Gordon VC, Honouring Australia, Arab Justice, War in the Western Desert

Gordon VC, Honouring Australia, Arab Justice, War in the Western Desert

Cpl Jim Gordon VC. Cpl. Gordon, a Western Australian, was awarded the V.C. for taking single-handed a machine-gun post obstructing the Australians' advance in Syria on July 10, 1941 by B3/59

BROTHER Na'amthallah was industriously chipping away at a piece of stone when we arrived at the headquarters of an Australian rail-way unit constructing the Beirut-Tripoli section of the great railway which will link up Palestine, Syria and Turkey.

Beneath his chisel the Rising Sun emblem of the Australian Military Forces was taking shape. This Maronite monk and his two assistants have been commissioned to fashion a number of these plaques, one of which will be set in the embankment of each major bridge along the track. The plaques will commemorate the deeds of the Australians in Syria and the work of the Australians on the railway.

They will serve, too, to keep the memory of Australians ever fresh with the Syrian people.

Through an interpreter Brother Na'amthallah was told that his photograph would be taken at work after lunch. We were disappointed that he did not show any enthusiasm about the proposition, but after lunch shades of the great John Barrymore! It was the same monk who strode down from the monastery on the hill, but his whole appearance was transformed.

He was dressed in his finest raiment-long black beard glistening under its fresh combing, and with a glossy silk parasol held aloft. He was proudly erect and his steel-rimmed spectacles shone with the reflected gleam of his eyes. He was as vain and as happy as a new season's debutante.

Born in the Lebanon, he had studied sculpture and painting in Brussels and Paris for two and a half years before returning to the monastery. His skill as a sculptor is well-known and proudly acknowledged throughout the district. His works are to be found in many village churches and wayside shrines.

The order to which he belongs is self-supporting. The monastery, perched in the mountains of the Lebanon, has its own farms, and does all its own handiwork.

Founded more than 200 years ago, it still gives shelter to wayfarers, as it did in those early days when such shelter often meant haven and refuge.

It is fitting that the work of this monk should be given a place on this living memorial of Australian endeavour. Long after the soldiers have gone home, it will serve to illustrate both his fine art and the spirit of civilian collaboration which so greatly assisted the railway engineers in their task. By WX---

ON the magistrate's bench was an Arab. He wore western clothes. Below the bench were native policemen in smart blue uniforms; on their heads, helmets of astrakhan. Their black leather leggings told of mounted status. Most of their work is done on Arab ponies. In a pen-like enclosure at floor level were two Arabs in typical garb.

Others like them occupied all the seats and the floor at the back of the court; others again dribbled into passage-ways. The overflow squatted on the earth in the sun outside the building. Those who had seats also had sticks. As they sat, they leaned forward with clasped hands on the knobs. They listened intently.

With an A.I.F. officer I moved quietly into the court. We stood near the back. We were not there many seconds when there was a noticeable lull in the official proceedings and in the buzz of unofficial undertones. All eyes were turned on us. Something had been said in Arabic which was so much Greek to us. We stood. One of the native policemen began to pack into an earthenware jar a number of rectangular packages that had been strewn on a table. The magistrate gathered up papers lying at his elbow and rose. I have never seen a taller or more stately man. Another policeman opened the rail of the "dock" and the prisoners filed out. There was a stir among the onlookers and one by one they shuffled from their seats and went into the sunshine.

Apparently we arrived just as the hearing had finished. We were curious to know the charge and the penalty. While we were asking a policeman to tell us what had happened another astrakhan-helmeted official came to us, saluted and indicated that we were wanted in the magistrate's room.

Both of us were conscious of the ease with which strangers can give offence by intrusion on native ceremonial. For that reason we had tried to remain obscure when we entered the court.

In the magistrate's room the magistrate looked even taller, statelier and more commanding. In deep resonant tones he introduced himself and asked us to be seated. We were both feeling awkward in spite of the friendly welcome. I felt it necessary to explain that we were interested in customs, ceremonial, ritual and the like and had just dropped in to see the court at work. It seemed, I said, we got in too late. I asked what was the charge against the Arabs.

