The Malayan Campaign

THE MALAYAN CAMPAIGN

This history of the Malayan campaign gives a vivid impression of the land fighting. It omits circumstances leading up to the first act of war and finishes at the point where Singapore was surrendered and a thousand Allied troops were left armed to maintain order in the city.

AT the outbreak of hostilities early in the morning of December 8, 1941, a portion of the 11th Indian Division, according to plan, advanced into Thailand, but was soon held up by Thai forces, chiefly Thai police. The Thai forces withdrew, and the advance was continued until stopped by the Japanese at a point 21 miles from the frontier. Almost immediately the Japanese launched an attack against the division.

It was said at the time that our troops were disconcerted by the unexpected change from attack to defence, for which they were not properly disposed. At all events a withdrawal commenced. The 12th Indian Brigade was thrown into the fight, and the portion of the 11th Division in Penang withdrawn from the island.

Penang was severely bombed and the island was so hastily evacuated that we failed to destroy stores of clothing, equipment and ammunition, which later fell into the hands of the enemy.

Simultaneously with the Japanese attack on the 11th Division on December 8, a landing was effected at Kota Bharu, the garrison there being forced to withdraw under pressure from a superior force. It had been realized that this force was in a weak, isolated position. The aerodromes had accordingly been prepared for demolition. Nevertheless these enemy successes gave him aerodromes at Alor Star and Kota Bharu from which he commenced to operate almost at once.

A few days later a small enemy party appeared on the Betong-Kroh front. It was afterwards that local natives guided the Japanese through the jungle paths towards our occupied positions. Whether the guides were natives or Japanese was of importance. The Japanese were known to have been reconnoitering jungle tracks over the frontier for some time. On our part, watching posts consisting of the staff of Forestry Department and local natives who were well acquainted with the district, were in position along the northern frontier.

As the enemy discovered our posts, he adopted his infiltration methods and appeared in the rear of our troops. Our posts fell back to avoid being cut off. These tactics were continued and further withdrawals took place.

The threat of a penetration from Kroh, with the possible result of cutting the line of communication to the force operating in the Sungei Patani sector, decided the 3rd Indian Corps to withdraw still further south. It may now be questioned whether it have been wiser to fight here the defensive battle of the campaign before the into his stride. The Japanese at this time had one division operating against the 9th Indian Division at Kota Bharu and later at Kuantan, and one division against the 11th Indian Division.

It was later that another Japanese division was brought against the 11th Indian Division on die west coast sector. The failure of some units caused heavy loss to the best fighting elements-for example, to the 2nd Battalion Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders which had to bear the brunt of the attack. At this stage Malaya Command did not feel disposed to denude Singapore Island or Johore of troops in order to strengthen the force opposed to the Japanese in Kedah, as it was considered that an attack by sea against the island or a landing at Mersing was possible and probable.

The enemy did not follow the Indian troops in their retreat down the Kroh road, but turned down the road through Grik in Upper Perak. The fear of a development of this move brought about a withdrawal towards Ipoh, and a position along Perak River was occupied.

From this stage, the threat of outflanking by the enemy was switched over to the west coast, as movement through the jungle country in Kelantan and Pahang was extremely difficult. He procured small Malay fishing craft and crept down the coast in small parties, sometimes of 5o men and seldom more than 200. His first threat was towards Telok Anson via Kuala Perak and Sungei Bernam.

Am attempt to deal with these landing parties failed, with the result that a still further withdrawal was made. Still, a stand was made in this position for some days. -Meanwhile the Kota Bharu units of the 9th Indian Division were withdrawing via the railway and road.

The next withdrawal took the 11th Indian Division to Tanjong Malim, which was held to prevent the 9th Indian Division being cut off. The enemy short cut this stand by landing troops from small craft in the vicinity of Sungei Selangor. This threat forced another retreat towards Rawang in front of Kuala Lumpur. There the enemy, by another landing at Port Swettenham, threatened Kuala Lumpur, and it was decided to withdraw to the Johore frontier and to relieve the tired 9th and 11th Divisions, which had been actively engaged for five weeks. The Johore frontier was reached on January 14. This withdrawal was made by three stages, namely, Seremban, Tampin, Gemas, on three successive nights. Contact with the enemy was lost during this withdrawal.

