The Australian Army in the Battle for New Guinea

Huon Peninsula Battle Maps

OUTLINE OF CAMPAIGN

Early in July 1943 the G.O.C. New Guinea Force, Lieut.-General Sir Edmund Herring, outlined to the commanders of the Seventh and Ninth Australian Divisions their roles in General Sir Thomas Blamey's plan for a major offensive in the New Guinea Area.

The immediate objective of these concerted operations was the seizure of the airfields in the Lae-Markham Valley area. The broad plan was less restricted, and envisaged the expulsion of the Japanese from the entire Huon Peninsula, and the consequent domination of the Vitiaz Straits separating New Britain and New Guinea.

The Ninth Australian Division under the command of Major-General G. F. Wootten would strike the enemy from the sea in the first Australian amphibious operation since Gallipoli, while the Seventh Division-Australia's first air-borne division-attacked from the air.

Ten days later elements of the Ninth Division planning headquarters arrived in New Guinea and, in collaboration with the U.S. Navy and the Fifth U.S. Army Air Force, began the intricate task of planning its amphibious operation.

On the 5th of August 1943 General Sir Thomas Blarney, accompanied by Major-General F. H. Berryman, as his Chief of Staff, arrived at H.Q. New Guinea Force to direct operations personally. Twelve days later Advanced H.Q. New Guinea Force moved to Dobodura where it became H.Q. First Australian Corps, with Lieut.-General Sir Edmund Herring as G.O.C.

The Seventh Division, concentrated in the Pom Pom Valley area at Moresby, had long been training for this daring air-borne venture. This division knew jungle as well as mountain warfare, for already it had whipped the Jap in the thick jungle of the Owen Stanley Ranges. Now its troops trained for a new task, climbing, fully equipped, in and out of old hulks of fuselages at the end of a monster airstrip.

Since it returned from the Middle East in February 1943, the Ninth Division had been reorganized for jungle operations. It had undergone intensive training in jungle fighting, and shore to shore operations with the 532nd U.S. Boat and Shore Regiment (2nd Engineer Special Brigade), which was later to come under command of the division for the actual operations.

Lae was a powerful base, manned by a Japanese force estimated at 7,000 strong. Many well dug strongpoints, covering all approaches and sited in considerable depth, were located in and around the town itself. There was no evidence of any defences east of the Busu River, although concealment in the thick vc,4ctation would have been simple. Unconfirmed reports placed enemy beach defences along the entire southern coast of the Huon Peninsula.

Confronted with this strong opposition, it was imperative that we should make no mistake. In two long years we had learnt many lessons in jungle warfare - lessons learnt the hard way, by trial and error. Those two years had given us time to build up our air strength. Now, with everything in our favour, we were making each successive blow a sure one.

The proposed D day, H hour-household phrases now, after five years of war-and the time in which the sea and air landings were to be completed, were altered from time to time as new factors cropped up in the planning stages. The loading of vessels, availability of equipment and aircraft, and naval and air commitments in other spheres extant and projected, constitute general headings under which these problems may be grouped. Under these headings could be listed an almost unending series of considerations.

The area through which the Ninth Division proposed to approach Lae consisted of a flat coastal plain to an average depth of three miles, before rising into the rugged foothills of the inland mountains. West of the Burep River the plain broadened into the valleys of the Busu, Butibum and Markham rivers, the two former being divided about two and a half miles north of Lae by the Atzera Range, the southern slopes of which dominated the town. The coastal plain was covered with dense jungle interspersed with patches of kunai grass eight to ten feet high, and with mangrove swamps in the immediate coastal areas.

Between the main landing beach-Red Beach-and Lae, the plain was interspersed by five rivers and numerous small streams; but apart from the Busu River they were not expected to present any real problem. There were no roads.

The landing beaches, Red Beach to the east of the mouth of the Buso River, and Yellow Beach near Hopoi, were of firm black sand and about twenty yards in width. Swamps behind the beaches allowed few exits, but between the Buso and Busu rivers other beaches were subsequently found and developed.