The magistrate said they had been mixed up with traffic in hashish.

"Oh," said I, "then the packets the policeman put in the jar were hashish?" I thought hashish was a kind of weed.

"Yes," he said. "The stuff is compressed and put up like that for trade."

"Would the packets we saw in court be very valuable?" I asked.

"As a product, the worth is trifling," he said, "but as a commodity for an illicit market the worth is absurdly high. The stuff you saw put in the jar would bring 170 or 180 in the proper market in Egypt. Our job is to stop the stuff going there."

He went on to explain that there was no demand for it in Palestine. The interest of the local Arabs was in trading. Possibly they would become addicts if it was readily available, but Syrian and Turkish grown hashish was in such demand that the average Arab could not afford to buy it.

A native boy entered with a brass tray, three cups of steaming, fragrant coffee and cigarettes. We drank, smoked and talked.

From hashish in particular we drifted to drugs in general and their effect on human emotions. We talked, too, about capital punishment and the merits of the varying methods of effecting it. He told us that some Arabs were expert at taking life with one blow from a hooked stick.

The blow was aimed from the front of the victim but contact was made with him on a lethal spot at the base of the skull behind the ear.

"They are very clever at it," he remarked.

After we had been with this charming host Arab magistrate for the best part of an hour, party manners suggested we had better be going. He did not press us to stay longer. He rose, and, with polished courtesy, thanked us for calling and bade us good-bye.

As we were leaving, I asked, "Did you find the Arabs guilty this morning?"

He replied, "I had only just begun the hearing when you arrived. I adjourned the court so that I could have coffee with you. I shall now resume. by " B3/42"

LIBYAN NIGHT

THE angry sun, his day's work done,
Sinks sullenly away,
And the tired troops, bar the sentry groups,
Stand down at the close of day;
Then the pallid stars, especially Mars,
Gaze down on the rival hosts,
Aloof and clear, yet seeming near,
And mark the sentry posts.

On the fire step, o'er the parapet,
Steadily searching the plain,
Eyes hard and bright, to pierce the night,
That the search be not in vain ...
Till the moon serene illumes the scene
In silver and ghostly grey,
And I live anew, as I dream of you
In Aussie so far away.

Where the moonbeams chase, I can see your face,
Can hear you breathe my name,
I draw you near, in wondering fear,
Ah God ! Together again !
I touch your hair, you are really there,
Your head falls on my breast,
My arms enfold ... to have and to hold,
My Life! My Love! My Rest!

Your lips on mine, your eyes ashine,
Borne on the wings of their thrill
I am back! I am back, on the old bush track,
With the sun behind the hill;
You sob it o'er, as you did of yore,
"Never we two must part",
And the answering vow, as then and now,
Comes from my throbbing heart.

The scream of a shell, like a soul in hell,
As it hurries across the way,
And the answering speech from the enemy breech
Stuns me back to the grim to-day ...
Where the moonbeams shine is the glistening line
Of the barbed and twisted wire,
And your face is gone, but your soul stays on,
And my heart remains afire. "JW"

WAR IN THE WESTERN DESERT

BY the end of October, 1941, the Allied Forces on the Egyptian Frontier had been built up and strengthened with reinforcements and equipment, while the A.I.F., which for the past seven months had been defending Tobruk' s and perimeter, was being withdrawn and replaced by fresh British and Imperial troops. It was known that the Afrika Korps had also massed a formidable opposing force, and, from information carefully pieced together by our Intelligence, it was now apparent that a drive against Egypt was imminent.

The Allied and enemy tasks were to a certain extent parallel, General Sir Claude Auchinleck's being to open a corridor to Tobruk, thus enabling greater pressure to be brought to bear on the Axis Forces* while Rommel's task was to acquire Tobruk Harbour, thus removing the threat to his flank, and enabling him to concentrate his panzer units on a drive to the Nile Delta. Forestalling this by a few days, General Auchinleck's Army, under the command of General Cunningham, launched on November 18, 1941, simultaneous drives on several points of the frontier. By November 22 Fort Capuzzo was occupied, and Halfaya, Sollum, and the Bardia defences were invested, while the main opposing forces had joined battle at Sidi Rezegh.