The coastal flank at Muar was given to the fresh 45th Indian Brigade to defend. The 2/3oth Australian Battalion took up an outpost position some miles ahead of the main position at Batu Anarn and laid a successful ambush. This outpost battalion dealt successful blows against the enemy in which 10 tanks were destroyed and at least 1,000 Japanese were killed. It avoided the occupation of a fixed position and attacked the enemy wherever it found him. Ultimately the enemy reinforced this attack by at least a brigade and this outpost battalion fell gradually back on the main position, the idea being to launch a strong counter-attack against him with a fresh Australian battalion. The strength of the Japanese attack, however, petered out before the main position was reached.

Operations at Muar.

Suddenly the enemy crossed the Muar River in the sector of the 45th Indian Brigade at Muar. The reserve Australian battalion from Gemas-the 2/9th, which was to have counter-attacked the enemy-and one from Mersing, the 2/19th Battalion, were hastily sent to Bakri, near Muar, to restore
the position or at least to check the enemy's advance. Here they defeated a tank attack, destroying 10 enemy tanks. This made a total of 20 tanks destroyed by the Australians in these two operations.

Fearing further coastal landings, the 53rd Brigade of the 18th British Division, which had just arrived from England after an 11 weeks' voyage, was sent to hold Batu Pahat and to cover a bridge at Parit Sulong and some high ground at Bukit Payong.

A small enemy party infiltrated through the 45th Indian Brigade and took up a position behind the Australians at Bakri, isolating them. The Australians formed a perimeter and though attacked again and again, at times with tanks, managed to hold off the enemy and keep the road closed against any advance from Muar. Part of one newly arrived British unit, however, left the Parit Sulong bridge uncovered and the Japanese occupied the bridge and later the high ground at Bukit Payong, having either by-passed the 45th Indian Brigade on the coast road from Muar, or come from Batu Pahat.

A number of Japanese had also managed to gain a footing at Batu Pahat. As a result of these operations the Australians and the remnants of the 45th Indian Brigade at Bakri were completely isolated and were suffering severe casualties. To restore the position at Bukit Payong an attack by the 2nd Loyals was ordered. The Loyals, with a Norfolk battalion and an Indian battalion, were holding the road between Yong Peng and Bukit Payong, but the commanders responsible were unable to arrange the attack.

The Australians and Indians at Bakri fought their way through the enemy road block, but were ultimately held up on Parit Sulong. As it was realized that this force would ultimately be annihilated, the men were ordered to free themselves and escape back to our lines if possible. This they did after some valiant fighting in which their casualties were heavy. Of the two Australian battalions (less one company) engaged in the operation, under 4oo escaped.

The Japanese pressure at Batu Pahat was now showing signs of success. It was realized that any penetration along the Yong Peng road would cut off the 27th Australian Brigade and the nth Indian Division at Gemas-Batu Anam, allowing the enemy to press right through to Singapore Island; so a withdrawal behind Yong Peng of all troops to the north was ordered. At this time the line between Yong Peng and Bukit Payong appeared to be not very strong.

Operations at Batu Pahat

Malaya Command then ordered a firm stand on the line Mersing-Kluang-Yong Peng-Batu Pahat, the 3rd Indian Corps commanding the east and west coast sectors and Westforce, including the A.I.F., commanding the centre (main road) sector. Subsequently Ayer Hitam was substituted for Yong Peng in this line. The 53rd British Brigade at Batu Pahat now fell back from that place owing to the enemy threatening them at Senggarang and Rengit. About 2000 were subsequently picked up by the navy from the coast south of Batu Pahat. The enemy had occupied Batu Pahat and had erected road blocks behind the brigade on the coast road at Senggarang and Rengit.

