Chapter 2 Tobruk (the capture)

II. TOBRUK

THE Bardia action ended on 5th January, 1941. Three days later, Sixth Australian Division began to concentrate to the east of Tobruk, in preparation for another carefully planned attack.

Of the two "set-piece" siege battles which opened our campaign in Libya, Tobruk was the easier. Much had been learned at Bardia. The British and Australian formations within 13th Corps had now a proved technique of co-operation and complete confidence in each other. Troops were at the peak of their fitness to withstand fatigue. The enemy was shaken by a swift series of reverses. He particularly feared the British "I" tank, against which his anti-tank weapons had so far miserably failed.

After the experience at Bardia it seems astonishing that General Patasso Manella, with the forces under his command at Tobruk, should have been content to resign the initiative by sitting down in a defended position and, having done so, made no provision for counter-attack should his line be pierced. The age of this enemy commander was seventy-two. The commander of the 61st Division, General Della Hura, urged that a mobile force should be kept at a central point for the purpose of counter-attack. This counsel, however, was discarded, as General Manella considered that his artillery was strong enough to break up any attack.

As at Bardia, the defences consisted of a double perimeter system with only a few strong points of secondary defence. They were much less fully prepared than Bardia's. The perimeter itself extended for some thirty-two miles from the sea back to the sea, the greatest depth of this area being about eleven miles from Tobruk to a point just west of the El Adem-Tobruk road. The defences consisted of some 140 strong posts spaced fairly regularly around the perimeter in two lines, the second line being about 400 yards in the rear of the first. The strong points of the second line covered the gaps between those of the first line.

The Italians had altered their method of planting land mines since Bardia. At important points on their Tobruk defence line the mines were in two layers, one sunk into the ground some twelve inches below the other. This was not discovered until late afternoon on the first day of the battle, when a vehicle was wrecked at a spot over which traffic had been passing all day.

With the exception of wadi Zeitun on the cast and the wadi Es Sehel on the extreme west, the forward line was protected by an anti-tank ditch which was in most places ten feet deep and fifteen feet wide. In addition, there was a continuous double apron wire fence between the tank trench and the strong points. Many strong points also had wire on their flanks and a concealed anti-tank ditch covering the rear. These posts gave excellent shelter to their garrisons and were provided with concrete machine gun and anti-tank gun emplacements.

The garrison was estimated to comprise 25,000 men, with over 100 field and medium guns, some 3o heavy anti-aircraft guns and 6o light and medium tanks. Many of the light tanks were known to be unserviceable and to be dug in as fixed defences. Ladders mounted on tractors were in use by the enemy as mobile observation posts. The cruiser San Giorgio, which was aground in Tobruk Harbour, also mounted, in addition to its normal armament, eight heavy anti-aircraft guns, which proved most useful to the enemy as a defence of Tobruk town.

In Bardia it had been found that the average garrison of fortified points was sixty. In the longer perimeter at Tobruk the garrisons of the strong points were from seventeen to twenty men each. The morale of the enemy was considered to be poor, owing to successive defeats; but it was thought that the 61st Division would fight, as they had not been mauled previously.

The enemy expected an attack within two or three days of the fall of Bardia. When this did not eventuate they were apparently lulled into a sense of security, and considered that, owing to our transport difficulties, no major attack would develop until February. The enemy showed more initiative in repulsing our patrols than they had done at Bardia. No enemy forces were nearer than Derna, except a small force estimated at under 500 at Mechili.

For the capture of Tobruk, 13th British Corps disposed approximately the same forces as it had employed at Bardia. The artillery had been supplemented. The one squadron of Sixth Division Cavalry Regiment with the force had been organised as a tank-and-Bren carrier unit, using nine captured medium tanks.

The plan of attack broadly resembled that of Bardia. The British Armoured Division was to contain and distract the enemy along other sectors of the perimeter while Sixth Australian Division broke through the south-eastern sector. The break. through was to be between strong points R55 and R57, on a front of about 800 yards.

Along most of the perimeter, as already described, a deep anti-tank ditch existed; but at this point and along most of the Dahar El Azazi sector (owing to the ground being very rocky) the ditch was only about two feet deep and fifteen feet wide, with "spoil" one foot high on either side for a distance of about two yards. Sixty yards south of this tank trench was a single row of mines three feet apart and bedded to a depth of three inches. Further south still was a single row of "booby traps" connected by trip cords and trip wires.

