gold. If anything, this little newspaper was more, eagerly sought than rations. To troops practically marooned in the thick of the jungle swamps this link with news of the outside world came almost as tidings from another planet.

So far slight contact only, mainly with stragglers, had been made with the enemy, but Japanese dead were numerous-all of them striking evidence of malnutrition and sickness.

On the 3rd of February the battalion was relieved at Malasanga by the 30th Battalion, also facing its first campaign. The 30th Battalion experienced the same conditions as its predecessor. It too was forced by bitter, heart-breaking circumstances to learn that only in the jungle can the soldier learn the real difficulties of jungle fighting.

For the next stage of the advance, planning was similar, and called for a series of daily bounds designed to permit relief of the 3oth Battalion by the 35th Battalion at the Yupna River. This was designed to provide all battalions with experience in actual operations. But a number of factors, not the least of which was the continued heavy weather, made it impracticable to carry out the relief and the 3oth Battalion was ordered to continue the advance.

For ten days the battalion ploughed through mud, rain, and thick undergrowth, the troops hacking their way through in a rapid advance. In their ninety-mile trek the advancing Australians crossed no fewer than sixty flooded streams. One, the Urawa River, was more than a hundred yards wide, and several men were swept nearly a mile downstream before they managed to struggle to the opposite bank.

Sickness now began to take toll of the battalion's strength, and three men were lost from cerebral malaria. Others were suffering from dengue and all were weak with fatigue.

Continuing its fast advance the battalion pushed on, and on the 10th of February made contact with American forces at the Yaut River. Despite its three days' delay at the Kwama River the brigade had arrived at the rendezvous on the appointed day.

No pitched battle was fought, but the total ,enemy losses during the advance from the 24th of January to the 3rd of February were 1291, Of whom 300 were killed in running fights and the remainder found dead along the track. Many of the Japanese had been dead for some tune.

After contact had been made with the American forces at the Yaut River the 8th Brigade paused to rest the men. Then the 3 Sth Battalion, relieving the 3oth Battalion, continued patrolling the country inland from Weber Point. Japanese were known to have escaped into the hills, having bypassed the Americans at Saidor, and the 3Sth Battalion split into companies, and, assisted by a company of the Papuan Infantry Battalion, deployed into the mountains to comb out these stragglers. "A" Company of the 35th Battalion moved round in the direction of Gabutamon while "D" Company was assigned the task of completing the pincers through Ruange and Tapen.

Members of the P.I.B. were attached to each company and their bushcraft and native instinct proved invaluable; on several occasions our troops were saved from ambush by their uncanny knack of sensing the whereabouts of the Japanese.

Inland from Weber Point the country is as rugged and precipitous as anywhere in New Guinea. But unlike most mountainous country the ranges are a poor watershed. This caused hardship for our patrols. There were no streams in the vicinity and once they were forced to boil muddy water from bomb craters to quench their thirst. Finally it was found necessary to supply the patrols with water transported from the coast - a journey of seven hours up and along a mountain footpad. At this time it was impossible to find enough native labour to do the work, the natives having "gone bush" with the advent of the Japanese. So members of "C" Company became carriers and carried the water to their mates in the hills. Each man's pack was emptied to carry a two-gallon can. Each morning they began the long climb up from the river. Fortunately it was possible, some days later, to recruit sufficient natives for the job, but meanwhile the troops of "C" Company performed a back-breaking task.

It was on these patrols that the only "pitched" battle was fought with the enemy.

At Tapen, in a fifty-minute engagement, our men wiped out 103 Japanese. One member of "D" Company, creased by a bullet from an enemy sniper, went berserk, killing fourteen Japs with his Bren.

Tapen is 4500 feet above sea-level and the troops who had jettisoned weight, including their blankets, when the climb began, found the cold so intense that they were using mosquito-nets as covers for such extra warmth as they would give.

During this time "A" Company, patrolling in the Gabutamon area had accounted for seventy Japanese, and when the patrols finally returned to their base camp on the coast, they had killed 467 of the enemy. Another 795 Japs were found dead, and twenty-four prisoners of war were taken. The area had been cleared of the enemy.

The arrival of the Fifth at Saidor marked the end of the first phase of its pursuit of the Japanese, an operation successfully carried out to schedule.

But it was not without cost. Within a fortnight of the completion of the operation more than thirty per cent of the troops were evacuated to hospital suffering mainly from malaria, dengue, and skin complaints.

THE FINAL PHASE

On the 27th of April the 15th Brigade began to move, its headquarters and some units travelling by air to Saidor, and other groups on foot to Bogadjim. The air moves were completed by the 3rd of May, and on that day the brigade passed from the command of the Eleventh Division to the Fifth Division.

Advice was received from New Guinea Force on the 15th of May that the Ramu Valley was to be cleared of Australian units with the exception of Eleventh Division Carrier Company which was to move from Gusap to Dumpu. The Eleventh Division was to move to Wan, which it did, via Lae, four days later.

The Fifth Division forged along the coast, the 8th and 15th Brigades proceeding to Madang, the intention being to give the battle-weary 15th Brigade a well-earned rest if conditions permitted.

The 30th Battalion continued up the coast in the direction of Alexishafen. From Madang to Alexishafen the road had been well mined by the retreating Japs, resulting in a few casualties to our troops. The battalion entered Alexishafen on the 26th of April, and here again was evidence of the enemy's singleness of thought - escape. Again he left behind great quantities of stores, much undamaged. Here, too, for the first time in New Guinea, the Japanese had adopted a policy of deliberate destruction of airstrips by blowing craters with unexpended aerial bombs.

By the capture of Madang and Alexishafen we had possession of two first-class, deep, well-sheltered harbours.

Without pause pursuit of the enemy continued, the 35th Battalion moving rapidly up the coast. On the 2nd of June a landing was made by the 37/52nd Battalion on Kar Kar Island and, from information received from Chinese found there, it was learned that the Japs had left some time in March. This further strengthened the earlier belief that after the fall of Finschhafen the enemy had no idea but to retreat to his foxhole at Wewak.

On the 12th of June patrols of the 35th Battalion reached Hansa Bay and this, with patrols probing forward as far as the Sepik River, completed the second and final phase of the advance.

At Hansa the enemy had abandoned stores equal in quantity to any material captured in the New Guinea campaign.

With the landing of American forces at Aitape, and with our forces grouped as a bulwark to the east, the fate of the starved and weakened Japanese garrison in Wewak was sealed, despite a desperate attempt to fight its way out.

THE SERVICES

[This account incorporates Divisional narratives prepared by VX18229, SX2663, and NX15943. These were checked at the headquarters of the formations concerned. They were collated for publication by VX21257.]

Going South On Leave

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