Withdrawal to the Island

With the development of the threat along the coast road towards Pontian Kechil, it was decided to withdraw to Singapore Island itself. Throughout the withdrawal from Gemas along the main road and railway, the enemy exerted constant pressure. The 9th Indian Division moved down the railway through Kluang and the 27th Australian Brigade (less one battalion) to which was attached the 2nd Gordons Battalion, via the main road. The enemy constantly threatened the eastern flank of the 9th Indian Division.

The divisional commander (Major-General Barstow) fell into an ambush on the railway line and was missing, believed killed. His place was taken by Colonel Coates. In these operations a Sikh battalion fought magnificently. Near Sedenak the 22nd Indian Brigade of the 9th Indian Division, under Brigadier Painter, was cut off and not heard of again though every step was taken to contact it. The garrison at Mersing, consisting of the 22nd Australian Brigade, less the 2/19th Battalion, withdrew to conform to this retreat after meeting and defeating an enemy party near Jernaluang.

Enemy strength

Throughout these operations on the main road and the west coast there were two Japanese divisions in evidence, the 5th on the main road, and the 1st Guards Division on the coast. The Japanese had little artillery. It was thought that their only guns were those previously captured from our troops. The enemy made effective use of mortars, machine-guns and sub-machine-guns. His principal means of transport were the humble bicycle, taken from civilians, and motor transport, much of which had been captured from our troops. Throughout the retreat, Japanese aircraft were in constant evidence. Our airmen, with their few planes of inferior type, fought valiantly until our air force was almost wiped out. The result was that our planes were rarely seen. The enemy's chief aerial targets were the forward troops, and also road movement by day. He seldom used his aircraft by night except against Singapore itself.

Evacuation of the Mainland

The passage of the troops withdrawing over the causeway to the island on the night of January 29-30 was covered by an outer bridge-head guard, consisting of the 22nd Australian Brigade and the 2nd Gordons Battalion, under Brigadier H. B. Taylor, of the A.I.F., and an inner bridge-head guard of the 2nd Argyll Battalion and Sutherland Highlanders, under Lieut.-Colonel Stewart. After crossing, the causeway was satisfactorily blown up and effectively blocked by strong barbed wire entanglements.

The defences of Singapore Island were divided into three sectors as follows:
- (i) Eastern sector-Changi (exclusive) to pipeline (exclusive) just east of Johore causeway.
- (ii) Western sector-Pipeline to Sungei Jurong (on south coast).
- (iii) Southern sector -Changi (inclusive) to Sungei Jurong (inclusive).

The eastern sector was held by the 11th Indian Division under Major-General Keys. The western sector was held by the A.I.F. (two brigades) and the 44th Indian Brigade under Major-General Gordon Bennett. The southern sector was held by troops from Singapore defences under Major-General Keith Simmons. The 3rd Indian Corps, consisting of the 18th British Division and remnants of the 9th Indian Division, under Lieut.-General Heath, was in reserve.

These positions were occupied on January 30 immediately on withdrawal from the mainland. No position had been prepared on the eastern and western sectors. This work was put in hand immediately and it was soon realized that the coastline could be only thinly held. The coast was thickly covered with mangrove and rubber-trees which made it difficult, if not impossible, to hold securely this thinly manned line.

In each sector at least one battalion was to be held in reserve. Apparently no arrangements had been made to keep our Command informed of enemy movements on the mainland, though it had been suggested that wireless transmitting sets with selected men should be left behind for this purpose. Nor were our meagre aircraft able to keep us informed of enemy movements or intentions.

On or about February 5 the enemy occupied Pengerang on the mainland and the island Pulau Ubin.

Attack on the Island

On the night of February 4-5 an Australian patrol crossed to the mainland, returning the following night. This patrol encountered large enemy concentrations, estimated at one brigade, on the high ground overlooking the Straits of Johore. This patrol did not see any boats on the rivers traversed. Our artillery concentrated its fire on these occupied areas during the day of February 7.

This was reported to the Malaya Command, who feared a possible attack not only on the western sector but also opposite the 11th Indian Division on the eastern sector.