It was known that weather conditions might play a very large part in the success or failure of the plan. January is Khamsin month, and dust storms are frequent, when visibility is reduced almost to nil. In addition, Tobruk is subject to approximately eleven inches of rainfall, and this amount usually falls in January or early February, in about four or six extremely heavy showers.

After the showers the ground turns to mud, and all movement of mechanical transport would be brought to a standstill. For this, reason a meteorological officer was employed and the barometer very carefully watched. On 15th January there was an extremely bad dust storm, and 16th and 17th January were also dusty. On 18th January there was a mild dust storm and on 19th January an extremely bad one when visibility was reduced to nil.

The attack was fixed for 31st January, and on that day the weather conditions were perfect.

Zero hour was 5.40 a.m. Again the first infantry assault was made by the 16th Australian Brigade. Posts R55 and R57 were quickly taken, and also the two covering posts, R54 and R56, in rear of them. The 2/3rd Battalion made these first gains, and then swung left to "roll up" the enemy posts to the westward. One troop of tanks, accompanied the battalion.

Behind it, through the breach, came the 2/1st Battalion to wheel right, with another

troop of tanks in support, and mop up Italian posts eastward to the Bardia road. Then three more troops of tanks fanned out, northwards and north-eastwards within the perimeter. With each of these troops moved a company of the 2/2nd Battalion to capture enemy batteries.

The 2/6th Battalion, placed temporarily under the command of 16th Brigade, followed the 2/1st Battalion and then went on to cross the Bardia road.

As this rolling up of the south-eastern defence line proceeded, a new breach in the wire was made by 2/7th Battalion. It cut its way through as the tanks and the 2/1st Battalion passed across its front on their thrust to the right. Engineers were to have made the gap for the 2/7th, but they were unable to arrive in time. Such a contingency had been anticipated, and 2/7th Battalion carried short ladders, picks and Bangalore torpedoes. The Battalion was thus able to make its own way across and take up its r6le before the enemy had time to reorganize.

Before this, 17th Brigade had carried out, from zero hour, a demonstration by fire to confuse and contain the enemy in the eastern sector. This work was most effective. Those enemy guns that had not been blanketed by our counter-battery work were assiduously shelling and plastering the Bardia main road and side tracks. Very little shell fire was directed at the breach for at least two hours after the attack had commenced. The enemy also vigorously shelled El Adem road - on which there was no movement except that of Italian prisoners.

By 10 a.m. the first part of the attack was completed. The cost in casualties had been very small. A wide south-eastern slice of the defence line was ours. The flank of the enemy's eastern sector, in rough wadi country between the Bardia road and the sea, was menaced by the mortar and machine gun fire of our infantry.

The 19th Brigade had by now come into the picture. With an artillery barrage preceding, and the divisional cavalry unit on its flanks, the 19th deepened our penetration in the direction of Tobruk town.

During the rest of that day, the battalions of the other two brigades regrouped themselves. This imposed tiring marches on troops who had covered great desert distance since the eve of the assault. The fighting had been slight, but the discipline and verve of our men were none the less strenuously tested. The whole plan of battle hinged on movement to an exacting and elaborate time-table in an immense area of stony

waste, and amid the hazards of shell fire, minefields and booby traps. For some infantry Units 21St January was the day of a marathon walk. The sheer energy of their movement confused the ineptly led Italians and prevented the rally which might have set a costly price in casualties on our capture of Tobruk.

By nightfall, the three battalions of 16th Brigade were aligned on the left of the first break-through area, ready to meet any counter-attack that might have been organised from the untouched western posts. Beyond them, 19th Brigade were disposed against action from the north-west or from the town. The 17th Brigade held the enemy in the deep-cut coastal wadis inside the eastern defence line.

At dawn on 22nd January the British Armoured Division broke through the perimeter in the west and the 16th Australian Infantry Brigade advanced in a northwesterly direction. Meanwhile, the 2/4th Battalion, preceded by a troop of "I" tanks, made north for Tobruk, which was entered at approximately long hours.