The landing was to be effected in four main groups. Group One, which consisted of the  20th Australian Infantry Brigade with the 532nd U.S. Boat and Shore Regiment with supporting and maintenance units, was to land at Red and Yellow beaches, preceded by a naval bombardment. The main landing was to be at Red Beach, while the 2/13th Australian Infantry Battalion, with detachments of artillery, ack-ack and engineers, was to land at Yellow Beach to protect the eastern flank and to secure an alternative beachhead.

Group Two, which comprised the 26th Australian Infantry Brigade with supporting arms and services, was to land at H+2 hour at Red Beach.

Group Three was composed of the balance of the 2oth and 26th Brigades and 2 proportion of divisional troops with vehicles and bulk stores, and was to land at i i p.m, on D day. Group Four, the 24th Brigade, was to land on the night of the 5th/6th September -the second night after the initial landing.

The immediate objective of the operation was to capture Red and Yellow beaches, secure a covering position, and establish 2 beach maintenance area at Red Beach. From this beachhead the advance on Lae would begin.

It was a typical New Guinea day, hot and sticky, when Groups One and Two moved through the gaping jaws or clambered up the ramps of the landing craft. The sea was calm and below decks the sweat rolled off the men as they sat about playing cards or sprawled in idleness. On deck the Bofors and Oerlikons were constantly manned, but not even a reconnaissance plane appeared and in the predawn hours of the 4th of September, the ships stood off Red and Yellow beaches.

A short naval bombardment pounded the shoreline, and at 6-3o a.m. the first wave of infantry rushed the beaches. There was no opposition, and the landing proceeded as if it were a realistic manoeuvre. It was not until the fifth wave was about to beach some thirty-five minutes after the first troops had touched shore-that the first enemy aircraft appeared.

They came in low and bombed, hitting two L.C.Is (Landing Craft Infantry) and inflicting some casualties. But this was to be the only enemy interference with the entire landing operation, although there were later raids on the beachhead. The Japanese had been caught by surprise-a good augury for success. At Yellow Beach, where the 2/13th Battalion group had landed, about thirty of the enemy abandoned a strong post without offering any opposition.

By nightfall all the 2oth Brigade objectives on both beaches had been secured; and the 26th Brigade, with the 2/17th Battalion of the 20th Brigade under command, had begun the advance towards Lae, having crossed the Buso River to the west. Bofors guns were guarding both beaches against air attack, and at 11 p.m. the greater part of Group Three arrived at Red Beach.

On the following night the 24th Brigade disembarked at Red Beach, and was ordered to move along the coast towards Lae the next day.

Information available to the Seventh Division about enemy patrol activity and the Nadzab area defences was sketchy, and it was necessary to use special native patrols to learn the extent of Japanese occupation. In this way valuable and accurate information was gained. Aerial reconnaissances were carried out over the area by the G.O.C., Major-General G. A. Vasey, his staff, and commanders of infantry and U.S. paratroop units, thereby increasing the appreciation of air photographs.

Approximately forty-five air-miles from Lae a landing ground was cleared on the west bank of the Watut River, which had been reconnoitered as far as the Markham for suitable crossing places in the vicinity of Nadzab, a distance of approximately fifty track-miles. A route was chosen for an overland party along the east bank of the Watut, thence to the south bank of the Markham where a crossing place was selected at Kirkland's, approximately six miles from Nadzab.

	This overland party, comprising the 2/2nd Pioneer Battalion, the 2/6th Field Company, plus detachments of the 2/5th Field Ambulance and the Seventh Division Signals, flew from Moresby to Tsili Tsili on the ist of September 1943.  The pioneers walked as far as Kirkland's where they remained under cover ready to cross the Markham when U.S. paratroops had secured the airstrip at Nadzab.
Jap Hospital Ward - Lae

The engineers, who were to assist the pioneers by supplying boating for crossing the Markham, floated their gear down the Watut River. In this way all the necessary resources were on hand for the development of the Nadzab landing strips.