On the afternoon of February 7 enemy aircraft, artillery and mortars started bombarding the newly constructed defences on the western sector between Sungei Kranji and Pasir Laba fort on the west coast. After nightfall the bombardment increased to drumfire. Concentrated attention was given to all headquarters and roads in this sector. Very soon all communications were cut and it was later discovered that all beach lights, beach guns, and beach posts were destroyed by the bombardment. A few days later a captured enemy map showed all these defences and headquarters accurately marked, evidently the result of uninterrupted air reconnaissance. The next information received during the night was that the enemy had landed a large force mainly between Sungei Kranji and Sungei Berih.

The two battalions holding this portion of the sector were overrun and only 85 men of one battalion were accounted for next day. The other battalion was greatly depleted in numbers. The whole headquarters of one battalion and four company commanders were killed. The reserve Australian battalion from the Bukit Timah road was thrown into the fight to fill the serious gap in the vicinity of the Tengah aerodrome. In addition a company formed of Australian Army Service Corps personnel was pushed forward to assist. An endeavour was made to drive the enemy back by means of a counter-attack in the vicinity of the aerodrome. The garrison of this aerodrome (the Jind Infantry) was also engaged. The enemy plastered the troops in this position, particularly from the air, where he was unmolested, and followed the bombardment by a further attack on our position.

As a result of the attack portion of the line was overrun, including the part held by the remnants of the 22nd Australian Brigade and Jind Infantry which fell back. The A.A.S.C. Company, portion of the 2/29th Australian Battalion and a company of the 2/i9th Australian Battalion held on in three groups widely separated, though surrounded, and continuously attacked. During the course of the next 48 hours remnants of these groups found their way back to our new line, which was established between Sungel Kranji and Sungei Jurong.

The 12th Indian Brigade and the 2/15th Indian Brigade were then sent forward to support this front.

The enemy effected a further landing on the right bank of the Sungei Kranji and found their way between the thinly held posts of the 2/26th Australian Battalion, which swung back. The 2/30th Australian Battalion bolding the eastern flank of the sector conformed with the movement. There was no reserve in this sector to restore the position.

It was impracticable at this stage to launch any counter-attack, except on a small, local scale, since there were insufficient troops for the purpose. The troops who came forward from the reserves in the hands of the Malaya Command were inadequate for attack.

Continuous pressure by the enemy was responsible for further withdrawals, the line now being about a mile west of the main road between Bukit Panjong and Bukit Timah villages-that being the sector against which the enemy had concentrated his strength.

After a conference with General Wavell it was decided to push this line forward again by easy stages on February 11 and 12. The decision was communicated to the units concerned. It was found, however, that some of them were in no condition to attack, or even to hold on if hard-pressed. During the night of February 11-12 the enemy appeared with tanks on this sector and part of the line broke, though the rest, together with the Australian brigade, moved forward according to plan, but not as far as was intended. This check was due to the appearance of the enemy behind them at Bukit Timah village, he having passed through the gap caused by the withdrawal.

A force known as Thom Force, consisting of two battalions and the Reconnaissance Regiment of the 18th British Division, was then sent up to the vicinity of Bukit Timah racecourse as a reserve to this sector. This force was ordered to attack on the morning of February 12, and to drive the enemy out of Bukit Timah village and thus restore the position lost by the previous withdrawal. The attack was abortive.

The Australians had formed a complete perimeter of their own in the vicinity of Reformatory Road. Remnants of the 2/15th Indian Brigade had nestled in securely with them. To the right the Thom Force held the racecourse, leaving a gap between its position and the Australians. To the left, the 44th Indian Brigade and fortress troops extended the line to Pasir Panjong.

The additional troops to strengthen this portion of the front had been provided by part of the former garrison of the eastern sector, where the line had been withdrawn. It had been decided to endeavour to hold the reservoirs in the centre of the island The enemy landed troops on the island on the northern sector, which was now under the command of the 3rd Indian Corps, and this pressure forced the line back to the reservoirs.

During the course of the next three days the Thom Force fell back a further one and a half miles on the right of the A.I.F., which had by this time concentrated within its perimeter all A.I.F. non-combatant troops available to strengthen the position. In this position the Australians, to whom were attached the 2nd Battalion Gordons, remained to the end. The line on their left had gone, though the Australian position was reinforced by some of its remnants. The left had fallen back under enemy pressure a further mile or so to Buona Vista village. The enemy pressure at this stage was concentrated apparently on the cast of the reservoirs and certainly along the south coast road past Pasir Panjang towards Singapore city.