The 2/4th, 2/5th and 2/7th Battalions began to clean up the wadi country north and cast of the Bardia road. In the course of this operation the 2/7th Battalion captured the Area Commander in Post 94, in the wadi defences near the sea. The officer who captured him made this Commander telephone the neighbouring posts and instructed their occupants to come over and surrender.

Throughout the Tobruk area, organised resistance had virtually ceased by noon. The remaining tasks were the collecting of prisoners and the reorganising of our forces for a further move into Libya.

Success had come by methodical, unspectacular and exacting work. All the services had laboured equally to produce the result.

The signallers had laid 100 miles of cable, and found great difficulty in keeping communications open during an action in which brigades and regiments moved their headquarters rapidly to keep pace with the advance. Engineers, in addition to clearing the way for infantry and tanks under fire, had to clean up areas in which enemy aircraft had dropped "thermos" bombs and other traps for the unwary.

As at Bardia, the "I" tanks performed great feats in demoralising the enemy and cleaning up hostile batteries. It is worth noting that, after Bardia, it was considered that these tanks had more than over-run their normal span of life. It was thought that only six would be fit for service by i8th January. By dint of extremely hard work eighteen tanks were, in point of fact, got ready and took part in the Tobruk battle.

An Australian Army Field Workshop played a large part in getting these tanks into condition. The men of this unit worked enthusiastically long hours to accomplish the feat.

Captured motor transport was being used more and more to exploit the Italian defeat and to make up our own deficiencies in this war of movement. The role of the Australian Field Workshop and smaller Ordnance units was of the first importance before Bardia. At Tobruk and afterwards it was vital and most exacting. Some really magnificent work of improvisation was done.

The captured tanks used by our divisional cavalry squadron, though gallantly handled, were a disappointment in performance. Owing to mechanical breakdown and vulnerability they were almost useless. It appears that the use of captured enemy tanks has a great disadvantage in that, no matter how plainly they are marked, during the haze of the battle precious time is wasted by our infantry and gunners in establishing the identity of armoured vehicles before opening fire. The vulnerability of M II's was shown when fourteen of these enemy tanks were destroyed by the 2/8th Battalion merely with the use of rifle and anti-tank rifle fire.

In the material which it yielded to us Tobruk was a rich prize. It gave us vast quantities of stores, and abundant ammunition for the captured weapons. All these were later to be most useful to us. It opened the prospect of sea communication with Egypt for the future maintenance of 13th Corps in Libya.

A great deal of repair and maintenance work was necessary to make Tobruk serviceable as a port and sub-area in the development of the Cirenaica campaign. The reticulation system of the town was complex, and it was found that some pipelines and storage tanks had been damaged during the general pounding of the area by land, sea and air bombardments before its capture. Engineers of Seventh Australian Division had been brought up from Palestine, and they were given restoration tasks. A water distillation plant was operating by 28th January, and a refrigeration plant was supplying ice for medical use, and electric power was restored. Work was also undertaken on quays, roads and bridges.

In its moral effect on the enemy, Tobruk aided us considerably. At Sidi Barrani and in the six weeks that followed, the Italian forces in North Africa had been drastically broken and their leadership discredited. More generals, an admiral and 2,000 naval ratings were among the large tally of prisoners taken at Tobruk.

A new phase was about to open in the first Cirenaican campaign. Nothing comparable to the two deliberate battles of Bardia and Tobruk was to be repeated in the months ahead. The curtain can be rung down on Sixth Division's first month of active war by describing the scene in Tobruk on the morning of 22nd January.

Over the wide brown plain moved little groups of patrolling Australians. The white town, on the western side of the harbour, was very little damaged, though huge columns of smoke were belching up from the oil tanks which the Italians had fired. The cruiser San Giorgio had also been set on fire by the enemy and was belching black smoke, fore and aft. Two merchantmen had been scuttled and stranded, while across the harbour lay a submarine, half awash.

In the main streets a number of our "I" tanks stood, each flying a captured Italian flag. On the steps of the magnificent Naval barracks was the Italian admiral, complete with white gloves and with his bags already packed for departure and his small private Fiat car ticking over. Smoking a cigar, he watched hundreds of his men being marched up the main street towards the cages.

Immediately in front of the Naval barracks stood a tall flagstaff, from which the Italian flag had been hauled down, and at the masthead of which floated a "Digger's" hat.