Here the first great clash of armour occurred. The corridor to Tobruk was opened, but an enemy counter-thrust again isolated it. Heavy losses of both men and tanks were sustained by both sides, but gradually the bitterly opposing Axis Forces were pushed back until on December 12, our forces finally joined Allied units which had driven out against the enemy flank from Tobruk. Ten days later the Eighth Army had occupied Derna, from where badly mauled panzer units had withdrawn, and on Christmas Eve, 1941, Benghazi was again in our hands. By December 28 our drive had reached positions around Agedabia, where the remaining forces of the Afrika Korps turned at bay.

By now the positions had become reversed. Our long drive across Cyrenaica had carried us far from our bases, and our supply lines had become drawn-out and slender, while the Axis Forces had withdrawn closer toward their main supply bases.

The position became stabilized with the opposing armies warily watching each other, while gathering their exhausted forces, together. The main centre of operations now moved back toward the frontier area, where on January 2, 1942, after bitter enemy resistance, Bardia was retaken. Ten days later our troops entered Sollum, and on January 18 the remaining point of Axis resistance at Halfaya collapsed.

By now the brief rainy season had descended on Libya. The churned-up summer

dust became a clogging sea of mud. The roads were few, and badly torn about by the passage of armies, and our supply problems had become acute. Once more the initiative passed to Rommel, and by the fourth week of January his counter-thrusts had forced us to evacuate Benghazi. As we withdrew on our supply lines, we gathered strength, and by the end of February our positions had been well stabilized around Gazala. Although Tobruk had been relieved, by the vast area of the Libyan plateau that had been retaken, our armies were badly worn down. Our casualties had been high, and our armoured fighting vehicles were in urgent need of repairs and replacement after their long drive.

Allied and enemy forces again rested while strength could be built up for the next round. In this the Afrika Korps had the advantage with internal supply lines, enabling reinforcements to arrive in an infinitely shorter time than the Allied Forces could receive reinforcements, which had to take the 11,000-mile route round the Cape.

On May 27 Rommel's panzers advanced against our positions at Bir Hakeim. Bitter fighting ensued until June ii, when our troops withdrew to alternative positions. So far, although Rommel had made some slight advance, no decisive gains had been made, but on June 113 the British Army suffered a heavy blow. A large force of the British tanks engaged in the day's action was destroyed, the enemy thus decisively reducing our armoured strength, and forcing our withdrawal from the Gazala positions.

With our armoured strength severely depleted, it was now impossible to hold our positions, and our forces evacuated their positions at El Adem and Sidi Rezegh, thus allowing the partial encirclement of the Tobruk defences. A holding force of what was considered sufficient strength was in Tobruk, and the main British Army continued the withdrawal toward the Egyptian frontier. On June 21 our second decisive loss occurred when a successful German drive penetrated the Tobruk defences, capturing the town and garrison, while simultaneously Fort Capuzzo and Bardia were occupied.

The Eighth Army had now been weakened by casualties and armour losses. To have attempted to hold Mersa Matruh without this armour would have been to risk the serious danger of partial encirclement, and on June 28, after demolishing installations and defence positions, Meri Matruh was evacuated.

General Sir Claude Auchinleck, who had assumed personal command of operations on June 24, now chose his positions for the immediate defence of Egypt. Seventy miles from the great naval base at Alexandria the British occupied and extended positions at El Alamein on a 40-mile front, bounded on the north by the Mediterranean Sea and on the south by the marshy expanse of the Qattara Depression, these two obstacles forming a rough bottleneck, through which any further Axis advance must be made.

During this time A.I.F. Forces, under the command of Lieut.-General Sir Leslie Morshead, were engaged in establishing a comprehensive line of defences in Syria and the Lebanon. By June 15 the New Zealand Division had been ordered to move toward Egypt with the utmost speed. On June 21 Tobruk fell.