Meanwhile enemy aircraft concentrated most attention on the city, causing heavy casualties among the civilians. in fact the destruction became so great that the collection of casualties got out of hand. Our own aircraft had been necessarily withdrawn to Palembang in Sumatra soon after our arrival on the island, the aerodromes on the island having become untenable. Thus no effective support from our aircraft was available during the operations on Singapore Island.

On February 13 a conference was held at Fort Canning. It was attended by Lieut. General Percival and senior staff officers, Lieut.-General Heath (3rd Indian Corps), Major-General K. Simmons (Fortress Command), Major-General Smith (18th Division), Major-General Keys (11th Indian Division), and Major-General Gordon Bennett (A.I.F.). Each commander gave his opinion that further resistance was useless, the troops being quite incapable of holding the enemy for any time. Lieut.-General Percival
suggested attack, but it was realized that there were insufficient troops capable of launch an attack on a scale that would make any difference to the ultimate decision. Reference was also made to the plight of the civilian population. A message to this effect was sent to General Wavell, who replied ordering the troops to fight to the last.

The plight of the civilians could not be allowed to interfere with that duty.

On February 14 and 15 the situation grew worse. The city became more hemmed in and the plight of the civilian population became most serious. Supply dumps of ammunition, petrol and food were being demolished by enemy artillery and aerial bombardment. The Australians had accumulated large stores of water and 15 days' of food and 500 rounds of artillery ammunition per gun, with ample small-arms ammunition in their perimeter.

On the morning of February 15, a further conference was called by Lieut.-General Percival at Fort Canning. There were present: Lieut.-General Percival, Brigadier Torrance, Brigadier Lucas, Brigadier Newbiggin, Lieut.-General Heath (3rd Indian Corps), Major-General K. Simmons (Singapore Fortress
Command), Major-General Smith (18th Division), Major-General Keys (11th Indian Division), Major-General Gordon Bennett (A.I.F.), Brigadier Simson (Military Liaison Officer with Civil Administration), and Inspector Dickinson (Police).

The military position was discussed and opinions given at the previous conference were confirmed and expressed more forcibly.

The report on the civilian population was that the civil hospital had been without water for over twenty-four hours; that the city water supply had been exhausted; that the casualties caused by enemy aerial bombing were occurring faster than they could be collected; that many buildings had collapsed on occupants and that no labour was available to release them; that insufficient medical aid was available for the casualties; that there was a very limited supply of food for the people.

So far as the Army was concerned, the water supply had ceased and there was only three days' supply of rations. No artillery ammunition was available, and the troops were very depressed.

It was therefore unanimously recommended that as further resistance was useless, the force should surrender. The enemy had already forwarded a communication advising the method to be adopted under the circumstances, and they strongly urged capitulation to save further loss of life.

It was decided to send Brigadier Newbiggin and the Chief Secretary (Mr. Fraser) as envoys to meet the Japanese commander with the suggestion that hostilities should cease at 163o hours (4-30 P-m-) that day (February 15)- It was also decided to ask that sufficient troops be allowed to remain under arms to preserve order in the city of Singapore, there being a large number of stragglers in the city. Apart from this, no conditions were to be asked of the enemy. The destruction of technical equipment was discussed and left to unit commanders to implement.

On contacting the enemy, it is understood that they refused to deal with any officer but Lieut.-General Percival. Consequently there was some delay in finalizing the capitulation. Apparently some commanders had passed on to their troops information that hostilities were to end at 1630, for' some units withdrew from their defensive positions at that time. It was not until 2000 hours (8 p.m.) that word was received ordering the cessation of hostilities at 2030 hours (8-30 P-m-)

Units were assembled in unit areas in the vicinity of their positions, arms and equipment were collected, and troops stood by for further instructions. The enemy agreed that 1,000 men should remain under arms until relieved to maintain order in the city.