Volunteers from the 2/4th Field Regiment were called to make a paratroop landing with their 25-pounder guns. There were plenty. But time was short. Most of them had one practice jump - some didn't.

The operation was so timed that the seizure of the Nadzab airstrip would take place after the landing by the Ninth Division at Hopoi on the 4th of September.

On the 5th of September, preceded by heavy bombing and strafing and screened by smoke, the 503rd U.S. Paratroop Infantry Regiment, followed by Australian paratroop gunners with their 25-pounders, landed in the tall kunai in the vicinity of the Nadzab airstrip. Defensive positions were quickly consolidated without opposition. Dummy paratroops, accompanied by bombing and strafing, had been landed between Nadzab and Lae as a deception.

Immediately the airstrip had been seized, the overland party, waiting across the Markham River, came out of hiding. The 2/6th Field Company improvised a foot-bridge of eight folding boats, anchored broadside on, joined by timber found on the river-bank. In an hour and twenty minutes the airfield construction party was crossing the 210-feet-wide, 15-feet deep, 7½-knot Markham River at the rate of 550 men in an hour. To speed the crossing, a chain of rubber recce boats, suspended on a 2½-inch cable, was strung across the river and hauled by ten men. This was installed in thirty minutes.

These pioneers and engineers tramped on to Nadzab, where they quickly set to with hand tools, clearing the old airstrip by the following day. An air ferry-service from Moresby commenced that afternoon.

The G.O.C., Major-General G. A. Vasey, inspected the defences of Nadzab, and on the 7th of September the vanguard of the Seventh Division was flown in, some troops staging at Tsili Tsili, others flying direct.

The Ninth Division's first contact with the enemy was made in the early morning of the  6th of September, when the  2/23rd Battalion, which was leading the 26th Brigade advance, made contact with a party of more than a hundred Japs moving cast along the coast towards Singaua Plantation. In a sharp engagement thirty of the enemy were killed, and the remainder abandoned their weapons and fled.

In the meantime the 2/13th Battalion had pushed out eastward from Yellow Beach and had occupied Hopoi Mission without opposition.

The advance along the coast was progressing rapidly, but the distance of the forward troops from the beachhead was accentuated by the absence of tracks, and the difficulties which beset engineers trying to construct tracks in the marshy country in which the troops were operating. On the night of the 6th/7th of September very heavy rain fell, flooding the creeks and making what tracks there were almost impassable.

It became evident that overland supply by track could not keep pace with the advance, and landing craft were brought up along the coast with stores and supplies. Thereafter this became a normal means of supply.

On the 7th of September the 24th Brigade took over on the coast, and the 26th Brigade moved up the Burep River with the intention of crossing the Busu River higher up.

The following day the 2/28th Battalion reached the Busu River at its mouth. It found the river to be a formidable obstacle, the main channel being five feet deep, sixty yards wide, and with a flow of ten to twelve knots. Farther north the 2/24th Battalion had also reached the river, and, although bridging would have been possible, the country did not permit the transport of the necessary equipment. In both localities active enemy opposition was located on the far bank.

On the night of the 8th/9th of September two 25-pounder field guns were moved from Red Beach by barge to G Beach at the mouth of the Burep River, and were in position by the morning.

During the morning the 2/28th Battalion made several attempts to get patrols across the Busu, but found the current too strong, and was hampered by enemy fire from the far bank. The enemy was engaged with artillery and mortar-fire during the day, and in the late afternoon four companies of the 2/28th Battalion forced the crossing. Although a proportion of the men were washed away, and two-thirds of their weapons were lost in the struggle to get across, they secured a bridgehead and successfully repulsed a determined enemy attempt to dislodge them.