On the evening of June 25, word was received that the decision to send the A.I.F. to Egypt had been made, and the following morning the first convoys were moving. The big move from Syria to Egypt was speedily organized and quickly achieved. To conceal the departure from Syria, all troops wore steel helmets, and Australian badges were removed, tents and unit signs were left in camps and A.I.F. signs on vehicles were painted out.

Brigade groups travelled by an inland route to give the impression that the move was purely for training purposes. That these precautions were not altogether successful became apparent as long convoys streamed through Egypt. Tan boots, worn only by Australians, were recognized, and in passing through Cairo supposedly unidentifiable troops were greeted with cries of "Hullo, Aussie".

The first operational task imposed was for the defence of Cairo, but while still on the move, fresh orders were received to defend the approaches to Alexandria from the west and south-west. By July 2 the bulk of the force and attached troops were concentrated in the Alexandria-Amariya area, with the main headquarters on Smouha Racecourse, Alexandria.

Meanwhile a change was coming over the desert operations. Once again the all- important supply position was reversed. We had withdrawn to within close proximity of our supply bases in Egypt, while the Afrika Korps had advanced hundreds of miles from its nearest main base, Tobruk. Although attacks had been launched by Axis Forces against El Alamein positions on July 1 and 2, the attacks had lacked vigour and had been repulsed. Depleted in armour and weakened by the long desert drive, the Axis divisions had lost momentum. Their role now became that of defence while ours had changed to offence.

On July 3 the A.I.F. came under the command of the Eighth Army, and with supporting arms moved into the Western Desert. During the next few days the remainder of the troops occupied defensive positions in the El Alamein area. Australians arriving in the forward area received a warm spontaneous welcome from British and Imperial troops, and on their part, the men were entirely at home again in the type of country in which they had fought so long.

It fell to the 43rd Australian Infantry Battalion to make first contact with the enemy, when, on the night of July 7-8, a strong raiding party, including sappers of the 7th Field Company, moved out to German positions on the Ruweisat Ridge. After destroying a number of guns, tanks, and recovering a British carrier, about 4o enemy casualties were inflicted and nine German prisoners brought back for the loss of only one killed and seven slightly wounded. The value of this action lay not only in the damage done to enemy material and morale, but in its heartening effect on our own troops, who had been so long and so heavily engaged.

Divisional orders for the first main attack on the enemy's defences were issued on July 7- It was intended that the 26th Australian Infantry Brigade would thrust westward along the coast, driving a wedge between the sea and the German flank, with the capturing of the commanding razorback ridge running north-west between the railway line and the sea, then to swing south-west and if possible exploit to the full the feature known as Tel el Eisa or Hill of Jesus southward from the railway line. Constant night patrols, in which even battalion commanders participated, had gained valuable information of the enemy's positions. It was work for which the Australians were well fitted by their long months in the defence of Tobruk.

Attacking silently before the first light on July io, the 48th Battalion quickly advanced two and a half miles to its first objective and completely surprising the enemy overcame resistance and captured approximately 400 prisoners and a quantity of guns and ammunition. One company immediately pressed on to a second objective. By this time the enemy was wide awake and resisting stubbornly, but by strong artillery fire from the 7th and 12th Field Regiments, our infantry advanced and by 0555 hours had taken the position, and, supported by tanks, were moving southward toward the railway line. Meanwhile the second phase of the attack had begun.

The 24th Battalion had crossed the starting line, and was advancing across lower ground between the main feature and the sand dunes near the sea coast. The battalion quickly captured and consolidated its first objective, thus gaining ground commanding the main ridge. It had been intended that the attack should be supported by tanks and machine-guns, but unfortunately many vehicles bogged on the marshy road through the coastal depression, and only a portion of the tanks and none of the machine-guns arrived on time. It was, therefore, decided not to continue toward the Tel el Eisa feature.

Throughout the day the enemy launched repeated counter-attacks. Enemy infantry supported by tanks and waves of dive bombers tried desperately to recover positions, but all attempts were successfully repulsed, and by the evening our positions had been firmly consolidated. In addition, we had captured ii5o prisoners, a valuable wireless transmitter interceptor unit, destroyed several guns, and knocked Out 22 enemy tanks. On the following morning the original offensive plan was completed.

