Chapter 2.4

Operation IVANHOE 18 September1971-2 October1971

This operation will be hard to erase from the memories of those who participated.

Visual Reconnaissance aircraft at the commencement of the operation reported fresh tracks leading into the north eastern sector of the Province.

This, combined with a report of a lack of contact by 3 Brigade (US) with the enemy to the north and the additional agent reports, threw further light on the Nui Le/Nui Sao area in which D Company had struck reconnaissance groups.

During the early hours of 19 September, the 626 Regional Forces Company outpost on Route 2 received an attack by fire of 75 millimetre recoilless rifle and 82 millimetre mortar rounds.

Both weapons were held by 33 North Vietnamese Army Regiment Units.

Early the following day, 4 APCs from I Troop were ambushed along Route 2 between the village and the Regional Force Company outpost by approximately twenty enemy employing RPG 2, RPG 7 and small arms fire. A swift counter-attack by the APCs resulted in one North Vietnamese soldier being killed. He carried no identification and was well armed. A prisoner of war, captured in action by 3 Cavalry Brigade (US) on 22 November, who had been an assistant platoon commander with C9 Company of 3 Battalion, 33 North Vietnamese Army Regiment eventually revealed to interrogators that the original plan had been to lure 1st Australian Task Force units into a prepared ambush, east of Route 2. The attack on 626 Regional Force outpost on 19 September and the ambush of the APCs the following day in the same area, were the -bait" in an attempt to lure an infantry/ armoured reaction force east from the area along a logging track (ambushed by 3 Battalion) and into a bunker complex further to the northeast near Nui Sao, where 2 Battalion and Regimental Headquarters occupied defences in depth. Elements of D Company were engaged by RPG and small arms fire on the morning of 21 September. Throughout that day, repeated air and artillery strikes were employed in support of a series of assaults that were launched upon (later found out to be) the western most bunker system of a four system complex, large enough (twenty-four completed bunkers with fifteen prepared bunker sites) to accommodate 2 Battalion of 33 North Vietnamese Army Regiment.

APCs tracking off Route 2
	Good fire control was exercised by the enemy, using cut fire lanes. He took advantage of good canopy cover and the surrounding high ground to employ intensive ground fire against supporting aircraft throughout the daylight hours. On this third day in the area, 21 September, according to the prisoner, 3 Battalion were advised by Regimental Headquarters to move north as "the Australians" had somehow evaded the ambush and had contacted 2 Battalion and Regimental Headquarters in their bunker systems to the north-east. The prisoners stated that they were confused that the Australians had come (so rapidly) from the north of their defences near Nui Sao, although D Company had been contacting squad sized groups generally moving west and south-west since 14 September. <<< L/Cpl Wally Burford, D Coy These were probably advance elements of 3 Battalion moving to their ambush task.

(Perhaps their passage of information isn't always as effective as ours).

During the morning whilst withdrawing from the ambush, 3 Battalion were themselves contacted by a platoon from B Company who had been following up an insulated communication wire. The platoon subsequently killed a member of 3 Battalion. Continuing this lead in the afternoon, the platoon found numerous fresh tracks "criss-crossing" the area of the Sui Tam Bo towards the Suoi Ycruert and later came under sixty millimetre mortar fire.

Further contacts ensued, accounting for seven North Vietnamese soldiers as the remaining platoons and Company Headquarters redeployed and assisted "dusting-off" the casualties from the shelling. In darkness, B Company concentrated into a firm night defence position, amidst signs that the area had been recently occupied by a North Vietnamese Army force. Earlier, supporting aircraft had received ground fire from this area and a secondary explosion was reported after an air strike.

Napalm strike on Nui Le (Photo by Pte A. Garton).

In the late afternoon, D Company who were extracting their casualties and moving out of the bunker system to allow for further supporting fire, received small arms fire on their flanks from mobile groups of North Vietnamese soldiers having come from other systems within the complex.

Employing fire and movement, the company extracted its wounded to the secured winch point. On completion of the "dustoffs" the rear platoons again had to resort to fire and movement to delay the follow up by the North Vietnamese on to the perimeter of D Company's night defence position, four hundred metres south-west from the original bunker complex. The night defence position was also under fire from a separate (fourteen) bunker system which contained an observation post, thirty feet up a tree from which accurate harassing fire was directed into the position until well after darkness.

It would appear that apart from tactical considerations, one of the reasons that the enemy followed D Company to their night position was that it was in the direction of their Regimental Headquarters. The fourteen bunker system at that location appears to have been occupied by the Regimental Headquarters and possibly 2 Battalion had the impression that D Company was proceeding to attack them and sought to render assistance.

A weary night passed slowly as the Medical Officer in Nui Dat relayed treatment for the wounded via three command nets to the medics in D Company.

The North Vietnamese of 33 Regiment also worked frantically throughout the hours of darkness to evacuate their casualties and withdraw along prepared tracks which were subsequently located - showing signs of stretcher carriage - by B and C Companies, east of the Suoi Youert and D Company 3 RAR (under the command of the ANZAC Group) as they searched the bunker area near the Nui Sao, showing the withdrawal of the North Vietnamese had been to the north and north-east.

(FSB) Debbie in action.

On 25 September, two anti-tank mines, each consisting of approximately sixty pounds of "Chicom" explosive were detonated by APCs of I Troop in the Courtney Rubber. Both carriers were "write-offs", but thanks to that extra one thousand pounds of aluminium belly armour, casualties were light. The mines had been in place for some time, however they were probably placed in position and armed by the VC sappers whose bases in Suoi Tam Bo, V Company had destroyed during the previous month, on Operation NORTH WARD.

Prior to the incident, C Company located approximately three-hundred and seventy-five pounds of rice, cached on a platform in the swamp to the south of the plantation. 3 RAR and its supporting APCs had been deployed to the east of the 4 RAR/NZ Area of Operation in blocking positions at the commencement of the heavy fighting and then commenced a search of our eastern flank in an attempt to destroy any remaining enemy forces who had withdrawn to the north-east from the area of the battles.

The village of Cam My had also received further attacks by fire and minor attacks during this period and had requested supporting fire. It was apparent that elements from 274 Regiment were again at work in southern Long Khanh Province.

The construction of a bunker complex near Nui Sao, the cutting of good tracks to facilitate rapid re-deployment of North Vietnamese Army units in the Route 2/Nui Sao area and the detailed planning that was involved in the attempted ambush of an Australian force, indicated that 33 North Vietnamese Army Regiment intended to establish a semi-permanent base for future operations in that area of Phuoc Tuy Province.

Dawn patrol. Pink team en route to contact area, 22 Sep 1971. (Photo by Cpl T.G. Neal)