The Seventh Division pincer inland was also squeezing the enemy. The first brigade to be  committed was the 25th.  While the troops were waiting to emplane at Ward's Drome, a Liberator had crashed into a company of the 2/33rd Battalion causing many casualties, but the movement went on as scheduled. By the 9th of September two battalions of the brigade were moving along the road to Lac.

As the infantry pressed forward engineers went to work. They built thirty-two bridges and culverts of a total length of 520 feet on this Nadzab-Lae road. Twelve hundred feet of corduroy was laid down. Trees had to be cleared to admit sunlight and air, roads had to be drained. Infantry assisted the engineers in this clearing work, enabling guns and supplies to be pushed forward close behind the advancing battalions.

Twenty-five-pounder guns, hauled by jeeps, gave close artillery Support to the infantry. Gunners of the 2/4th Field Regiment shot consistently well, at times bringing fire down within thirty yards of our forward troops. Only one of our own men was slightly wounded.

So rapid was the advance that it almost developed into a race. Brigadier K. W. Father, commanding the 25th Brigade, was a familiar figure to the fore of the advancing troops in his jeep and trailer with pennant flying, earning for himself the name of Phar Lap. On many occasions parties of Japs cut in behind this prize target - bullets flying unhealthily close. These parties were quickly dealt with by oncoming troops. Leading elements of the 2/25th Battalion cleared Yalu, more than one third of the distance to Lae, during one afternoon, without contact.

First serious contact with the enemy occurred on the afternoon of the 10th of September at Jensen's Plantation where the 2/25th Battalion located an enemy patrol. The Jap was quickly outflanked on both sides, and withdrew under cover of darkness. During the following day a force estimated at 200 Japanese held on at Jensen's Plantation, but the 2/25th Battalion, supported by artillery, advanced through the plantation, killing at least thirty of them.

On the 12th of September, the battalion, maintaining the initiative, drove the enemy from two further positions and reached the area of Whittaker's Plantation. Here it clashed with Japanese marines who resisted stubbornly from well dug-in positions. In this fighting, Private Richard Kelliher won the Victoria Cross. Twice, single-handed, he stormed a machine-gun post, and saved the life of his section-leader.

In the coastal sector units of the Ninth Division were equally active. By the same day  the 2/32nd and 2/43rd Battalions had been moved across the mouth of the Busu by barge and folding-boat ferry. Heavy fighting developed in extending the bridgehead on the west side of the river, the 2/28th Battalion in particular fighting severely while extending along the coast to take in a suitable beachhead.

As soon as the line of the Busu River was secured the dumps at G Beach and at the beachhead on the Burep River behind the 26th Brigade were built up and engineers established a practicable road between the Burep and Busu rivers to supply the brigade. All stores were brought from Red Beach by small craft.

The Japanese were showing increased activity in this area and more artillery was brought tip as infantry support. On the 13th of September the advance of the 24th Brigade continued with the 2/28th Battalion following the coastal track and the 2/43rd Battalion on a parallel track about one mile inland. The 2/17th Battalion of the 20th Brigade crossed the Busu River at its mouth and assumed responsibility for the protection of D Beach, established west of the Busu River.

Next morning portion of the 2/24th Battalion effected a crossing of the river in the 26th Brigade area by launching a small box girder across the main stream in the face of enemy opposition from the far bank. A bridgehead was established, but our troops were unable to dislodge the enemy, and the crossing was not resumed until dusk. BY 7.30 a.m. next day the 26th Brigade was on the west bank, the enemy post having been abandoned during the night.

The 24th Brigade continued its advance along the coast against light opposition and the remainder of the 20th Brigade was ferried across the Busu at night.

Resistance was rapidly crumbling and on the morning of the 15th of September the 2/24th Battalion captured an enemy strongpoint immediately north of their crossing, killing thirty Japanese. The 24th Brigade reported at the same time that the 2/28th Battalion had secured Malahang anchorage area. Later the 2/23rd Battalion captured the Sawmill, the garrison having withdrawn towards Lae, leaving behind considerable quantities of arms and ammunition.