The 24th Battalion, supported by Valentine tanks and an intense artillery barrage, laid down by three divisional field regiments and British and South African field regiments, attacked and captured the Tel el Eisa feature, and by the first light had taken 26o prisoners. Coinciding with this attack, a mixed British and Australian raiding force had moved south-west towards the El Miteiriya Ridge, then held by the enemy, destroying eight enemy guns and capturing nearly 1,000 prisoners.

During the day, enemy counter-attacks with 'infantry and tanks developed against our positions, but these were successfully broken up by our artillery fire. This success concluded the first action. The 26th Australian Infantry Brigade had established its positions on the enemy's flanks, and had taken the dominating ridge of the Tel el Eisa feature, thus denying the enemy the use of a valuable position for observing our positions. In addition many enemy casualties had been caused and a substantial quantity of enemy equipment destroyed.

On July 12, the enemy again launched determined counter-attacks. Supported by dive bombers, German lorried infantry made two strong attacks, but these were successfully repulsed, largely due to the intense fire developed by the machine-guns of the 2nd Machine-gun Battalion supporting the 24th Battalion. Finally the enemy withdrew leaving over 6oo dead on the field. The terrific extent of our machine-gun fire can be gauged when it is realized that, following the action, replacement barrels were needed for all machine-guns.

On July 13 Axis Forces launched attack after attack, using tanks, high level and dive bombing and artillery, but these attacks were repeatedly thrust back. This was the first campaign in which the Australians were fully supported by air-power. Co-operation between land and air forces was complete-within an hour of a call for support Boston bombers and fighter-bombers would be blasting enemy troops and enemy positions. On July 14 the enemy, after preparing the way with heavy dive-bombing attacks on the Tel el Eisa feature, launched a strong thrust supported by 26 tanks and lorried infantry, and succeeded in penetrating our defences, between the feature and the main Tel el Eisa Ridge. Our troops were forced to withdraw from this position, but our main positions remained intact, and eight enemy tanks had been knocked out.

Enemy counter-attacks continued on July 15, when three separate attacks by lorried infantry supported with tanks were launched against positions held by the 24th Battalion. These attacks were successfully broken up by heavy concentrations of our artillery fire, that caused the enemy much damage. In addition to enemy killed and wounded we took 63 prisoners and knocked out io tanks. At o5oo hours on July 16, the 23rd Battalion, supported with tanks of the 44th Royal Tank Regiment, attacked and recaptured the Tel el Eisa feature. Casualties were inflicted on the enemy and 6oi prisoners were taken, but the hardness of the ground prevented our troops from digging in to

consolidate their gains, and in face of intense artillery and mortar fire, supported with dive-bombing attacks, we suffered casualties and had to withdraw closer toward our main positions.

This marked the end of the first phase of operations of the A.I.F. west of the El Alamein defences. Beginning with a successful attack against a determined enemy, the whole brigade group underwent the most searching test in the following five days. In an attempt to find a soft spot and wear down the defenders the enemy made repeated thrusts, using a considerable number of tanks at a time when he could ill afford them. Over 40 tanks became a total loss, while the enemy's casualties in tank-crews were heavy. No exact estimate of the enemy's infantry losses can be given, but the killed and wounded possibly amounted to 2ooo or more. Prisoners taken up to July 16 numbered 37o8 while we had captured a considerable quantity of equipment, including motor transport and anti-tank guns. Following this action, a compliment was unconsciously paid the Australians by all Italians being removed from positions opposite the Australian positions. The Italians were replaced entirely with the 90th German Light Division.