Units of the Seventh were also forcing the pace. During the 13th of September the 2/25th  Battalion pressed forward vigorously till halted at nightfall astride the road at Whittaker's Bridge with two companies on the high ground overlooking Heath's Plantation from the north. During that night two Japanese attacks on the companies north of Heath's were repulsed. On the morning of the 14th of September -Whittaker's Bridge was crossed, and Heath's captured.

Heath's, which had been an enemy strongpoint, was not contested-37-mm. guns and anti-aircraft guns were left by the Japanese without firing a shot. Heath's was absolutely demolished, having been well plastered by bombers before the paratroop landing.

The 24th Australian Infantry Battalion, patrolling south of the Markham River, contacted an enemy outpost near Markham Point. Approximately 200 Japs manned this outpost, as protection for the enemy lines of communication between Lae and Salamaua. To prevent these Japs escaping across the river to Lae via Heath's Plantation, the 2/2nd Pioneer Battalion was moved to a position on the northern bank of the Markham River.

At Heath's the 2/33rd Battalion moved through the 2/25th Battalion, regaining contact with the enemy in the vicinity of Lane's Bridge.

With the 2/31st Battalion, which had been held back at Moresby by impossible flying weather, the 2/33rd Battalion hit out at the Jap in the vicinity of Lane's Bridge and Edwards's. On the morning of the '5th of September these two battalions, assisted by bombing and strafing, soon overcame the stubborn Japanese resistance at Edwards's, and yet another plantation was in our hands.

The Japanese had abandoned hope of saving Lae. The 2/4th Australian Commando Squadron was ordered to hold Kunda Bridge, the main track-crossing of the Busu about ten miles from its mouth. The 2/24th Battalion (Ninth Division) was ordered to re-cross the Busu and move immediately to the area of Gawan and Musom about three miles north of Kunda Bridge to block all escape routes leading from Lae through this area. Subsequent information indicated that large numbers of Japanese had moved along these routes before the arrival of our forces.

Final resistance outside the Lae township was expected at Jacobsen's. Previously a poultry farm, Jacobsen's now merged into the rubble heap of the entire Lae area-undoubted proof of the accuracy and effectiveness of our previous bombing strikes. One pathetically bedraggled, battle-scarred fowl cautiously eyed the new captors. Only a few Japs were seen in this vicinity.

On the outskirts of Jacobsen's, Brigadier Eather, acting as forward scout in his jeep, was attracted by a sedan car parked on the side of the road. On investigation the brigadier's driver found two Japs hiding in the car. One of these raised an eating fork in self-defence, but they were both quickly taken prisoner. In the same area, they found a Japanese sergeant lying face down on the side of the road. This Jap refused to move. Afraid that he might have a grenade beneath him, Brigadier Eather ordered a rope to be placed around his legs to drag him out. As soon as the rope touched him the Jap sprang into the air, yelling in pidgin that all the Japanese had gone from Lae.

On interrogation of these three Japanese prisoners, it was found that the force remaining in the Lae area had consisted of a detachment of marines and a depleted regiment from Salamaua.

The occupation of Lae was near and events began to follow in quick succession. During  the afternoon of the 15th of September the 2/43rd Battalion captured Wagan, and three hours later one company of the 2/48th Battalion occupied the northern end of Malahang airfield without opposition. The 2/15th Battalion occupied the southern end of the airfield, the 2/43rd Battalion encircled Malahang Mission, the 2/23 rd Battalion was only 1,000 yards from Kamkamun, and by 8 p.m. the whole of the Malahang airfield had been occupied.

Following this Ninth Division success, two of its brigades, the 24th and the 26th, were ordered to push forward at dawn on the i 6th of September to the Butibum River and to cross if possible. An air strike against strongpoints on the western bank of the Butibum was arranged for that morning.

At 10.45 a.m. the same day the 25th Brigade (Seventh Division) reached the outskirts of Lae. The brigade could not enter the stricken town at once as it was in the throes of its last pounding by American bombers. When the bombing ceased a few minutes before 11 a.m., the 25th Brigade entered-just seven days after the offensive had been launched from Nadzab.

By midday the 2/23rd Battalion (Ninth Division) was in Kamkamun and the 2/48th Battalion (Ninth Division) had Butibum, both with opposition from stragglers only. During the morning the boundary between forward brigades of the Ninth Division had been pushed forward to control exploitation through Lae up to and including the airfield and its defences.

Explosions heard in the centre of Lae township at midday were presumed by 25th Brigade troops to be stores set off by previous bombing. But closer explosions accompanied by machine-gun fire and the unmistakable whistling Of 25-pounder shells soon made it clear that the Ninth Division was firing these missiles. As many of the shells were landing among the 2/31st Battalion, and native carriers were badly shaken, Brigadier Eather ordered a withdrawal to Jacobsen's, where the brigade awaited the cessation of the Ninth Division's attack.

For two hours the Ninth Division hammered the already battered township of Lae. For two hours the Seventh Division tried, unsuccessfully, to communicate with the Ninth Division. Finally a Boomerang aircraft, which landed on Lae airstrip before the Ninth Division's attack, got word through. By 2 O'clock that afternoon the shelling had ceased and once more the 25th Brigade entered Lae.

After the air strike and artillery concentrations on enemy posts on the west bank, the 24th Brigade (Ninth Division) crossed the Butibum without opposition and reported at 2.20 P.M. that it held the east end of Mount Lunamen to the sea. Five minutes earlier H.Q. Ninth Division had received a signal that troops of the Seventh Division had occupied Lae.

The Japanese flag was still flying on the summit of Mount Lunamen, which commanded a view of the entire Lae area. An Australian flag was hastily brought forward. With this Brigadier Eather and his party set off by jeep to replace the offending rag on Mount Lunamen.

Mount Lunamen was the objective of one of the Ninth Division battalions. This battalion, the 2/32nd, which incidentally was one of the original battalions of the 25th Brigade while in England and the Middle East, was advancing steadily up the Mountainside, rifles at the high port ready to attack. The chagrin of the men can be imagined when, right on the very summit of their objective, they saw the commander of the 25th Brigade and his staff in a jeep, casually watching their attack as though it had been staged solely for this small party's benefit.

Lae township had been blasted to the ground-it was no more than an evil-smelling rubbish heap. Dozens of Japanese planes littered the airstrip. Motor trucks, splintered, wrecked and overturned, lay where Chinatown had once been. Strong posts and foxholes in the hill-faces, filled with Jap bodies, marked the enemy's last stand at Lae. The only living thing untouched by our heavy air attacks was a fifty-yard hedge of blooming frangipanni.

The many Japanese dumps took on the appearance of a bargain sale; soldiers clambered over them, grabbing flags, the more attractive pieces of Japanese clothing, and various other portable items. There was still ice in the ruins of the ice works, and some beer - which did not last very long. Much valuable equipment was captured. Among the booty were heavy field and naval guns, anti-aircraft guns, heavy. and light machine guns, mortars, and much wireless equipment in good condition.

The 25th Brigade stayed overnight in Lae, handed over the town to the Ninth Division, and moved to Nadzab, back along the road it had fought for. It was an incongruous spectacle, a procession over which hovered the spirit of carnival. Almost to a man the troops were draped in souvenirs-flags, Jap clothing, Samurai swords and similar articles, tokens of another victory.

Battle casualties of the Ninth Division in this operation were: killed, 8 officers, 69 other ranks; wounded, 25 officers, 372 other ranks; missing, 3 officers, 70 other ranks; total, 36 officers, 511 other ranks. Thirty-eight officers and men of the Seventh Division lost their lives. Casualties totalled 270, one half of this figure resulting from sickness.

The next section covers Markham Valley & Finschhafen

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