South-south-west of the Tel el Eisa position the country breaks into a series of low ridges and shallow depressions running south-east and north-westward. The most important are the Makhkhad, El Miteiriya-because of its ruined buildings more commonly known as Ruin-and Etruweisat ridges. From the first two ridges the enemy was able to observe our positions. On the night of July 14-15 New Zealand and Indian troops to the south had attacked and secured the Western and Ruweisat ridges, and it was decided that a drive should be made in this direction from the north, thus squeezing the enemy between two thrusts. Accordingly it was planned that the 24th Australian Infantry Brigade should capture objectives on the Makhkhad Ridge, then exploit southward three miles toward the El Miteiriya Ridge. South African and British artillery and tanks were to operate with our own artillery in support.

During the early hours of July 17, the 32nd Battalion advanced under heavy enemy fire and gained the Makhkhad Ridge. The 43rd Battalion then attacked toward the El Miteiriya Ridge, three miles to the south. Defences, however, had been prepared in this area to repel possible attacks. Intense fire was brought to bear against our advancing troops, when the enemy counter-attacked with Stukas and tanks. Our battalions, therefore, withdrew according to plan to the-first objectives. During the action we captured 779 prisoners, mostly field anti-tank gunners.

Orders for a night attack were issued, and shortly after midnight on July 18, the 28th Battalion attacked and succeeded in recovering lost ground, and occupied the position on the eastern end of the Makhkhad Ridge. During the next four days there was a lull in the fighting, while plans were prepared for a further advance. The A.I.F. was to recapture the Tel el Eisa area, forward of the ridge, and objectives on the Makhkhad and El Miteiriya ridges, while South Africans and New Zealanders were to launch a thrust from the south, which, in conjunction with our advance, would isolate or compel a substantial portion of enemy forces to withdraw. The attack opened successfully in the south on the morning of July 22, when New Zealand and South African

troops gained their objectives. The 24th Australian Infantry Brigade and two companies from each battalion of the 26th Australian Infantry Brigade launched their attacks before the first light. After two hours of intense fighting the 24th Battalion captured its objective. The 23rd and 48th Battalions recaptured the Tel el Eisa feature, while the 32nd Battalion, after long and bitter fighting, reached its objective on the Makhkhad Ridge, maintaining it against all attacks. All battalions attempted to consolidate their positions under heavy artillery and machine-gun fire.

The increasing rate of casualties, however, necessitated a withdrawal from the forward positions captured by the 26th Australian Infantry Brigade. On the evening of July 28, with the support of British tanks, an advance was made toward the El Miteiriya Ridge. Despite considerable fire, the tanks and infantry reached what was thought to be the ridge, because of the similarity of the ground and the presence of some ruined buildings. Unfortunately the battalion had taken up its position short of its objective, and thus the opportunity of securing the El Miteiriya Ridge was lost. Although partially successful, this action had cost us many tanks. Prisoners numbered 182.

It was still the Army Commander's intention to break through the enemy's positions and destroy him. With this object, a fresh attack was planned by the 30th Corps. The A.I.F. was to advance from the north and to attack a section of the El Miteiriya Ridge, while the 69th Infantry Brigade attacked from the east, after which the 2nd Armoured Brigade would pass through to clear the area south of the El Miteiriya Ridge. The attack opened in bright moonlight early on July 27, when the 28th Battalion advanced toward the ridge. The enemy immediately opened heavy fire on the front and the flank, but the battalion steadily advanced until reaching a point 8oo yards from its objective.

Here newly laid minefields were encountered. A gap was quickly made by sappers, and the battalion passed through and gained the ridge. Motor transport carrying supporting arms began to move through the breach, but almost immediately one of the leading trucks was hit and burst into flames. Aided by this light, the enemy was able to bring down an intense and accurate concentration of fire. Numerous attempts to take support to the battalion were made, but although six anti-tank guns did get through, several other vehicles were knocked out, and soon the gap became impassable, because of the confusion and the heavy fire maintained by the enemy. Every effort to reach the battalion, either by supporting parties or by single men, failed.

Meanwhile, in the south, the 69th Infantry Brigade had advanced but was unable to gain its objectives. Armoured forces were to pass through the brigade, but wireless communication was not established until shortly after 0900 hours when the 28th Battalion asked for support. Our artillery enclosed the battalion with a protective box barrage of shell fire, but when armoured forces of the 50th Royal Tank Regiment gained the ridge they were not able to trace the battalion. In face of heavy enemy fire, and after suffering considerable casualties, the tanks were forced to withdraw.

The full story of the 28th Battalion's resistance on the ridge is unknown, for not one man who was with them when the enemy counter-attack developed got back. They had gained, however, and held their position for nine hours, and intercepted German

messages revealed that they had put up a terrific and gallant resistance in which heavy losses were inflicted on the enemy. Enemy prisoners numbered 13o, and one enemy battalion was virtually wiped out. This was the concluding action fought.

The month of July had been an eventful one in the history of the 9th Australian Division. Four heavy actions had been fought and although we had suffered casualties, the losses inflicted on the Axis had been infinitely greater. On the ground we had gained important strategical positions, and denied the enemy the use of other features. In manpower we had inflicted heavy casualties in killed and wounded, while more than 4200 prisoners had been taken, apart from a great quantity of guns, equipment, and armoured vehicles captured, destroyed or damaged. This was the first occasion when the whole division's artillery, cavalry regiment, and machine-gun battalion had fought beside the division's own infantry, and for many this was their baptism of fire.

The value of co-operation had been learned. A strong mutual trust had been established between the various arms and services. The anti-tank regiment, newly equipped with heavier guns, fought with good effect. Holding the fire of their well-concealed weapons until the last minute, the regiment's gunners made the enemy pay dearly for his at-Lacks and forays into our territory. Our artillery kept up an incessant and accurate fire on enemy positions, while the cavalry regiment literally proved itself the eyes of the force. With long patrols, and short sharp contacts with the enemy, valuable information was gained.

One aspect of the campaign, and a new and refreshing one to the A.I.F., was the day-after-day flights of Bostons of the South African Air Force passing overhead to blast enemy positions and lines of communication. Front line positions were attacked by fighter-bombers of the R.A.F. and R.A.A.F., that also constantly swooped and strafed enemy transport and troops. Instead of the normal daily flying time of three hours, many pilots and crews spent up to nine hours daily in operational flights. Similarly pilots of fighting planes returning with empty ammunition belts, and flying close to the ground, appreciated the protection of a screen of anti-aircraft fire provided from guns of the 4th Australian Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, which during the month destroyed at least io enemy planes and damaged an additional 12.

Behind the lines, the supporting services, in the face of all difficulties, functioned smoothly and successfully. Crossing and recrossing the forward areas, signal trucks laid hundreds of miles of telephone wires to maintain vital communications between units. Breaks in the lines caused by the passage of heavy vehicles were quickly located and repaired. Day and night trucks of the Army Service Corps rolled along the exposed coastal ridge to the front, carrying supplies, food, and ammunition to feed the men and guns. The sick and wounded were treated swiftly and evacuated. Wrecked vehicles and guns were recovered and repaired.

In many ways conditions had been similar to the warfare of 1918, with quick advances and sharp hand-to-hand fighting, but with three notable exceptions. Tanks, which had appeared only at the latter end of the four years' war, were then a new and almost undeveloped weapon used mainly for mounting machine-guns in support of infantry firepower. Lightly armoured and very slow, they were easy targets for artillery and mortar fire, and even were vulnerable to concentrations of small-arms fire. Now they had been perfected into fast moving giants, protected with heavy armour

plating and manning guns similar to field artillery, and capable of a high rate of fire, long range, and enormous striking power. Belts of thickly sewn minefields added to the hazards, and engineers had to work swiftly to create breaches through which the infantry could penetrate to enemy defences. In addition troops now had to look to the air for enemy counter-attacks. High level bombing and screaming diving Stukas imposed conditions unknown during the irqi4-i8 war.

As the division, during 1941, had proved itself capable of holding a set line of defences in the fortress of Tobruk, so now it had proved itself capable of fighting and maintaining itself in the more fluid action of operations in the Western Desert. As the British Prime Minister (Mr Winston Churchill) summed it up in a few terse words during his visit to the A.I.F. on August 8, "You have done a splendid job. We are proud of you. Keep it up."